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Summarv 
An idealist approach to history construes what 
historians do in terms of coherence, unity and 
individuality. An outline of the historical thought of 
Dilthey and Croce in chapter one signposts the major 
concerns of Collingwood and Oakeshott. Both approach 
history from an idealist perspective yet, their 
conclusions differ radically for Collingwood the 
historian re-thinks the thoughts of past individuals, 
inferred from evidence, in answer to a question. The 
object of historical thought is not dead actions but 
living thoughts. The limits of historical thought 
reflect the boundaries of our mental faculties, and the 
identity of subject and object in historical re- 
enactment becomes the model for all genuine knowledge. 
Oakeshott rej ects this identity. History is a 
particular understanding of objects left-over from the 
past, governed by organising postulates, and logically 
distinct from other "modes" of understanding. It has no 
privileged subject-matter, neither a real past of 
events, nor an every-increasing archive of authenticated 
evidence. The past is constructed within historical 
thought. 
Chapters four and five are spent tracing the 
implications of an idealist understanding of history. I 
argue that analytical philosophy's interest in 
explanation and truth in history is never "second- 
order", there is always a prior idea of what it is that 
historians try or fail to explain and make true 
statements about. I pay particular attention to those 
thinkers who have accepted, rejected or modified the 
idea that history is something constructed and not 
transcribed, and to the fragile border between 
description and prescription in the philosophy of 
history. 
An idealist critique of the realist assumption 
inherent in history urges, a re-think about the nature 
of historiographical conclusions and defences of 
history's legitimacy. It is not an invitation to 
scepticism. The attempt, however, to ground the 
autonomy of history upon a priori postulates and so 
secure its role in our self-understanding cannot be 
sustained. 
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Introduction 
Idealism contends that a mode of enquiry, or universe 
of discourse, is the world seen and understood within a 
determinate context, governed by postulates, 
presuppositions or articulated rules, and given expression 
within an appropriate idiom or language. More than this, 
a mode of understanding creates an object appropriate to 
itself. 1 Thus history creates its own object, the past, 
and endows it with a conditional intelligibility. In 
different guises this is the argument of Dilthey, Croce, 
Collingwood and oakeshott. In this sense an idealist 
approach to history is precisely the investigation of the 
nature of history as a form of analysis and practice: of 
the way it bestows intelligibility upon present objects. 
One common aim is to illuminate, even expose, the 
unquestioned presuppositions of an historical mode of 
enquiry. For Collingwood this involved asking the 
question how history came to be an organised and coherent 
form of understanding. For Oakeshott it is a question of 
laying bare the tentative constructions of an historical 
past built upon 'limited and unquestioned postulates'. 2 
One approach is composed of different "phases" or levels 
which are dialectically related; lower forms of experience 
being taken up and transformed by higher ones. An 
investigation of the idea of history is an exploration of 
its evolution and transformation over time and in 
different contexts. Experience is a unity and 
interrelation of all facts: there are no isolated or 
discrete particulars. Oakeshott argued that in experience 
the world is understood within distinct, exclusive models 
or universes of discourse. In his early thought the 
interrelation of all facts is revealed only by philosophy 
which convicts the various modes of experience of being 
partial and arbitrary 'arrests'. An analysis of history 
involves revealing the logic of its underlying 
presuppositions. 
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What is common to both approaches, the guiding theme 
of this thesis and reason for reaffirming the word 
idealist, is the contention that history is mind- 
constructed. Whatever else it might be, our knowledge of 
the past cannot be described in terms of discover, 
recovery or the validation of models and hypotheses. 
Ontologically the historian is presented from engaging in 
repeated experiments or detailed comparisons. The non- 
existence of the past is a truism and its implications are 
reflected in all systematic enquiries. Perhaps, in 
history, it has been considered more ruinous because, in 
history, a claim is made to study the past and to arrive 
at truthful conclusions about it. Yet the scepticism 
generated by the second-hand, indirect nature of history 
is misplaced and inappropriate. It is also entirely 
without relevance. History, as written by historians, is 
not touched by this sense of loss. Indeed it comes into 
existence precisely on the assumption that the past has no 
substantive existence. There would be little excuse for 
the diverse interpretations of single events which 
characterise historical writing if the past had a 
determinate shape and form to which disputes could be 
referred. This thesis is concerned with the 
epistemological problems involved in trying to give the 
past a shape and form, and with different descriptions of 
this activity. 
The philosophical problems of writing history revolve 
around the relationship between subject and object - 
historian and the past. What kind of knowledge can the 
historian have of the past? How far does individual 
perspective after the way his object is seen? How 
truthfully can it be captured in narrative? Can the 
historian explain it? All of these questions presuppose 
an idea of what constitutes the object of historical 
enquiry. Here again an idealist approach provides an 
important organising concept. All knowledge, the idealist 
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argues, is a unity of the knower and the known, experience 
and what is experienced, subject and object. But how, 
with history, can any such unity be achieved when the 
object is a dead, irretrievable past? Croce and 
Collingwood argued that the unity of historical knowledge 
is found in the re-enactment of the thoughts of past 
agents. History is always the history of thought and 
historical understanding is also the historian's own self- 
understanding as he thinks for himself, past thoughts 
interpreted from evidence. Oakeshott disagrees. The 
unity of subject and object involves no sense of 
identification between historian and historical agent. It 
is achieved only in the rigourous adherence to the logic 
of the historical mode of enquiry. The presuppositions 
prescribe and separate off an historical past from all 
other modes and the interest in the past which they 
entail. In both cases history is conceived as a present 
activity, an intellectual confrontation with the deposits 
from the past, and historical understanding as something 
won and not given. There is, however, a clear difference 
in the way the object of enquiry is understood. 
one commentator has argued that an idealist approach 
to history 'concerns one particular aspect of the problem 
of time'. 3 With the passing of time 'myriads of things 
happen and change'. Since it is impossible for the human 
mind to take in more than a minute fraction of these 
events, to have any meaning history is dependent upon 'the 
mind's capacity to select and to link the selections'. 4 
This is another way of saying that history is mind- 
directed. I will examine those thinkers who have accepted 
this as the salient feature of historical understanding. 
In one sense this thesis concerns the importance of the 
historian puts it, it could not have existed. A past of 
historical events is, in Munz's term, a particular shaRe 
which historians place upon time. The linking together of 
occurrences into events and of events into narrative 
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interpretations is entirely the product of intellect - it 
owes nothing to a search for the Past-as-it-really-was. 
Towards the end of the thesis I will look at the 
implications for history, and the legitimacy of separating 
"analytical" from "speculative" philosophy of history, of 
the idea that not only historians' narratives but also the 
historical record itself (evidence in all its manifest 
forms) is already a selection, an interpretation, an 
artifact, and not the dusty remains of a past reality. 
The first chapter comprises of discussion of Dilthey 
and Croce which serves as a scene-setter for the 
exegetical chapters on Collingwood and Oakeshott. It is 
my contention that, in the historical thought of Dilthey 
and Croce, one can find both the essentials of an idealist 
approach to history - the central importance of the 
enquirer, the interrelatedness of facts and conclusions, 
the presentness of historical understanding - and also an 
interpretative context in which to understand the 
strategies and direct of twentieth century philosophical 
interest in history. They also provide an opportunity to 
explore the diversity within an idealist position. In 
this sense Dilthey's attempt to disclose the Kantian 
categories of historical reason - the underlying, common 
presuppositions through which the mind confronts the 
human-historical world - can usefully be seen as the first 
systematic effort to reveal the postulates of "critical 
history", postulates which both define and determine the 
activity of historians. This project, however, prompts a 
recurring question "are the postulates of history fixed 
and unchanging? ", indeed are they susceptible to rational 
study at all? This under the problem of relativism, is 
one of the most important concerns of the philosophy of 
history. Do these presuppositions afford the possibility 
of truth as the coherent application of them, or do they 
determine, in an a priori sense, the constructions of 
historians? Croce's belief in the unity of historical 
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thought (the identification between the thoughts of past 
agents disclosed in evidence, and the historian who, in 
re-thinking them, understands his own mental limitations) 
was taken up and extended by Collingwood. An idealist 
belief in the inseparableness of subject and object seems 
to give history a moral force. History is self-awareness, 
self-knowlege and self -understanding. It allows us, with 
the "trained eye of a woodsman" to detect the tiger in the 
long grass, to unravel social and political problems, to 
understand how the present came to be the way it is. 
History it seems, is heuristic. Yet this, as I will show, 
leads to the question of who establishes the moral 
imperatives of history, and how they are preserved from 
contamination by less altruistic interests. In 
Oakeshott's extreme rejection of the idea of history as a 
source of practical examples and moral lessons we will see 
a clear dichotomy in the idealist approach. 
In the second half of the thesis I attempt to trace 
some implications of an idealist approach to history. My 
organising concept is, once again, the idea (in many 
different guises) that history is, to a greater or lesser 
extent, dependent upon selections, connections and 
interpretation: that it is mind-directed. This idea is 
explored in relation to the leading concerns of post-war 
philosophical interest in history - explanation, 
narrative, objectivity, relativity, construction versus 
discovery - and through the thought of several of the most 
important contemporary philosophers of history. With the 
latter I attempt to identify rejections of concessions to, 
or affiliations with an idealist approach. Thus, for 
example, I devote a good deal of space to showing how the 
philosopher's obsession with the "scientific" legitimacy, 
or otherwise, of the explanations historians give, is 
always based on a prior idea of what it is that is being 
explained. Walsh and Dray deny that historians make tacit 
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or explicit use of general laws when explaining past 
occurrences precisely because they do not see the 
historical past as something fixed and finished on which 
different explanatory models may be tested out. In an 
important sense, the object which historians study is 
constituted by the values and techniques of analysis which 
they bring with them to that study. To talk about 
historical explanation as if it were a question of 
applying laws or models of causal connections to something 
already settled and concluded is, for Walsh and Dray, a 
misconception of the character of an historical past. 
I also argue that idealism occurs, in recent 
philosophy of history, as a (largely) rhetorical extreme 
around, or against which other positions have been taken. 
In this sense an idealist approach to history has helped 
to set an agenda. At the same time it provides a clear 
conceptual means to analyse this agenda. 
if, however, this thesis concentrates on 
philosophical analysis of the importance of the historian 
in constructing knowledge of the past, it is also an 
investigation of the limits and restraints on the free 
capacity of the mind to direct itself towards its object, 
the past. There are different ways to construe these 
restraints: the problem of relativism, the opaqueness of 
language, the influence of structural controls. 
It is my contention that emphasis upon the absolute 
autonomy of historical understanding places a heavy burden 
upon an idealist belief in the enquiring subject. The 
important spiritual and practical role of history in the 
life of individual and society in the thought of Dilthey, 
Croce and Collingwood necessitates its cordoning-off from 
partisan, poetical and positivistic intrusions and its 
protection as an autonomous form of knowledge. But this 
is achieved at the cost of defining truth in tautological 
and a priori terms. With Oakeshott, on the contrary, 
history is to be protected from all calls to be practical, 
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instructive or useful. The tentative, conditional 
conclusions which historians arrive at are without any 
moral significance because the historical past cannot be 
understood in terms of good or bad, right or wrong, since 
these terms enter history f rom. a practical universe of 
discourse which is the world seen under different 
postulates: inter-discourse co-operation is excluded on 
logical grounds. To defend a legitimate, if difficult and 
obscure, interest in the pastness of present objects, 
Oakeshott falls back upon the logical and structural 
presuppositions of a mode of enquiry: again autonomy is 
gained at the price of incommensurability. In both cases 
establishing truth in history seems, at first, to rest in 
the hands of the historian (provided he be sufficiently 
critical and aware). Yet, when the philosopher asks what 
it is about historical truth which differs from that of 
science or everyday the conclusion seems to deny the free 
exercise of thought and responsible judgement. This 
definition of the autonomy of history as something 
spiritual, logical or structural creates a tension which 
leads to, or indeed is based on, a loss of confidence in 
the knowing subject - the historian. I want to examine 
its basis in an idealist epistemology and how it affects a 
conception of the role of history in the world. 
My initial reading revealed that any attempt to 
present the historical interests of Collingwood and 
Oakeshott in the light of British idealist philosophy 
would not have been illuminating. It was my intention to 
write a thesis examining descriptions of the philosophical 
problems involved in writing history and, as Collingwood 
wrote in an incisive comment in 1931, 
... the 19th century idealist in England were 
not, in general , historically minded: there are traces of the historical point of view in 
Bradley and Green, and Caird - but they are not 
very strong, and in Bosanquet they vanish 
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entirely, and the relics of that school in 
Oxford are quite out of touch with history. 
An epistemological influence, on the other hand, is very 
strong and since the ideas of coherence, interrelatedness 
and unity are, when applied to an analysis of historical 
thought, precisely what make an idealist approach so 
interesting, I have attempted to provide an account of 
their role in the philosophy of Collingwood and Oakeshott. 
To Bradley and Joachim Oakeshott owes much, but what is 
new in his thought is the application of idealism to 
history (Bradley's "The Presuppositions of Critical 
History" is a work indebted to Hume and empiricism). 
My reading of Bergson and James suggested certain 
shared approaches and some strong rejections but I did not 
want to overstretch the idea of interpretative influence. 
For the same reason I do not include a specifically 
philosophical account of Husserl Is work in phenomenology 
even though it is, conceptually, very pertinent to the 
idea of history as a critical construction. Indeed, when 
history is understood as something written by historians, 
our knowledge of the past is entirely phenomenological. I 
decided to concentrate upon Dilthey and Croce to the 
exclusion of other candidates because both, as idealist 
thinkers (admittedly of very different persuasions), 
confronted history and extended historical thought. 
Furthermore their influence upon Collingwood and Oakeshott 
is textually as well as interpretively demonstrable. The 
opening chapter is one of sign-posting what follows. 
It remains for me to clarify my own interests and 
intentions. This thesis is a work in the history of 
ideas: the idea in question is that of history. It is a 
history of the idea of history in the last one hundred 
years or so. The circularity here is fitting. -it is 
fitting because, as an historian, I want to focus on what 
philosophers have said that history is. This is to 
reverse the usual flow of traffic. I also believe that 
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the respectful distance at which certain philosophers 
claim to be working - analyses of history without 
implications for its practice - is largely untenable. In 
the identification of its salient features, of its 
comparability or not with the natural sciences, post-war 
analytical philosophy of history has, in fact, offered a 
critique of what history actually is, and what it should 
aspire to whether historians realise it or not. To put 
this another way (in the form I have used to make clear my 
own interests), there exists an idea - assumed or explicit 
- of what history is all about. I am interested in the 
philosopher's idea of history. I want to explore the 
supposedly neutral ground between philosophical interest 
and the workforce of historical activity, to map it out, 
follow its contours and ask if its borders are legitimate. 
Are there genuine reasons for believing that analytical 
philosophy of history is a wholly distinct concern to a 
"speculative interest in the shapes and patterns of the 
past, when it is understood that the interpretations and 
narrative orders of historians are precisely shapes and 
patterns, that they are the product of inference and not 
of transcription. 
My "primary" materials, or sources, are the writings 
of philosophers and historians - reflections on the nature 
of history. My subject-matter is not historiography 
unless it is cited and used to support an analysis of 
history, which has not been frequent. My own selection 
from these works has been guided by the idealist theme 
outlined above - its proponents, its rejectors and those 
whom I have identified as having contributed to the 
continuation or extension of an idealist approach. The 
identification of the latter is largely a conceptual one; 
that, within the context of an idealist approach to 
history it makes sense to see such and such an idea as 
related. Unless otherwise stated I am not arguing for 
explicit influence nor certainly for the presence of a 
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school of thought. Nor am I engaging in the sociology of 
knowledge. It is, however, certainly the case that an 
idealist analysis of history has been one of the most 
persistent and important voices in the philosophy of 
history. What I hope to show is that its persistence is 
still felt and shown in may different guises, and that it 
presents history with its most incisive critique. 
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Chapter 1 
i) Wilhelm Dilthey: The Realm of Objective Mind 
By referring to a common sphere of 
mind we can bridge the gulf between 
men of different ages or cultures who 
are divided by different beliefs and 
ideologies. 
Theodore Plantinga has argued that Dilthey's writings 
post 1900 demonstrate that his elaboration of the concept 
of Verstehen had undergone an 'objective turn'. ' Dilthey 
shifted the focus of attention away from knowledge as an 
2 inner experience, Erlebnis, attained either through 
introspective identity or psychological reflection, to 
what he called the 'world of objective mind'. Plantingals 
argument is well supported by the writings collected 
together in volume VII of Dilthey's Gesammelte Schriften, 
in particular by the unfinished manuscript "The 
Construction of the Historical World in the Human 
Studies". 3 In this section I want to concentrate on 
Dilthey's description of this realm of 'objective mind', 
its constitution and how it can be an object for 
knowledge, and its implications for historical thought. 
Above all Dilthey's attempt to fuse a neo-Kantian 
conception of the 'categories of historical reason' with 
an emphasis on the importance of empirical data in history 
suggests a wal forward for the philosophy of history. It 
is also, from the perspective of this thesis, an 
interesting anticipation of Collingwood's idea of the re- 
enactment of past thoughts expressed in action and 
embodied in evidence, and perhaps helps to clarify the 
absence of reliance upon intuition as the means of getting 
at past events. on the other hand the attempt to spell 
out the categories of historical reason which mind imposes 
on experiencc., gives rise to the same relativist 
implications as Collingwood's theory of absolute 
presuppositions. Finally, Dilthey's emphasis on the 
hermeneutical approach to history, which distinguishes 
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between the "cultural" and natural sciences in terms of 
the way in which objects are "read" within a particular 
context or 'model of understanding to reveal a particular, 
meaning points the way forward to Oakeshott's division of 
a practical from an historical past. 
Dilthey's work, Ermarth has suggested, may be seen as 
the attempt to mediate between a 'dream idealismo4 
populated by metaphysical suppositions which have no 
bearing upon, or implications for, life, and a barren 
empiricism which made mind and the "spirit" a function of 
sense-data, and accepted the exact procedures of the 
natural sciences as the only legitimate path to knowledge. 
Ermarth uses the term 'Idealrealismus'5 (a 'philosophical 
middle informed by a sense of historyl)6 to characterise 
Dilthey's position' a fusion of the positive elements in 
the idealism of Kant and the German historical school - 
the one asserting that epistemology begins with the 
knowing subject and asks how it acquires knowledge, the 
other refusing to see transcendental causes determining 
human history and demanding that each epoch be understood 
in its own terms - with the empirical methods of 
scientific research, which grounded concepts in rigourous 
testing and application and often sprang from the demands 
of practical experience. It was Dilthey's contention that 
we must always begin with the datum of experience, but 
that experience was a concrete thing which consisted of a 
reciprocal relation between individuals and their 
environment. Rickman expresses this idea in the following 
way: 
... we know the world through our feelings and 
strivings as well as through our sense 
impressions and thinking. The real cognitive 
subject is the whole human being conditioned by 
the functioning of his body and by social and 
historical conditions, who not only perceives 
objects but knows and evaluaýes them in terms of 
the concepts he has learned. 
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Dilthey's conception of experience as something 
'richly variedI8 includes the contention that the external 
world does not write itself upon a passive mind. 9 Like 
BergsonlO and James", Dilthey stresses that experience 
and the 'psychic life, are continuous and immanent, and 
that philosophical analysis must begin with life itself 
rather than substituting an 'emasculated' conception of 
experience solely in terms of sense-data, or of posited 
absolute coherence which is transcendental, against which 
our lives are imperfections, shadows, or failures. The 
affinities of Dilthey's thought with that of pragmatism 
has been emphasised by certain commentators, " as has the 
implications of his concentration upon the experience of 
living for the existentialism of Heidegger and Jaspers. 
But he should nonetheless be distinguished from both of 
these philosophical strains because of his belief that man 
is an historical being, that he inhabits an historical 
world pervaded by meaning, and that through the careful 
application of concepts he can understand the patterns and 
structures inherent in the history within which he comes 
to know himself. 
Like Vico and Croce after him, Dilthey argued that 
history was a proper subject for knowledge because it was 
the sphere of human activity; 'The spirit understands only 
that which it has created'. 12 Although Dilthey did not, 
as both Croce and Collingwood were to do, resolve all 
knowledge into historical knowledge he did represent 
history as 'the accumulated experience of what man and his 
13 world is like'. As such it provided the basis for the 
wider human studies which Dilthey hoped to co-ordinate 
into a systematic study of the 'whole man'14 in what he 
15 called 'anthropology'. This accounts for his 
acknowledged debt to Ranke and the philological method of 
the historical school. He pointed out in his Introduction 
to the Human Studies, 16 however, that the historical 
school lacked a 'healthy relationship to epistemology and 
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psychology'. 17 If history was not to be the "bare 
recitation of surface detail" it needed to be analysed for 
what it presupposed. This was the project which Dilthey 
set for himself in his uncompleted critique of historical 
reason. His intention was to supplement Kant's categories 
of understanding - the structures of the knowing mind - in 
terms of which we experience the physical world, by adding 
an analysis of what is presupposed in knowing the 
historical world. 18 Yet although he took f rom Kant the 
important idea that 'experience itself was the product of 
mind's activity which shapes and structures the data it 
receives'. 19 he did not believe that the structures of the 
knowing mind could be established in any a priori or 
absolute sense. Dilthey wanted to historicise the 
presuppositions involved in knowing the past since he 
believed that the 'categories' of history were themselves 
the product of change and development. 
Dilthey's defence of the GeiBteswissenschaften 
against naturalism and the belief in the supremacy of 
positivistic methods of enquiry, places him alongside 
20 other German thinkers, such as Windelband and Rickert, 
who attempted to establish a "science of the individual". 
His final position, however, is more sophisticated than an 
appeal for the autonomy of history as knowledge of the 
individual distinct from science as the study of the 
universal. 
Plantinga has noted that whereas Windelband 'proposed 
a division of the sciences on the basis of modes of 
knowledge, rather than on the basis of subject matter', so 
that the real opposition 'is not between nature and 
"Geist" but between laws and eventst2l, and Rickert 
contended that the element of universality, or generality, 
is introduced by the scientists' concepts, Dilthey 
insisted that the 'two kinds of science are based on two 
kinds of experience'. 22 That is to say,, not distinct 
parts of reality, but the products of looking at reality 
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with different interests and using different methods; for 
the one speech is a physical movement, f or the other a 
mode of communication and meaning. Dilthey himself 
expressed his division of the Geisteswissenschaften f rom 
the Naturiswissenschaften in this statement: 
... the way in which their subject-matter is formed that is to say, in the procedure which 
constitutes these disciplines. In other one a 
mental object emerges in understand J_rkg; in the 
other a physical object in knowledge. zj- 
Dilthey's idea that the Geisteswissenschaften are 
founded upon 'inner experience' initially led him to 
concentrate upon knowledge of historical actions as a kind 
of "inner echo". 24 He later rejected the intuitionist and 
subjective connotations of this approach and raised up 
psychology as the means of access to the mental world; 
finally in a last attempt to ground the human "sciences" 
upon an objective foundation, he turned to the concept of 
the objective mind. Plantinga has argued that this three 
fold division of the development of Dilthey's thought may 
be seen as corresponding to the three works, the 
Einlietunct (1883), Ideen (1894), Aufbau (1910) . 
25 From 
our point of view the shift in Dilthey's thought may also 
be considered in terms of an answer to the question "how 
can the human past become a stable object for knowledge? ". 
The initial formulations of 'inner experience' could 
be interpreted as advocating intuition, the attempt to 
apprehend by introspection the experience of others. 
Although certain statements support this interpretation - 
'we understand only that which we allow to happen over 
26 again in ourselves" understanding is 'dependent upon a 
degree of sympathy' - it is not correct to treat Dilthey's 
notion of Verstehen as a peculiar, heuristic device. it 
is interesting that Collingwood, in The Idea of History, 
accuses Dilthey of conceiving the 'living past in history' 
as the 'immediate experience of the present'. 27 It is 
somewhat ironic that Collingwood's own theory fo re- 
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enactment was subjected to exactly the same criticism by 
certain critics including Gardiner and Walsh, 28 the latter 
who interprets Dilthey's 'inner experience' or Erlebnis as 
suggesting immediate identification bereft of all 
inferential thinking. 29 Collingwood himself, though 
commending Dilthey - 'a lonely and neglected geniusl3O _ 
for the idea that documents or evidence offer the 
'occasion for reliving in his own mind the spiritual 
31 activity which originally produced them" mistakenly 
assumed that Dilthey's final position equated Erlebnis 
with subjective or immediate experience, therefore 
reducing historical re-enactment to a species of 
psychological speculation. 32 In fact Dilthey emphatically 
rejected the elevation of intuition in the romantic 
idealism of Herder, Goethe and Schelling. He failed, 
however, convincingly and consistently to explain what he 
intended by Erlebnis and so the suspicion that it refers 
to some 'private psychical sphere' remains. Although 
Dilthey's writings of the 1890s help to clarify his 
position, they do so at the expense of subsuming our 
knowledge of the human past under psychology. 
The 'inner experience' with which the 
Geisteswissenschaften are concerned is Dilthey's way of 
referring to awareness of the mental content of an action. 
Though the primary object is given in 'outer experience' 
or perception -a document or f acial gesture - we move 
from this sensory awareness through reflection to the 
mental content which it expresses. This idea is made more 
familiar in Collingwood's distinction between an action's 
'outside', physical movements, and its 'inside', the 
thought it expresses. 33 It is this distinction which 
allows Dilthey to divide history, and the human sciences, 
from the phyEical sciences: 'we explain nature, but we 
34 understand mertal life'. Inner experience is reached 
through understanding, Verstehen, and it is both an 
element in everyday living and something which has been 
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consciously developed in the study of human expressions. 
Plantinga has pointed out that, in its early from, 
Dilthey's conception of concrete experience (which 
recognises no distinction between experience and what is 
experienced, a unity of content and apprehension) linked 
to the notion of Verstehen as a psychical realm of mental 
content entailed a preoccupation 'with the idea of basing 
the Geisteswissenschaften on direct observation and 
apprehension of mental states'. 35 The new discipline of 
psychology, with its empirical pretensions, seemed to 
offer the way to co-ordinate and objectify these 'direct 
observations'. The misleadingly dualistic metaphor of 
physical-thing-perceived and mental-content-embodied, 
lends itself (as with Collingwood) to an interpretation of 
understanding the past as the method of direct 
acquaintance with other thoughts through introspection of 
our own. In addition Dilthey talked of the need to re- 
live and re-experience the other's thoughts as a form of 
empathy or projection - Nacherleben36 - so that, as 
Ermarth has remarked, he sometimes 'implied that Verstehen 
accomplished an actual repetition or reproduction of 
mental process or mental life going on in the mind(s) 
manifest in expression, 37: a kind of 'social science 
seance'. But Ermarth goes on to argue that Dilthey's 
reasoned position relies on a crucial phenomenological 
distinction between 'mental acts and contents' so that 
Verstehen 'operates with representations of mental 
38 content, not psychological acts'. Furthermore Dilthey 
appeared to realise the difficulties involved in basing 
our knowledge of the world of mind, or spirit, on the 
psychological search for hidden motivations. 39 This is 
why it is accurate to depict his later writings as an 
objective turn. In a later work he wrote of inner 
experience, 'it is a common error to identify our 
knowledge of its with psychology'. 40 
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In "The Construction of the Historical World in the 
Human Studies" Dilthey reaffirmed that 'the realm of 
mental reality... is the subject matter of the human 
studies'. 41 However this realm of mental reality is now 
fixed in objective form. By 'objective mind' Dilthey 
meant 'the manifold forms in which what individuals hold 
in common have objectified themselves in the world of the 
senses. It is a medium in which the understanding of 
other people and their expressions takes place: 42 
At birth a child learns to understand gestures 
and facial expressions, movements, and 
exclamations, words and sentences, only because 
it encounters them always in the same form and 
in the same relation to what they mean and 
express. Thus the individual o 'entates himself 
in the world of objective mind*fi 
Understanding these expressions is called interpretation 
44 and its methodology hermeneutics. The world of 
objective mind, or 'realm of "Geist"' is a shared world; 
no longer a private psychical sphere of experience but 'a 
common world of meanings and objects regarded as 
expressions or objectifications of life and mind'. 45 This 
idea of objective mind is Dilthey's attempt to overcome 
the difficulties of subjective idealism: it refers 
differences in interpretation to a fixed object. The 
cultural realm, composed of languages, social and 
political institutions, and moral conventions, is where we 
meet and express ourselves; it also provides access to the 
minds of others. We can interpret gestures, expressions, 
and evidence of past events in terms of their meaning. 46 
This requires the active participation of the intellect 
and the imagination, but, above all, it involves the 
assumption that understanding is the 'rediscovery of the I 
in the Thou, 47, the humanistic belief in "the ultimate 
community of all persons". 
on one level Dilthey hoped that the various human 
sciences would supply the methods, techniques, and data 
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which would raise hermeneutics to an absolute criterion of 
understanding. But he also realised that the shared 
sphere of mind was bound on all sides by historical 
change. 48 To ref er an historical interpretation back to 
documents, or evidence, and thus a concrete and share 
object, was one way of making the past stable in 
historical research. It was also the case that the object 
of historical research had first to be constituted as 
such, it had no definite and translucent character 
confirmed beyond debate. Interpreting documents or 
evidence as manifestations or expressions of meaning was a 
handy way of describing one central presupposition of 
history - the category of inner and outer - and of 
resolving some of the difficulties of a subjective 
idealism, but it provided only a partial solution to the 
problem of how we can know that we are "reading" the 
documents correctly. 
Dilthey expressed the problem of the (historical) 
interpretation of expressions which originate in 'cultural 
realms' far removed from our own, by distinguishing 
between 'higher' and 'lower' understanding. 49 Lower or 
'elementary' understanding relies on 'common 
connections, 50, a fixed order between expressions and the 
mental content or meaning they embody. Language - the 
'meaning of words ... as well as the significance of 
syntactical arrangementsl5l - is the primary example of 
elementary understanding which is 'common to a 
community'. 52 With 'higher' forms of understanding the 
relation between an expression and its mental content - 
the assessment of the appropriate historical and cultural 
context - must first be established by inference. 
53 
Dilthey described this by arguing that the 'greater the 
inner distance between a particular given expression and 
the person wk.,. o tries to understand it, the more often 
54 uncertainties arise'. The ideal of understanding is one 
'in which the totality of mental life is active - re- 
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55 creating and re-living'. Dilthey believed, however, 
that hermeneutics must recognise that the 'historical- 
social world I is composed of a complex of patterns and 
structures, 56 shifting and changing, so that 'we always 
find ourselves in the middle of complex situations which 
we try to disentangle by making then revising, provisional 
assumptionsl57: 'circularity pervades our whole 
intellectual life,. 59 The hermeneutics of higher 
interpretation is implicitly dialectical and circular in 
character, based, as Rickman has suggested, on the 
assumption that 'reality is a whole of interrelated parts' 
and 'philosophy must make us aware of that unity'. 60 The 
description and analysis of a past event entails an 
'anticipatory determination j 61 of what happened and its 
place in a wider context or whole. Ermarth writes, 
... interpretation begins with a provisional and 11shiftable" hypotheses and a constant shuttling 
takes place between the initial predetergnation 
and the results of closer investigation. 
It was Dilthey's conviction that one fundamental 
category implied in our knowledge of the human world was 
that of part and whole. 63 In any enquiry there are no 
self-evident starting points and no final conclusions. 
Our knowledge, the concepts we employ, the language we 
express ourselves in, are constantly changing, and so any 
expression will be relevant to its particular context. 
With history this means that 'the past appears different 
to every age and requires a different presentation'. 64 It 
is this interrelationship between individual and general, 
between expression and context, which characterises the 
human historical world. History's 'ideal objecto65 is the 
individual, but not the isolated and unique. In as far as 
an individual person (Schleirmacher in Dilthey's 
biography)66 inhabits, reflects upon, and evaluates the 
world in which he lives, he or she provides our 'means of 
access to the large structures, connections ... that make up 
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the social historical world'. 67 Biography, in Dilthey's 
thought, is a perfect model for our understanding of this 
interrelation between part and whole. It illustrates the 
patterns and connections of Leben, 68 and the fundamental 
'inner coherence' - Zusammenhang - of our experience. 
Bismarck, Dilthey argued, is not to be understood as some 
'inward essence' but as a 'pattern or relations'; a 'point 
of intersection' for family, state, religion, class, 
culture, etc. 69 History then, rather than being a 
succession of events, is a 'structure of overlapping 
coherencesq70 which is why relating part to whole, 
individual to social context, is the appropriate way of 
accounting for historical change. 
Dilthey rejected the use of impersonal theoretical 
entities, or metaphysical embodiments, to account for 
change in history, just as he rejected scientific 
causality. But his position is not unambiguously that of 
a methodological individualist. He speaks of tracing back 
to a 'common mind" 71 and of 'the historical spirit of an 
72 age'. His approach in fact reflects a faith and 
confidence in the use of concepts and the inevitability of 
abstraction. Above all, his emphasis upon part and whole 
reflects a belief that experience is constituted within a 
common and shared historical world. Man has a history 
73 rather than a nature and is thus an 'undetermined type@. 
Ermarth expresses this succinctly, I ... our experience is 
constituted not within the private confines of pure 
consciousness but within the cultural medium of the 
objective mind'. 74 In this way an individual may be taken 
to be "representative" of his age. 75 
The categories of historical reason (including those 
of inner and outer, part and whole, and value or meaning) 
illustrate Dilthey's belief in certain universal features 
involved in congnition. Although these categories are 
claimed to be derived from experience and not deduced I 
priori, and despite the fact that they are themselves 
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subject to historical change, they form the necessary 
support for the common realm of 'Geist' which allows for 
the re-discovery of the I in the Thou. 76 The 
interpretation of expressions requires precision and 
rigour, but it presupposes the existence and embodiment of 
mental content. 77 This is precisely the assumption made 
by Collingwood. In the next chapter I will argue that the 
absolute presuppositions introduced by Collingwood to act 
as af inal ground and arbiter of what can be thought or 
presupposed do not rescue his theory of history from 
relativism, and instead introduce a more pernicious f orm 
of determinism which perhaps threatens the humanistic 
basis of his approach. Dilthey seems to have grappled 
with a similar problem. Although, as Plantinga has 
argued, Dilthey believed that the notion of contextual 
relativity was more liberating than sceptical in 
implication, it is difficult not to see his categories as 
an attempt to place limits upon the scope of this 
relativism*78 The objective turn in his thought clarifies 
the relationship between past events and present evidence. 
Stuart Hughes is unpersuasive in arguing that, by marrying 
history with psychology Dilthey contradicted his claim 
that thistorical scepticism can be overcome only if the 
(historian's) method does not need to rely upon on 
determination of motives'. 79 The post-1900 writings show 
a clear rejection of this kind of psychologism. If there 
is an element of truth in Hughes' criticism it is that, in 
order to describe Geist as a third, cultural realm of 
existence, the common inhabiting of which allows us to 
understand the minds of others, Dilthey has to posit a 
fixed link between expression and mental content; a link 
which is a quality of the expression itself, ascertainable 
in interpretation. So The objective basis of hermeneutics 
is the assumption of common categories which constitute 
human rationality. 81 
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Patterns and structures of history, and the relation 
of individual to a wider social and cultural context, 
raise ideas which tread a delicate line between free-will 
and determinism. Dilthey never renounced his idealist 
faith in the primary importance of the experiencing 
subject, but it was important for him to establish the 
nature of the relationship between the knowing mind and 
the concrete data of experience. His answer to the 
problem of how the individual was shaped, or influenced by 
his or her environment was, as Bulhof has pointed out, to 
stress how a given period could produce or condition 
certain thoughts or expressions while excluding others. 
In this way it created a 'horizon for its members that 
could not be transcended... regulated and determined by the 
82 interlocking cultural systems of a period'. It is not 
clear whether Dilthey conceived this determination as 
conscious or not, though his analogy of the cultural 
environment as a language which we not only learn to speak 
but also analyse its words and syntax, 83 suggests that a 
degree of self-awareness is possible. History may 
recognise that human behaviour is "conditioned" on the 
humanistic assumption that 'man lives in an objectively 
existing, interpersonal cultural world, into which each 
person is born'. 84 
The idea that the relationship between an individual 
and cultural environment is reciprocal and dialectical has 
important repercussions for the philosophy of history. 
For Dilthey, history provides us with a way of 'grasping 
the world': it is practical and it is the realm of value 
and meaning - 'In history man comes to know himself'. 85 
In this sense his thought leads on to Croce Is idea of 
86 'contemporary' or lethico-political history" and 
Collingwood's more careful formulation of history as the 
self-knowledge of the present. Dilthey applauded the 
attempt to understand a particular period in its own 
terms, but at the same time he allowed for the possibility 
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that an historian could transcend that understanding. The 
possibility of understanding an historical event or 
individual better than it was understood at the time - 
Besserverstehen87 - is simply a matter of recognising that 
at any given time the interlocking patterns and structures 
(the coherence of lived experience) are infinitely 
complex. History, Plantinga comments, is a 'complex web 
of patterns, connections and relationships that can never 
be properly comprehended by a single mind'88; a more 
complete account of the relevant forces and circumstances 
allows for progress in historical knowledge. In this way 
Dilthey combines an idealist faith in the integrity of the 
individual, understood in his or her own terms, with a 
belief in the importance of social and cultural 
influences. 'Unlike Croce, Collingwood, and Oakeshott, in 
the writings of Dilthey the sciences (natural and social) 
are not employed as a rhetorical fiction; an 
epistemological opposite against which to establish the 
autonomy of history. 89 Dilthey had a healthy respect for 
exacting empirical research; his objection was not to 
science but to scientism, to any 'approach that fails to 
acknowledge the centrality of the life of the spirit'. 90 
Dilthey's later writings have been accurately 
described as 'objective' idealism. 91 The idealism is 
evident in the firm belief in the reality of the mind. It 
is objective in as far as he attempts to fix mind in a 
third realm of existence. Consequently his tentative 
conclusions leave open two points of departure for 
historical thought. The first, taken up by Collingwood, 
is to focus upon the epistemological conditions of 
interpreting evidence for past actions as the expression 
of thought; to probe further into the mind of history this 
entails, and to expand upon the nature of truth or 
certainty that history can achieve. Significantly 
Collingwood rejected psychology as a 'pseudo-science', and 
placed the critical re-enactment by the historian at the 
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centre of our knowledge of the human world. The second 
direction, pursued by Oakeshott, is to concentrate solely 
on the interpretation92 of 'survivals' from the past by an 
enquirer who constructs rather than discovers,, as the 
function of a particular 'model or 'discourse' of the 
present. What falls out of Oakeshott's theory altogether 
is the presupposition that evidence embodies mental 
content or thought. For him there is just no way of 
connecting an inferred historical past to a "real" past of 
events; this is an assumption without implications for the 
activity of history. on the one hand, history is directed 
at life by life. It is knowledge of how the present came 
to be what it is; perhaps even the possibility of 
predicting, in a very general sense, future outcomes. On 
the other, history is an inferential argument, protected 
against the intrusion of practical interest only by 
strictly eschewing moral judgements and the idea that the 
past teaches lessons. In both cases the spectre of 
relativism (a rupture between past and present which 
corrodes the notion of truth in history, as distinct from 
a belief in the importance of "appropriate" contexts to 
assess knowledge claims) is very apparent. The first 
attempts to escape it via a distinction between what is 
conditional and what is absolute in our judgements. The 
second to isolate a proper interest in the past through a 
modal division of experience. 
ii) Benedetto Croce: Living History 
once the indissoluble link between life and 
thought in history has been effected, the doubts 
... as to the certainty and utility of history disappear altogether in a moment... (it is) ... 'a knowledge that has come from the bosom of life. " 
Croce's assertion that 'all history is contemporary 
history' involves three related ideas. The first is that, 
with history, the 'point of departure is the mind that 
thinks and constructs the facts'. 2 Epistemologically, the 
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historian's enquiry arises out of, is directed at, and 
culminates in, an understanding of the past in the 
present. The second point is that, 'only an interest in 
the life of the present can move one to investigate past 
fact'. 3 Historical work is 'an act of comprehending and 
understanding induced by the requirements of practical 
4 life'. The primary importance of the knowing subject in 
the construction of past fact means that, 'however remote 
in time events there recounted may need to be, the history 
in reality refers to resent needs and present 
situations'. 5 Past events 'vibrate' in the consciousness 
of the present. The relativist implications of the second 
are embodied in the third idea, which is an affirmation of 
the 'spiritual' integrity of an historicist outlook. 
Historicism for Croce is both the 'science of history' and 
the belief that 'reality is life and history'. 6 Awareness 
of the historicism of life banishes transcendental 
metaphysics or 'illuminism' from historiography through 
the recognition 'of the manifold complexity of human 
life', 7 but at the same time it reveals that all 
knowledge must be historical knowledge which in turn is 
'not only superior to philosophy but annihilates it'. 8 
It is in history that the 'spirit' (Croce's favourite 
deus ex machina) manifests itself in all forms of 
conscious activity. self-consciousness of the spirit in 
its concrete, living actuality, is attained only in 
historical understanding. There is a certain similarity 
between Croce's sustained attack against positivism, 
naturalism and any attempt to 'contain the complexity of 
human life and history in verbal general isations 1,9 and 
Oakeshott's rejection of a rationalist understanding of 
the past, of politics, law and education. In both there 
is criticism of rationalist 'system-mongering', of the 
elevation of one area of human understanding (scientific 
method, economic relations) to a sovereign position, and 
of the failure to appreciate the slow, indeterminate, and 
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ceaseless movement in self-consciousness, expressed in 
tradition and patterns of conduct rather than in rules of 
formula. But, on the other hand, Croce Isf aith in the 
'intimate link between the impulses of practical and moral 
life and the problems of historiography' 10 is anithetical 
to Oakeshott's sharp division between a 'practical' and 
'historical' awareness of the past, and is, in fact, 
inverted in Croce's thought as 'chronicle', dead history, 
and 'history' proper, 11 the living past, which is more 
resonant of Dilthey's "philosophy of life". Finally, the 
relation between Croce's theory of history and 
Collingwood's is marked. In particular Croce's belief 
that historical knowledge involves an act of re-enactment 
by an historian, and that the activity of the historian is 
an autonomous one, sanctioned not by appeal to the natural 
or social sciences, nor to any accumulated factual 
information about past happenings, but to the authority of 
historical thought itself. 
Croce, as Collingwood was to do later (and with 
greater clarity) resolved philosophy into history and, as 
a result had to contend with the implications of a 
thorough-going relativism. His solution was an attempt to 
distinguish between moral and historical judgements and, 
in this way, lay the basis for historical truth and 
certainty by distinguishing different attitudes towards 
the past. Consequently (along with Dilthey and 
Collingwood) he has been accused of advocating an 
intuitionist theory of historical knowledge. We have seen 
how Dilthey's mature elaboration of Verstehen can be 
understood as an attempt at objectifying 'historical 
reason' through the disciplined and empirical exegesis of 
Z mind. In the next chapter I want to expressions o. 1 
support an interpretation of Collingwood's re-enactment 
doctrine as the elucidation of certain necessary 
conditions involved in "knowing" past thoughts,, rather 
than being a strange and esoteric method of clawing back 
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the Past. Yet, it Dust be acknowledged that, with Croce, 
the intuitionist charge fixeB itself with greater force. 12 
In this section I want to examine the nature of 'living' 
or 'contemporary' history and question whether the 
division between moral and historical judgement is 
sustainable. Croce's conjunction of practical life with 
the problems of historiography ensures that history has, 
potentially, a vital, ethical role to play in the life of 
the present, but the price he pays is a fragile 
distinction between 'partisan' or 'poetical' history one 
the one hand, and lethico-politicall history on the other. 
Croce'B strong reaction against positivism and the 
minute antiquarian research of his youth in the archives 
in NapleB, 12B prompted him to make, in Collingwood'B 
words, a 'bold move' in defence of the autonomy of 
history. In the essay of 1893, "La Storia Ridotta sotto 
il concetto Generale Dell'Arte"13 Croce argued that 
history, as the narration of individual and concrete 
occurrences, dealt with the representation and 
presentation of individual facts. This allies it with 
art: 'Historical writing does not elaborate concepts, but 
reproduces particular events in their concreteness; and 
for that reason we have denied it the character of a 
science'. 14 Science deals with general truths by 
employing abstract and classificatory concepts. 
Collingwood warmly approves of the identification between 
history and art - 'the spectacle of the completely 
determined individual'15 - because it involves a clear 
rejection of any attempt to assimilate it to the sciences. 
It also renounces the efforts of German thinkers, among 
them Dilthey, Rickert, and Windelband, to arrive at a 
'science of the individual'. This, for Croce, is a 
muddying of the waters, since, in history as in art, the 
individual is known not through an act of external 
apprehension, but through the effort of internal 
comprehension. Although, as Croce's writings on 
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aesthetics make clear, art is not intended to be thought 
of as a recreational exercise of imagination and fantasy, 
and is itself a form of knowledge, his subsuming history 
under it appears to have largely been a rhetorical move, 
one that clearly rejects any notion of a community of 
'human sciences' which Dilthey identified with the 
Geisteswissenschaften. The advantages of this move was to 
focus upon history as "reproduction", or determination of 
individual events, itself the outcome of a creative 
engagement by an historian, instead of any conception of 
history as accumulation and classification of discrete 
facts. The disadvantage, as Dextler has pointed out, is a 
'complete relativist theory of history'. 16 
In his Aesthetic (1902) Croce stuck with this 
original definition of history, and made more explicit a 
division in knowledge between the intuitive and the 
logical. Intuitive knowledge is concerned with the 
individual and particular; logical with the 'universal'. 
The first 'produces images in the mind, is essentially 
imaginative, and forms the basis of art', 17 and 
consequently of history. The second is developed by the 
intellect and is the basis of science. Now the 
implication of this position is an enthusiastic 
subjectivity. At this time Croce seemed little concerned 
with the difficulties of establishing and communicating 
subjective images of the past, because he had achieved a 
description of 'living' or 'contemporary' history, 18 an 
occupation unfit for "eunuchs" and for antiquarian of 
lphilological'19 history which he had come to despise. 
Living history answered to the needs of life, to the value 
schemes and aesthetic preferences of historians and to 
their own "cu. 3ture". It provided, in Drextler's words, a 
'unique freedom in historical writing from prevailing, 
objective scientific standards'. 20 History had to be 
written from a 'determined point of view' with 'a personal 
conviction of his own regarding the facts whose history he 
19 
21 has undertaken to relate I. Yet if the idea of living 
history "vibrating" in the soul of the present was an 
attractive one to a philosopher whose monisitic approach22 
opposed the dualism between theory and practice, it also 
concerned the humanist who had, under the guidance of 
23 Labriola, greeted Marx with great enthusiasm only 
vehemently to reject 'its crudity', its deification of 
matter, and as a 'bitter enemy of liberalism'. 24 This is 
an essential tension at the heart of Croce's approach to 
history. On the one hand there is a profound faith in the 
possibility of growing human self-consciousness, and the 
role of history in sustaining and Ire-educating' Europe 
into a lost sense of historicism25 _ 'the creating of 
appropriate actions, thoughts, or poems, by moving from 
26 present awareness of the past'. And on the other we 
find an anxiety over all forms of transcendence and the 
corrupting influence of lilluminism'. 27 Much of his work 
may be seen as an attempt to reconcile af aith in history 
(its humanist antecedents) with a fear over its potential 
misuse. In the Aesthetic the only qualification imposed 
upon the vitality of living history is the 'moral dutyl28 
of scholarly respect for facts. In this way, Croce hoped, 
the subjective criterion was compatible 'with the utmost 
objectivity, impartiality and scrupulousness in dealing 
29 with the data of facts'. 
In his Autobiggraphy (which, along with his study of 
Vico, was translated into English by Collingwood) Croce 
wrote of how, in 1905, he plunged into the writings of 
Hegel. 30 The importance of Hegel in Croce's thought 
(along with that of the Italian idealist Gentile) has been 
well attested. 31 Stuart Hughes has commented upon an 
Hegelian influence in Croce's decision to 'recast' his 
Aesthetic and the Logic (1909) as the first two volumes of 
his "Philosophy of Spirit". 32 Whatever the extent of the 
influence, and it is a selective influence (hence the 
title of Croce Is study What is Living and what is Dead in 
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NW-el) 33 given his rejection of transcendental metaphysics 
and the 'cunning of reason', 34 Croce's view of history had 
shifted by the time the Logic 35 was written, and this new 
understanding of history took full shape in his Theory and 
HistoU of Historiography. 36 The intrinsic comprehension 
afforded by historical understanding is resolved into a 
judgement which is a unity of subject (the intuition of an 
historian) and predicate37 (a conceptual or "universal" 
category). This identity of 'the universal and the 
individual't 38 of 'intellect and intuition' is the basis 
of a judgement which is truly historical. On the one hand 
it raises the act of cognition involved in 'living' 
history above a subjective projection of images, and so 
frees it from subjection to art; 39 on the other it 
challenges the idea that history is concerned solely with 
the individual as a unique entity. An historical 
judgement, Croce argued, contains two inseparable 
elements: universal truth in the form of a conceptual 
category (a right decision, a good ran, a just piece of 
legislation(, and a contingent or individual truth (the 
execution of Charles 1 was, on balance, a just act). This 
is 'intuition coverted into thought"40 an idealist 
synthesis of the individual and universal, and Croce's own 
version of the Hegelian concrete universal. 41 It also 
marks the "liquidation" of philosophy into history; a 
constituative element within historiography: 'philosophy 
is the methodological moment of historiography', it is an 
'elucidation of the categories constituative of historical 
judgement, or of the concepts that direct historical 
interpretation'. 42 Furthermore it is the assertion that 
the individual judgement of history is the only "true" 
judgement. There is indeed only one proper judgement and 
it is both individual and universal, referring to an 
individual state-of-affairs (the individually determinate) 
but understood through an idea or concept which is 
"universal". The universal is true only as realised in 
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particular instances. The particular is only fully 
understood when seen in its context. Collingwood, in an 
essay written in 1930 commends Croce's conclusion: 
The individual judgement of history contains 
within itself, in the shape of its own predicate 
the universality of science; history is shown to 
be, not something which falls short of 
scientific accuracy, rationality and 
demonstrativeness, but something that possesses 
all this and, going beyond Jý, finds it 
exemplified in an individual fact. 
In the statement 'All S is P11 which is a 'scientific 
judgement' we must have some notion of a 'this S1. As 
Collingwood put it, 'the rationality of science lies not 
in the f orm "All S is P11 but in the predicate P, which is 
a concept, a universal idea properly thought outi. 44 
Science is 'history with its individual referent 
neglected'. The ideal political state of Hobbes' 
Leviathan involves a universal idea or category, but at 
the same time it includes an individual judgement based on 
the political arrangement of a seventeenth century 
absolute monarchy. Now, this idea is an affirmation both 
of the ability of historical research to reconstruct what 
is individual in a particular historical situation45 -a 
determinate context - and also to refer this to 
interpretative concepts which are more general and 
enduring, if not universal in a timeless sense. 
Ultimately it is an emphatic commitment to historicism. 
Common to both Croce and Collingwood is an attempt to 
establish history not merely as an autonomous form of 
knowledge, but as itself primary and sovereign: a 
significant inversion of positivism's model of scientific 
method. 
The best way to assess the role of this particular 
historical judgement - which converts the intuitive and 
empathetic identity of living history into thought, and 
thus is preparatory to moral action46 _ is to examine two 
distinctions which are central to Croce's theory of 
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history. The f irst, a contemplation and reverence of a 
dead past, which Croce imputes to the "taxidermistl, 47 
approach of Ranks, and also at the naturalist conception 
of facts as a steady accumulation, is a distinction 
between 'chronicle' and 'history'. 43 The second is aimed 
at easing the anxiety involved in maintaining 
historiography in the service of the 'spirit', that is, of 
preserving a truly non-partisan approach which stands 
'ideally' above the turmoil of contemporary political 
disputes and the insidious intrusion of propaganda; a 
distinction between living history on the one hand, and 
'poeticall49 history and illuminism on the other. 
Croce expresses the difference between chronicle and 
50 history in terms of 'different spiritual attitudes'. He 
argues that history is 'living chronicle, chronicle is 
past history'. 51 The distinction here is not one of 
subject-matter; it is asserted of the approach of an 
historian. The hallmark of 'philological historyt52 is an 
antiquarian respect for the dead "reality" of the past; it 
manifests itself in painstaking compilations, 
transcriptions, and summaries of extant evidence. 
Although it has 'a scientific appearance' it lacks a 
'spiritual tie, 53 without which it fails to 'nourish and 
keep warm the minds and souls of men'. 54 Croce's poetic 
condemnation of chronicle is echoed, with equal scorn, in 
Collingwood's attack on the mentality of the 'scissors- 
and-pastel approach to the past. 55 In both there is a 
contention that the paradigm of the apprehension of an 
external object - an external reality - which is held to 
animate scientific research, has intruded itself into 
history. The respect for 'anthologies of 
56 information ... notes, annals" of 'empty chronicles', or 
of 'authorities', is not enough to guarantee history 
either as 'contemporary' or 'scientific'. A scholarly 
approach to the past f or the past Is sake may result in 
narratives which are 'correct but not true'. 57 For Croce 
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truth in history answers to present practical, and ethical 
needs. It is the 'critical exposition of a document, 58 in 
the full consciousness that an historical enquiry is 
constituted by historical thought (in Croce's terms, the 
demands of the spirit), and not by reference to any 
external arbiter or authority. Commenting on Ranke and 
the German historical School, Croce concedes the 
'excellent standard of editing and criticism, 59 but he 
denies that the notion of objective insight, or of 'pure 
historiography l 60 is the highest idea of historians. The 
essential failing of Ranke's approach is that it 'lacks an 
historical probleml; 61 a problem which answers to the 
present and is animated by contemporary interests. The 
result is that Ranke 'seems to be engaged... in the f ine 
62 art of embalming a corpse'. 
In both The Theory and History of Historiography and 
the later Historv as Thought and Actipn, 63 Croce 
maintained that there was a rigid division between history 
and chronicle. 64 This division supports his belief that 
'Historical science and culture' was central to the 
'purpose of maintaining and developing the active and 
civilized life of human societyl. 65 The practical and 
ethical vitality of history lay in its promotion of the 
self-consciousness and self-awareness of the 'origin of 
contemporary dilemmas@66 and of the transient nature of 
all political solutions. This awareness of the 
historicity of past and present was a consequence of an 
active engagement with ideas, not of their passive 
recitation nor assimilation. To this end he advocated 
that an historian must re-enact the experience of past 
agents, 
Do you wish to understand the true history of a 
Ligurian or Sicilian neolithic man? First of 
all try if it be possible to make yourself 
mentgýly into a Ligurian or Sicilian neolithic 
man. 
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Unlike Collingwood, Croce is not at all clear as to how 
re-enactment is achieved. The thrust of his argument, 
however, is quite lucid: history as 'ideally' contemporary 
and present seeks as 'interior verification'. 68 As 
opposed to science, history deals, as Haddock has pointed 
out, with a 'world which appears intelligible to 
agents"69 and it must be understood in terms of this 
rationality. Croce advocates analysis and classification 
of past events only when interior verification has 
failed. 70 The ideal of living history remains self- 
enactment, the capacity for living again, so that a relic 
from the past 'does not answer to a past interest, but to 
a present interest, insofar as it is unified with an 
interest of the present life' 0 
71 
I have emphasised the dimension of Croce's thought 
which focuses attention upon the central importance of the 
enquirer in the constitution of the historical past, and, 
through the historian, upon the wider practical and 
ethical demands of the present. This addresses the 
positivistic notion of knowledge as correspondence to an 
external reality, the phantom of the "thing-in-itself 11,72 
which erects a false and unattainable criterion of truth. 
For Croce the "thing-in-itself" or "real past" induces 
only frustration and corrupts genuine 'idealistic' 
history73 through the temptation to fall back upon the 
'philosophy of history' (in its speculative sense) or the 
'magic want of finality'. 74 In both cases awareness of 
how limited and ignorant our knowledge of the past is must 
first be conceded in order to dignify the fragments that 
we possess. But there is a tendency to appeal to an over- 
arching purpose - the cunning of reason - and to believe 
that our limited knowledge reflects, however imperfectly, 
a transcendent scheme. 75 Croce urges us to rej ect the 
allure of transcendence and of universal history and all 
utopian dreams'. In his Autobiography Croce wrote, 
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... the concept of truth as history tempers the 
conceit of today and opens up hopes for 
tomorrow; for the despairing sense of struggling 
in vain to pursue a quarry that always flees and 
hides, it substitutes the consciousness of 
always P? gsessing a wealth that always 
increases. 
There is however, a negative side to the vitality of 
living history; it may be that a reaction from the 'pale 
and bloodlesso77 philological history will be driven into 
a free exercise of 'poetic imagination'. 78 To avoid this 
Croce attempts to distinguish between the 'intimate link 
between the impulses of practical and moral life and the 
problems of historiography', from that between 'practical 
ends and historical narratives' which give rise to 
"'tendentious" or "party" histories'. 79 Again the 
difference is one of the approach of an enquirer rather 
than subject matter. Croce's description of a partisan 
approach, which sees the images of past persons, actions, 
or events in terms of their use and efficacy to 'reaffirm 
or defend the end being pursued'80 is similar to 
Oakeshott's practical past, as is the assertion that its 
influence is pernicious and widespread, even in the 
'genuine history books', 81 written by historians such as 
Droysen and Treitschke - defenders or a strong, military 
state - and Macaulay, Grote, and Carlyle who all exhibit 
party tendencies. 82 We must,, Croce urges, rise to the 
level of the 'historical judgement' which 'liberates the 
spirit from the pressure of the past', is 'pure and 
extraneous to conflicting parties' and 'maintains its 
neutrality'. 83 It is an essential aspect of living 
history that we enjoy 'the vivid experience of those whose 
history we have undertaken to relate... their re- 
elaboration as intuition and imagination'. 84 Yet, though 
imagination is 'inseparable from the historical 
synthesis', it must be imagination 'in and for thought', 
85 radically distinct from a 'free poetic imagination'. To 
this end Croce demands, as Butterfield was also to do, 86 
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that we eschew all moral judgements, because they are 
anachronistic and a historicist. Historians should not 
play at being hanging judges since historical individuals 
have 'already appeared before the tribunal of their day, 
and cannot be condemned or absolved twice'87: 'they belong 
88 to the peace of the past'. In other words, the thoughts 
of historical agents, re-enacted in the present, are the 
objects of an historical judgement which respects the 
context in which they thought and acted, and which does 
not aspire to assimilate them to present value-schemes. 
The historian must 'Judge' but not 'condemn'. 89 
It is Croce's belief that any statement about the 
nature of past events involves a judgement; that this is a 
duty from which the historian cannot abstain and should 
indeed be 'energetically' involved. The historical 
judgement which unites subject and predicate is the bond 
between past and present which cannot be broken without 
falling back into either chronicle or speculative 
metaphysics. But history must not be judgemental, in the 
sense of allowing one's personal values to intrude into 
the writing of history. To do so is to confuse the 
dimension in which judgement is legitimate, the 
determination, through 'critical exposition' of documents, 
of the value of past thought and action to present 
concerns, with the illegitimate projection of our values 
into past 'deeds and personages'. "Good and evil", 
"decadent periods", are not ontological entitities: there 
are no such things as 'good and evil facts in the 
world'. 90 Good and evil,, the characters of periods and 
epochs are the products of historical interest which is 
inseparable from thought. 
Croce's rejection of 'natural necessity'91 and all 
forms of transcendency is an attempt to make way for what 
he calls 'idealistic' history. Idealistic history 
involves a recognition that, 
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... no historical event has ever been the result 
of deception or misunderstanding, nor 
accidents ... that the explanation of a fact is 
always to be sought in the entire organism and 
not in a single part torn from other parts; that 
history could not have developed otherwise than 
it has developed ... 
92 
And yet, in his own histories, Croce employs 'quasi- 
metaphysical' entities - the 'spirit' or the 'Goddess 
Liberty'93, (which Stuart Hughes has characterised as a 
guiding thought, a 'projection of man's spirit toward 
self-realisation, the unending struggle against natural 
and human obstacles to organise a free society'). 94 Croce 
wrote about 'liberty', that it 'is the external creator of 
history; and itself the subject of every history ... the 
explanatory principle of the course of history, the moral 
95 ideal of humanity'. His tetrology of histories written 
between 1925 and 193296 are excessively judgemental, and 
one commentator has described them as being 'more properly 
designated as moral tracts than pure scholarship'. 97 How 
are we to reconcile this flouting of the neturality of 
historical thought? 
Croce's idealist approach exemplifies a humanistic 
belief that history is concerned with 'thoughtful, that is 
to say purposive and, as such, free action. In this sense 
history is about what man does, not what happens to 
98 him'. In his theory, as in Collingwood's, natural 
events enter historical narrative only as constitutents of 
consciousness: They may be reacted to but cannot 
themselves determine, in a straightforward cause and 
effect sense, human action. Similarly, though Croce does 
not deny the role of the "irrational" in human history, he 
refuses to assign it a determining place, calling it a 
'negative aspect of ... reality'. 
99 Hayden White has 
described Croce's position in the following way: 
... the historian must be able to recognise the degree to which man is a slave to animal passion 
and animal necessity, but his ultimate interest 
will always be individual persons, or events in 
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so far as they manifrgý the capacity for morally 
responsible actions. 
It appears that by 'spirit' - in his later 
formulations 'liberty' - Croce intended to include all the 
manifold aspects of human activity which are conscious and 
free. This is the basis of the vita morale and of 
lethico-politicall historiography, 101 which raises a 
narrative of political events onto a plane of moral 
guidance by encapsulating the whole area of man's highest 
aspirations, as expressed in art, religion, ethics, or 
political principles. 102 Croce conceived living history 
as preparatory rather than determinate to action. By 
'drawing aside a veil from the face of the real' 
historical thought could 'achieve an orientation in the 
world in which one lives and in which one's own mission 
and duty has to be accomplished'. 103 The writing of 
history in a fascist regime had a more specific moral duty 
to accomplish, and perhaps this is why Croce replaced the 
neo-Hegelian spirit with the more humanistic liberty, the 
104 'external creator of history'. 
The great flaw in Croce's philosophy of history is 
the imprecision and impressionistic terms in which he 
describes the conversion of intuition into thought - the 
distinction between an historical and a value-judgement. 
above all, as Stuart Hughes has asked, are we to treat 
Croce's own notion of historical truth as unconditionally 
valid, or as historically determined. 105 He seems to have 
thought that the historicity of all knowledge is, 
potentially liberating, but did he accept that his faith 
in liberty and his rejection of transcendence was only a 
relative judgement? 
'Philosophical history', in Croce's thought, is a 
condition of maturity, fit only for the enlightened and 
tolerant. The zealot finds little comfort in history 
because it is full of contradictions and exceptions to 
rules,, governed only by continual change. For those who 
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can accept that history is finite and always provision, 106 
who resign the search for a recoverable past reality, who 
have the courage to reject the solutions of final ends and 
general laws, and have the integrity to remain faithful to 
the resolution of a particular historical problem, then 
history may be the royal road to self-knowledge. But 
Croce himself does not provide us with the best example of 
'idealistic' history. His use of the 'spirit' and 
'liberty' as the guiding forces and explanation of human 
behaviour verges on a schematic rationalism, and his own 
historical judgements are overtly moralistic and 
partisan. 107 In his condemnation of the detachment of 
philological history he opens the way for assimilating the 
past to the present. 
Croce's approach to history is a fusion of an 
idealist epistemology with a quasi-Enlightenment faith in 
reason. In his Autobiography he claimed to have dispensed 
with the intuitionism of Bergson and the pragmatism of 
William James, 108 and that his thought dealt in precise 
logical concepts. His theory of history, however, centres 
on the translation of intuition into thought through the 
exercise of an historical judgement; an imprecise 
description compounded by the nebulous idea of communing 
with the desires of the spirit: 'history becomes present 
as the development of life demands'. 109 
History, in Croce's thought, bears too many 
responsibilities. As knowledge of the past from the 
perspective of the present it is epistemologically secure; 
as awareness of the relative and transient nature of our 
conclusions it is a caution against the conceit of final 
solutions; as the self-conscious application of "felt- 
needs" to historiographical problems it is ethically 
vital; as the way to self-knowledge and understanding of 
the development of the spirit it transcends the 
abstraction inherent in naturalism and positivism. The 
tension which is a consequence of the attempt to ground 
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historical knowledge in the morally responsible and 
logical historical judgement, is a humanistic solution to 
the relativism which his own historicist outlook had let 
in. 110 It is, in the end, not an acceptable solution. 
Collingwood, facing up to the uncertain and shifting 
nature of historical understanding, introduces 
presuppositions which are 'absolute' and stand somehow 
outside a reality which is through and through historical. 
Oakeshott, on the other hand, roundly rejects any notion 
of living history; an idea he describes as a piece of 
'obscene necromancy'. His historical past is constituted 
by an engagement to infer the existence of a past which 
has not survived into the present; a dead past. Yet in 
both cases history begins with the knowing subject and is, 
as it was for Croce, knowledge of the past is it is (re-) 
constructed in the present. 111 
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Chapter 2-RG Collincrwood: History as Self-knowledge 
of Mind. 
Introduction 
T. M. Knox in the editor's preface to The Idea of 
Historyl divides Collingwood's published writing into 
three periods. In his opinion the second group 
2 
comprising, The Essay on Philosophical Method, The Idea 
3 of Nature, and The Idea of History, should be seen as 
the higher water-mark of Collingwood's philosophical 
achievement. 4 Thereafter, and in particular in his 
AutobiograRhV5 and the Essay on Metaphysics, 
6 Knox 
regards Collingwood as lapsing into an illness-induced 
'historicism, and Iscepticism, 
7 which is an irrational 
blemish on his reputation. This judgement indicates 
Knox's own philosophical commitments: it is not a 
particularly convincing assessment of Collingwood's 
work. The scheme of 'absolute presuppositions' which 
was worked out in the Essay on Metaphysics and the 
vitriolic condemnation of realist logic, epistemology, 
and moral philosophy to be found in the AutobiograRhy, 
have relativist, but not necessarily sceptical, 
implications. That this should be represented as a 
falling away, or degeneration, is even less credible 
given his early rejection of realism and the metaphysics 
of pure being. To locate the source of this "decline" 
in a cursory description of Collingwood's illness, which 
began as early as 1932 - at the time he was working on 
what Knox rates as his finest book8 - is not 
particularly illuminating. Nonetheless Knox's 
assessment finds its home in the posthumous publication 
of Collingwood's philosophy of history. As such it 
reads like an extended obituary notice. What is 
disturbing is the implications for the editorial policy 
pursued by K. iox in sifting through the unfinished 
manuscript of The Principles of Histor 
9 the project 
Collingwood had looked forward to being his 'chief 
work'. 10 Knox believed himself justified in including 
only three 'excerpts' from that manuscript (some half of 
its length) which subsequently perished. His principal 
32 
objection to the rest of it seems to be that it was 
'written in Collingwood's later manner'. 11 It is to 
this excessively judgmental editorial policy that one 
may refer some of the confusions of interpretations 
surrounding Collingwood's thought as it appears in The 
Idea of Histgry, a collection of essays, lecture notes 
and fragments of manuscripts which had not been intended 
for publication in the form in which they appeared in 
1946.12 
It would, however, be grossly unfair to lay the 
infelicities of expression, the inconsistent application 
of key words and concepts at the feet of its editor; yet 
Collingwood has been unfairly judged on the assumption 
that The Idea of History f orms, and attempts to be, a 
consistent whole. This assumption was reinforced by 
Knox's assessment that The Idea of Historv should be 
slotted, as a finished work, into Collingwood's 
I'mature"13 philosophy, despite the fact that it contains 
ideas fully worked out as early as 1928, and 
formulations not completely developed until 1940. As a 
consequence, and once the initial chorus of criticism 
condemning Collingwood's idea of history as overtly 
intellectualistic, ascribing strange and esoteric 
methods of penetration into the past, had subsided into 
a more balanced assessment of his philosophical 
analysis, commentaries have been dominated by efforts to 
disentangle the 'real' Collingwood from The Idea of 
Histor . Collingwood, as he appears in exegesis - 
beginning with Knox's preface - must be saved from 
himself. 
Publication in 1965 by William Debbins14 of seven 
of Collingwood's essays in the philosophy of history 
helped to clar-1-fy the relation of The Idea of History to 
the development of his thought on history. The opening 
up of a Colingwood archive containing some 3,000 pages 
of manuscripts, 15 has gone further in this direction. 
The attempt to place Collingwood's theory of history in 
the wider context of his philosophical preoccuptions - 
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pioneered by Donagan16 and followed, most notably, by 
Mink17 and Rubinoff18 - have emphasised that some of the 
central doctrines in The Idea of History have f ar f rom 
pellucid application. William Dray's influential 
exposition of Collingwood's re-enactment theory, and his 
deployment of a Collingwoodian explanatory scheme 
against the "covering law" model of explanation f or 
history, has both clarified and limited what Collingwood 
was contesting. 19 
Several commentaries and critical works have 
offered an interpretative unfolding of Collingwood's 
thought as a whole. Most have sought to resolve the 
internal tensions by reference to his broader philosophy 
of mind, stressing the inappropriateness of treating The 
Idea of History as the final version of Collingwood's 
philosophy of history. Donagan argues in The Later 
Philosophy of RG Collincfwood20 (against Knox's 
judgement) that the later books should be seen as a 
consistent working out of the programme laid down in The 
Essay on Philosophical Method. Debbins and Harris2l 
both conclude that there is no major change in 
Collingwood's understanding of history from the essays 
of the 1920s to that expressed in The Idea of HistorV. 
Perhaps the most successful (certainly the most 
ambitious) is Louis Mink's attempt to reconcile the 
fluctuations and interpretative difficulties under the 
guiding concept of the dialectic. Mink's synthesis is 
masterfully developed in Mind, History. and DialectiC22 
in which he argues that Collingwood's last book, The Ne 
Leviathan23 is seen as the culmination and summation of 
ideas that are mainly Irecessive, 24 in The Idea of 
History. Mink's book is a contribution in its own right 
to the critical philosophy of history, it is also the 
apogee of efforts to save Collingwood from himself, from 
the epigrammatic tone of his later writings and the 
confusion surrounding his theory of absolute 
presuppositions and its relation to the possiblity of 
historical knowledge. W. J. Van Der Dussen in his 
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detailed search through Collingwood's approach to 
history. 25 His main contribution to Collingwood 
criticism (through copious references) is the contention 
that Collincjwood's philosophy of history is marked by a 
fundamental shift from a 'realist' to an 'anti-realist' 
position culminating in the "Die manuscript" of 1928. 
Van Der Dussen's scholarly march through the extant 
literature is a valuable compendium, but it lacks the 
purpose of an interpretative synthesis and one is left 
with a wealth of detail about the various aspects of 
Collingwood's numerous intellectual activities. 
It is my intention in this chapter to reaffirm 
Collingwood's idealims but in the process to clarify 
what this signifies. As a result it will be argued that 
his thought marks a significant departure from the 
idealism of T. H. Green's 'school'. Collingwood stated 
that his Ireapprochement' between philosophy and history 
was in opposition to both realism and idealism. In his 
AutobiographV26 he writes, with contempt, of a review of 
his early work, Speculum Mentis, in which he is accused 
of turning out the 'usual idealistic nonsense'. 
Collingwood's idealism was far from usual. It marks a 
new departure in British philosophy: an idealism which 
has confronted the philosophical problems posed by the 
study of the past. Why, if it is such a departure, do 
we persist in calling his position idealist? Would it 
not be better to refer to Collingwood's philosophy of 
history a sustained anti-realism? 27 There are three 
main reasons for reasserting Collingwood's idealism. 
Firstly I want to refer to the different direction taken 
by idealism on the continent, in particular that 
developed by Gentile, de Ruggiero, 28 and Croce in Italy, 
which had a far greater influence on Collingwood's 
thought than the idealism at oxford, dominant at the end 
of the 19th century. Secondly because I believe anti- 
realism implies a negative or destructive approach which 
does not do justice to the crusading zeal with which 
Collingwood championed a philosophical reckoning with 
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history. There is a comprehensive philosophical 
enterprise built upon his central axiom, that 'all 
history is the history of thought'. The final reason 
relates directly to the interpretation of this thesis. 
Collingwood's idealism, in its reception, is, par 
excellence, the position around which, or against which, 
post-war analytical philosophy of history developed. 29 
The reception of Collingwood, placing him towards one 
end of a conceptual spectrum, has been of major 
importance in establishing an agenda. The significance 
of Collingwood's position, understood as an idealist 
approach to history, is its emphasis on the constructive 
role of an enquirer. 
In so far as this chapter propounds a schematic 
interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy of history, 
it does so in answer to a problem that is raised, but 
not solved, in Speculum Mentis. 30 The problem concerns 
the relation between subject and object in history which 
answers both to a (revised) idealist epistemology and to 
the practice of historians. 
The Problem Raised in Speculum Mentis 
Rubinoff and Mink have both pointed out the 
importance of Speculum Mentis in correctly assessing 
Collingwood's philosophy of mind. Rubinoff goes so far 
as to contend that all of Collingwood's subsequent work 
may be seen 'as a projection of the programme outlined 
in Speculum Mentis, 31 Mink finds it 'in certain ways 
32 the most illuminating of his books'. For our purposes 
it is his description of history which is of interest. 
History promises, according to Collingwood, to resolve 
the subject-object division in knowledge which gives 
rise to abstraction. However, in SDeculum. Mentis, it 
fails to deliver that unity and is exposed as an 'error 
in self-knowledge'. 33 
History, as Collingwood presents it in Speculun 
Mentis, is a form of experience or thought, and as such 
is dialectically related to other, lower forms of 
experience, revealing and transcending their 'errors'. 
36 
History reveals the error of scientific thought in its 
pursuit of the "abstract universal" by directing mind to 
a world of "concrete" fact. 34 The summit of history's 
achievement is the 'concrete universal, 35 in which each 
individual fact implies a world of related facts so that 
to know any f act is to reveal its place in a coherent 
whole. 
The question Collingwood posed himself in Speculu 
Mentis is, "how can mind come to know its object? ", 
under what conditions can a unity of subject and object, 
which is "true" knowledge, be achieved. In answer he 
attacks the epistemology of "realism" which he was later 
to characterise in the formula, 'knowing makes no 
36 difference to what is known'. Each of the f orms of 
experience aspires to true knowledge of its object. 37 
and each falls short of the ideal of unity because it 
misconceives its object as other than the knowing 
mind, 38 which is Collingwood's definition of 
abstraction. History suffers the same fate. Though it 
is accorded the highest status on the scale of forms it 
cannot have 'actual' knowledge of its object. Its 
object, Collingwood argues, is a world of integrated 
facts which must be known together as a completed whole, 
or not at all. That is to say, the context of any 
individual fact is essential to our understanding of it, 
and yet the appropriate context is none other than the 
entire world of related facts, the whole human past. 39 
To be ignorant of any part of this context is to 
abstract an event from its "living" actuality and to 
mutilate its individuality. Since the historian cannot, 
given the limits of his intellect, be anything other 
than a specialist, he must always remain ignorant of the 
appropriate context of his field of enquiry, and so, 'if 
history exists its object is an infinite whole which is 
unknowable and renders all its parts unknowable'. 40 The 
inevitable conclusion is that history 'as a form of 
knowledge cannot exist'. 41 
37 
History, then, despite appearing to present mind 
with an accessible object, the concrete universal which 
is a perfect symmetry between part and whole, turns out 
to be illusory: 'history is the crown and reductio ad 
absurdum of all knowledge considered as knowledge of an 
42 objective reality independent of the knowing mind'. 
Only philosophy can reveal the error and contradiction 
implicit in historical experience and in so doing 
transcend it. It provides the solution to the division 
of subject and object in knowledge by revealing that the 
'world of fact which is explicitly studied in history 
is... implicitly nothing but the knowing mind as suchl. 43 
Philosophy is the 'self-co±iousness of experience 
in generall. 44 It reveals that the 'map of knowledge, 45 
charted in Speculum Mentis is a map not of the 
independent territories of knowledge, but of the knowing 
mind itself. In a passage which is strikingly similar 
to Oakeshott's 'arrests' in experience, Collingwood 
describes the forms of thought - art, religion, science, 
and history - as 'philosophical errors I. The error is 
one in self-knowledge. The philosopher 'knows what the 
historian does not know, that his own knowledge of facts 
is organic to the facts themselves, that his mind is 
these facts knowing themselves and these facts are his 
mind knowing itself'. 46 Although this provides a clue 
to the direction of his later formulations, at this 
stage in Collingwood's thought philosophy should not be 
considered as complementing history. In superseding 
history philosophy destroys it as a form of thought. 47 
In Speculum Mentis Collingwood was convinced that 
the epistemology of the realist 'school' was fatally 
flawed. His account of how mind comes to know itself 
through explicit self-consciousness resembles a neo- 
Hegelian phenomenology of mind. However, his account of 
the object of historical thought failed to satisfy him. 
His work as archaeologist and historian (which he argued 
fed directly into his philosophical reflection)48 was 
distinctly at odds with the conclusion that historical 
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knowledge is impossible. Furthermore he had, in an 
early, unpublished work called Truth and 
49 Contradiction, given expression to a rudimentary 
version of what developed into his I logic of question 
and answerl5o and his theory of presuppositional 
analysis. This argument indicated that the question 
posed by an enquirer - philosopher or historian - had a 
significant bearing upon the nature and direction of the 
enquiry. This did not chime in with the description of 
history given in Speculum Mentis. It seems that, in 
that book, Collingwood was chiefly interested in history 
as a form of experience illustrative of the dialectical 
scheme of Speculum Mentis, and deployed in an argument 
against realism. In order to do this he accepted a 
realist description of history as objective spectacle: 
'The historical consciousness asserts concrete fact'; 51 
history 'rejoices in their (the facts') hardness and 
finds its satisfaction in their very diversity and 
uniqueness"52 'an historian must state the facts as 
53 they happen'. 
It may have been that, in Speculum Mentis, 
Collingwood used history in a rhetorical role. However, 
given the efforts he expended after 1924 to find a more 
satisfactory description of historical thought, one must 
conclude he had not at that stage found a way of 
including history within an idealist epistemology. In 
Speculum Mentis he had set history an impossible task. 
To be true knowledge history's object must be "organic" 
to it, yet its ideal object is an infinite world of 
facts existing independently and outside of the knowing 
mind. Its contradiction is implicit in Collingwood's 
definition. 
The problem which Collingwood attempted to overcome 
after 1924 wes: how the past can be an object of 
knowledge. His solution involved a metaphysical 
reversal: he first had to redescribe history's subject 
matter before answering questions about what kind of 
knowledge could be had of it. In so far as the writings 
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which compose The Idea of History do not make explicit 
the attempt to ground history in a secure relation with 
an ideal object of knowledge, the statement that all 
history is the history of thought needs to be referred 
to the development of Collingwood's "ideal' of history in 
the 1920s. 
There is present in Collingwood's reflection on 
history in the 1920s both a "philosophical" and 
"empirical" concept. 54 By a philosophical concept of 
history he meant af orm of thought or experience as in 
Speculum Mentis. In this sense history is 'a universal 
55 and necessary form of mental activity" and 
'historical thought is one among a number of attitudes 
taken by by the mind towards the objective worldl. 56 
His interest in a philosophical concept of history is 
with the logic of understanding that it implies, and 
with its relation to the other forms of experience. In 
his early writings Collingwood had contrasted history 
with natural science. Though he detected differences 
between them in terms of their respective interests he 
opposed a rigid division along the lines of 
Geisteswissenschaten, with their study of the 
individual, and Naturwissenschaften, with an interest 
only in the universal. 57 Instead, he argued, both 
history and science deal with facts (instances) and 
generalities. Both forms of experience are concerned 
with the reality of 'concrete fact'. At this stage in 
his thought Collingwood felt no pressing need to defend 
the autonomy of history as a distinct form of knowledge; 
a need which dominated his later formulations. At the 
time of Speculum Mentis and shortly afterwards, history 
was understood to be transcended by philosophy, 'history 
is included in philosophy, while philosophy is excluded 
58 from history'. 
Collingwood reaffirmed the conception of history 
expressed in Speculum Mentis in an essay of 1925-59 He 
did though, make a significant concession to historical 
knowledge. In 'The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of 
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Historyl6o he aruged that 'the real plot of history is 
coincident with universal history omit any part and you 
mutilate the plot and misrepresent its general 
significance'. 61 However, he concedes that historians 
can, and do attain a 'qualified' knowledge which is part 
of an intelligble communication. Nonetheless history is 
eventually pronounced an abstraction, and knowledge of 
the past impossible. 62 
The solution to Collingwood's dilemma - how can the 
past become an actual object for knowledge, rests, it 
has been suggested, in the overturning of a realist 
notion of an objective, discoverable past of finished 
facts. His criterion of true knowledge (achieved by 
philosophical reflection) is idealist, yet his 
description of history is realist. The two produce the 
contradiction that is manifest in Speculum Mentis. 
History's abstraction lies in its failure to comprehend 
a 'world of fact independent of the knowing mind ... not 
constituted by the knowing mind'. 63 History though it 
is a 'necessary form of thought' is not true knowledge 
because it is not self-knowledge. Its object is other 
than mind, a world of pre-existing facts which cannot be 
grasped in their entirety and so must make do with 'a 
64 world of half-ascertained fact'. 
This position is resonant of the dismissal of 
history by British idealists summed up in Bosanquet's 
remark that it is 'the doubtful story of successive 
events'. 65 Collingwood later castigated this "outside" 
view of history, and in his Autobiography, spoke of the 
'total neglect of history as an example of knowledge' 
which was a 'discredit to English philosophy'. 66 Yet 
history seen as a form of experience in Speculum Mentis 
fails to achieve an "inside" understanding of history, 
that is, it fails to reconcile its practice with an 
idealist criterion of knowledge, at once immediate and 
organic. Collingwood's subsequent supersession of the 
"outside" view to include history within an idealist 
theory of knowledge, whilst altering its criterion of 
SHEt. 
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"actual" knowledge is the positive side of his rejection 
of a realist idea of the past. However, in the early 
1920s, Collingwood found himself astride the horns of a 
dilemma which, in The Idea of History, he traced back to 
Bradley: 
Either reality is the immediate flow of subjective 
life. in which case it is sublective but not oblective, 
it is enjoyed but cannot be known or else it is 
oblective and not subiective, it is a world of real 
thinas outside the sublective life of the mind and 
outside each other. 67 The dilemma was supported, he was 
to argue, by a misconception of the very nature of 
experience. As early as 1924 Collingwood's programme of 
philosophy as the dialectical development through the 
forms of experience to a state of self-knowledge, was an 
attempt to resolve the paradox of "mere" subjectivity 
and "abstract" objectivity. In terms of history, 
however, the paradox remained. 
It would not be accurate to argue that the 
resolution of the problem posed in Speculum Mentis 
occurred in a single flash of inspiration. There are 
indications in his early work that the problem is not 
far from solution. In an essay on "Croce's Philosophy 
of Historyl, 68 Collingwood affirms Croce's statement that 
'all history is contemporary history'. 69 History, 
Collingwood concurs, 'goes on in the mind of the 
historian: he thinks it, he enacts it within himself'i7O 
history is 'thought: there is here a perfect synthesis 
of subject and object, in as much as the historian 
thinks himself into the history and the two become 
contemporary'. 71 His argument in this essay appears to 
be midway between a stringent philosophical concept of 
history, and an empirical concept - what historians do - 
on which he focused later. He is not explicitly 
demanding that history must know a totally integrated 
world of facts or nothing at all. 72 on the other hand, 
he concludes by stating that historical understanding is 
entirely relative to a point of view. 73 The 
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understanding achieved by historians is of mutually 
exclusive Imonads'. 74 only the philosopher, the 
Imonadologistl75 can transcend the monadism of 
historical thought becaude he sees what the historian 
does not, that each perspective is a 'world ... of thought 
related to its thinker'. 76 Collingwood is emphasising 
the subjective nature of historical experience. He 
criticizes Croce's contention that 'history always 
justifies, never condemns', insisting instead that 
'rethinking involves reliving, passing judgment again' 
because history (necessarily and desirably) is written 
from a particular point of view. 77 This is a function 
of the limited, because partial, knowledge which history 
can achieve. He could not see (as he was to with such 
clarity a few years later) that Croce's paradoxical 
statement refers not merely to the subjective dimension 
of historical thinking, but also to the object of that 
thought, existing as a result of a "living" interest in 
material evidence which understands it as the 
expression, or embodiment, of past thought. Collingwood 
himself had not yet found a way of reconciling the 
subjective enactment of past thought with the objective 
ideal of history as a world of related facts. 
The 'empirical concept of history', Collingwood 
wrote in 1927,78 'arises out of actual historical work'. 
The relation of philosophy to this empirical concept is 
79 as 'the methodology of history'. By 1928 the 
philosophy of history had become 'the idea of a 
philosophical science of historical thought'. In his 
early work, as Van der Dussen has pointed out, 80 
Collingwood's main concern is with a philosophical 
concept of history (although the two concepts were not 
intended to be exclusive categories) . Collingwood saw 
'the science of history, 81 as the highest embodiment of 
history as a form of thought. increasingly after 
Speculum Mentis Collingwood turned his attention upon 
history as a special form of activity. One of the 
significant consequences of this shift was his need to 
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emphasise the differences, in theory and practice, 
between history and the physical sciences. This is 
characterised in Collingwood's thought by a pronounced 
hostility towards positivism which, in The Idea of 
History he called 'philosophy acting in the service of 
82 natural science'. More significantly, it was through 
his attempt to reconcile the achievements of the 
'science' of history with the formal description of 
history as af orm of experience which led to a new 
definition of the object of historical thinking and to a 
profound change from the idealism of SReculum Mentis. 
By 1928 Collingwood was writing, 
... the past as past has no existence 
whatsoever ... events can be historically known 
not through anything in the least analogous to 
perception observation or... "apprehension", 
but by their re-enactment in the mind of the 
historian... if history is ideal it cannot be a 
single self-contained body of fact awaiting 
discovery, it must be a growing body of 
thoughts, decomposed and recomposed by_ every 
new generation of historical workers... 83 
Van der Dussen has charted the course of this 
fundamental change in Collingwood's approach to history 
in great detail. My own reading of the relevant essays 
and manuscripts suggests similar conclusions to his, 
though I would want to place more emphasis on the 
tensions that led up to the overthrow of a "realist" 
idea of the past, and on certain areas of continuity 
underlying the change. Above all, and for the purpose 
of interpretion, I want to argue that the change is 
better understood as the accommodation of history to 
idealism, that is to his idea of 'actual' knowledge, 
which he had given expression in Speculum Mentis. 
History becomes, in Collingwood's later philosophy, 
precisely what "philosophical history" was in that book: 
self-knowledge of mind. The continuity of the idealist 
quest for a unity of subject and object in knowledge is 
unbroken in Collingwood's thought. What changes is that 
it becomes history, rather than philosophy, which best 
illustrates this thesis. As a result of reflecting on 
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the practice of history Collingwood developed an 
"inside" view of history. This enabled him to 
reformulate his question about the possibility of 
knowing the past, the answer to which would be the 
solution he offered to the problem of 'mere' 
subjectivity and 'abstract' objectivity. 
The elements of this reformulation were present in 
the essays of 1921 and 1922,84 in which he had seen that 
the object of history must be thought alone. What was 
needed was a description of historical thought which 
placed it outside of the destructive flow of immediate, 
subjective experience. Its place as thought in the flow 
of subjective experience guaranteed the anti-realist 
proposition that knowing makes a difference to what is 
known (the subjective points of view of historians), but 
it was also necessary that its removal from that flow, 
from the "real" and appropriate context of facts, should 
not mutilate and distort its true individuality and 
hence out understanding of it. 
The Idealitv of the Past 
In "The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of 
History"85 Collingwood had drawn attention to the 
problem of the shifting nature of historical facts. He 
argued, that 'no given fact can ever be completely 
86 stated'. Showing the influence on his thought at that 
time of a notion of the past as a given whole of related 
facts, he writes, 'the battle of Hastings is a label for 
something which, no doubt, did happen in that year; but 
no one knows, no one ever has known, and no one ever 
will know what exactly it was that happened'. 87 
Although his conclusion is that 'fact in its reality is 
unknowable'88 (the philosophical concept of history), he 
mitigates this by introducing certain 'rules of the 
game' by which historians arrive at, and determine the 
success of their various accounts (the empirical 
concept). These 'rules' are described by Collingwood as 
implicit 'qualifications... assumed by historians' * 
89 
They are essential to, and indeed allow for, an 
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intelligbile process of ascertaining historical facts. 
Such qualifications are the often unexpressed basis for 
communication among historians, and compose the limits 
to what they claim for their "hypotheses". Collingwood 
is concerned at this point to counter the challenge of 
'scepticism' which, in its most extreme form, implies 
that, in our knowledge of the past, I no one opinion is 
preferable to another'. 'It is', he argues, 'certainly 
possible to choose between different historical 
views'. 90 As examples of 'qualifications' he points to 
the disclaimers, 'in my opinion', or, 'as far as the 
available evidence goes'. 91 This would appear to be a 
clear indication of the kind of intelligibility to be 
had under the empirical concept of history. He goes so 
far as to say, 'If there is to be a philosophy of 
history it can only be a philosophical reflection on the 
historian's efforts to attain truth, not on a truth 
92 which has not been attained'. History, as af orm. of 
"scientific" activity, operates successfully with its 
own standard of 'truth which has not been attained' is 
in fact demanded of history, in Collingwood's own 
scheme, by philosophical criticism. 
Several post-war philosophers have been quite 
satisfied with the notion of truth or certainty in 
history as it has emerged within the rules or "controls" 
of the discipline:, a criterion of truth relative to the 
aims, methods, and achievements of historians. 93 
However, though reference to these 'qualifications' 
quite clearly illustrates Collingwood's faith in the 
actual practice of historical research, they could not 
support his theory of historical knowledge. History, as 
it develops in Collingwood's thought has too much work 
to do, too many assertions to defend, to be satisfied 
with a shifting consensus of aims and methods. At the 
very least historical knowledge had to be, on its own 
terms, as demonstrably and self-evidently true as that 
attained in the pure sciences. 94 If not its autonomy as 
a form of knowledge (which Collingwood develops above 
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all in The Idea of History) is threatened. Most 
important of all, history had to be "actual" knowledge 
of its object rather than approximation to, or 
reflection of, a world of integrated facts ultimately 
beyond our grasp. The philosophical concept of history 
remained to be worked out. 
This early description of a relative understanding 
of truth in history is important, and it is a persistent 
theme running through Collingwood's work. it gives a 
glimpse of the tension which developed within his theory 
of history and which is most apparent when we come to 
the relation of the exact re-enactment of past 
experience to the theory of the 'absolute 
presuppositions' of different epochs. As f ar as his 
earlier thought is concerned there is another 
significant conclusion to be drawn. If facts can only 
be conditionally stated, 'interim reports' open to 
constant renewal, then they must be in part dependent 
upon the questions asked by historians, or, more 
generally, the current state of historical opinion. if 
this is so then the object of history cannot be 
described, philosophically or empirically, as a given 
world of objective facts existing outside of the knowing 
mind. Instead historical knowledge has to be conceived 
as the condition of historical thought down to the 
present, and a statement about the Battle of Hastings 
will necessarily be a statement about its place in our 
present knowledge. The distinction between history as a 
world of past f act and our knowledge of past events 
begins to look very fragile. By 1926 Collingwood had 
come to the conclusion that 'no historical problem about 
any past event can be settled until we have settled the 
95 problem of the history of its history'. 
The breakdown of this dualism is most noticeable in 
Collingwood's revision of his 1926 lectures on the 
philosophy of history: the Die manuscript of 1928. In 
order to complete the transition in Collingwood's 
thought from the reality to the 'ideality' of the past 
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it is necessary to address the other half of the 
Bradlean paradox. Knowledge of the past considered as a 
reconstruction of an ideal object rather than a dip into 
a fathomless 'reservoir of facts, 96 provides the 
subjective identity of enquirer with his object which 
enables history to overcome abstraction. But how can 
this identity become an activity of self-consciousness? 
How, that is, can it be known to be "objectively true"? 
In 1928 Collingwood denied the realist notion of an 
objective, discoverable past of facts. History if it 
was a name f or anything, was a process of enquiry and 
not an objective project. However, the past, in order 
to be 'known as an object must exist'. In the lectures 
of 1926 the subjective and relative nature of historical 
knowledge was in the ascendent in Collingwood's thought: 
our knowledge of the past is ... not knowledge 
of the past as an actual object, and therefore 
not true knowledge; it is only the 
reconstruction of an ideal 44ect in the 
interest of knowing the present. 
But the 'ideal' object of historical knowledge is no 
longer present as a world of related facts awaiting 
fuller, although never complete, description. It is 
nothing other than historical thought as it changes and 
enriches itself. Thus 'the past has become the 
present ... The past and the present are not two 
objects ... The purpose of history is to grasp the 
98 present'. 
The past in its 'ideality' exists in the present in 
relation to the thought that thinks it. But the past is 
still not an "actual" object for knowledge. Furthermore 
if the past as an ideal object is part of present 
experience how can we know ourselves to be thinking past 
thoughts rather than present. Collingwood later 
criticised Oakeshott (and also an imaginary idealist 
objector) for arguing that our knowledge of the past is 
necessarily knowledge of the present and that history is 
in fact present experience organised under the postulate 
of the past: the idea that the historian in thinking 
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that the present is past is committing the 
'philosophical error which makes him an historian'. 99 
In 1926 Collingwood himself had not found a way of 
objectifying the subjective experience of the past-in- 
present. Interestingly, despite his affirmation of the 
'living' and contemporary dimensions of history and its 
relation to present activity, he was most anxious to 
eschew moral judgments of past events (just as Croce had 
been): 'there is nothing to be done-The dead must be 
left to bury the dead and to praise their virtues and 
lament their loss'. 100 Collingwood, at this stage, 
seems to be clinging on to a dualistic belief in the 
dead reality of the past which can be distorted and 
misrepresented when judged subjectively, or by the 
standards of the present. Subjectivity excludes 
objectivity, threatens the true and appropriate context 
of an event, and has overtones of private and arbitrary 
judgements. 
In the Die manuscripts, entitled "Outlines of a 
Philosophy of History" Collingwood finally overcame the 
dualism in his approach to history. 101 'The past 
event', he argued, 'ideal though it is, must be actual 
in the historian's re-enactment of it. In this sense, 
and in this sense only, the ideality of the object of 
history is compatible with actuality and is indeed 
inseparable from actuality'. 102 He goes on to state 
that the object of historical thought is an event; not a 
partial and always fragmentary reflection of an event, 
but an event as it exists in our knowledge of it. 103 
The past as objective spectacle is replaced by the idea 
of an event as a process of enquiry, and historical 
knowledge as something that is developing or becoming. 
'The object of thought, then, while having no existence 
at all apart from thought, and being so far idea, is 
actualised by that thought which thinks iti. 104 The 
"real" past as criterion and standard against which to 
judge the partiality of an ideal reconstruction is 
exposed as an assumption without application in history. 
In an important passage, Collingwood writes, 
The only sense in which the object of 
historical thought is actual, is that it is 
actually thought about ... Not only is the history of thought possible but, if thought is 
understood in its widest sense, it is the only 
thing of which there can be a history ... All history, then, is the history of thought, 
where thought is used in the widest sense and 
includes all t4e, 5 conscious activities of 
the 
human spirit... I" 
Anticipating the next section of this chapter, it 
may be stated that the re-enactment doctrine, as Van der 
Dussen has correctly pointed out, is not a 'proposal for 
a historical methodology, a sort of methodological 
device for arriving at reliable knowledge of the 
past'. 106 The correct background to a discussion of 
Collingwood's re-enactment theory is as a response to 
the question how historical knowledge is possible, and 
'not to a different question how we can arrive at 
ite. 107 It is also important to emphasise that when 
Collingwood talks of 'thought' he is talking of a 
possible object for an enquiry into the past, and not 
the subjective experience of the historian alone. This 
is what he has in mind when he states that 'thoughts are 
not private property'; 108 they are objects for knowledge 
precisely because they have been given expression in 
activity which has left a physical imprint (in the form 
of evidence) . The statement that all history is the 
history of thought should not be seen, in its early 
formulation, as an attempt to circumscribe the scope of 
historical interest to the merely reflective actions of 
"rational" individuals. 
In The Idea of History Collingwood incorporated his 
understanding of the ideal-actuality of the past in a 
solution to Bradley's dilemma. 109 Henceforth experience 
was not to be conceived as either merely subjective and 
immediate on the one hand, or abstractly objective or 
mediate, on the other. Experience, Collingwood aruges 
repeatedly, includes thought which is both subjective 
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and objective. To remove a thought, or fact, from its 
place in a flow of experience does not falsify its true 
nature, as it did for Bradley. Thought is given 
objective existence by Collingwood as an activity which 
carries with it its own context, from which it arose or 
to which it was a response. It remains to apply this 
idea to historical re-enactment but its early expression 
with reference to the "public" dimension of thoughts 
leads credence to interpreters, most notably Dray, who 
have taken the re-enactment theory to be a necessary 
component, or goal, in the interpretation of actions 
within the practical deliberation, or problem situation 
of their appropriate context. 110 
By 1930 Collingwood was able to dispense with the 
'hypercriticism' demanded by his earlier philosophical 
concept of history, as a misconception both of the 
object of historical thought and the aim of historical 
enquiry. The I rules of the game I when analysed by the 
phi losopher-hi storian reveal not a falling short of an 
ideal, universal history, but the consistent working out 
of a genuine form of knowledge which is autonomous of 
all others. 
Intuition versus Inference 
To an important extent the ideas expressed in The 
Idea of History are themselves 'interim reports' in the 
development of Collingwood's thought. Taken as a 
finished whole the book contains several internal 
contradictions, most notably concerning the range of 
human activity susceptible to being re-enacted, and the 
status of historian's conclusions. These 
inconsistencies are hardly surprising given that (as has 
been pointed out) The Idea of Histor contains excerpts 
from unfinished manuscripts, lecture notes, and 
published articles, written for different audiences at 
different times. In this light Knox's achievement in 
presenting these diverse writings as a completed book is 
an editorial achievement. It is also an exegetical 
minefield. To give a cogent assessment of Collingwood's 
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main ideas as they appear in The Idea of History depends 
to a large extent on knowing when to refer them to the 
wider context of his philosophy. The importance of 
reconstructing (in deference to his own 'Baconian"" 
logic of question and answer) the particular question 
which Collingwood is addressing at any one time is 
vital. 
Mink has drawn attention to the 'recessive' 112 
nature of certain key doctrines in The Idea of History. 
He argues that these doctrines must be interpreted in 
such a way as to do justice to their place in 
Collingwood's later thought. His argument centres on 
the role of "thought" in the theory of re-enactment 
which, he argues, should be understood as a 'quasi- 
113 technical term in the theory of the mind'. Mink 
believes that what Collingwood intended by the concept 
of thought is given fuller expression in The Principles 
of Art and The New Leviathan, 114 where it is clear that 
thought refers to a dialectically related order of 
consciousness, in which the fourth and highest level, 
inferential thinking (the reflective level to which re- 
enactment is confined by most interpreters of The Idea 
of Histor ) is shown to carry the 'freight' of lower 
levels, including emotions. Mink's argument, which is 
perhaps the most successful attempt to make Collingwood 
speak with a single voice, urges the reader of The Idea 
of History to reject a "received interpretation", or 
caricature, of Collingwood's theory. 
Dray, on the other hand, has developed a defence of 
Collingwood's re-enactment theory because (particularly 
when translated into what Dray called 'rational 
explanation') he believes it to make, on the whole, 
excellent sense of what historians are about when they 
claim to have understood a past event. Dray's articles 
are based mainly on a reading of The Idea of Histo and 
attempt to show that Collingwood's arguments are quite 
intelligible if interpreted as dealing with the 
'conceptual' problems associated with knowledge of the 
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past. 116 Dray does not attempt to reconcile all the 
anomalies found in Collingwood's pronouncements. But 
he, like Mink, tries to rescue Collingwood from a 
"received" interpretation. 
The received interpretation of Collingwood's 
position in The Idea of History which is rejected by 
Mink and Dray, along with Donagan, Rubinoff, Debbins, 
Martin, and Van der Dussen, 117 comprises two main 
charges. The first is that Collingwood was expounding 
an 'intuitionist' theory of historical knowledge. The 
second and related charge accuses him of advocating a 
curious and esoteric method of arriving at facts about 
the past which drastically limits historical interest 
and colludes with a wilful subjectivity. The 
intuitionist charge, though itself a caricature of a 
range of detailed criticisms, is a useful way of 
referring to a chorus of criticism which met The Idea of 
Historv in the two or more decades after its 
publication. The criticism was initially voiced by 
Walsh, Gardiner, and Toynbee and has been echoed, with 
diminishing cogency, by Renier, Fischer, leff, Elton, 
Marwick, and Carr. 118 The methodological charge 
encompasses a continuing debate which is altogether more 
complex. 
Interpretation of The Idea of Histo is further 
complicated by the continuing presence of both 
philosophical and empirical concept of history. In The 
Essay on Philosophical Method, published in 1933, 
Collingwood had argued that a concept embodies a scale 
of forms. 119 in The Idea of History the concept of 
history is present both as a transcendental analysis of 
a universal and necessary idea, part of the furniture of 
all our minds, and as a "scientific" activity. In some 
passages the concept of history is discussed in both its 
"phrases", nowhere clearer than in the rethinking of 
past thoughts. 120 The empirical concept is uppermost in 
his discussion of the interpretation of evidence, the 
decline of 'scissors and paste'121 historiography, and 
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122 aspects of "The Subject Matter of History". The 
philosophical concept is foremost in his tracing of the 
"ideal' of history as a reflection of human rationality 
or self-consciousness; 123 the nature of experience 
implied by the possibility of thought revival, 124 and 
the identity between the thought of an historical agent 
and that of the historian in rethinking it. 125 Both 
phases of history contribute to the various arguments 
for the autonomy of history as a self-justifying form of 
thought. This is testimony to the imminent 
reapnrochementl26 between philosophy and history in 
Collingwood's thought. 
The development of Collingwood's philosophy of 
history up to 1932 supports the interpretation of the 
re-enactment theory as a response to the question, "on 
what conditions is present knowledge of the past 
possible? ". The alternative interpretation, that 
Collingwood's approach advocates intuition and immediate 
identity as the methodology of history, sees re- 
enactment as the essential component in his reply to the 
question "what is history? " According to the latter the 
re-thinking of past thoughts and the re-enactment of 
past experience is an attempt to solve the problem of 
how the historian gets at his subject matter. Since, on 
Collingwood's own admission, the object of historical 
thought is thought itself, the historian's re-thinking 
must be the device by which he penetrates into a past 
composed of 'queer objects1: 127 the 'invisible 
engines'128 which are the minds of historical agents. 
The communication attained must, it follows, be a kind 
of intuitive identification between historian and the 
minds of the past; 'a telepathic communication with the 
past'129 achieved by 'exquisite symbiosist. 130 Some of 
Collingwood's statements can be used to support this 
view. The historian 'looks not at but through the 
events to discover the thought within theml; 131 'the gap 
between past and present being bridged ... by the powers 
of past thought to reawaken itself in the present' ; 132 
54 
'I plunge beneath the surface of my mind, and here live 
a life in which I not merely think about Nelson but am 
Nelson'. 133 What Collingwood was trying to do, Gardiner 
argued, was to re-work history as a form of knowledge by 
direct acquaintance, in this case by 'transporting' the 
thoughts of the past in to the present where they may be 
apprehended by the historian-134 
The charge of intuitionism has not held up under 
critical scrutiny. The conviction that Collingwood was 
proposing a methodological devise by which the 
historical past may be composed has proved more 
persistent. The related criticisms, that re-thinking 
implies a stringent methodological individualism, is 
overtly intellectualistic, and thus severely restricts 
the range and a scope of "legitimate" interest in the 
past, 135 have all been challenged. 
In Speculum Mentis Collingwood had identified 
history with perception as an objective spectacle. The 
past as a world of facts was, in its totality, 
unknowable. Historical knowledge could only be 
fragmentary, and since, as Bradley had shown, thought 
was organic and immediate, a thought would be falsified 
and mutilated unless it occurred in its true context, a 
world of integrated facts, or universal history. To 
know the past was to know it at once and all together, 
or, in abstracting, to destroy its concrete reality. In 
the years after 1924 Collingwood had overturned this 
conception of history which saw it as an error in self- 
knowledge, and in the process arrived at a theory of 
knowledge which broke with aspects of the idealism of 
136 Green's 'school'. The object of history became, for 
Collingwood, thoughts embodied in evidence, and not in a 
finished whole of facts given to perception but never 
fully apprehended. 
Donagan has argued that Collingwood preserved the 
idealist contention that thought must be grounded in an 
appropriate context, but that he rejected the idealist 
137 belief 'that only one context could be appropriate', 
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and by doing so he denied that thought is immediate. At 
the same time, his rejection of a realist notion of the 
past as a world of related facts, meant that the 
'appropriate' context f or historical thought was 
supplied by a question posed by the historian. To avoid 
the pitfalls of solipsism, Collingwood argued that past 
thoughts existed in the present only in their embodiment 
in the concrete record of human activity, an idea which 
is close to Dilthey's "realm" of objective mind. 
By "thoughts" Collingwood did not mean 
lintrospectible'138 phenomena, nor the private 
antechamber, or mental causes of actions. Thoughts have 
no existence apart from the actions which express them. 
The 'inside' of an action (a misleadingly dualistic 
metaphor) is not, as Gardiner suggested, spatially 
removed from its loutsidel, 139 but given expression by 
it: they are inseparable aspects of the same activity. 
There is substantial evidence in The Idea of 
History (even when it is considered separately from 
Collingwood's wider philosophy of mind) that Collingwood 
did not rely on an "entity" view of mind - the realm of 
mental substance - and instead considered that mind 
could only be known through its activities. He writes, 
'mind is what it does, human nature... is only a name for 
140 human activities'. We can only gain access to 
thoughts by placing meanings on actions, other peoples 
or our own. Dray has clarified Collingwood's position 
by suggesting that the 'inside/outside' metaphor might 
be better expressed as; 'whatever thought is 
express'/'whatever event expresses ite. 141 
Collingwood certainly made bold claims for the 
status of historical re-enactment, but he did not 
advocate the exercise of intuitive, sympathetic 
imagination in place of critically examining and re- 
constructing from evidence. 142 Indeed the discussion of 
re-enacting past thought contributes, although it does 
not define, a perfectly sensible description of the 
interpretation of evidence, which in turn depends upon 
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careful preparation and inference: 'facts in history are 
arrived at inferentially by a process of interpreting 
143 data'. But the theory is not the method of 
historical research; it is the elucidation of the 
conditions upon which it is possible to make knowledge 
claims about the past. As such it f orms the central 
part of Collingwood's answer to his own question, "How, 
or on what conditions, can the historian know the 
past? ". 
The subject matter of history is the product of 
human activities, existing in the present and recognised 
as evidence for past actions. In The Idea of Historv 
Collingwood writes: 'the subject matter of history is 
not the past as such, but the past for which we possess 
144 historical evidence'. Interpreting evidence as 
expressing 'conscious, thought is, for Collingwood, one 
of the distinguishing features of historical study 
since, unlike the archaeologist with a fragment of 
pottery, it makes no sense to ask the geologist what 
this particular rock signifies by way of intention or 
purpose. 145 The historian's re-thinking of the 
conscious activity, or thought, expressed in evidence is 
an integral part of critical inference; to Icertify'146 
for himself whether the reasons he has ascribed to the 
agent, or agents, in performing an activity are valid as 
a means of understanding the resulting action. Re- 
thinking, according to Dray, is the 'formulation of a 
condition which must be satisfied for understanding to 
be claimedl, 147 or, as Van der Dussen puts it, a 'theory 
describing what is logically implied by historical 
148 knowledge'. This is made clearer when it is 
understood that Collingwood had explicitly rejected both 
the idea that knowledge of the past was knowledge of an 
object external to the knowing mind, left untouched by 
thought, and the idea that thought, or experience, was 
"mere" immediacy. This much Collingwood had worked out 
before the writings which make up The Idea of History. 
The "objectivity" of history rested on treating thoughts 
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not as mental causes of actions but as themselves 
expressed or embodied in activities. Throughout The 
Idea of History Collingwood condemns the concept that 
experience is subjective and immediate, arguing instead 
that conscious experience is always thought and 
judgment. 149 Experience is neither "merely subjective" 
and therefore carried away in the flux of life, nor 
entirely "mediate" and external to the knowing mind. 
Thought, Collingwood argued, was at once subjective and 
objective, both Caesar's own experience and the 
objectification of that experience in action. 
Donagan has suggested that Collingwood's later 
philosophy of history cannot be reconciled with either 
realism or idealism: it draws from both. From realism, 
Donagan argues, Collingwood took the idea that 'thoughts 
are objective or "mediate", and not necessarily altered 
by the context in which we think them'. 150 But the 
"objective" existence of thoughts, in Collingwood's 
formulation, should not be confused with the dualism of 
subject and object, against which he railed in his 
Autobiography. 151 The "objectivity" of thoughts is, for 
Collingwood, a device to ensure at least the possibility 
of historical knowledge; to ensure, that is, that 
although 'knowing makes a difference to what is 
known"51 it is not a falsification of the original. 
The appropriate context in which to re-think a thought 
is supplied not by its place in an objective whole of 
facts but by a question asked by an historian. 
Collingwood's expression of the re-enactment theory 
if far from consistent, and it is quite possible, as 
Mink has pointed out, to see Colingwood, in The Idea of 
History, engaging in 'a philosophical analysis of 
historical method' . 
152 As such the discussion of re- 
thinking the thoughts of Caesar crossing the Rubicon, 153 
of the Theodosian code, 154 and of the murder of John 
Doe, 155 read like examples of how re-enactment leads to 
the discovery of facts about the past. This does not 
support the charge of intuitionism since, in all three 
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cases, the historian is interpreting "evidence". 
156 In 
the example of the murder in the vicaragel57 Collingwood 
shows just how widely an historian may cast his net for 
potential evidence, and reveals that the explanatory 
deliberation involved in certifying the plausability of 
a certain course of action from the standpoint of an 
agent (the agent's situation and the way it is 
perceived), is not restricted to reflective thought 
alone, if this means the expressed intention of an 
individual. Collingwood goes so far as to suggest that 
'the historian can rediscover what has been completely 
forgotten. He can even discover what until he 
discovered it, no one knew to have happened at all'. 158 
By reflective thought Collingwood means to exclude all 
theories which assert the determinate influence of 
natural or psychic causes. For him it is a 
presupposition of history that such "influences" do not 
determine human actions in a straightfoward cause and 
effect sense. 159 They form the 'proximate 
environment'160 within which actions take place; 
environmental forces "enter" history in terms of how 
they are perceived, reacted to, and overcome, but this 
is ultimately a matter for consciousness. 161 Similarly 
the idea of the irrational as determinate of thoughts 
and actions falls outside of history's subject 
matter. 162 This is not to suggest that all actions are 
rational in the sense of being reasonable or pre- 
planned; an action or past event may, for Collingwood, 
be entirely unreasonable. 163 The rationality of a past 
event is supplied by the historian in his understanding 
of it, and the question as to whether human activity is 
ultimately free is, in a sense, shelved while historical 
research procedes on the assumption that past actions 
may be understood from "within" as instances of 
conscious, though not necesarily intentional or 
purposive, thought rather than exemplars of classes or 
types of responses. 165 
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In the example of Caesar crossing the Rubicon166 
the historian has the record of an action which, having 
assessed, he intends to treat as something to be 
explained. The resulting explanation, that Caesar's 
crossing of the Rubicon was a challenge to, and defiance 
of, republican law, is achieved by a process of 
deliberation. 167 The historian reconstructs the 
'problem situation' - the situation in which the action 
occurred - and the possible alternative courses of 
action open to Caesar. Having decided upon the thought, 
or reason, most plausible relative to the problem 
situation, the historian then re-characterises the 
action complete now with its 'thought side' in answer to 
his original "why" question. This is what Dray has 
called discerning the practical argument contained 
within a past action: rational explanation from the 
standpoint of an agent or agents. This practical 
argument assumes a conscious awareness - the defiance of 
republican law - of a particular situation, but it is 
itself something inferred by an historian from evidence. 
It is not the discovery of 'something that cannot be 
gotten at through evidence, 168 in this case an 
explanatory thought. 
A good deal of confusion has arisen over the 
explanatory dimension of re-thinking past thoughts, in 
particular Collingwood's inside/outside metaphor, and 
the paradoxical statement, 'when the historian knows 
169 what happened he already knows why it happened'. 
There are, however, adequate examples in The Idea of 
History to conclude that re-enactment is not a vehicle 
for discovery. 170 Firstly, as Martin has pointed out, 
the historian 'reconstructs' from evidence: he 
characterises the action, or actions, under 
investigation according to the focus of his attention 
and the condition of current historical "opinion". The 
role of lempathetic imagination"171 Martin argues, 'is 
simply to put the investigator into a position where he 
can understand what the agent did, given his 
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reconstruction of the agent's thought. The function of 
empathy is to suggest alternative courses of action by 
172 considering the situation in which the agent stood'. 
If it is to be considered as explanatory, the re- 
enactment of past thought should be restricted to the 
"empirical" phase of history, where it takes its place 
alongside the belief that the object of history are 
actions expressing thoughts. 173 What these thoughts 
are, whether they are intelligbile, is a matter for the 
historian. 
The identification of an agent's thought with the 
thought re-enacted by an historian is a notion 
particularly susceptible to confusion. When Collingwood 
discusses the possibility of thinking over again the 
exact same thought of Euclid, 174 so that the historian's 
thought is not merely of the same kind but literally 
identical in terms both of act and content, both the 
philosophical and empirical phase of history are 
present. In its philosophical sense thought-revival 
supports the argument that experience is not mere 
immediacy and that thought, as conscious activity 
arrests and transcends the flow of subjective 
experience, and thus may be revived in a different, 
though always appropriate context. 175 This is an 
epistemological point, a contribution to Collingwood's 
solution to the problem of present knowledge of the 
past: 'I am considering how history, as the knowledge of 
past thoughts (acts of thoughts) is possible'. 176 In 
the empirical sense, thought revival refers to the kind 
of relationship between the thought or reason ascribed 
by an historian to an action, and his own 
"certification" of that thought as intelligible relative 
to the situation in which it occurred. Dray has 
clarified the issue by stating that the identity in 
Collingwood's theory is not one of sympathy, nor 
necessarily of empathy, 'what is literally identical in 
the thought of historian and agent is the rational force 
of the argument', 177 which is 'a discovery of 
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reason'. 178 The rational force of an argument is not a 
curiously inaccessible dimension to which the historian 
must, but dint of imagination, penetrate. Re-enactment 
does not lead the historian out of his present concern 
with interpreting evidence. Rather, it is a condition 
of that inference and a description of its goal. Dray, 
writes, that thought is activity, enquiry, and not 'mere 
spectacle', 'seeing whether we can re-think it as our 
thought will raise the question of its cogency'. 179 The 
importance of attending to the "phases" of history in 
Collingwood's thought is to prevent the re-enactment 
theory being interpreted as a device for getting at the 
past or for bringing the past into the present. 
Collingwood, in his Autobiography talks of the 
Ilaboratory'180 of his historical researches in which he 
could compare and contrast his theoretical ideas with 
his empirical results, and where his activity as both 
historian and archaeologist would suggest new 
philosophical problems. He castigated the realist 
separation of theory and practice. Several commentators 
including Donagan, Mink, Goldstein and Van der Dussenl8l 
have urged that more attention be paid to Collingwood's 
historical and archaeological writings in order to 
resolve conflicting interpretations, most specifically, 
relating to the scope of history's subject matter: how 
broad, or narrow, does the statement 'all history is the 
history of thought entail'? Van der Dussen has shown 
comprehensively that Collingwood's historical writings 
reveal the cross-over of several important philosophical 
ideas. 182 From his historical writings it may also be 
concluded that he did not hold, or at least employ, an 
extreme form of methodological individualism, 183 nor did 
he restrict history to instances of expressed 
intention. 184 Above all they indicate that evidence, 
understood as the record of conscious activity, is 
"created" by a 'scientific' interest in the past and is 
not intended to restrict the scope of historical 
research by defining its subject matter. 
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It is important to stress that Collingwood's re- 
enactment theory is not identical to his 'Baconian' 
logic of question and answer. The latter, which 
Collingwood claimed to have developed as early as 
19,8185 is indeed a methodology of research, or rather, 
it is a general description of a critical attitude 
attained in 'scientific' history. It is a theory which, 
in The Idea of History appears side by side with re- 
enactment and, in criticism, has often been confused for 
it. 186 They should, however, be kept separate. In The 
Idea of History Collingwood argues that the critical 
approach exemplified by putting evidence into the 
witness box and demanding what it means, of the 
historian constituting himself the sole authority and 
court of appeal is (although he overstates it), the 
hallmark of the newly-emerged scientific history. 187 
Much of his defence of the autonomy of history from the 
natural sciences is built upon this definition of 
history as itself a 'science'. In his Autobiography 
Collingwood claimed that it was his experience on 
archaeological digs which had first suggested how 
historical enquiries are question-led. 188 Subsequent 
reflection prompted him to conclude that the question 
was put not to external data but to the historian 
himself. 
This "scientific"189 attitude is undoubtedly 
related to the re-enactment theory, not least in its 
emphasis upon critically restructuring the 'question' to 
which a certain action (understood as the expression of 
thought) is a response. But they are, however, 
logically distinct. Re-enactment deals with the 
conditions, the possiblity and the goal of historical 
understanding, while the logic of question and answer 
refers to a process of investigation. Questions 
concerned with the truth, the subjective or objective 
dimension of history, should be related not to the re- 
thinking of past thoughts, but to the critical 
interpretation of evidence. The fact that it is 
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possible to know what Caesar was up to in crossing the 
Rubicon depends upon the assumption that his action 
(embodied only in record) expresses a conscious 
awareness of his 'problem-situation'. This assumption, 
in Collingwood's theory, provides history with a 
presently existing object. But an historical account, 
what actually took place and why, is the work of 
inferring from evidence. Dray has argued that the re- 
enactment of past experience is the effort of putting 
oneself in the position of an agent and attempting to 
conceive the situation as he or she did. 
190 It only 
makes sense to talk of this as a process of explanatory 
deliberation since, otherwise, 'How does a person who 
does not yet know what an agent Is thought was go about 
discovering what it was by re-thinking it, * 
191 
Goldstein has argued that the theory of re- 
enactment concerns 'how the historical past is known in 
historical research. It has nothing to do with 
192 
explanation at all' . To demonstrate this he 
introduces several examples from Collingwood's 
historical writings: the building of the Antonine wall, 
Emperor Severus' fortification campaign, and the 
presence of an Irish tombstone in Silchester. In all 
cases, he argues, Collingwood uses re-enactment to 
determine what the historical action actually was, that 
is, to explain the presence of evidence by postulating 
an historical event. The question 'why that sort of 
thing could happen' he considers to be 'something else 
again'. 193 The significant part of Goldstein's argument 
is that it emphasises that much of Collingwood's history 
was not concerned with the actions of named individuals, 
but with walls, fortifications, artistic traditions, 
etc. To interpret these objects as evidence in terms of 
the thought they express must be the work of inference 
and not of identification. Furthermore Dray has noted 
that, although Collingwood's most notorious examples of 
re-thinking mention named individuals - Caesar, Plato, 
Nelson - this may well have been better to illustrate 
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his theory. There are other examples of group actions, 
of long term, even "unconscious" traditions, 194 and of 
sympathy with the holistic tendencies of certain 
philosophers, most notably Vico. 195 The thoughts in 
question here could not have been 'before the minds' of 
a single individual although group actions might be 
reducible to the anonymous individuals. This prompts 
Dray to conclude, unlike Donagan, that Collingwood was a 
methodological holist but ontological individualist. 196 
It also, I would suggest, shows that for Collingwood, 
the statement 'all history is the history of thought' 
belongs to the epistemological conditions of historical 
knowledge. Concrete historical thinking assumes only 
that evidence is evidence for 'the products of human 
actions. The question whether these products should be 
seen as individual or collective is undetermined. if 
this is so then the characterisation of history as being 
concerned with thought does not exclude any branch of 
'historical scholarship'. 197 The re-enactment theory is 
not a description of the subject matter of history; it 
is an elucidation of the conditions which make 
historical knowledge possible. 
Goldstein, however, confuses re-enactment with the 
logic of question and answer. Collingwood's enquiry 
into the Silchester tombstone is an excellent example of 
his 'scientific' approach. It is a concrete instance of 
the procedure followed by the inspector in his murder 
story. Collingwood's question is, why is there a 
tombstone bearing an inscription in an Irish form of 
Celtic at a time when no Irish community is thought to 
have settled in that area? Goldstein believes that the 
answer - the postulated existence of an Irish colony - 
is the outcome of 'the working of the historical 
imagination ... the techniques and autonomy of history in 
the reconstruction of the historical past'. 198 This 
statement refers to Goldstein's broader thesis that 
history is a matter of 'constitution' and owes nothing 
to a correspondence or "realist" theory of historical 
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truth, which will be examined in chapter 5. He argues 
that the Ire-enactment of thought results in historical 
constitution, and historical constitution has the 
function of explaining evidence'. 199 This much is 
reasonable, but he goes on to assert that the 
explanation of evidence achieved by historical 
constitution is a different thing from the explanation 
of past events. 200 Now, either he is confirmed in his 
view that knowledge of the past as the correspondence 
between an historian's account and a past event has 
absolutely no implications for history, in which case 
historical constitution is the only possible knowledge 
of past events; or he is not, in which case the idea of 
history's explaining evidence is mere semantic nonsense. 
He cannot have it both ways and contend that the 
historical past explains one thing while explaining the 
"real" past is another. Certainly Collingwood did not 
allow this dualism. Re-enactment was developed in 
response to the problem of an "actual" object for 
historical knowledge. Evidence for Collingwood, is 
evidence of past thought which, though it may be an 
assumption, enables the historian to proceed as if his 
interpretation is not merely of evidence but of thoughts 
inferred from evidence. Indeed the assumption of this 
'encapsulated' past is perhaps, for Collingwood an 
absolute presupposition, neither true nor false but the 
guarantor of a level of intelligible communication. 
Goldstein is also implausible in assuming that the 
only 'why' questions in history must refer to background 
or situational causes of events. There is already a 
'why' question implicit in the historian's interest in 
the Silchester tombstone; a 'what' question might 
conceivably be satisfied with a description of the 
physical details of a piece of stone. Once again Dray 
puts it clearly when, in a discussion of Collingwood's 
what/why paradox, he writes that it 'only makes sense if 
the "it" refers to the action as characterised before 
the explanation begins; and the "what" refers to the 
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action as re-characteriseo when ... the thought said to 
explain it is incorporated into a re-description of what 
201 was done'. What I think Goldstein is contending is 
that the process of historical constitution establishes 
the 'thought side' of an event which thus renders it 
intelligible. Any further process of explaining the 
thought side - why an agent actually did conceive the 
situation in the way that he did - is a distinct and 
separate question. This seems to me to be correct. But 
it is not re-enactment which establishes what happened. 
Re-enactment provides the possibility of thoughts; what 
the various thoughts were is a result of critical 
inference, of a process of question and answer. 
The understanding achieved in the re-enactment of 
past experience is conceptual: re-thinking should be 
seen as a necessary, although not a sufficient, 
condition of historical knowledge. Historical evidence, 
in The Idea of History, is represented as "a problem to 
be solved". The past is 'encapsulated in the 
presentl202 because Collingwood has substituted the idea 
of a finished spectacle with the idea of process and 
"becoming". The question remains, what is the status of 
an historical re-enactment? 
There are passages in The Idea of History where 
Collingwood seems to be claiming that history can 
achieve a level of truth and certainty which is final 
and complete. He argues, for example, that 'the proof 
of a point in history can be as conclusive as a 
203 demonstration in mathematics'. His idea of the 
'self-determining' and self-justifying, innate 'a priori 
imagination, is another point in case. And yet the 
prevailing tenor of his argument is a recognition of the 
"historicity" of our knowledge of the past. He writes, 
'in history no achievement is final ... every new 
generation rewrites history'. 204 The kind of truth to 
be had in history is only achieved 'inferentially, 
arguing... from accessible evidence'. 205 The 'a priori' 
imagination is, as Donagan has suggested, better 
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described as a presupposition of historical thinking; an 
imagined picture of past events, localised in time and 
space which is presupposed by an historian, and, in this 
sense, is neither "true" nor "falsell. 206 What follows 
from the historian's particular picture must, however, 
be 'coherent and continuous ... one which makes sense'l 
207 
and is most certainly a matter for debate. The 
framework for these debates is defined by the 
"qualifications" which we have met before. In 1928 
Collingwood had written, 
The game is won not by the player who can 
reconstitute what really happened, but by the 
player who can show that his view of what 
happened is the one which the evidence 
accessible to all the players, when criticised 
up to the hilt supports... (there is) ... no way 
of knowing what is "correct", except by 
finding out what the evidence, critically 
interpreted proves ... The realist account of knowledge as apprehension of aI Oindependently existing object does not apply. 
In The Idea of Histor Collingwood reiterates this 
notion of historical truth when he writes, 'what we mean 
by asking whether an historical statement is true is 
whether it can be justified by an appeal to evidence'. 
And evidence, for the 'scientifically' minded historian 
is, leverything... which the historian can use as 
evidence'. 209 
Collingwood in fact, overstates the difference in 
approach between the 'scissors-and-pastel, and the 
'scientific' historian. There will always be 'questions 
of fact' which, for the purpose of a particular enquiry, 
are treated as having been settled. 210 To deny the 
operation of "focuses" of interest is to reintroduce the 
spectre of universal history, with the notion that to 
exclude any aspect of the context or background of a 
past event is to falsify and distort. When Collingwood 
says that 'scientific history includes no ready-made 
statements at all, 211 he is referring to a critical 
approach which refuses to recognise 'authorities' , 
212 
but he seems also to be suggesting that each historian 
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is working alone and in a vacuum; constructing anew the 
entire historical past. And this is a point which 
Oakeshott also , stumbles over. In both cases it is a 
consequence of pursuing the implications of present 
knowledge of the past and the absence of all 
correspondence, even with the work of other historians. 
Collingwood might usefully have added to the list of his 
'qualifications' assumed by historians an awareness of 
historiography. It was, however, his intention to 
distance history from positivism, which he characterised 
as the call to collect facts (events as instances of 
types) and then frame general laws, and also from the 
Ilogicician's conspiracyl, 213 which he linked to the 
lbankruptcy, 214 of realism. The latter conceived 
knowledge as a system of judgments, involving the 
asserting of propositions and the apprehending of facts. 
This conception, Collingwood realised, was fundamentally 
ahistorical and hostile to his own view of knowledge as 
a ceaseless and 'active process of questioning1: 215 'the 
dialogue of the soul with itself'. 216 History, 
according to Collingwood had, in its critical treatment 
of evidence and in its rejection of authorities and the 
primacy of direct testimony, undergone a 'Coprenican 
revolution'; 217 a revolution every bit as important for 
human self-understanding as that achieved by the natural 
sciences in the seventeenth century. The self-reliance 
of historical thought gave history the right to be 
recognised as an organised and systematic enquiry; an 
autonomous "science". However, it is to be 
distinguished from other sciences because, uniquely, it 
deals with human actions, res gestae, 218 and as such 
with the expression of past thoughts. Natural science, 
Collingwood argued, was interested in an event only as 
an instance of a generalisation: it goes 'beyond' the 
event to compare and classify. 
Essentially science plays a rhetorical role in 
Collingwood's theory. His main target for attack in The 
Idea of History (as he made clearer in his 
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Autobiography) was the dominance of an epistemology 
which had arisen with the ascendancy of the natural 
sciences in the nineteenth century, and which, he 
argued, was uncritically accepted by "realists" as the 
only correct description of how knowledge is arrived at. 
In the Autobiography Collingwood protested that this 
positivistic mentality, while excellently suited to 
dealing with material objects, was woefully unable to 
comprehend human affairs. 219 it treated "human nature" 
as an unchanging substance and so failed to penetrate to 
the complexity of particular, potentially unfamiliar 
situations. Even more damaging, in the hands of realist 
philosophers, was the idea that the process of our 
questions and answers; that the 'problems with which 
philosophy is concerned were unchanging"220 and this 
had resulted in the teaching of ethics and politics as 
spectacles to observe rather than activities to engage 
in. This led Collingwood to the tendentious conclusion 
that the 'minute philosophers' of his youth, 'for all 
their profession of a purely scientific detachment from 
practical affairs, were the propagandists of the coming 
221 fascism I. Collingwood's alternative, of course, was 
'living' history which recognised that, 'the past, its 
ostensible subject-matter, was encapsulated in the 
present and constituted a part of it not at once obvious 
to the untrained eye... history stood in the closest 
222 possible relation to practical life'. This belief 
is reminiscent of Croce's lethico-politicall history but 
not at all what Oakeshoot intended by an historical 
reading of the present. 
A Decline into Relativis ? 
Collingwood's "liquidationl, 223 of philosophy into 
history occurred sometime between 1932 and 1939. In the 
Essay on Philosophical Method he argued that philosophy 
is 'a distinct and living form of thought, and not an 
appendage of natural science or a part of history'. 224 
In the Idea of History he drew a distinction between 
'philological history', which confuses history with 
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'Just scholarship or learning', and history proper. 225 
The first inquiries into 'what Plato thought.. without 
enquiring "whether it is true'11.226 Yet in a passage in 
his Autobiography (written in 1939) discussing the 
history of changing presuppositions, he argued that, 'It 
is not their', (the metaphysician-historian), 'business 
to raise the further question whether, among the various 
beliefs on this subject that various people hold, this 
one or that one is true'. 227 Now Knox, as we have seen, 
represents this as Collingwood's decline into 
scepticism. It has also been pointed out that, during 
the years of this shift in Collingwood's thoughts he was 
immersed in historical studies, 228 and that this 
exacerbated the tendency, already present, to elevate 
the model of historical research above all others. 
This, however, is only a partial explanation of 
Collingwood's later "historicism". There are also 
reasons to believe that Collingwood's position in his 
Autobiography and the Essay on Metai: )hvsics is not a 
complete break with his earlier thought. 
History, for Collingwood, exemplified the thesis 
that knowing makes a difference to what is known. 
History became the ideal of a subject-object unity in 
knowledge. Furthermore history is knowledge of the past 
'encapsulated, 229 in the present; it asks the question 
"how has the present come to be what it is? " The 
subject matter of history is past human actions, it is, 
as Collingwood would put it, knowledge of what mind has 
done in the past. But, as Collingwood also argued, 
reality is itself historical, a constant process of 
change and becoming. As such history - its concepts, 
methods and criteria of rationality - are also under 
constant review: History cannot be made to square with 
theories according to which the object of knowledge is 
abstract and changeless, a logical entity towards which 
mind may take up various attitudes. 230 The historical 
past is a never ending process of questioning and 
answering. It is never finished because, fundamentally, 
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it exists only in relation to a present critical 
concern. And more than this, history is self- 
knowledge; 231 the 'value of history... is that it teaches 
us what man has done and thus what man ist. 232 What man 
is, is not an act of mere apprehension, it is an 
engagement to infer; to-think critically. This calls 
attention to the importance of present interest in 
determining which past will be re-constructed 
(Collingwood gives the example of Enlightenment 
historians' dismissive attitude to the Middle Ages). 233 
In a passage discussing the goal of historical re- 
thinking, he writes: 
... historical knowledge is not either knowledge of the past, and therefore not 
knowledge of the present, or else knowledge of 
the present and therefore not knowledge of the 
past; it is knowledge of the past in the 
present, the self-knowledge of the historian's 
own mind as the preEnrýt thinking and reliving 
of past experiences. 
In the Autobiography the same point is translated into 
more heuristic terms: 
In re-thinking what somebody else thought, he 
thinks it himself. In knowing that somebody 
else thought it, he knows that he himself is 
able to think it. And finding out what he is 
able to do is finding out what kind of man he 
is. If he is able to understand, by re- 
thinking then, the thoughts of a great many 
different kinds of people, it follows that he 
must be a great many kinds of man. He must 
be, in fact, a microcosm of all the history he 
knows. Thus his own self-knowledge is at the 
0s knowledge of the world of human same tim? 3 affairs. 
History is epistemologically licit, and it is, for 
Collingwood (as for Croce) ethically important. As an 
autonomous form of thought it reveals the impotence of 
the positivistic claim to explain "human natur e". 
Collingwood denies any division between theory and 
practice, and supports the idea of the 'gloves-off 236 
philosopher. 
It has been argued that Collingwood's theory of 
presuppositional analysis is in fact the method of 
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historical reconstruction. Skagestad has contended that 
presuppositional analysis of question and answer 
"chainsl, 237 is the method of re-enactment, 238 and that 
the theory of presuppositions provides the 
'epistemological moorings for the re-enactment 
doctrine'. 239 This assessment runs foul of the non- 
methodological interpretation of re-enactment, and it 
also fails to connect the theory of presuppositions with 
the 'rapprochement' between history and philosophy. 
This latter is achieved by the resolution of metaphysics 
into an historical inquiry into general beliefs about 
the world. 240 The metaphysician becomes a 'special kind 
of historiant. 241 
One of the main elements in the theory of 
presuppositions is that, in order to know what a 
statement, or action, means, one must know the question 
to which it is an lanswerl; 242 this means it owes to the 
earlier 'logic of question and answer'. In the Essay on 
Metaphysics Collingwood wrote, 
If the meaning of a proposition is relative to 
the question it answers, its truth must be 
relative to the same thing. Meaning, 
agreement and contradiction, truth and 
falsehood, none of these belonged to 
propositions in their own right, propositions 
by themselves, they belonged only to 
propositions answering a question strictly 
correlative to itself. 243 
To find out what a particular 'proposition' meant - be 
it a potsherd or philosophical theory - is to 
reconstruct a 'complex of question and answers', a 
process which is historical. The answer to a question 
becomes the presupposition of the next question and so 
on in linear fashion. To trace an intellectual 
tradition involves following a chain of questions and 
answers. 244 
The idea of presuppositional analysis is 
Collingwood's attempt to do justice to the assertion 
that history 'is concerned with processes not events, 
and processes are 'things which do not begin and end but 
turn into one another'. 245 It also characterizes the 
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provisional and shifting nature of historical knowledge. 
'There is no finality in any knowledge whatever. There 
is nothing about which we have any knowledge at all, 
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about which there is not more to know'. 
The difficulty with the theory of presuppositions 
is that Collingwood was not content to emphasise the 
point that all actions have contexts and that, in order 
fully to understand them we must reconstruct the problem 
situation in which they occurred and made them 
intelligible. Above these 'relative' presuppositions 
which "give rise" to questions, he postulated the 
existence of 'absolute' presuppositions which are 
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neither true not false, do not have propositional 
form, and are never themselves "answers to questions". 
A complex, or chain, of question and answers 
presupposing each other in a relative manner is 
grounded not in an infinite regression, but on certain 
general and shared principles or beliefs about 'the 
world's general nature, the presuppositions of all their 
"physics", that is, their inquiries into its detaill. 248 
The existence of these absolute presuppositions, such as 
'God exists', the Newtonian principle of continuity, and 
the Kantian principle of universal causality (all of 
which appear to have, despite his claims to the 
contrary, propositional form), in Collingwood's thought, 
have led several commentators to the conclusion that he 
succumbed to 'charms of an historical relativism'. 
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Rotenstreich, Toulin, and Krausz share this 
conclusion; 2-50 Donagan and Skagestad believe that any 
attempt to force a rigid distinction between relative 
and absolute presuppositions is doomed to failure. 
251 
Dray, on the other hand, regards the theory of absolute 
presuppositions as 'primarily a theory of certain limits 
to the possibility of Collingwoodian explanation in 
history'. 252 Mink is perhaps alone in endorsing 
Collingwood's theory in its entirety. He sees it as 
Collingwood's way of confronting conceptual change: 
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Collingwood's final answer to the question - 
what is the validity of philosophical 
arguments which belong to a history in which 
the criteria of validity have their own 
history of change ... Historicism is itself a kind of Copernican revolution which dissolves 
the egocentric &: pviction that history pivots 
on the present. 
For Mink the analysis of presuppositions and the 
transition form one 1constellationj254 of absolute 
presuppositions to another helps to clarify the role of 
collective and institutional factors in Collingwood's 
theory of history. 255 Absolute presuppositions are 
supposedly, a widely shared basis for communication, and 
that may also be 'coercive in their relation to 
individuals, 256 in the sense of defining the limits of 
rationality. Mink argues that the 'discernible patterns 
of imagination, belief and action in historical 
epochs, 257 should not be taken as 'causally 
explicable"258 but 'intelligible as exhibiting the 
complex structure of the world and themselves'. 259 In 
spite of the brilliance of this interpretation of 
absolute presuppositions as the culmination of 
Collingwood's dialectical concept of thought, Mink fails 
to explain why Collingwood needed to place them beyond 
verification, beyond truth and falsehood, and even 
beyond conscious awareness. How can absolute 
presuppositions, Dray asks, be 'explanatory thoughts in 
the Collingwoodian sense? 1.260 To be so they must be 
thoughts which have been 'ascribed to the agent, 
thoughts he actually "had"'. 261 Yet Collingwood denied 
that absolute presuppositions can be thought in this 
way. Most importantly of all, the postulation of 
presuppositions which are absolute and a Rriori, 
threatens the entire structure of his re-enactment 
doctrine. Skagestad has aptly summarised the assumption 
which underlies Collingwood's theory: 'the realm of 
presuppositions is bounded by a common rationality, 
every corner of which can be invaded given sufficient 
imagination and goodwill'. 262 
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The assumption of a common human rationality is 
important to Collingwood's theory of history; not a 
timeless, unchanging human nature, but a continuous 
chain of questions and answers which links out 
263 presuppositions to those of preceding generations. 
The presence, in different epochs, of presuppositions 
which determine our "sciences" - 'any body of systematic 
or orderly thinking about a determinate subject 
matterl264 - threatens to rupture the unbroken chain of 
presuppositions, and turn certain fundamental statements 
about the world into relations holding within a single 
self-enclosed context. Historical relativity, as Toulin 
has pointed out, is all too quickly converted into 
historical relativism. But this is not the 'necessary 
and inescapable consequence of a cultural diversity and 
265 relativity of intellectual concepts'. As Collingwood 
provides us with no criteria for identifying absolute 
266 presuppositions, and since they are not acquired 
through argument, it is difficult to see how one person 
can share the same thoughts of another if their absolute 
presuppositions differ, a problem compounded by the fact 
that 'no one person can be aware of his own absolute 
presuppositions'. 267 
If one ignores the more extreme relativist 
implications of the theory, 268 then it could be argued 
that Collingwood was attempting to describe the relation 
of specific statements, or questions, in a conceptual 
system, to more general doctrines. General doctrines or 
principles of a 'science' would, in this sense, be 
assumed and would guarantee the intelligibility of 
lower-level questions. 269 This as Mink has pointed 
out, 270 would place Collingwood's theory in proximity to 
Kant's categories of understanding, and to 
Wittgenstein's analysis of language games, both of which 
attempt to describe the determination of what is 
conceivable. it might also suggest possible 
similarities with T. S. Kuhn's model of 'scientific 
revolutions' in which certain "paradigms" guarantee, and 
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to an extent determine the course of 'normal' scientific 
activity. 271 "Breakdowns" and large scale theoretical 
or conceptual shifts occur at the level of paradigm 
"failure"; failure to predict and control the course of 
scientific discovery. This interpretation of 
Collingwood's theory illuminates its positive aspects, 
in particular its account of conceptual systems may not 
necessarily be the consequence of conscious decision- 
making. Furthermore it helps to clarify his own 
investigations into the changes in the concept, or idea, 
of history and of nature. His examples in the Essay on 
Metaphysics272 are mainly drawn from the development of 
the natural sciences and the way in which a dominant 
presupposition of an age - Newtonian, Kantian, 
Einsteinian - have given rise to a particular cosmology. 
But one can also apply this notion to the idea of 
history, with its development through distinct phases - 
Greek, Christian, Enlightenment, 'scientific'. In each 
case the particular concept of history, of the relation 
of past to the present, was embedded in, and entailed 
certain general conceptions about human nature. The 
break-through of Vico, 273 and the beginning of "modern" 
historiography, involved the recognition that so-called 
human nature was itself only a product of human 
activities, subject to constant change. Yet there is 
nothing in The Idea of Histg. Ky or The Idea of Nature to 
suggest that these large scale conceptual shifts - these 
cosmological changes - are anything but rational and 
274 conscious developments, susceptible to statement in 
propositional form and, above all, matters which are to 
be j udged as good or bad, progressive or stagnatory. 
Toulin has argued that Collingwood might have done 
better had he distinguished between theory and 
'disciplinary aims', so that a change in fundamental 
concepts need not be from one self-enclosed universe of 
discourse to another, and could be intelligible provided 
there 'exist a body of intellectual ambitions, and 
rational methods, common disciplinary principles, 
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criteria of adequacy which guarantee a continuity of 
methods... if not of theoretical principles'. 275 
In the Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood resolved 
the last remaining aspect of philosophy into history; 
metaphysics becomes a 'kind of cultural 
anthropology"276 'a study of different world views 
entertained in the course of history by individuals and 
277 groups of individuals'. The problem for this kind of 
metaphysical study of changing constellations of 
absolute presuppositions, is that it must assume the 
independence of the mind which enquires into 
historically-conditioned conceptual systems from any 
such determination. This is the dilemma of any 
sociology of knowledge, or of 'conceptual 
relativism'. 278 And yet Collingwood was neither a 
determinist nor a sceptic. In his theory of history he 
declares the freedom of human action from natural or 
psychological causes. Why then, the attempt to ground 
human rationality in presuppositions which are not 
consciously held? 
The increasing stridency of Collingwood's 
historicism was undoubtedly a reaction to what he took 
as the moral bankruptcy of theories which separated the 
knower from what is known, 279 and which did no justice 
to the historical dimension of all human activity. The 
theory of presuppositions warns us not to attempt to 
familiarise the unfamiliar through anachronism and 
assimilation. 280 But Collingwood's theory of history is 
built upon the present engagement of an historian, on 
the authority of historical thought and on the autonomy 
of its conclusions. 281 The empathetic deliberation 
which completes an historical re-enactment must, in the 
final analysis, be justified by the sense it makes to 
the historian himself or herself. A re-enactment relies 
for its credibility upon coherent extrapolation from 
evidence and its relation to other historical writing. 
History then, as a 'science', has developed certain 
procedures for dealing with evidence. It presupposes - 
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as other disciplines presuppose - that its conclusions 
refer to an external reality: past events. But this 
external object, this thing-in-itself, is an object 
composed within the enquiry itself (an historical past) 
rather than approximated to or corresponded with. 
History, in Collingwood's later philosophy is reality 
itself and so the conclusions of historical enquiry are 
themselves dissolved in a ceaseless process of question 
and answer. Historical re-enactment are relative to 
particular questions which form links in a chain of 
historical research. In his Autobiography Collingwood 
clarifies this idea by talking of 'right' answers in 
relation to questions are those which help one to 
proceed in an investigation; 282 truth relative to 
present interests. 283 The introduction of absolute 
presuppositions which are neither true nor false makes a 
nonsense of "interest" as being a matter for selection 
and conscious adoption. 
Furthermore to take seriously the implications of 
the absolute presuppositions of an epoch is to limit 
historical re-enactment to individuals who share the 
same conceptual categories as our own. Absolute 
presuppositions - it it is possible to identify them in 
the thoughts of past agents - it if is possible to 
identify them in the thoughts of past agents - provide a 
way out of infinite regress, and a closed system in 
which to re-construct a particular action. But this is 
bedrock certainty bought at the price of 
incommensurability. Above all it is an arbitrary 
delineation of the history of conscious activity founded 
on certain fundamental principles which Collingwood 
seems to employ as the unconscious determinants of 
thought. 
The implications of the theory of absolute 
284 presuppositions are, as Knox suggested, sceptical if 
interpreted as an attempt at system-mongering. This 
interpretation does, however, contradict the development 
of Collingwood's theory of history. Rather, I think, we 
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must attempt to understand them in the way suggested by 
Mink; as large and shared concepts which are the basis 
for communication among individuals, and which allows 
the historian to direct his efforts at relating a 
particular thought or action to its "appropriate" 
matrix. In this way the theory is a conceptual or 
interpretative formulation of the principle that 'how we 
think is inseparable from the question in what terms we 
thinkl. 285 To view his later position as advocating 
formal, self-enclosed systems is to reintroduce an idea 
that Collingwood himself rejected when he re-worked the 
idealist belief in the subjective immediacy of all 
thought. 
Absolute presuppositions, taken quite literally, 
would be the assertion of the absolute nature of certain 
relative values and concepts, which would be a 
contradiction in itself. I believe that Collingwood, in 
defending both the autonomy of history and the 
historicity of all our judgements (even of philosophy) 
overstretched his position and attempted to define 
certain boundaries which would mark out the shifting 
conclusions attained in history: 286 the limits of an 
historicist understanding that would leave space for the 
attainment of "true" knowledge about the past. 
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Chapter 3- Michael Oakeshott. History: Conversation or 
Discourse? 
Mr Oakeshott's thesis... is so original, so 
important and so profound that criticism must be 
silent until his meaning has been long 
pondered-the chapter on history is the most 
penetrating analysis of historical thought that 
has ever been written... (R. G. Collingwood) 
Introduction 
Oakeshott's contribution to the philosophy of history 
is substantial, yet his reception has been patchy, and 
sometimes hostile. His approach is perhaps, amongst our 
idealist, the most systematically lucid. His conclusions 
are, somewhat ironically, the most destructive to the 
possibility of history. Whereas Collingwood presumes a 
reality of past actions and events that may be 
reconstructed through the critical interpretation of 
evidence, l Oakeshott discards altogether the comforting 
assumption that this historical account must have been, 
more or less, how things actually were. He does not deny 
that the past was once present, but that the ontology of 
past, present, and future is entirely irrelevant to 
history as a form of thought or experience. The 
epistemology, or logic, of historical understanding is 
Oakeshott's sole professed concern. To the extent that 
his investigation into the nature and activity of history 
pursues, with relentless rigour, what it means to know now 
what happened in the past, he pushes to the limits the 
assertion of both Croce and Collingwood that historical 
thought is a present engagement with the world. 
History, in Oakeshott's phenomenology, is a 
particular "modal" reading of present objects to "evoke" 
the past. There is no trace of any desire to recover or 
even discover the "truth" of the past lying behind present 
evidence, nor of the attempt to re-enact the experience of 
past individuals. The past of historians is, for 
Oakeshott, one way, among many, of 'attending' to the 
constituents of a present 'world of ideas'. At the 
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outset, then, his position may be characterised as 
understanding history as construction, not as 
reconstruction. The past of history neither lives in the 
present, nor has it any substantive existence to which the 
use of carefully honed methods may penetrate. 2 The 
'historical past', composed of 'contingently related 
events I exists as the outcome of an enquiry. it is an 
inferred past, 'an invitation to imagine'. 3 
Oakeshott's theory has been described as advocating 
4 the study of the past for its own sake, and, in this way, 
identified with that of others - most notably Butterfield 
and Elton5 - who have emphasised the importance of 
scholarly detachment, a recognition of the dissimilarities 
between past and present, and the rejection of a practical 
orientation as the proper way of investigating the past. 6 
Yet Oakeshott's assertion that the historical past is 
concerned with a past that is dead and irretrievable is 
only a distant relation of the ideal of disinterested 
scholarship. 7 Oakeshott shares a repugnance of 
anachronism, towards all attempts to assimilate the past 
to the presenta and demand that it teach lessons or offer 
guidance, and against any notion that past events are of a 
type to be classified into regular patterns exhibiting 
law-like relations. But there the similarity ends. 
Oakeshott's position rests on his conclusion that the past 
which the historian is interested in has not, because it 
could not, have survived. The detachment, the respect of 
the historian for the past he investigates, is not merely 
a cautionary exhortation or an intellectually responsible 
approach; for Oakeshott it is the inescapable condition of 
all our knowledge. All knowledge is experience, all 
experience is present experience and so the historical 
past is itself present, the historian's 'world of ideas'. 
A past-for-the-past's sake approach is a sensible 
distinction only with regard to keeping apart a practical 
from an historical interest in present objects which are 
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recognised to have 'survived' from the past. It does not 
serve to delineate two worlds: the world of past events 
lying beyond the intrusion of historians' value judgements 
and the methods of social scientists, enshrined for ever 
in its complete integrity, and the world of historians' 
efforts to account for, represent, claw back, or reflect 
this past reality. For Oakeshott, history is what 
historians make, or infer, not what they dig up or 
describe. 
Oakeshott has also been labelled an idealist, 9 and 
thus an extreme exponent of the autonomy of history. His 
approach has been regarded as highly sceptical - possibly 
even nihilisticlO - towards the possibility of knowledge 
of the past, with the consequence that he reduces history 
to whatever the historian spins out of his head. I want 
to examine the nature and extent of this scepticism, and 
also focus or. the differentia of Oakeshott's idealism. 
Dray has criticised oakeshott's idea of 'continuity' and 
'discontinuity' as an explanatory postulate of the 
'historical' past. 11 He questions whether the categorial 
rejection of cause' as an irrelevant intrusion from the 
scientific mode is defensible and, as a result, whether 
Oakeshott has really achieved what Collingwood praised him 
for doing, establishing that the 'historian is master in 
his own housel. 12 Walsh has asked whether Oakeshott's 
rigid division between a practical and specifically 
'historical' past is sustainable, noticing how severely it 
circumscribes historical interest and the use of 
organisational hindsight. 13 1 want to assimilate these 
various criticisms and refer them to the wider context of 
Oakeshott's philosophy. In relation to history this 
argument will extend discussion by including an account of 
the first three essays of on History, 14 which Oakeshott 
has referred to as 'the only work of mine that matters'. 15 
The three essays On History are the culmination of 
Oakeshott's reflection on the activity or engagement of 
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history. The remarkable semantic intricacies which he 
weaves reflect his efforts to specify the conditions, the 
content, and the status of an historical past, itself, 
necessarily, a reading of the present. It is with 
Oakeshott's attempt to delineate an historical past 
distinguished from a practical, scientific, or poetic 
past, that this chapter is primarily concerned. But I do 
not want merely to describe its outlines and determine its 
structural weaknesses. In order to understand what 
Oakeshott means by a specifically historical past we must 
raise the question of why he goes to such extraordinary 
lengths to define both its autonomy and its conditional 
nature. In his work form is inseparable from content; 16 
the dimensions of the historical past are 
indistinguishable from the objects which furnish it: the 
objects of this world are constituted in relation to 
ourselves. Oakeshott's ideas, Cowling has argued, are 
'inseparable from himself'. 17 The very fragility, 
transience, and conditional nature of an historical past 
is reflected in the array of sub-clauses and 
qualifications which he employs: 
By an historical event I mean an occurrence or 
situation, inferred from surviving record, 
alleged to be what was actually happening, in a 
certain respect, then and there, and understood 
in terms of its emergence; that is, understood 
as an eventus or outcome of what went before. 18 
And these qualifications do not merely confirm Oakeshott's 
precision in formulating the character of the historical 
past, they are testimony of an attitude or understanding 
which is elusive, difficult to sustain, and a 'holiday 
excursion, 19 from the more pressing demands of practical 
existence. I want to ask, then, not only what is 
Oakeshott's hi-storical past, but what he intends by it, 
and whether, -1 n the end, he means it to be an achievable 
accomplishment. 
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Philosophy and the 'abstract' Modes of Experience 
In Oakeshott Isf irst book ELcRerience and - 
its Modes 
(1933) history appears as a mode of experience, a partial 
and abstract 'world of ideas', which, in asserting reality 
(which is present through and through) in the form of the 
past reveals itself to be an 'arrest' in experience and a 
renunciation of the concrete whole of experience which 
accepts no modification in its search for a completely 
coherent, unified world of ideas. In this extraordinary 
restatement of the first principles of idealism2O it is 
philosophy, 'the determination to remain unsatisfied with 
anything short of a completely coherent world of 
ideas... experience sought and followed for its own 
21 sake" which is able to criticise the various modes of 
experience (history, science, and practice)22 for their 
various abstractions and for their attempt to conceive the 
whole world of experience from the perspective of their 
own organising postulates (past, quantity, and change). 
Philosophy exposes their inherent contradiction; their 
qualification and representation of a world of ideas which 
is a seamless whole, and in so doing supersedes them from 
the standpoint of experience as a whole. However, as 
Fuller has pointed out, the 'philosopher is caught between 
the insufficient and the infinitely removed'. 
23 That is 
to say, although Oakeshott contends that philosophy is the 
ground and aim of all experience, the only fully coherent 
way of understanding our experience, it is an attitude 
extremely difficult to attain and sustain: it is 'useless 
to men of business, 24 and, in one sense, it is the 'denial 
of life'. 25 it is not surprising then, that the 'sweet 
kisses of abstraction, 26 entrap us, and that 'most people 
most of the time are content to understand the world 
within the framework of a particular modes' construction 
of the world'. 27 Oakeshott gives this explicit 
recognition by asserting that, though philosophy may 
supersede the modes of experience it cannot take their 
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place. Within the particular modes there is a certain 
'level' of achievement of coherence in experience, the 
attainment of truth 'in so far as it goes'. 28 This may be 
represented as the consistent organisation of its subject 
matter according to the postulates or assumptions of the 
particular modal understanding. Oakeshott writes, that 
the 'differentia in a form of experience may be taken to 
lie in the degree of thoroughness with which the criterion 
29 is applied'. Fuller aptly characterises this 
understanding in the following way: 
A 'model of experience is not merely a 
perspective on things. A mode is a disciplined, 
if ultimately arbitrarily founded, account of 
experience proceeding from certain assumptions 
about the way in which the world is to be 
explained and which develops over time peculiar 
methods of inquiry that will create a body of 
organised knowledge and identifiable manners of 
conduct that will portray our world of 
experience as, implicitly, the practitioners 
learn to look: the historian's past, the 
scientist's nature, the politician's pry3ect for 
progress, the poet's world of images... 
Philosophy can separate the modes of experience but not 
abolish them. The constant demands of practical 
understanding on our attention indicates just how 
"useless" philosophy is to our day to day existence. 31 
Yet, if philosophy provides no extrinsic goal, and no 
particular and superior kind of knowledge, it is able to 
identify the modality (and thus abstraction) of all 
attempts to define reality as one thing rather than 
another; reality as history, or a world of quantifiable 
relations. Precisely because philosophy entails, 
according to Oakeshott, no presuppositions or 
postulates, 32 it can reveal how each mode of experience 
attempts to flow out of the confines of its modality and 
colonise experience as a whole. Each mode, however, in 
arresting experience at a particular point is governed by 
its own fixed system of postulates within which its 
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pursuit of understanding may be coherent and self- 
sustaining, 33 and each mode of experience is utterly 
autonomous and independent of any other. The modes are 
not tracts in experience, not separate fields of knowledge 
which may be combined to f orm a whole; they embody the 
attempt to conceive reality as a whole in a categorically- 
defined way. 34 As such they are mutually exclusive: they 
cannot converse or co-operate with each other. Any 
attempt to move from one modal understanding to another 
without recognition of the dominion of their organising 
presuppositions, results in a fundamental contradiction, a 
hybrid form of experience, or to what Oakeshott calls 
ignoratio elenchi. 35 A science of history is an example 
of ignoratio elenchi, the forcing together of the category 
of cause and effect with the contingency of the historical 
world. 
Cowling refers Oakeshott's argument in Experience and 
its Modes to the intellectual climate of Cambridge in the 
1920s and the 'proliferation of areas of academic study'. 
In this light, Oakeshott's position is 'polemical indeed'. 
Cowling writes: 
What theoretical innocence had done was to 
forget that the worlds of experience were 
abstractions, and to claim for particular 
abstractions a power either to disclose reality 
or to deploy reýjity in relation to worlds other 
than their own. 
Oakeshott attacks the idea of rationalistic, social- 
science programmes (such as anthropology) for learning, 
which attempt to patch together a coherent form of enquiry 
out of the different and incompatible modes of thought. 
These ventures mistake what Oakeshott holds to be the 
essential conception of learning as an 'adventure' in 
'self-enactment' and understanding; they forget that 
'knowledge iEý experience organised according to the 
postulates of a world which the mind has established'i 37 
and they also separate subject form object, or experience 
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from experiencing. In a recent work Oakeshott has urged 
us to recognise that an adventure in self-knowledge is an 
38 inescapable 'ordeal of consciousness" and that, as 
Fuller puts it, 'the human condition is a predicament, not 
39 an itinerary'. To an extent then, as Cowling has 
pointed out, Experience and its Modes contains a 
'recognition of the unsatisfactory but unavoidable nature 
40 
of partial experiences and understandings'. All 
understanding is modal, and modality is abstract. 
Oakeshott attempts to limit the damage of this partiality 
by defending these "abstractions" as 'autonomous 'levels, 
within experience and at the same time, to expose their 
presuppositions and, in this way, prevent any one 
particular mode from being held up (as empirical research 
was by positivism) as the model of all that is true in 
knowledge. They are all alike conditional, and, from the 
standpoint of experience as a whole, arbitrary 
'backwaters' and Imistakes, 41 which have only the 
satisfaction of their own partial organisation of reality. 
The thesis of Experience and its Modes is intangible 
and circular and the commentator has called it 'down right 
mysterious'. Above all it is extremely unclear whether 
Oakeshott believes that the effort of philosophy to remain 
unsatisfied with anything but a completely coherent world 
of ideas can 'come to completion'. 42 On the one hand 
philosophy is itself the 'criterion of all true 
experience' and serves as a caution to all ambitious 
abstractions, positivism among them. In this role it is a 
reference back to the "Absolute" in Bradley's thought; the 
beginning and end of all thought; the interrelationship of 
facts and the principle of coherence. It does not lie 
behind nor ahead of experience: it is experience made 
concrete, unitary and whole. Oakeshott does, however, 
handle this monistic concept with extreme care. Though 
philosophical experience reveals the contradictions 
inherent in maintaining the dualisms of subject and 
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object, mediate and immediate, experience and reality, it 
cannot be consulted or appealed to, and philosophy has no 
practical consequences: it cannot provide a "philosophy of 
lif ell. In Oakeshott's thought this "Absolute" in 
experience acts as a negative and limiting block upon our 
faith in reason. Philosophy thus serves a sceptical 
function; it 'raises the spectre of incoherency, and hence 
insecurityl: 43 it is the 'philosopher's sceptical 
disease, 44 which threatens the certainty that 
practitioners might have in their various modal 
procedures. Philosophy can, as Collingwood wrote in his 
review of Oakeshott in The Idea of History, show that we 
are, for example, 'at liberty to be historians', and that 
historians can 'play their game according to its own 
rules ... tolerate no interference, and listen to no 
analogies from any outside quarter'. 45 But philosophy 
will also show that history is only a game, made up of its 
players and the rules to which they subscribe. 46 
Fuller has suggested that Oakeshott's scepticism in 
Experience and its Modes is 'in the manner of friendly 
detachment, not of hostility'. 47 This assessment is 
accurate to the account of the various modes of experience 
when they are minding their own business, but Oakeshott is 
extremely hostile to rationalistic schemes (reflected in 
48 his writings on politics and education), to the idea of 
co-operative exchange between the modes of experience, and 
to any attempt to divide subject from object in knowledge 
and make truth a matter of correspondence or approximation 
to some external standard. Cowling's conclusion that 
Oakeshott, at this point, is 'less conservative than 
bohemian and nihilistic, 49 is far more apposite. 
History as a World of Ideas 
The most striking feature of Oakeshott's 'historical 
experience'" as it appears in Experience and its Modes, 
is how exactly it conforms to an idealist epistemology. 
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In his later writings Oakeshott makes the claim that he is 
attempting to elicit the logic, 51 of historical 
understanding as it is implicit in the enquiry of 
historians. In ExRerience and its Modes his first concern 
seems to be to illustrate the thesis that all reality is 
experience, all experience is thought, and all thought is 
a present 'world of ideas'. He acknowledges that 'the 
historian is engaged in the attempt to establish truth or 
coherence in the world of history itself, 52, whereas his 
point of view is that of philosophy, the 'standpoint of 
the totality of experience'. 53 Collingwood has argued 
that, in Oakeshott's scheme, it is unclear why experience 
is arrested to become history, and Oakeshott no where 
gives a clear explanation of this, preferring to contend 
that modality is a condition of our partial understandings 
of the world. Experience is then arrested, and history 
'asserts' reality under the category of past: sub si: )ecie 
Praeteritorum. 54 This exclusive concern with the pastness 
of the present is, according to Oakeshott, the most basic 
55 and important of history's postulates. 
Oakeshott argues that experience - the inseparable 
and 'concrete whole which analysis divides into 
"experiencing" and "what is experienced" l56 _ is a unity 
of subject and object. Experience is not immediate 
consciousness, 'the mere flow of sensations and feelings, 
it is also and always thought, judgment and assertion of 
reality'. 57 If history is to be a genuine form of 
experience it must be thought and thus a unity fo the 
historian and his object, the past. But the past as such 
is something outside of experience, a world of external 
events, and something outside of experience is something 
not known: a non-entity. 58 To be known the past must be a 
part of the historian's present experience (all experience 
being necessarily present, a here and now) . Oakeshott 
achieves this unity with little difficulty. He writes: 
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... the distinction between history as it happened (the course of events) and history as 
it is thought, the distinction between history 
itself and merely experienced history, must 
go... it is meaningless. The historian's 
business is not to discover, to recapture, or 
event 0 interpret; it is to create and 
construct. Interpretation and discovery imply 
something independent of experience, 59 and 
there 
is nothing independent of experience. 
Like Croce and Collingwood, Oakeshott criticises the 
notion of a real and recoverable past reality. 60 The 
history that historians write is not to be equated with a 
"time series"; 61 like 'every other form of experience' 
history 'must make its material as well as determine its 
methods, for the two are inseparable'. 62 Every 
'historical event', 62 Oakeshott argues, involves an 
historical judgement, which is an act of thought or 
inference on the part of an historian and not an act of 
recall or recovery. 
For Oakeshott history is an lorganisation of present 
consciousness''. 63 it is the historian's critical 
experience, 64 and as such the 'historian's world of 
ideas'. But this is not to condone subjectivity, since an 
historical construction is an act of thought, not of 
unrestrained imagination: it is a judgment founded on the 
"reading" of evidence. 65 At the same time an historical 
construction is not objective 'in the sense of being 
untouched by thought or judgementl66 as this would place 
67 history outside of experience. As an act of 
construction history can make no use of a correspondence 
notion of truth, there being nothing external to the 
historian's present experience with which to correspond. 
The principle of truth in history, as it is for all our 
experience, is coherence. History Oakeshott continues, 
begins with 'a homogenous world of ideas, 68 (which I take 
to mean a provisional understanding, or sketch, of a past 
'occurrence, ) and 'the work of the historian consists in 
the transformation of this world as a whole, in the 
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pursuit of coherence'. 69 The 'process in historical 
thinking is never a process of incorporation, it is always 
a process by which a given world of ideas is transformed 
into a world that is more of a world'. 70 The idealist 
principle of coherence and interrelatedness confirms the 
movement in history from provisional hypothesis to more 
complete description; 71 this movement is a movement in our 
present thought, in the pursuit of a more intelligible 
72 account of evidence, from which the historian infers73 
the existence of past events. 
One immediate consequence of Oakeshott's position is 
to dissolve any distinction between history and 
historiography, between res gestae and historia rerum 
cfestarum: 'history', he writes, I is made by nobody save 
the historian; to write history is the only way of making 
iti. 74 There have been several strong objections to this 
75 conclusion. According to Walsh, it is one thing to 
acknowledge that historical evidence must be present, 
quite another to believe that the events it refers to are 
themselves present. Gardiner has argued that Oakeshott 
(like Croce and Collingwood) is wedded to the ideal of 
knowledge by direct acquaintance76, and, concerned about 
the pastness of history's object, and anxious over the 
second-hand condition of its conclusions, attempts to re- 
work an acquaintance theory of truth by dragging the past 
(events in the mind of the historian) into the present. 
Meiland, on the other hand, approves of Oakeshott's 
scepticism and 'constructionist' approach, believing him 
to be denying the possibility of historical knowledge 
altogether. 77 These criticisms are, however, swiftly 
dispatched when one realises that Oakeshott's concern is 
not (here) with the ontology of past events. His interest 
is with the phenomenology of present experience. 
Oakeshott, as Atkinson has pointed out, challenges a 
distinction between 'idea and object, thought and thing, 
phenomena and noumenal. 78 Furthermore (as is made clearer 
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in the essays On History) Oakeshott's point is that the 
events with which history is concerned are themselves the 
answer to an historical question, the outcome of an 
historical enquiry. The past of history is composed of 
events which are the product of thought and, in this 
sense, they never existed. The logic of history entails 
that history is a present, constructive exercise, and this 
remains the case no matter what comforting assumptions of 
correspondence are added. 79 Oakeshott draws his 
conclusion with a relentless force: 'the past in history 
varies with the present, rests upon the present, is the 
present'. 80 
History, for Oakeshott is autonomous not because it 
investigates a particular subject matter, nor because it 
employs its own peculiar methods and procedures. History, 
in Dray's words, is what 'the historian constructs in 
accordance with the categories of historical thought', 81 
or as Oakeshott puts it himself, the 'character and status 
of history as a form of experience is determined by the 
character of its postulates'. 82 Oakeshott employs this 
idea of structural categories to fee history from the 
intrusion of Iscience'. 83 His dismissal of explanation in 
terms of cause and effect (from history) is on account o 
fits belonging to the modal postulates of scientific 
experience. His account of change in terms of the 
continuity and discontinuity of historical 'individuals' 
is one of the least satisfactory aspects of his theory of 
history. 84 Dray, in particular, has criticised the 
attempt to show that history carries with it its own 
explanation. " But, it is not enough to examine the 
substance of his argument; we must also explore its form: 
the role it plays in Oakeshott's idealist thesis. 
'The historical past', Oakeshott writes, 'does not 
lie behind present evidence, it is the world which present 
evidence creates in the present'. 86 As a constructive 
activity, historical experience does not (as Collingwood's 
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'scientific' historian did not) recognise any authority 
external to historical thought. Yet Oakeshott's argument 
is not merely designed to establish the legitimacy of 
historical interpretation; he wants to explode all 
lingering dualisms, between a "then" and a "now", between 
an event and an idea, and between the truth of 'what 
happened in the past' and the 'Judgement we make, based 
upon, and guaranteed by our entire world of experience'. 87 
The presentness of historical knowledge then, is not 
merely circumstantial and an unfortunate but unavoidable 
hindrance: it is logical and it is absolute. History is 
what present experience establishes in the present, and 
this means that historical facts and historical events as 
historical (the result of an historical enquiry) are 
present facts and events. Oakeshott's intention, in 
dwelling on the presentness of what the historian 
postulates as past is to reveal its central contradiction, 
its abstraction and hence modality, but it also protects 
history from all efforts to treat history as if it were a 
fixed and finished world, a world which can be mapped out, 
divided into causal sequences, or seen as the revealing 
the determinant influence of a particular overriding 
factor - God, the economy, or geographical conditions. 
What Oakeshott is arguing is that the past in history 
simply cannot be outside of the experience of historian's; 
'without historical experience there is no historical 
world, no course of events from which gather the 
88 principles of historical knowledge'. All notions of 
"great" historical events, of history teaching lessons, of 
evolution and teleology imply that there is a past out 
there, external to a present enquiry, which can be 
consulted, which can be made to speak to us, and which 
exists independently of the though that thinks it: 'the 
course of events, Oakeshott argues, 'is ... the result, not 
the material of history', 'history ends, and does not 
begin, with facts'. 89 
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Cause and effect are postulates of scientific 
experience, and the scientific mode asserts the whole of 
reality under the category of 'quantity'. Its world is a 
world of instances and not events, and as such it 
organises experience in terms of relations between 
abstract concepts. It is, Oakeshott writes in a later 
work, 'the exclusion of whatever is private, esoteric, or 
ambiguous'. 90 Science recognises the existence of 
necessary and sufficient conditions because it "makes" its 
world on the presupposition that there are law-like 
relations between facts. The attempt to explain change in 
history in terms of causal laws represents a 'monstrous 
intrusion of science into the world of history1: 91 
ignoratio elenchi. Historical events, which are the 
product of inference, are not however unique or isolable. 
They are always known in terms of a system, or a 'world of 
homogenous ideas'. Each event implies the existence of a 
'world' of others. This is an echo of both the "oneness" 
of all experience in Bradley's thought, and of 
Collingwood's position in Speculum Mentis. But Oakeshott 
is not subscribing to an ideal of universal history, since 
this is itself an abstraction. The historian's hypothesis 
requires an organising concept, or historical individual' 
(the Reformation, a history of Naples, Cambridge or of 
Christianity), although these individuals can never be 
fully defined. 92 The principal postulate upon which an 
historical individual is constructed by historical thought 
is continuity, and continuity, Oakeshott argues, is 
something intrinsic to events. The Roman empire is an 
historical individual established by means of the 
'discontinuity, the relative break which seems to precede 
it; and its capacity for maintaining its individuality 
lies int he continuity or relative absence of break, which 
93 it can show'. In the same way an 'historical person' is 
marked off by birth, 'the discontinuity which establishes 
their individuality; death the discontinuity which 
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shatters ite. 94 There is nothing solid, absolute, or 
permanent about the character of historical events which 
compose an historical individual; they are 'designated' by 
95 an historian in terms of questions of 'scale'. 
Oakeshott's idea of historical continuity, or unity, 
which he restates in On History, marks his effort to 
describe the fluidity and interrelatedness of an 
historical series. It is a vital component in his 
argument to show that the historical past has no 
predetermined shape in advance of, or as a result of, an 
historical enquiry. In Experience and its Modes, he 
contends that the presupposition of continuity excludes 
the idea of cause and effect, which implies that a single 
historical event may be abstracted from the world of 
history, made free from all its relations and connexions, 
and spoken of as the cause of all that followed it or of 
certain selected events which followed iti. 96 on the 
contrary, history is an interrelated world of ideas in 
which a particular historical event is constituted as it 
is by the character of antecedent events. As a result of 
this internal coherence Oakeshott states that there are no 
events in history which are non-contributory, 97 that is 
there are no 'accidental' events (though of course there 
are in the 'practical' mode) because, 'in the scientific 
sense there are no inevitable events'. 98 In an 
illuminating account of Bury's argument for contingency as 
the vehicle for explaining change in history, 99 Oakeshott 
criticises the idea of hypothetical constructions which 
postulate how different everything would have been without 
the "accident" of a particular event (the length of 
Cleopatra's nose, the invasion of the Huns in the collapse 
of the Roman Empire), or of the presence of a particular 
personality (the "madness" of George III in the events 
leading up to the American War of Independence) . 
100 The 
difficulty with Bury's model, oakeshott writes, is that 
'Inevitable events are those which have place within any 
96 
one of these causal sequences I (a causal series of events 
governed by what Bury called its 'natural development') 
'which is permitted to follow its own course of 
development unhindered; accidents or contingent events are 
the product of any conflux of these independent causal 
sequences'. 101 But this is an extremely arbitrary 
division, and there is not one 'causal sequence'102 which 
may not be broken up into further subsidiary events 
themselves belonging to other series. Bury confuses cause 
with contingency and compounds the situation by purporting 
to derive this model from a study of history itself. Yet, 
as Oakeshott continues, 
History knows nothing of the fortuitous or the 
unexpected; in history there is nothing extra- 
ordinary, because there is nothing ordinary. 
The hard winter of 1812 which ruined Napoleon's 
expedition to Russia, the storm which dispersed 
the Armada - these, from the standpoint of the 
participants were distressing mischances-But 
the attitude of the historian is not that of the 
eyewitness or the participant. Where they see 
mischa and accident he sees fact and 
event. 
We must, Oakeshott urges, see that the 'only explanation 
of change relevant or possible in history is simply a 
complete account of change. History accounts for change 
by means of a full account of change ... no lacuna is 
tolerated'. 104 
Dray has commended Oakeshott for his 'step-by-stepI 
approach to explaining change in history, 105 but he has 
questioned exactly what relation there can be between 
'continuous' events once Ispatio-temporal and causal' 
relations have been excluded. 106 He also notes that 
Oakeshott's admission that historical thinking cannot 
proceed without at least the 'designation' of 
'individuals', 'breaks UPI the continuity of the 
historical world in exactly the same way as cause and 
effect. 107 
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The most unsatisfactory aspect of Oakeshott's 
contention that history is not an explanatory exercise is 
the argument that this is the case because it is a 
presupposition of the historical mode, and, in this way, 
places it outside of debate. Yet why is the inner 
continuity of events a postulate of history? Why are all 
generalisations beyond enumerative ones (all Reformation 
parliaments were packed)108 excluded? It is dif f icult to 
see how Oakeshott can defend these categorial exclusions 
when he has stated that there I is no course of events 
until it has been constructed by thought', and no relation 
between events 'unless we have first put it there. 109 
Oakeshott's historical past postulates unity as the 
"explanation" of a course of events, not because it finds 
unity inherent in the events, but presumably because it 
puts it there. There are times when Oakeshott seems to be 
arguing that the postulates of history, in this case 
continuity and discontinuity, are modally determined, 
prior to the historian's experience of actual research, 
and in this way somehow determinate of, and outside 
reflective thought. This uneasy relationship between the 
self-conscious pursuit of historical understanding as an 
engagement or activity in self-understanding, and the 
modal conditions 'in terms of which he is conscious of 
whatever comes before him"10 remains a constant tension 
throughout Oakeshott's writings. 
It should be stressed that the conception of history 
in Experience and its Modes supports a philosophical 
thesis. History is a world of ideas with its own 
organising principles, and its own specific level of 
coherence within experience, but, from the standpoint of 
concrete experience it remains a 'backwater' and a 
'mistake'. It is an abstract world of ideas which 
philosophical thought exposes as an enormous 
contradiction: 
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The historical past is always present and yet 
historical experience is always in the form of 
the past. And this contradiction must remain 
unresolved as long as we remain in the world of 
historical ideas ... History, because it is 
experience, is present, its facts present facts, 
its world a present world of ideas but because 
it is history, the formulation of experience as 
a whole sub specie praeteritorum it is the 
continuous assertion of a past whicýljs not past 
and a present which is not present. 
In other words, the 'form' of history contradicts the 
'nature of its contentl,, 112 where form is an enquiry into 
the past, and content is the world of the present. The 
past in history is not 'merely contemporary' ; it is not 
the present subjective experience of a particular 
historian, 'whatever enters the historian's head'; it is 
113 thought and judgement, 'what he is obliged to believe'. 
The presentness of history is emphasised in contrast with 
'what cannot be in experience'. It is, as Collingwood 
puts it, not a 'mistake gua historian' which entails that 
history is an arrest in experience, but a 'philosophical 
mistake of arranging in the past what is actually present 
experience'. 114 Philosophy, as Walsh expresses it, is 
concerned with the 'past as it is in history', and not the 
'past as it is for history'115 which is the responsibility 
of the historian. Whether in fact Oakeshott finally 
allows for such a neat division of responsibilities is 
something to which I want to return. Here, however, it is 
important to realise why, from the standpoint of 
experience as a whole, history is pronounced an 
abstraction: 
... to suppose this world of history actually to lie in the past, to accept it (that is) in a 
form in which it is satisfactory in historical 
experience involves us in a radical 
contradiction. It obliges us to suppose a world 
which is not a world of ideas, to suppose facts 
which are not in experience, truths which are 
not true, reality which is not real. Fo 11po 
fact, truth or reality, is, or can be, past. 
99 
In Experience and its Modes, philosophy, though not a 
distinct kind of knowledge, is judge and arbiter of the 
modes of experience. Essentially, philosophy establishes 
the limits of modal competence and their autonomy from one 
another, and, in this sense, as Cowling has pointed out, 
is 'the affirmation of the necessity of error if life is 
to be conducted. 117 There is a striking continuity in 
Oakeshott's thought from this first book to the essays Qn 
History (published in 1983), and in particular his 
constant revision and restatement of the idea that present 
experience includes distinct 'voices', 'utterances' or 
modes of perception. Yet one element which appears to 
drop out of Oakeshott's thought is the possibility 
(however remote) of ultimate philosophical 'satisfaction'. 
He continues to define a specifically historical approach 
in the severest terms which make its attainment thoroughly 
uncertain, but philosophy no longer awaits to convict all 
such efforts as mistakes in knowledge. One suggestion for 
this shift is that Oakeshott's profound hostility to 
rationalism meant that he believed the primary task of 
thought was to separate and keep apart the modes, or 
"discourses", of the present; to distinguish the 
'utterances' and conditions of their 'utterance', and, in 
this way, to direct the 'ordeal of consciousness' - the 
'voice of liberal learning' - towards the multiple 
'invitations' which are offered to understanding, and no 
allow philosophy to subvert the whole process by posing as 
itself the system to end all systems, the world to end all 
worlds. In an essay entitled 'The Voice of Poetry in the 
Conversation of Mankindl,, 117 he writes, 
... the image of a meeting place for the diverse idioms of utterance... is not an inquiry or an 
argument, but a conversation ... There is no 
symposiarch or arbiter ... voices which mak in 
conversation do not compose a hierarchy. 
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The Practical and Historical Past 
In 'The Activity of Being an Historian' (written in 
1955, and published in the essay collection Rationalism in 
Politics in 1962) history is described as an activity 
which has 'gradually emerged' and has begun to acquire 
specific identifying features. 119 The activity of 
history, as with all other activities, comes to be 
'specified' in practice; 120 it follows no predetermined 
course, nor is it enacted as a programme. Oakeshott 
declares it his intention to 'consider the manner and 
achievements of current reflection about the present 
condition of the activity of being an historian"121 and 
to 'discern some special characteristics' which might 
distinguish an historian from others who share 'an 
122 interest in "the past"'. This is somewhat 
disingenuous. Oakeshott has no intention of engaging with 
current analytical philosophy of history, and indeed he 
quickly dismisses the 'piecemeal' and 'ad hoc' 
lexclusionsv123 which characterise these 'philosophically 
naive'124 investigations. Instead he proposes to elicit 
the 'logic' of certain unspecified attempts 'to delineate 
the field of historical enquiry'. 125 
In the essay the historical mode of experience 
becomes 'a certain way of reading the present'. 126 We 
begin, Oakeshott argues, in a present world to which we 
take certain attitudes 'to what is happening before 
Use 1 
127 and in doing so 'always making something of it for 
ourselves'. 128 The most common attitudes are the 
'practical', 'scientific', 'contemplative' (later 
129 'poetical') and 'historical'. Each of these responses 
imposes a certain character on what we look at. The 
dominant feature of a practical attitude is happenings 
understood in terms of their relationship to ourselves; 
the world that is, in terms of its 'habitableness' * 
130 
The practical response understands and values occurrences 
as 'friendly' or 'hostile', 'useful' or 'useless', 'cheap' 
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131 or 'expensive', and it is to this approach that our 
value judgements and moral assessments belong: it 'admits 
us to a world of discourse'. 132 But there is another, an 
alternative: the 'scientific' attitude. 133 This attitude, 
Oakeshott argues, understands happenings not in relation 
to ourselves but as independent, what is 'vulgarly' called 
lobjectives'. 134 Oakeshott. gives an example of heat: 135 
feeling hot is a practical attitude and the statement it 
is a hot day' is in the practical 'idiom' - the world in 
relation to our feelings of comfort or discomfort. On the 
other hand the statement, 'the boiling point of water is 
100 degrees Centigrade' is in the 'idiom' of science 
because the 'situation described is hypothetical, and the 
observation is not about the world in relation to myself'. 
One of the significant ideas in this statement is 
that 'what we see is relative to how we look'. 136 The 
'practical' and 'scientific' attitude understands present 
events in a particular way. The present is a world we 
share; it is not a subjective or private sphere, but there 
are a variety of ways of conceiving it. It is, however, 
the only world we have. Therefore the 'past' is a 
'construction we make for ourselves out of the events 
which take place before our eyesl; 137 "'the past" appears 
when we understand current happenings as evidence for what 
138 has already happened'. 
Oakeshott's next move is to argue that there are a 
variety of attitudes that we may take up towards the past 
- ways of reading present to disclose past. Of these 
attitudes the practical and scientific are, once again, 
the most prominent. The 'practical' attitude understands 
past happenings in relation to ourselves and to our 
current engagements. We explain the past in terms of the 
present and 'make moral judgements about past conduct'. 139 
The 'scientific' attitude does not assimilate past events 
to our present concerns, it response is 'the past for its 
own sake. 140 It is, however, important not to confuse 
102 
this "objective" attitude with a specifically historical 
approach, since the former, Oakeshott contends, makes 
statements about past events in terms of their 
exemplifying general laws; its world being a 'timeless 
world' of 'hypothetical situations'. 141 Finally, there is 
aI contemplative I attitude towards the past, illustrated 
by the historical novelist, 142 in which the past is not 
significantly past at all; the 'pastness' of an object if 
lignored"143 and instead its past is a 'storehouse of 
mere images'144 of which 'factual' questions are 
irrelevant. Oakeshott's conclusion is that, 'whatever 
attitudes present events are capable of provoking in us 
may also be provoked by events which appear when we regard 
present events as evidence for other events - that is, 
what we call "past" events'. 145 As a consequence, there 
is 'not one past because there is not one present'. 146 
It is Oakeshott's contention that each of these 
different attitudes implies a distinguishable 'universe of 
discourse'147 (his new expression for modally conditioned 
'worlds of ideas') which are logically exclusive of each 
other. This is a significant point, for, if there is to 
be a specifically historical past - the attitude of 
"historians" - then it must itself be a particular way of 
'regarding' present events. By describing these cognitive 
approaches as 'universes of discourse' Oakeshott intends 
it to be clear that no approach patched together from the 
different attitudes can add up to an historical past. An 
'historical approach' cannot borrow "objectivity" from 
science, contemporary political dilemmas from practice, 
and imaginative images from contemplation, in order to 
achieve an historical reading of the present. Oakeshott 
(as in Experience and its Modes) deliberately excludes 
this kind of co-operative endeavour. Indeed his 
description of an historical past is avowedly tendentious, 
to 'loosen the tie between the past and the "practical 
present'11.148 
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If there is an historical way of 'provoking' past 
from present happenings, where is it to be found? The 
vast bulk of statements made about the past are, Oakeshott 
argues, in a practical or 'artistic' idiom, and this is 
true even of so-called 'histories. 149 To look f or a 
consistently historical attitude in the writings of 
historians is, on the whole, to be disappointed since, as 
Oakeshott puts it, 'History is a miscellany of utterances 
about the past in which the practical and contemplative 
idiom is predominant'. 150 Nonetheless, it has to be 
conceded that the activity of history has 'emerged 
gradually' and has only recently acquired a specific 
character"151 in just the same way that astronomy emerged 
from a contemplation of the heavens to discern what they 
foretold, to become a 'scientific' activity, and thus we 
may, Oakeshott concludes, resist the temptation to judge 
too severely. Furthermore, Oakeshott continues, we are 
'not looking for the necessary and sufficient conditions 
of the activity of being an historian, our analysis begins 
and ends with what has been achieved'. 152 He appears at 
this point to be suggesting an empirical approach; an 
enquiry into the 'new techniques' developed by historians 
for the 'critical treatment of sources of information, and 
their selection of 'general organising concepts'. 153 Yet 
Oakeshott has no intention of specifying an historical 
past in terms of techniques or procedures, but rather in 
terms of underlying presuppositions which exist prior to 
any enquiry. Although these presuppositions may be 
elucidated from the 'achievements' of historians, they 
function as fundamental categories of organisation and 
approach of which, it appears, an historian may not be 
conscious. The activity may have emerged gradually but it 
seems that these presuppositions have existed, fully 
formed from the outset, and do indeed represent criteria 
of achievement against which a particular history may be 
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assessed, at least by one who is interested in their 
underlying 'logic'. 
There is an 'historical' reading of present objects, 
and it is to be found only, although not 'consistently', 
154 in the writings of historians . Unlike the 'practical 
man' the 'historian' does not 'read the past backwards 
from the present or look to the past for an explanation of 
his present world'. 155 The past although it is present in 
the form of a particular approach and understanding, is 
not 'treated' as if it were the present. 156 Oakeshott 
lists various ways in which the historical past differs 
from the practical and scientific past. It does not, he 
157 argues, search for 'origins', because this is a way of 
reading the past backwards from a present perspective, and 
it imposes an arbitrary teleological structure which, in 
its 'Whig' conception of the past culminating in the 
triumphs of the present, reveals an 'incursion of a 
practical attitudel. 158 Histories titled 'The origins of 
the French Revolution', 'The evolution of parliament'. 159 
are not "properly" historical: they are in fact instances 
of iqnoratio elenchi. The historian does 'not inquire 
into the moral value of past conduct', 160 not because this 
may lead him into partial or subjective judgements, but 
because all such judgements of approval and disapproval, 
moral appraisals, and the Icategories'161 of 'right' and 
'wrong', 'good' and 'bad', 'Justice' and 'injustice' 
relate to 'the organisation and understanding of the world 
in respect of its relationship to ourselves'. 162 
Repeating an argument from Experience and its Modes, 
Oakeshott argues that, in history, 'nothing is non- 
contributory"163 which means that history (unlike 
practice) does not recognise accidents, in precisely the 
same way that its does not recognise 'inevitable' or 
'necessary' events. 164 History, unlike science, knows 
nothing of the necessary and sufficient conditions of an 
occurrence - war for example. The historian 'knows only 
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of a set of happenings which, when fully set out, make the 
outbreak of this war seem neither an I accident I, nor a 
"miracle" , nor a necessary event, but merely an 
165 intelligible occurrence'. Indeed any attempt to follow 
science and isolate general causes of events ends up as a 
'relapse' in to a practical lidioml: 166 it is an attempt 
to assimilate the past to our present understanding and 
make it speak in the voice of induction or prediction. 
Above all, Oakeshott states, history must eschew a 
vocabulary which belongs to practical "utterance": 'He 
died too soon'; 'He dissipated his resources in a series 
of useless wars'; 'The Boer war was to make clear the 
necessity for radical reform in the British Army'; 'The 
167 Pope's intervention changed the course of events'. He 
writes, 
In 'history' no man dies too soon or by 
'accident'; there are no successes and no 
failures and no illegitimate children. Nothing 
is approved, there being no condition of things 
in relation to which approval can operate, and 
nothing is denounced. The past is without the 
moral, the political or the social structure 
which the practical man transfers from his 
present to his past. The Pope's intervention 
did not change the course of events, it was the 
course of events and consequently his action was 
not an 'intervention'. ý68 did not die 'too 
soon'; he died when he did. 
Both Walsh and Dray have been critical of this rigid 
division between a practical and historical past. Walsh 
argues (in defence of his idea of colligation) that 'Every 
historian will read history backwards, in so far as he 
identifies continuing trends or processes"169 and he 
believes the historian justified in making use of his 
'advantage', the benefit of hindsight. 170 The act of 
specifying not only what happened but also what was 
intended, and the extent to which it succeeded, is, Walsh 
argues, an essential feature of history. 171 Oakeshott's 
entirely Itheoreticall172 approach removes history from 
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any 'living context of enquiry'. 173 Similarly, Dray 
believes Oakeshott to have overstepped his point, 
particularly in the assertion that the 'place of an event 
is not determined by its relation to subsequent 
events'. 174 It is one thing to avoid a teleological 
perspective which sees everything culminating in the 
present, but quite another to regard as 
lunhistorical ... all tracing of consequences and 
175 explanation of a later in terms of an earlier event'. 
In what way, Walsh asks, would the organising concept 'the 
Rise of the Gentry' be an intrusion of a practical 
attitude; 176 it is not being asserted that the events 
grouped together under this heading make sense because 
they led on to what is happening now. Ironically one of 
Oakeshott's few examples of history, which has emancipated 
itself from the practical idiom, is a passage in which 
Maitland describes the system of holding land, in the name 
of the King, at the time of the Doomsday Book. 177 In this 
passage Maitland makes use of a teleological structure and 
an explanation of earlier events in terms of a subsequent, 
when he writes, 'Towards such a theory English law had 
been tending for a long while past, very possibly the time 
was fast approaching when the logic of facts would have 
generated this ideal. 178 In another passage Oakeshott 
appears to make the concession that certain expressions - 
'ancient', 'modern', 'renaissance', 'enlightened' - which 
began life as practical terms have now acquired 'limited 
historical usefulness'. 179 But these expressions are 
organising concepts and as such help make tangles of 
events lucid f rom a thematic point of view ; they can 
hardly be said to exist in the (contingent) relations of 
events distinct f rom the interest of an historian. Dray 
is also concerned that Oakeshott's dismissal of evaluative 
judgement from history excludes even those judgements made 
from the standpoint of the period under study, even though 
this 'has often been taken as the mark of a specifically 
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historical approach'. 180 The thrust of his argument, and 
of Walsh's, is that Oakeshott's criteria of the truly 
'historical' are too severe and unnecessarily restrict 
legitimate "historical" interest. 181 
The substance of these criticisms may, I believe, be 
conceded. Oakeshott's 'historical' past is too sharply 
divided from the present in which it emerges to be 
sustainable. In an essay of the same period he seems to 
have recognised this when, in criticising the 
Irationalist's' approach to political reform, he writes, 
that 'All sense of what Burke called a partnership between 
present and past is losto. 182 But I am more concerned 
with the contention that an historical 'reading of the 
present' is a categorically distinct universe of 
discourse', and the way that this begs the question how 
the 'activity' of history has assumed the shape it has, 
and whether its presuppositions are themselves open to 
further change and specification -a conception of a 
changing "ideal' of history which Collingwood insists upon. 
I must insist upon approaching Oakeshott's position from 
the angled question, what does he mean? 
It is vital, for Oakeshott, that an historical 
attitude, which has emerged in 'the face of many 
hindrances', 183 be distinguished from 'practical' activity 
if it is to resist subsumption under the demands of 
utility and instruction. This is why he represents it as 
'the product of a severe and sophisticated manner of 
thinking about the world'. 184 The 'activity' of history, 
it if is to be an engagement in 'self -enactment', must be 
kept separate from all attempts to conceive the past as an 
independent source of information, whether it be heuristic 
- philosophy teaching by example - or empirical - the 
social science approach. The historian's past is, for 
Oakeshott, 
... a complicated world, without unity of feeling 
or clear outline: in it events have no over-all 
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pattern or purpose, lead nowhere, point to no 
favoured condition of the world and support no 
practical conclusions. 118 ýs a world composed 
wholly of contingencies... 
Historical understanding is an lachievement'186 pursued 
f or no other end than its own. It is an achievement of 
inferential thinking, which is a denial of any notion of 
an existing past, of an 'already specified occurrence', to 
which thought must approximate or explain. The idea of a 
living past (espoused by Croce and Collingwood)187 is 
anathema to Oakeshott; it is a 'piece of obscene 
necromancy'. 188 The past the historian 'adores' is 
Idead'. 189 
The lenemy'190 of the historian's theoretical 
interest in the past for its own sake is, above all, the 
practical attitude. It is the most basic and constant way 
in which we respond to the world, yet it is not the only 
way, and 'addiction to practice"91 must not be allowed to 
provide the sole impetus to learning. The past, for this 
practical attitude is an interest 'only in retrospective 
politics, '192 and because of this 'the past is now more 
than ever a field in which to exercise our moral and 
political opinions, like whippets in a meadow on Sunday 
afternoon'. 193 We must, Oakeshott urges, recognise that 
past events appear first in the 'idiom' of practice which 
must be 'translated' into the historical, 194 and this is 
why we should avoid writing about past events which 
'circumstantially provoke a practical interest', 
particularly those which are more recent or are in some 
195 way 'related to the present'. 
However unsupportable Oakeshott's modal division 
between a practical and historical past, it should be 
understood as a plea for the possibility of "genuine" 
learning, and for departures from a practical present: 
'excursions into a foreign country'. 196 
Oakeshott's concentration on the scholarly 
disinterestedness and on the break between past and 
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present in history, might have been secured through 
emphasis upon the exacting procedures and controls of 
historical enquiry. But he does not pursue this path: 
indeed he cannot. he is committed not only to the radical 
independence of the past from present interests, but also 
to the assertion that past events cannot exist 
independently of an historical construction. on the one 
hand the historical past is a 'dead' past, without lessons 
to teach, known only through a 'sophisticated' process of 
inference from evidence. But on the other, the historical 
past is that which is "made" or written by historians in 
the present. I take this to be the central, unresolved 
and irresolvable tension at the heart of Oakeshott's 
theory of history. His idealism contends that 
understanding is a unity of subject and object, and hence 
that all thought is present thought. History is an 
engagement in present understanding. But he wants to 
define this present understanding in terms which will 
exclude "subjective" or practical intrusions and separate 
it from other ways of understanding exactly the same 
objects. To do this he reasserts the pastness of the 
historian's object of interest; he throws it back into the 
form of a dead past where it can serve no practical 
purpose. Yet this is precisely the abstraction which he 
characterised as implicit in historical experience in 
Experience and its Modes. The "pastness", or independence 
of the historical past is confirmed, according to 
Oakeshott, by a postulate of historical 'discourse'. All 
his attempts to specify the 'logic' of these underlying 
presuppositions (which reaches its apogee in on History) 
are efforts to make sense of the idea that the historian's 
past, though present, is not merely present; is not the 
subjective experience of a particular historian. It must 
be a present which 'speaks only of past'. 
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The Ordeal of Consciousness197 
The three essays which compose On History f orm. an 
extended and intricate defence of the thesis that an 
historical past is a specific 'reading' of present 
objects, modally distinct in terms of the 'conditions 
198 which constitute it a distinct kind of enquiry'. The 
essays are a relentless search for the correct expression 
of an understanding of the past which, though grounded in 
the perception of objects existing in the present, is 
'logically distinct' from, and irreducible to, the 
languages of other modal understandings. Again Oakeshott 
claims to be attempting to 'distinguish and take hold of a 
current manner of enquiry', which is 'the invention of 
historians'. 199 His interest is with 'its theoretical 
postulates as reflected in a piece of historical 
writing"200 but this does not entail a concern with the 
methodology of historical research, nor is it an attempt 
to define history in 'terms of its so-called subject 
matter'. 201 Oakeshott's concern is with the 'logic of 
historical enquiry... a concern not with the truth of 
conclusions but with the conditions in terms of which they 
202 may be recognised as conclusions'. History as a 
'current and contingent manner of enquiry' is an activity 
which has 'acquired a recognisable shape, 203; to identify 
the 'conditions' which announce it an 'historical mode of 
understandingp204 one must discern the texture of its 
significant features. This is extremely ambiguous. On 
the one hand the historian chooses his enquiry205 and 
historical thought confirms whatever authority and 
validity it may achieve, which would seem to allow an 
'historical' awareness of the past206 to be a matter of 
self-conscious deliberation. But on the other hand the 
modal postulates of the historical past are such that they 
may only be discovered in terms of the underlying "logic" 
of an approach: an approach sustained by 'conditions' of 
understanding which themselves 'specify what is to be 
ill 
understood'. 207 Although Oakeshott denies that he intends 
to Oprescribel2O8 any legitimate interest in the past, 
that 'he is not composing directions for the conduct of an 
historical enquiry"209 he goes on to state that the 
engagement of the philosopher is not a matter of 
'observing' and 'recording' the practice of historians, 
and that his conclusions do 'not seek confirmation in 
their work'. 210 Now, any attempt to circumvent the 
'ordeal of consciousness' is plainly antithetical to 
Oakeshott Is conception of learning and knowledge as must 
be any attempt to formulate the "rules" or "techniques" of 
history. But his description of historical understanding 
is so severe, contingent and conditional; so hard to 
sustain, that it is, in effect, a caution to historians. 
In its negative assertion of what an historical past is 
not, he reduces the scope of historical interest and, by 
implication, the achievements of historiography. 
The addition to Oakeshott's theory of history in the 
three essays is his theoretical description of the 
'Procedure' whereby 'past' may be evoked from present. A 
modally distinct past, Oakeshott argues, is the 
counterpart of a particular reading of the present, and 
this reading of objects is a procedure in which we derive 
a past. The discussion of the 'present-past' in the first 
essay, "Present, Future and Past". 211 is a brilliant 
elaboration and reassertion of the idealist unity of 
subject and object in knowledge. We begin, Oakeshott 
writes, with a present, and, 
- .. what I mean by a present is a universe of discourse composed of a subject (that is, a 
reflective intelligence identified in terms of a 
mode of perception) related to objects (that is, 
things identified in terms of certain 
conditions): a subject and obj Ili? which 
correspond to and define one another. 
But out relationships to this present is neither immediate 
nor intuitive. There are various different ways of 
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understanding an object (Venice, 213 the Magna Carta, Robin 
Hood) but each is not therefore subjective or esoteric. 214 
our various understandings 'may exclude one another but 
they do not deny one another'. 215 'Every such object is 
the perception of a subject, but none is "subjective" in 
the sense of being outside discourse or impervious to 
216 error. "Subjectivity" is not an ontological category'. 
The way Oakeshott tries to exclude "subjectivity" from 
these distinct understandings is by arguing that each can 
be specified as a particular and exclusive approach. For 
the person who uses Hume's Treatise to keep out a draught 
the object is useful, but the argument of the Treatise 
cannot perform such a function. 217 Oakeshott represents 
these exclusive understandings as a 'transaction' between 
subject and object, and since 'no object is 
unconditionally recognisable, 218 each such transaction can 
be specified in terms of its conditions. Again he 
contends that the 'practical present' is the one which we 
occupy most often, in which objects are understood in 
terms of their worth to us in our present activities. 
Nonetheless the practical present is not 'emancipated from 
219 modality'. It is an autonomous universe of 
discourse; 220 a 'coherent self-sustaining understanding of 
the world in which a single formal character is imposed on 
everything that receives attention', and yet it is still a 
conditional understanding. The relating of an object to 
our current purposes may be an understanding which has 
circumstantial priority, 221 but it cannot be represented 
as an act of immediate perception. 222 There are other 
modes of understanding which we may engage in than this 
223 'Present-future' of practical engagement" and room 
224 must be created for them. 
As the practical -present is the most prominent mode 
of understanding its counterpart (since the present 
'determines what particular past shall be soughtl)225, the 
practical past, is the most common way of evoking past. 
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Oakeshott identifies several different kinds of past all 
of which are understood in relation to ourselves: a 
remembered past, an encapsulated past, and most 
importantly a recollected or consulted past. 226 This 
latter emerges when objects are recognised to have 
'survived' from the past which may be consulted, 'listened 
227 to, #, 'neglected or ignored'. The recorded past 
provides us with an enormous wealth of analogies and 
metaphors ('he met his Waterloo', the 'touch of Midas', 
'the wisdom of Solononl,, 228 'Luther at Wormsv229) and it 
forms what Oakeshott calls a 'living past', a 'current 
vocabulary fo self -understanding and self-expression 1 . 
230 
The contents of this giant Istorehouse, 231 of preserved 
objects are names, images, dates, buildings, charters etc. 
Their salient feature is a readiness to be employed in the 
present, as emblematic, in nostalgia, for political 
purposes etc. It is what Oakeshott describes as a 
232 'didactic' past, recalled in terms of unproblematic 
images which are held to teach lessons, prove that current 
projects are sanctioned by past authority, or that 
'"history is on our sidell'. 233 Although this past is 
understood to have survived it is not the result of 
critical enquiry, indeed it is not 'significantly past at 
all'. 234 The procedure of evolving this past is one of 
recall. 
An 'historical' understanding must begin in a shared 
present, and its objects may well be the same as those 
which compose a practical past. However, the procedure of 
evoking past is altogether more Isophisticated, 235 and 
'difficult to achievel. 236 The subject (historian) is 
'exclusively concerned with past"237 and he treats the 
fragments of a conserved past as Isurvivals"238 that is 
objects of which the appropriate question is not 'is it 
true or false', 'fake or forgery', but 'what is its 
239 authentic character? I. A 'survival', in other words, 
is not a self-contained, unproblematic image or emblem, 
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but an object which demands further inquiry; it has 
survived but is a 'not-yet-understood object'. 240 The 
historian is concerned to 'relate it to its provenance and 
understand it in terMB Of its occaBione. 241 
OakeBhott calls these 'survivals' utterances, 
artefacts, performanceB or exploits; res gestae. The 
f irst task of the historian is to find out about their 
'authentic character'. It is not a question of whether or 
not they provide direct evidence of what happened: 
such reports and descriptions are not read by an 
historian as informative utterances testifying 
(correctly or incorrectly) to what they report; 
they are constituents of the performative 
utterances (addressed, not to posterity or to 
some future historian, but to contemporaries) in 
which their authors 2 yfre responding 
to their 
current situations... 
The evidence which an historian interprets is, for 
Oakeshott, already the outcome of inference; 
'authenticated survivals from the past are dissolved into 
their component features in order to be used for what they 
are worth as circumstantial evidence from which to infer a 
past which has not survived'. 243 This is a crucial 
phenomenological distinction. Survivals from the past may 
be translated into 'circumstantial' evidence, but they 
cannot (as they could, when interpreted as the expression 
of thoughts, for Collingwood) provide access to a past of 
events. The objects of historical attention are 'bygone 
244 performances" which may be understood in all their 
complexity and interrelationship, but they refer only to 
themselves, that is, to their 'performance' and to their 
record. The res gestae of the historical past are the 
recorded 'exploits' of past human beings. Past events, as 
events, have not survived. This point is similar to that 
made by Munz245 when he argues that historical evidence is 
evidence not of events as they actually happened (of a 
time series) , but of events as they have been recorded, 
and this record is itself an artefact, something made 
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rather than transcribed. the historical series is not the 
same as a time series, and an historical past composed of 
related events exists only as the outcome of an enquiry, 
in response to a question. Not only can the historical 
past not be dug up, in an important sense the historian's 
past was never present246 _ 'In the sense of being 
observed to have happened or of being recognised to have 
247 happened" Oakeshott writes, 
The character of these surviving utterances as 
informative reports about human performances or 
about other kinds of happening is subordinate to 
their character as themselves the performances 
of their reporters; it merely specifies their 
artefactual idi the performative utterance 
of its reporter. 
Oakeshott has to insist upon this initial stage of 
inferential enquiry (the ascertaining of the 'authentic 
character' of a survival) because the historian shares the 
same present with the practical-present-past. It is only 
in the approach of an historian to his object as a not- 
yet-understood thing, valuable for what it may disclose by 
way of evidence, which distinguishes the two attitudes. 
Oakeshott's historical past is thus a construction, and it 
is authoritative within its own 'discourse'. Indeed the 
historian 'creates his present, his so-called sources, and 
endows then ... with authenticity'. 
249 He seeks to 
understand survivals by establishing their relations to 
one another and, in this way, to make 'recorded exploits 
interpret and criticise each other'. 250 Having done this 
he is interested in what may be inferred from them: the 
understanding achieved at this stage in an enquiry is of 
what Oakeshott calls an 'historical occurrence'. 
An historical occurrence is a conclusion of 
inference, it is an 'identified condition of human 
circumstance', in a certain respect chosen by an 
historian$, 251 and it is not to be equated with any 
lartefact or recorded utterance which has survived'. 252 
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An historical occurrence is 'an anatomised fragment', 253 
and it is the conclusion of an enquiry into the 
'character' of a survival: it cannot itself have survived. 
Oakeshott is unclear has to how precisely 'survivals' may 
be translated into evidence, but his contention seems to 
lie beyond methodology. It is his belief that the 
evidence from which historians construct an account of a 
past occurrence and infer what 'did in fact happenj254 
must not be understood as a permanent record of past 
events which may be consulted, or ignored, at one's 
leisure. Evidence exists as the conclusion of an enquiry, 
and it cannot be gathered together as though it were 
itself the past existing in the present. As Oakeshott 
points out, a complete record of 19th century legislation 
can never constitute a history of parliament in that 
century. 255 There is no such thing as historical evidence 
existing independently of an interest in the 'authentic 
character' of 'survivals'. 
Historical occurrences, Oakeshott continues, can 
never be identified singly or in isolation, 'each being 
what it is in relation to other occurrences'. 256 and so 
the next level of historical enquiry is 'exploring and 
anatomizing the characters of situations of various 
257 dimensions'. Dimensions are decided according to what 
an enquiry 'finds to be appropriate to the characters it 
258 has attributed to there component occurrences'. Again 
the emphasis here is upon the historian's designation and 
criteria of 'appropriateness'. Oakeshott writes, 'An 
historical occurrence is a rudimental historical 
situation, and an historical situation is a composition of 
notionally contemporaneous, mutually related, historical 
occurrences'. 259 Historians denote the 'situations' they 
'undertake to explain'. Examples he gives are, 
'Alexandrian Platonism,, 'The formal structure of English 
feudal Society around A. D. 12001, 'the Civilization of 
Renaissance Italy', $logical positivisml260 etc. But, 
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importantly, these situations are not intended to refer to 
the 'designs, purposes or exploits of assignable agents', 
that is, they do not refer to the 'self-understandings' of 
261 persons who occupied these situations'. 
This last conclusion represents a clear break between 
Oakeshott and a past-for-the-past's sake position, and its 
concern with the past as it understood itself. These past 
situations are constructed in answer to an 'historical 
question'. It is Oakeshott's point that the past made up 
of these occurrences or situations have not survived 
because they could not have survived. It exists in an 
historical series, the conclusion of an enquiry, and there 
is not independent past (including a past encapsulated in 
record) to which they could be compared. 
Oakeshott's hostility towards the notion of 
correspondence with the past "as it actually was" involves 
an intense effort to describe the circumstantial and 
conditional nature of evidence, and the emphasis, at all 
levels of historical research, on the primary importance 
of the approach of an historian and the question raised by 
an enquirer. 
Oakeshott acknowledges that any past situation 
identified by an historian will necessarily be an 
abstraction from 'the flux and inconsequence of all that 
was going on then and there"262 and that this 'procedure 
of abstraction is recognised when an historical past is 
263 specified as an answer to an historical question'. 
However since one of the postulates of history is 
'change', a past which is 'constituted in terms of its 
situational immobility, 264 must be transformed in to one 
which is an assemblage of 'historical events and the 
conjunctions of historical events'; 265 and this for 
Oakeshott is an 'historical enquiry properly speaking'. 266 
This past of events is a 'past of which there can be no 
record'; it is one which is 'necessarily unknown in 
267 default of such an enquiry'. 
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To capture the flavour of oakeBhott's historical past 
one should attend to the caveats and qualifications in 
some of his characteristic statements: By an historical 
event I mean... an uncovenanted circumstantia, 268 
... confluence Of vicissitudes'. 
269 This sense of 
historical events as 'a somewhat tentative 
construction, 270 accurately reflects the dilemma of 
Oakeshott's position. In order to break the link between 
history as the present Organisation of experience, and the 
present of our practical activity, oakeshott argues that 
historical events, though not themselves contingent, are 
related to one another in a manner which is entirely 
contingent; they have no f ixed shape and no predestined 
outcome. But Oakeshott transfers this indeterminacy into 
the present of historical enquiry and attempts to make the 
whole historical construction a conditional exercise. A 
particular historical event cannot, he argues, be known or 
understood in advance of its emerging as the conclusion of 
an historical enquiry: 'what they are is how they come to 
be woven'. 271 The whole array of efforts to deduce the 
occurrence of events; teleology, dialectical shifts, 
covering-laws, cliometrics etc. 272 - as somehow necessary 
or inevitable, mistake the fundamental nature and 
conditions of the historical past which is the attempt to 
infer from surviving record a past which has not 
survived. 273 History, for oakeshott, is not an 
explanatory exercise but an engagement to understand 
discursively, and all efforts to classify events into 
types or kinds, to quantify and deduce, rely on the notion 
of an 'empirically observable past, 274, a past which has 
survived, which is "given" to understanding, and so assume 
to be 'already known what it is the purpose of an 
historical enquiry to ascertain'. Cause and effect are 
inappropriate to the historical past precisely for this 
reason, a 'cause may be sought only for an already known 
and understood effect'. 275 
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Oakeshott Is criticism of Hempel Is covering law model 
of explanation in history276 is altogether different from 
that pioneered by Dray. He argues that it is not a 
question of whether or not we possess enough reliable 
information about the past in order to deduce 
generalisations or laws about the occurrence of past 
events, but, that such an approach involves an 
277 lunresolvable categorial distinction'. Laws relate 
only to 'model-situations' and these contradict the 
character of historical events as not-yet-understood 
278 occurrences. We cannot account for the occurrence of 
an event as though it were something resolved, fixed and 
made an object for empirical study. But, in addition, an 
historical event is 'not a happening or situation which 
occurred or could have occurred'. 279 For Oakeshott an 
'assemblage' of historical events is an answer to an 
historical question, and any such passage or series must 
be understood as a 'circumstantial' gathering, not the 
display of an underlying logic. In a passage discussing 
causation he argues that cause has acquired a place in 
historical 'discourse,, but that it is an ambiguous 
'rhetorical expression'. When an historian writes of the 
'causes of the French Revolution', he means to identify 
its 'noteworthy antecedents', and as such, cause is a 
'loose insignificant expression'. 280 
The question remains, what is the nature of relations 
holding between historical events? Oakeshott argues that 
the historian is interested in the 'character' of an 
event, not with the question, 'what did this event or 
those events, cause? but only with their non-exclusive 
relationship with some subsequent event in terms of which 
the character of that subsequent may be understoodi. 281 
The character of a subsequent - the abolition of the Slave 
Trade - is what it is in respect of its relation to 
antecedent events. 282 Although these relations are 
established in an inferred passage of events in answer to 
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an historical question, Oakeshott denies that they are 
exclusively conceptual; the abolition of the British Slave 
Trade in 1806 was the 'unintended eventual' by-product of 
contingently related events, some of which 'had nothing to 
283 do conceptually with slavery or the trade', Thus an 
historical event is a 'convergence of significantly 
related historical events'. 284 Oakeshott employs the 
metaphor of a dry stone wal, 285 to indicate the way in 
which antecedent events 'in touching' constitute a 
consequent or leventus'. This is narrative history in its 
most extreme linear and continuous series form. 
This notion of relations between events being their 
'unintended', circumstantial proximity is extremely 
difficult to sustain, not least because, at no point in 
Oakeshott's argument are we permitted to have the vaguest 
sense of what shape a passage of events will assume, nor 
any impression of the 'character' of aI subsequent'. 286 
There is, Oakeshott contends, 'no explanans of a different 
287 character from an explannadum" and this refers not 
merely to the illusory idea of a real past, but also to 
the activity of historians in constructing an historical 
past. How, then, is a passage of events to be assembled; 
how are 'significant' connections established? Surely any 
historical question specifies, if only in very general 
terms, the object or occurrence it intends to investigate, 
and this projected occurrence is, however vaguely, an 
already specified outcome. Oakeshott, in arguing against 
all notions of correspondence, also rejects the 
possibility of comparison between different historian's 
conclusions; the study of historiography. He writes, 'An 
historian is never in a position to look back f rom an 
already understood historical situation or event and to 
conclude what must have been its components or significant 
antecedents... o288 Teleological schemes are rejected as 
'inherently impossible"289 since an historian 'remains 
290 ignorant' both of beginnings and endings. Oakeshott 
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seems to concede some ground when he writes that an 
historical enquiry is I concerned to understand what has 
somehow been identified but the character of which is not 
291 yet understood'. Such "identification" as is possible 
is limited to the formulation of an historical question, 
but Oakeshott leaves unanswered what kind of question this 
might be. He argues that an historical enquiry must 
always begin with a question addressed to an existing 
object -a survival - and then proceeds through searching 
for its 'authentic utterance' - the anatonizing of a 
situation which has not survived - and concludes with a 
provisional understanding of an event which could not have 
survived. 292 Yet it is not an option open to him to break 
up these various stages of an enquiry, calling them, 
research, monograph, history; or even "chronicle" (the 
first stage only) and "true" history. The historical past 
exists, if at all, as a coherent, modally distinct 
approach to the present, which, although it may be 
investigated and elucidated, cannot be divided up into 
separate concerns. The study of historiography, as a 
record of the conclusions of historical enquiries is 
itself ruled out in the following statement, 'The 
engagement of an historical enquiry cannot be that of 
learning to distinguish between the relative credibility 
293 of different accounts of the past'. The radical 
division between an historical and practical past may 
support the possibility of historical knowledge as a 
present reading of objects, but, it must also dispense 
with that area in which correspondence does seem 
operative, the comparing and contrasting of different 
interpretations. Perhaps what Oakeshott intends is to 
make a distinction between the study of different accounts 
of the "same,, past and diverging "historical" pasts which, 
by their nature, cannot be compared or contrasted but only 
juxtaposed. 
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Since, for Oakeshott, history must not be thought of 
as heuristic, comparisons with other historical 
situations, even in 'respect of detail', becomes 'merely a 
distracting irrelevance'. 294 And this is 'not because 
such likenesses may not be observed, but because 
conceptual likenesses or identities cannot themselves 
constitute significant relationships between historical 
events'. 295 But what can constitute a 'significant, 
relation? Oakeshott's answer, as it was in ExRerience and 
its Modes, is that relations between events cannot be 
imposed from outside, they must be sought in 'some 
intrinsic quality... its own coherence j . 
296 But we have 
already seen that historical events and 'the differences 
297 which compose a passage of historical change" are 
Joined contingently; they have no intrinsic, predetermined 
shape, and are what they are only in their assemblage by 
an historian. It is the historian who is responsible for 
establishing the coherence of the historical past, for 
assembling significantly related antecedent events, and 
for revealing their intrinsic continuity. The three 
essays On History are, however, devoted to limiting the 
scope of the historian's creative freedom, while, at the 
same time, arguing for the categorial autonomy of 
historical thought. In the end Oakeshott shows himself to 
be thoroughly suspicious of the historian's prerogative, 
and this is why the historical past is so tenuous and 
298 shifting: 'a continuity of divergent tensions'. 
Oakeshott believes that a specifically historical 
awareness of past is something which is still emerging, 
side-tracked as it is by the 'insinuating voice of 
299 practical understanding'. The philosopher's 
disinterestedness means that he is concerned to elicit 
what is consistent and distinguishing in this approach, 
but also to recognise that the 'present in historical 
understanding' is 'difficult to sustain'. 300 He writes, 
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And what I have said does not require that there 
should anywhere be found a piece of writing 
which exactly reflects an imagination so 
relentlessly concentrated upon relating a 
passage of historical events to an historical 
question about the past that it never 
diverges ... to speculate upon the intentions of a 
philosopher or the motive of a pfiltician, or 
never utters a practical judgement. 
This is not, however, a concession to the exigencies of 
writing history, not is it a reason to conclude that 
Oakeshott's description of history is perhaps not as 
severe as I have been arguing. It is meant only to 
acknowledge the demands of the practical mode. He 
continues, 
I an not dismayed when I find both kinds of past 
represented in a history book, because it is not 
to be expected that any book will avoid being 
somewhat miscellaneous ... we are concgped solely 
with the "history" in history books. 
Oakeshott's confidence that the 'historical past' is 
the understanding which all "history" aspires to, goes 
beyond the terms of his investigation into the activity of 
being an historian: it suggests criteria by which an 
historical approach may be assessed. This mixture of the 
descriptive and prescriptive reflects the ambiguity of 
Oakeshott's theory of history. on the one hand history, 
Par excellence, an 'adventure' in self-enactment, an 
opportunity to enquire and to construct; an essential 
element in the 'ordeal of consciousness', which, in a 
recent essay, he describes as an 'adventure in which the 
individual confronts the world he inhabits'. 303 This 
notion of 'becoming' through learning, of freedom being 
the ability to express one's understanding in 
statements, 304 and 'also in the world's being for him what 
he understands it to be$? 305 accords with the thesis of 
his book on Human Conduct. Here he argues that 
understanding is a resolve 'to inhabit an ever more 
intelligible - less mysterious world'. 306 This is an 
lunsought and inescapable freedom"307 and it involves, 
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above all, assuming responsibility for the meaning of our 
'utterances'. History, divorced from any notion of a 
fixed and finished past which teaches lessons, of 
submission to a scientific paradigm of causal deduction, 
provides us with the opportunity to 'imagine'. And yet, 
on the other hand, because it is independent of a 
practical, assimilationist urge, it is clearly 'useless', 
potentially 'positively misleading to our present 
circumstances'. 308 No other reason, Oakeshott concludes - 
moral, political, or financial - can be adduced for 
studying the historical past than a curiosity about the 
presence of survivals, and even this interest is, as we 
have seen, attenuated. This may be the past-for-the- 
past's sake approach, the attitude of the scholars, but it 
is purged of any lingering faith that his efforts will 
slowly, incrementally, approximate (ever more faithfully) 
to the reality of "what happened". An historical event is 
a 'tentative construction' subject to constant 
Irevisions'. 309 
At the heart of Oakeshott's theory of history is the 
demand not to misconceive the nature of historians' 
conclusions. Referring to the 'names' given by the 
historian to their continuities of 'change' - 'the 
Carolingian Empire', the 'protestant Reformation', the 
'Intellectual Revolution of the Seventeenth Century' etc. 
- he makes the following plea, 
... we must understand him to be begging us not to place too must weight upon these 
identifications ... not to confuse his tentative, 
multiform historical identities with the stark 
monolithic products of practical and 
mythological understancýiM which these 
expressions also identify. 
But, by excluding all practical interest, Oakeshott 
excludes too much, and, in effect, leaves the historian 
stranded in a present with no facility event to make use 
of his own previous conclusions. There is just nothing 
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for the historian to look back upon and everything is 
dissolved in the continuum of a present f orm which there 
is no escape. 
Since Oakeshott's idealism explodes any notion of 
correspondence, and of facts outside of experience, he has 
to distinguish "pasts" in terms of present interests. In 
On Human Conduct, Oakeshott expresses the prerogative of 
the historian. 'His', he writes, 'is an engagement ... not 
to re-enact in his own imagination the perf ormance of an 
agent... (but) ... to take hold of a performance and endow it 
with a conditional intelligibility of which he is the 
author'. 311 This creative dimension, the self-certifying 
aspect of historical thought, was recognised by Dilthey, 
Croce, and Collingwood. Yet, for them, the past of 
historians' is, to varying degrees, linked to the life of 
the present. The present-past f or Croce is af orm of 
vital ethical awareness, for Collingwood, a condition of 
self-consciousness. But Oakeshott does not follow this 
humanistic conclusion; it is anathema to him, and to his 
sense of freedom: deliverance from a past which, though it 
is profoundly silent, can nonetheless be forced to speak 
in the language of practice. 
Oakeshott's account of historical change is far from 
satisfactory. To argue that the past possesses no 
determinate shape is one thing; 312 to deny that historians 
can establish conceptual or thematic descriptions of 
events is quite another. But once again we must return to 
Oakeshott's rejection of the idea of an external arbiter, 
in this case an historically established past, the 
conclusions of historians. Instead he throws their 
conclusions into the same melting pot with the relations 
between events, and the historian is left to occupy, in 
Croce's contradictory phrase, an 'eternal present', a 
present not only cut off from the past as it really was, 
but also from the past as it has been inferred in record. 
Such is his concern that history should not be represented 
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as a growing body of attested facts and agreed upon 
interpretations, that an historical past seems to exist as 
a question, but not an answer; a series of undertakings to 
'assemble past events' in a continuum of forgetting. 
With the exception of a passage from Maitland, 
313 an 
approving mention of De Tocqueville, and an array of other 
history books introduced as examples of I'denotedol314 
historical 'situations', Oakeshott gives no encouragement 
that the historical past, as a sustainable approach, is 
achievable. His own writings provide no examples of what 
he describes as an 'historical enquiry properly speaking'. 
Must we conclude that the historical past is the ideal 
goal of understanding but that its iron logic prevents its 
attainment? This appears to contradict his notion of the 
'conversation of learning' in which we learn to 
distinguish 'utterances' in terms of their 'voices'. 
Conversation, however, implies conversing with others, and 
yet Oakeshott explicitly ruled out the possibility of 
translating from one 'language' to another. Significant 
communication only occurs within a particular modal 
understanding. Indeed, despite Oakeshott's libertarian 
conviction that understanding is an activity to be engaged 
in, the severity of his historical past opens the way for 
any number of "failures" and "distortions" posing as 
history. The structuralist implications of On HistorY, 
with its talk of 'universes of discourse', of modally 
distinct 'utterances'. of 'tropes', are revealing. The 
logic of historical understanding appears to be placed 
between the subject (historian) and his object (survivals 
from the past) and entails that a certain kind of past 
will be understood. The postulates of the historical past 
are, in Oakeshott's final analysis, placed outside 
'conversation'. 
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PART II 
An Idealist Legacy 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapters I have attempted to 
describe an idealist understanding of history. It has not 
been a precise delineation of agreed concerns and shared 
approaches; there is considerable distance between Croce's 
rejoicing in the conjunction of contemporary concerns and 
historical problems, and Oakeshott's separation of the 
practical present from the pursuit of a specifically 
historical past. However, if it is a decent likeness, 
this description of an idealist understanding of history 
stands against a distinction between positivism (commonly 
cast in the form of a demand for greater scientific rigour 
in historical explanations) which recognises no frontiers 
or boundaries, and an equally extreme defence of the 
autonomy of historical knowledge int terms of its 
intuitive reliving of past thoughts: the idealist 
manifesto. This chapter will be spent analysing the 
nature of this 'perceived' idealist position and on the 
broader implications of Collingwood's and Oakeshott's work 
as it has been received by post-war philosophy of history. 
Placing an idealist approach to history in opposition 
to the 'epistemological hegemony' of positivism is a 
correct estimate of the background against which to set 
the development of Collingwood's and Oakeshott's thought. 
In as far as both thinkers articulated a conception of 
historiography radically distinct from the methods and 
practice of science, they helped set the agenda for a new, 
analytical philosophy of history. From W. H. Walsh's An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Historyl onwards 
philosophers . )f history have trod a careful line of 
compromise between 'positivist' or the deductivist in 
Hempel in particular and to a lesser extent Popper and 
the idealist position. Where they have placed themselves 
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along this conceptual spectrum has largely depended on 
their analysis of explanation in history. Thus, while 
Gardiner and Mandelbaum, have tended towards a qualified 
acceptance of the proposition that historians inevitably 
use explanatory laws of one type or another, Dray and 
Walsh have been more persuaded that historians explain 
through he contextual appraisal of human actions. One 
could elicit a similar pattern of response to the problems 
of historical objectivity, truth and fact, and the 
peculiarities of narrative. 
It was Walsh who, in 1951, announced the scope and 
range of a post-idealist philosophy of history. There are 
earlier contributions, 2 but with this publication came 
recognition of the second-order nature of the philosophy 
of history: the study of the study of history. 3 In order 
to salvage academic respectability and accommodate 
philosophical interest within a wider historical 
community, Walsh made explicit a distinction. Henceforth 
philosophy would eschew speculation about the overall 
course of history, res gestae, indulging in discerning 
patterns in time; indeed it would cease, on the whole to 
pass judgement on the merits of particular historiography4 
and instead pay attentive interest to the demands of a 
5 flourishing academic discipline, asking questions related 
to the historian's pursuit of historical understanding. 
Walsh distinguished between 'critical' and 'speculative' 
philosophy of history6 and this division has bene 
preserved, for the most part, every since. 7 On the one 
hand the distinction is confirmation of the two-fold 
meaning of the word 'history' which was recognised by 
Oakeshott (1933), S and one the other an assertion that 
history, as a discipline, was not awaiting intellectual 
maturity, nor rites of passage into the ranks of the 
sciences, but already had recognisably specific aims and 
organising principles and, to that extent, could be 
treated as a something given. Thus for most post-war 
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philosophers of history the conceptual space created 
between history's practitioners (historians) and its 
consumers (a readership) is the legitimate territory of 
those interested in investigating the study of history. 
'Speculative' philosophy of history, that 'submarine 
monster, dredged up from the deep waters of 19th century 
metaphysics, its jaws occasionally opening to emit 
prophecies in a dead (or at any rate a foreign) tongue - 
the language of the Hegelian dialectic', 9 now becomes 
subject-matter for analysis by 'critical' or 'analytical' 
philosophy of history. 
By and large critical philosophy of history has 
tended not to be confrontational. Occasionally individual 
historians are stung into countering a theoretical 
intrusion into his or her perceived domain. 10 Indeed, 
although again there are exceptions, much of the debate 
over explanation has been conducted at a distance: 
abstracting and comprising 'models' from the sciences and 
from history. In reaction to the claims for sovereignty 
on behalf of law-based explanation (in particular those 
expressed by Popperll and Hempell2) analytical 
philosophers have emphasised the incompatibility of these 
claims with historians' intentions of understanding what 
is individual and even perhaps unique. Further they have 
highlighted the lack of specific and applicable examples 
offered by the 'proto-science'13 position. This complex 
and intricate debate is perhaps only now beginning to 
subside. The outcome has been inconclusive. William Dray 
has directed his attention towards the examination of 
concrete instances of causation in historiography, 14 while 
notions of a science of history have f ound a home in the 
statistical history of the cliometricians and certain 
factions of the Annales school. For the purpose of this 
chapter historical explanation will be indicativeless of a 
series of detailed exchanges than of an occasion for 
affirming a positive role for critical philosophy of 
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history. It may well be true that, in focusing so much 
attention on this particular problem, many philosophers 
and theorists have obscured a position, the true nature of 
which is far more at odds with the actual practice of 
history than most will allow. If this is so we must ask 
whether the distinction between critical (or analytical) 
and speculative philosophy of history is as rigid as has 
been maintained. 
An idealist approach to history is commonly seen as 
one extreme in a polar argument over the nature of 
historical knowledge. This itself is reason enough for 
talking of a 'legacy'. In addition to this reading of 
idealism we also have testimonies of acknowledgement to 
the stimulus and importance of Collingwood. 15 Whether in 
terms of influence or opposition Collingwood is widely 
acknowledged as the point of departure for critical 
philosophy of history. The extend of the commentary upon 
his writings is adequate indication of his continuing 
importance although for our purposes much of this work has 
been used as secondary material in the preceding 
exigetical chapters. Yet, despite this acknowledged 
influence the tracing of an idealist legacy is not a 
straightforward interpretive exercise. one is not dealing 
with a 'school of thought'. There are no explicit 
advocates of an idealist understanding which had shed the 
trappings of rationalist system-mongering and is already, 
firmly, in the analytical mods. To an extent this is not 
surprising since the espousal of identifying labels has 
often been considered antithetical to original 
philosophical insight. 16 However this does not present us 
from noting that, for example, W. H. Walsh has sympathies 
and Goldstein at times seems to teeter on the edge, and 
yet their readings of idealism deny them the opportunity 
of a closer identification. This denial takes the form of 
a partial miscuing of idealism in which much that is 
overstated in Collingwood and, to a lesser extent 
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Oakeshott, are taken as glaring ontological errors. 17 In 
addition this received interpretation fails to account for 
the fact that the position of the later Collingwood and of 
Oakeshott is already, in an important sense a Post- 
idealism. Much of what is interesting in Collingwood's 
'absolute presuppositions' and Oakeshott's modal divisions 
within knowledge is that it represents the crystallizing 
of a position which has undergone a 'crisis of faith'. 
The unity of the all-embracing 'absolute' has fractured, 
and splintered into separate 'worlds of ideas'. Despite 
his allowing philosophy to appear as 'knowledge without 
presuppositions, or 'arrest' there is not, in Oakeshott's 
writings, any clear conviction that such 'experience' is 
attainable. Instead one is left with rigidly 
distinguished modes of experience which cannot communicate 
one with another, nor be translated from without loss and 
distortion. Collingwood's 'absolute presuppositionst 
similarly render the historical continuum full of rupture 
and disjunction and do damage to his faith in the reliving 
of past experience. As with Croce the historian, 
entrapped within the presuppositions of his own time, he 
is left only to celebrate his relative and personal 
understanding of the past. 
Here, then, we have the tension implicit in a 
confrontation of idealist epistemology with a developed 
historical "science". with the latter's emphasis on 
change, context and difference, and it is this, I have 
argued, which led Collingwood and, more especially, 
Oakeshott to devote so much attention to the notion of a 
specifically historical way of understanding the present. 
This position, thought it has the appearance of an 
ontological commitment, is in fact an attempt to salvage 
knowledge of the past as a legitimate 'form of 
experience', distinct from the aims and methods of the 
sciences. Cut loose from its own distinguishing subject 
matter (past reality) the emphasis on history as a 'way of 
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knowing' 18 has, for the most part been seen as a negative 
tendency. Negative because it is said to isolate history, 
in an a Priori sense, from a wider community of knowledge. 
History, it is countered by those who have defended it as 
a "rich, intellectual field", is marked by procedural and 
methodological differences, but it shares a common world 
of experience with the sciences, natural and social. 19 
Therefore one line of investigation will be to pursue 
those thinkers who have worked with an epistemological 
description of history, 20 while recognising that, on the 
whole, philosophy of history has become the analysis of 
practice divorced of any such speculation. 
In Quentin Skinner's 'Meaning and Understanding in 
the History of Ideas' we are reminded of the dangers of 
ascribing influence where we cannot demonstrate it 
textually, of searching for coherence where there is 
disparity and contradiction and of applying schematic 
interpretations which are anachronistic. Skinner 
highlights the pitfalls involved in tracing the 
'morphology of some given doctrine, 22 and warns us, 'the 
fact that ideas presuppose agents is very readily 
discounted, as if the ideas get up and do battle on their 
own behalf'. 23 Since this chapter does seek an 
interpretive coherence and treats the "post- idealism" of 
Collingwood and Oakeshott as a 'received doctrine', it is 
hoped that it will not slip into any of Skinner's 
exegetical 'mythologies'. By concentrating on a perceived 
version of an idealist historical understanding, we must 
acknowledge that this is not a comprehensive 'doctrine' in 
the sense of a presuppositional orthodoxy within which 
interpretations are formulated (in a sense similar to that 
explored by Maurice Cowling in his multi volumed Religion 
and Public Doctrine). 24 As I have mentioned, the 
rejection of idealism provided an opportunity and occasion 
for a critical realignment. Therefore "influence" is here 
taken to mean a certain agenda for analytical philosophy 
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of history and the development of a conceptual 
middleground between the claims of covering - law 
theorists and those f or possible alternative descriptions 
of historical knowledge. Questions as to whether this 
reading and rejection of idealism reflects the concerns of 
Collingwood and Oakeshott must be kept separate from 
speculation as to "anticipations" or hidden influences. 
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Chapter 4- EXplanation and Causal Analysis: The Primacy 
of the Historian 
i) Introduction 
The course of the debate over explanation in 
history may be traced schematically. Its origins go 
back into the late nineteenth century and the ascendancy 
of a post-Kantian distinction between the natural and 
human 'sciences'. This distinction, hammered out 
against a background of a positivist programme for the 
25 advancement of knowledge, was crystalised by Wilhelm 
Windelband into a conceptual division between nomothetic 
thought (the direction of knowledge towards the 
permanent and universal: the search for 'laws') and 
idiographic thought (knowledge of the individual and 
unique: exemplified in history). A similar division 
between the sciences of the physical world and 
Geisteswissenschaften, cultural sciences or the sciences 
of the mind is fundamental to the thought of Wilhelm 
Dilthey. 26 To a certain extent this rigid division 
(formulated in terms of subject-matter or cognitive 
interest) was an artificial creation to give 
intellectual breathing space to those disciplines and 
thinkers who rejected the more determinist, straight- 
jacketing effects of a positivist conception of 
knowledge. one need not equate this distinction with a 
realist - idealist divide, and yet the idiographic focus 
of attention o the cognitive subject, the emphasis on 
interpretation and intuition in acquiring knowledge of 
the individual, are all conducive to an idealist 
epistemology. Moving centre stage, both Collingwood and 
Oakeshott arrived at this position though both had 
reasons for amending and extending it. For Collingwood, 
history is knowledge of past thought expressed in action 
and therefore historical knowledge is self-knowledge: 
inferential identification with the perceptions and 
reasoning of past agents acting within the context of 
particular 11problem-s ituat ions" social milieus. Such 
historical Ore-thinking' from present evidence, though 
empirical, is founded, however, on the historian's 
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experience qua historian. That is to say, the 
determination of the I logic I or rhythm of past actions 
is not in the end reducible either to common-sense 
generalisations nor to calculations of probability based 
on laws abstracted from the natural or social 
29 sciences. Historical knowledge becomes in Collingwood 
(as it did f or Croce,, though f or broader humanistic 
purposes) a separate species of knowing, which has 
developed over the last century and a half into a fully 
formed, critical 'category' of mind, and which has its 
own standards of judgement, its own methods and goals, 
and its own explanatory procedures. Collingwood's 
version of the distinction outlined above rests its case 
both on points of methodological differences and on the 
pursuit of different ends, and his later work allows for 
history to 'subsume' philosophy because it is self- 
knowledge of mind in its development. History is 
therefore no poor relation of the sciences, it does not 
focus on the individual and particular because it lacks 
reliable data and experimental techniques to proceed 
towards classification and the universal. Critical 
historiography represents that unity of subject 
(historian), and object (the past) which Hegel sought 
and lost on a transcendental scale. 
Oakeshott has less to say on the subject of method 
than Collingwood but his epistemological position is 
more consistent. In its severity and uncompromising 
hostility towards a rationalistic community of knowledge 
he has far more in common with other inter-war 
philosophers who also dealt in divisions and 
disjunctions: with the language games of the later 
Wittgenstein, 30 and with the post-phenomenological 
position of Heidegger. 31 History, for Oakeshott, is a 
mode of experience, a 'universe of discoursel32 
separated from all others in terms of its logical 
presuppositions. The distinction between scientific and 
historical explanation is thus something fundamental, 
not a matter of precision or clarity, but a function of 
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a primary division in the way in which the world is 
regarded. It is a division of apperception. Indeed 
explanation -a category of scientific understanding - 
has no place at all in historical practice. This is not 
to say that historians have no sense of connection 
between events, but that, Oakeshott contends, such 
connections are exemplified in the unified 
"constitution" of past events. They are not, or should 
not, be the result of applying one or other of various 
explanatory models. I will, therefore, look for the 
implications of Oakeshott's constructionist approach in 
the debate over the peculiarities of historical 
narrative, the metaphor of story-telling as an 
organising principle, and to the particular question it 
addressed, can the narrative form in which historians' 
characteristically express their conclusions itself be 
an explanation of NU something occurred? 
Interpretation of Collingwood's work has provided 
the occasion for countering a sophisticated version of 
positivism in the form of "covering-law" theory. To do 
justice to this influence I will look at the work of 
William Dray who has presented a very plausible 
interpretation of Collingwood's notion of re-enactment 
and re-thinking, and created an account of what 
historians might mean when they claim to have explained 
something. It was Dray who coined the term "covering- 
law" in his book Laws and EKRlanation in HistM 
(1957), 33 and by examining his arguments it is possible 
to recognise the polarity of the perceived idealist and 
positivist positions without getting hopelessly bogged 
down in minutae of what is a very intricate and complex 
debate. The importance of Dray's arguments is the way 
in which (after a sympathetic hearing) he has used 
Collingwood as emblematic of a position he would not 
want to defend, a belief in the absolute autonomy of 
historical knowledge, yet short of that extreme to 
define a conceptual space conducive to the aspirations 
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of historians (and indeterminists), one which offers an 
alternative account of historical explanation. 
Certain aspects common to both Collingwood's and 
Oakeshott's descriptions of historical knowledge are 
critically examined by W. H. Walsh34 who, amongst post- 
war British philosophers of history, is perhaps the most 
sympathetic to an idealist position. 35 A concern with 
the relation between part and whole and the interaction 
of the cognisant subject and his object of knowledge are 
taken up by Walsh in a discussion of what he terms 
"colligation". What is interesting in Walsh is that one 
can detect a similar tension to that which underlies 
(and perhaps undermines) an idealist description of 
historical knowledge, yet because Walsh has shed the 
"metaphysical', commitment which divides up experience 
(or at least makes the attainment of a unified 
experience a virtual impossibility) and the restrictions 
of an epistemological a priori. 
ii) W. H. Walsh: Colligation and Historical Wholes 
In his Introduction to the philosophy of HistorV36 
(1951) Walsh comments on the difficulty of dividing his 
subject into net conceptual compartments. In dealing 
with his idea of colligation37 we have a good working 
example of this difficulty. On the one hand it is an 
analysis of a common historiographical procedure, the 
ascription of significance to certain events and the 
identification of themes or developments. Colligation, 
it is argued, involves finding an appropriate concept 
under which to group diverse happenings and so to see 
them as some kind of unity or whole. As such it is an 
examination of an interpretive device which aims at 
organising and clarifying in order to facilitate 
understanding. But, on the other hand, it one asks 
where these appropriate colligatory concepts are to be 
found, and how their appropriate ness is to be assessed, 
we move away from a question ostensibly dealing with 
practice and towards the theoretical problem of the 
role of 
ýhe 
historian in the construction of historical 
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knowledge. Indeed Walsh intends just such a shift of 
focus. In emphasising the participatory role of the 
historian Walsh contends that it is a task of history to 
provide guidance through a tangle of disparate events, 
to identify continuing process by looking not only at 
the intentions of agents (in a Collingwoodian sense) but 
also at the results of their actions, and thus to make 
creative and instructive use of hindsight. In vivid 
contrast to 'the past for the past's sake' idea of 
historical enquiry, 38 Walsh condemns the deceipt 
involved in the avoidance of descriptive names and 
labelS39 (the characterising of periods and 
developments) and concludes that the ultimate 
justification of colligation is if it helps to make the 
past intelligible to IM. This approach is, I shall 
argue, a reassertion of indeterminism4O and moral 
agency, and a demand that history has 'living' interest, 
in a Crocean sense. 
It could, with some justification, be argued that 
Walsh's idea of colligation belongs in a section 
discussing the problems of objectivity/subjectivity in 
history, particularly in terms of the notion of 
significance it employs and the possible anachronism it 
encourages. In the third edition of his Introduction, 
Walsh states, 'Dray and I are ... more concerned with 
interRretation than explanation"41 and that after 
colligation further explanation may well be necessary to 
provide a full answer to "why" questions. 42 I want to 
preserve this discussion in this chapter for two main 
reasons. Firstly because colligation makes clear 
reference to one aspect of the idealist programme, the 
notion of unity in diversity, or intrinsic relations 
between separate events; what Hegel called a 'concrete 
universal' and Oakeshott an 'historical individuall. 43 
Explanation becomes an exercise in establishing (in a 
sense to be examined( intrinsic connections rather than 
'external' links of cause and effect. secondly, that 
colligation taken as a way of responding to an 
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historical question, embodies certain assumptions about 
what there is to be explained, and why. In other words 
it reveals the presence, of presuppositions about the 
nature of historical understanding. With Walsh,, such 
presuppositions are either explicit or very near to the 
surface. We may also mention that the colligatory 
notion of describing what happened under the 
1quidance, 44 of an organising concept, the grouping 
together of separate events in a thematic way, has 
affinities with a definition of narrative explored in 
the fourth section of this Chapter. Could it be as Mink 
argued, that tracing out a configuration of events in a 
narrative is itself a mode of understanding, an adequate 
response to an historical question? 45 
In an article written in 1967, Walsh describes how 
his earlier formulations of colligation had 'tended to 
treat it as an explanatory process. 46 He continues, 
'My interest in it at the time arose out of an attempt 
to find a plausible version of the idealist theory of 
47 history'. Elsewhere he characterises this idealist 
theory in the following way: history is properly 
'concerned with human thoughts and experiences' (with 
which he agrees); 'historical understanding is of a 
unique and immediate characterl48 (with which he 
disagrees); therefore history is a manifestation of mind 
(with which he is in partial agreement only). This 
presumably is the idealist theory of history according 
to Collingwood. His conception of an idealist 
philosophy of history also involves a clear rejection of 
Oakeshott's 'historical' past. 49 
Before examining Walsh's interpretation of an 
idealist philosophy of history and thus the context for 
the development of his idea of colligation, it should be 
said that, along the lines of his critical/speculative 
division, Walsh's own work is of a second-order nature 
only to a limited extent. It continues to interest 
itself in the logic and presuppositions underlying 
historical practice, and, if it does not criticise 
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specific historiography,, neither does it hesitate in 
drawing conclusions as to the role of the historian in 
both an ethical and heuristic sense. However, if we 
attend to Walsh's use of the word 'critical' to define 
his interest in history, there is little cause to be 
surprised at the lack of olympian reticence in his work. 
Taken in its Kantian sense, 'critical' is precisely that 
interplay of presupposition and analysis which animates 
Walsh's own interest in history. This is really not the 
same, almost apologetic, attitude taken by certain other 
philosophers of history towards the object of their 
interest. 
Walsh announced in an article of 196750 his failure 
to find a plausible version of an idealist philosophy of 
history, and also in an addition to the third edition of 
his Introduction. 52 This does not involve a rejection 
of his idea of colligation, but refers to his conclusion 
that idealism unnecessarily restricts its range and 
scope. He became increasingly critical of Collingwood's 
historical explanation through the rethinking of past 
thoughts. 53 Whereas Walsh accepts that there is a need 
to see past actions as expressions of thoughts or ideas 
for the sake of interpretation, and such thoughts from 
the standpoint of agency, he concludes that we must move 
away from the notion of individual, self-sufficient 
minds. 54 He wants to retain human actions as the 
essential unit of historical study yet, in a 1963 
article, he accuses Collingwood of impoverishing the 
55 historian's 'causal apparatus'. It proves inadequate 
for the 'modern' historian who is interested not only in 
the question 'who caused what? ', but also in lyb_4t 
caused whatV56, which accounts for such factors as 
political and economic conditions which, at the very 
least, restrict the range of choices open to the 
individual. The I'modern,, 57 historian in addition seeks 
to account for individuals acting not in isolation but 
as 'members of complex organisations'. 58 Overall Walsh 
seeks a 'reduction... in our estimate of the significance 
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of individuals in history... 1,59 although this must not 
be equated with a commitment to social wholism. 
In two separate essays Walsh criticises Oakeshott's 
Itheoretical'60 version of historical understanding: the 
'historical' past. Walsh argues that history is not 
Just description but 'assessment',,. it should 'provide 
guidancel, 61 and that a desire to make comparisons 
between the past and present animates our historical 
studies. Ultimately history is the $sphere of the 
practical', and it cannot be understood in terms which 
seem to exclude the practical. He argues that 
historians' use of the 'standpoint of the agent'62 
refutes Oakeshott's fear of an intrusion of interest 
which is unhistorical, in that it allows him to speak 
'from a point of view without embracing that point of 
view, 63 that of a general in a battle, for example. If 
this approach were not possible then we would be forced 
to agree with Oakeshott, who in Walsh's words, reduces 
history to 'truths which are not merely independent of 
persons, but independent of any living context of 
64 enquiry'. 
Walsh then is concerned to increase the range and 
scope of historians' causal explanations, and also to 
defend a legitimate interest in the past. In many ways 
this is a rejection of one version of idealism, which 
has undergone a "crisis of faith", by an appeal to a 
more expansive version represented by Dilthey and Croce. 
Dilthey with his emphasis on hermeneutical understanding 
and its ascription of meaning and significance to 
actions, and his notion of the part-to-whole analysis. 
As Walsh writes of his own colligatory scheme it 
attempts to deal with groups of actions, and 'tries to 
find unity by looking for some unity of thought'65 by 
seeking for 'intrinsic relations between separate 
v66 events And Croce, with his emphatic belief in the 
vivacity and instructiveness of 'living' history. Walsh 
is much impressed with Croce's distinction between 
history and chronicle, the latter being the "mere" 
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recital of disconnected events. Walsh's concept of 
colligation emphasises the ethical dimension of the 
historians' activity. In this, as in many other things, 
his position in close to Dray's; the belief in the 
indeterminism of human actions, 67 and also in the 
participatory function of the enquirer in a historical 
construction. Whereas Dray finds expression for these 
beliefs in his model of rational explanation, Walsh 
focuses on the Icharacterising of ... historical 
68 wholes'. 
Walsh's colligatory scheme runs something like 
this: the historian colligates by 'placing events in 
their context by tracing a myriad of connections between 
them and other events'. 70 First though he must find an 
appropriate concept. Appropriate, in this sense, is 
largely the result of organisational efficacy, and can 
be seen, on one level, as an organisation of "fact": 
71 'The Greek Age of Enlightenment'. or 'The Rise of the 
Gentry'. Walsh argues that the choice of colligatory 
concepts 'must fit the facts not be straightjacketedl72 
on them. The test of this will always be existence of 
evidence. In this way colligatory concepts might be 
understood as summarative generalisations that both 
encapsulate and give form to $low-level, 73 factual 
statements based on evidence. Colligatory concepts must 
aptly characterise the 'facts' that they hold together, 
they must provide a means of making sense of separate 
'events' when seen in a particular thematic order. 
Presumably in some cases a colligatory whole will 
compose a single historical event -a battle, an 
election - revealing, by the selection and ordering of 
f acts, its significance. In other cases, as in 'the 
Rise of the Gentry', it is separate events taken perhaps 
as background knowledge or as somehow already 
"constituted", which are colligated. 
Walsh stated that 'history can be called a science' 
if what is meant by this is its success in establishing 
'what in particular occurredl74. The "facts" of history 
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may, he believed, have a stable and detachable 
character, but how they are taken, in what form and 
order they are put together is far from being a neutral 
affair. In history there must be judgements of 
75 importance, and these are reflected in the process of 
colligation, which does not pretend to cover all facts, 
but only significant ones. 76 The criterion of 
significance, he argues rests on the notion of what is 
intelligible to us: 'readers want not just a bare 
recital of what happened... but also guidance as to what 
it amounted to,. 77 
One of the assumptions which underlies Walsh's idea 
of colligation, is the assertion that history is not nor 
cannot be a science if what is meant by this is 'a body 
of established truth which holds without distinction of 
person'. 78 History is not objective in this extreme 
sense. Instead every history is necessarily partial and 
selective, and 'contains an account of the facts as seen 
from a particular point of view ... every narrative is 
someone's narrative, told to some other party'. 79 In 
the next chapter I want to turn to Walsh's rather 
confused and doubtful hope in the possibility of a 
'science of human nature'80, or set of criteria, by 
reference to which historians resolve, or at least are 
able to suspend their basic, presuppositional 
differences and in this way overcome charges of 
subjectivity and bias; more generally the conclusion 
that historical truth is a matter of perspective and 
thus is ultimately relative in nature. 81 Here I want to 
concentrate on the explanatory structure and direction 
of understanding which colligation implies. 
Walsh, as we have seen, argues that history is not 
Just description, the historian must reveal the 
significance and importance of past occurrences. The 
very act of colligating is premised on this belief, 
since the historian must exercise a judgement of 
importance in the selecting and ordering of his 
material. He writes 'the primary task of the historian 
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is the identification of continuing processes'. 82 These 
'processes' or themes are the product of the historian's 
search for intelligibility; they are organisational 
schemes to 'illuminate the facts', 83 and their existence 
is sanctioned by their reliance on evidence and their 
efficacy in producing understanding. This looking for 
'unity in diversity'84 - the holding together of 
disparate events under a colligatory concept - is 
similar to what Mink, in an article in 1966, called a 
'synoptic judgment'. 85 The presence of such a 
judgement, or historical synthesis, is indicative of a 
difference in the direction of understanding to be found 
in history. For,, as Mink points out, the synoptic 
judgement is both a procedure of history and its goal 0 
86 
Elsewhere Dray has noted that the historian's synthesis 
which is expressed by means of an organising, 
colligatory concept, may be seen as 'the essence of 
historical enquiry, not an artistic ornament', and that 
(as opposed to the covering law model) the relating of 
part to wholes is not "a search for necessary and 
sufficient conditions". 87 Walsh himself is more 
reserved about the implications of colligation in 
history. For him it is mainly a vehicle for expressing 
a certain belief in the important role of the historian, 
and the nature of his subject matter. He argues that 
colligation explains only to the extent of showing how 
an event fitted into a continuing process8s. Yet 
insofar as 'showing how' involves the "appropriateness" 
of the organising concept, and 'continuing process, 
could be understood in Gallie's sense of locating 
historical meaning in the context of a story, it is 
possible to argue that Walsh's schema has explanatory 
potential, at least in response to Dray's 'how-possibly' 
question, or Gallie's 'following a story'. It might 
however,, still be contested that the explanatory force 
of colligation resides in an assessment of the 
relationship between the colligatory concept and the 
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'facts' included under it. How is this relationship to 
be assessed? 
We have already seen how the 'low-level'89 
statements of colligation must have their basis in 
evidential observations, resting on that "concrete" part 
of historical knowledge which has established F= 
happened in the past. if it is allowed (as Oakeshott 
never would) that there is nothing problematic in 
'observing' evidence in a way which is value-neutral, it 
is possible to follow Walsh in his belief that the 
interpretation of facts is the realm where notions are 
ingredients in the process of colligation. The presence 
of this assessment of significance, far from being an 
obstacle to the development of a "scientific" history, 
is an essential and valuable aspect of the historian's 
activity. The historian justify the choice of concept 
and the selection of facts through writing 'a narrative 
of the individual events of his period showing them to 
be intelligible in the light of the dominant concepts he 
has discovered'. 90 And if such a judgement does 
"illuminate" events and help us to see them as forming a 
"coherent" whole,, then their worth, for Walsh is 
assured, be they the 'Rise of the Gentry' or the 
'Goddess Liberty'. 91 
There is a further question as to the legitimacy of 
concepts which 'were not used or understood by agents at 
92 the time" of relating past actions to the ideas they 
expressed when the ideas could not have been understood 
by the agents, or which specify the workings of 
unconscious motivation, collective, and physical 
factors. Walsh answers, 'concepts need not be those 
available to past people', they are 'legitimate if they 
depict a proper description of certain states of 
affairse. Dray concurs with this answer: 'When is it 
justifiable to interpret past actions in terms of ideas 
their agents did not and could not have had?... when it 
makes them intelligible to us,. 93 and, 'Colligation must 
- in the end - always be understood f rom the point of 
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view of the historian. 94 This would appear directly to 
contradict Skinner's thesis, being riddled with 
'exegetical mythologies'. Yet both Walsh" and Dray96 
deny that they are condoning deliberate anachronism. 
Colligatory concepts are, after all,, to be founded on 
"acquaintance" with evidence, and, as Dray argues, 
'retrospective colligation' need not be in the service 
of present utility, instead it may refer to 'a coherent 
97 synthesis of what is presently known about the past'. 
It is an attitude which characterises historical 
knowledge as a search for meaning or significance, and 
in history, one could argue that such and such an event 
is significant in an interpretive sense without 
committing oneself to any speculation as to what agents 
"really" meant or were "really" doing. 98 It is a 
position which reflects a difference in emphasis: 
historical knowledge is ultimately worthwhile in terms 
of its 'living, worth, and not as a coincidental by- 
product of an enquiry into the remnants of a dead past. 
It is also an affirmation of the belief that it is the 
historian's responsibility actively to engage in making 
decisions as to value and significance. In a passage 
exposing the scholarly detachment of the "past for the 
past's sake" view of history Dray writes: "... using our 
terms does not commit us to a practical orientation 
towards the past, using theirs does not protect us from 
it". 99 Taken in this light colligation makes the 
important point that prior to explaining (however that 
is conceived) there will be a process of designating 
areas of interest and, within this, of significant 
events to be studied. 
Walsh's idea of colligation is essentially a 
teleological one. It involves the configuration of a 
'surface rationality', 100 the order of separate events 
held together in terms of relations of expressed ideas. 
In the sense that 'actions are the translation of ideas' 
it is a new version of an 'idealist emphasis on 
understanding past actions from the inside'. 101 We have 
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noticed how, in its later formulations Walsh widens the 
causal net so that ideas are not limited to being the 
product only of rational reflection; social, physical, 
and emotional factors enter the agent's calculation or 
perception of his situation. However, actions remain to 
be understood as the realisation of some purpose by 
which Walsh means, 'that events widely separated in 
time' can be treated 'as parts of a single development, 
whenever we have to do with processes which can be 
102 initiated, forwarded, or impeded by human efforts'. 
Colligation as it were, provides the glue to hold such 
events together so that we may recognise 'internal' 
connections among 'an agent or group of agents pursuing 
a long term policy over a period of timej. 103 The 
historian, in this way, is primarily concerned with the 
'pattern, and relationships into which individuals 
enterl, 104 which itself reflects Walsh's 'belief in 
continuing themes in diverse materials', and that men 
can actively seek general aims because 'attitudes 
can ... be shared by large groups'. 
105 
It should be emphasised that the entire 
teleological direction of historical understanding 
advocated by Walsh rests on the belief that 'some 
historical events are intrinsically related'. 106 One 
wonders whether, given the centrality of the historian 
relating events together under an appropriate concept, 
this statement would be clearer if it said 
'interpretively related'. Walsh's use of 'intrinsic' is 
resonant of an idealist notion of coherence. Historical 
understanding proceeds through identifying relations 
between thought and action, of actions to expressed 
ideas; it then attempts to further comprehend the 
action, or event, by placing it in a designated context 
or whole. The connections between events within this 
context may be seen as intrinsic to it, and similarly, 
the "surface rationality" of events will form a pattern, 
a theme, or a development. Colligation seeks just such 
historical wholes, the 'unity in diversity'107 of 
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persons, collectives or institutions. By colligating 
separate events under an organising concept history may 
reveal the 'concrete' identity of the particular and 
individual by placing it in a wider context. 
iii) William Dray; A Plea for Humanistic Historiography 
Maurice Mandelbaum has characterised Dray's 
position on historical explanation as Ireactionist'. 108 
by which he means that he is among those who share an 
'assumption that a proper analysis of explanation in 
history must conform to the statements which historians 
actually make in their attempts to explain particular 
occurrences'. 109 it is difficult to see how Dray would 
disagree with this characterisation. Much of his 
writings on the problem of historical explanation have 
been in "reaction" to what he termed covering-law 
theorists, and he has continually exemplified that 
strand of analytical philosophy of history which demands 
close attention be paid to the actual practice of 
history as conducted by historians. His principal 
objection to the 'Popper-Hempel"10 position the 
1hypothetico-deductive'111 model of explanation112 has 
been the disparity between it and what 'historians 
usually mean in offering an explanation of a human 
action. 113 However Mandelbaum intends more than simply 
to account for this "reaction": it is a reversion to a 
neo-idealist position. Walsh, he contends, demonstrates 
just how close the reactionist and idealist positions 
are. 114 Mandelbaum accepts and affirms the polarity of 
the debate over explanation, when the truth of the 
matter is that it is essentially an argument over the 
middle-ground. 
Few philosophers or for that matter historians, 
have wanted to accept Hempel's rigid description of what 
form historical explanation must take in order correctly 
to answer "why" questions. Popper himself in Tlm 
Poverty Of Historicis 115 in attempting to demonstrate, 
logically, that studies of the past cannot reveal the 
universal laws of historical change, and that any such 
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search is both misguided and morally wrong, is concerned 
to elucidate a hypothetico-deductive model of 
explanation which the social sciences may aspire to, but 
also to limit the free-play of causality and teleology 
the search fro historical laws. other philosophers of 
science, in particular T. S. Kuhn116 have argued strongly 
for a recognition of a certain relativism even within 
the physical sciences' supposedly hard world of facts, 
and therefore of the difficulty of abstracting a 
methodological principle from the context in which it 
operates. Those who have wished to defend the 
proposition that,, in explaining why something happened 
in the past historians make explicit or implicit 
reference to general laws, 117 be they physical, 
statistical, classificatory or common-sense 
generalisations, have been concerned either with the 
logical structure of historical explanation (as is the 
case with Mandelbaum and to a lesser extent 
Gardiner), 118 or to assimilate history, its practice and 
understanding to the wider community of the social 
sciences. 119 In addition there has been a continued 
attempt to dismiss the notion of historical 
understanding as the study of individual, or unique 
events via the mediation of empathetic imagination or 
synoptic judgement: the position which demands (to a 
greater or lesser extent) that history be recognised as 
a distinct way of "knowing". 120 This itself is a legacy 
of the nomothetic/idiographic divide, cited by 
Mandelbaum as that against which covering-law theorists 
have reacted. 121 Yet it is also witness to an 
interpretation of an idealist "manifesto" which, in the 
context of a debate over historical explanation, is, for 
the most part, a conceptual fiction. 122 
Dray is one among a group of post-war 
philosophers123 interested in the particular problem of 
historical knowledge who have been concerned to analyse 
what historians do and to explicate the logic of the 
procedures underlying this practice. Dray himself, in 
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two separate examinations of historiographical 
controversies has focused his attention on historians I 
use of causality. 124 From this he attempts to elicit 
common assumptions about the nature of *xplanatory 
causal relations, instances of disagreements, and 
conclusions of the extent to which judgement of 
relations between cause and effect, and larger 
explanatory assertions, implicate or contain value- 
judgements. Dray's forray into historiography can be 
taken as evidence of a belief that history, as a way of 
enquiring into past happenings, has identifying 
characteristics and recognisable (if not shared) 
procedures. His theoretical study has provided him with 
sufficient reason to conclude that, when historians 
claim to have understood why something occurred in the 
past, their claims may rest upon a particular 
explanatory structure which need not appeal to general 
laws for its validity or intelligibility, even though 
the explanation remains explicitly causal. It is not, 
as Mink pointed out in an article of 1966, that Dray is 
claiming to exclude on principle covering-law 
explanations of events, what he is arguing for is at 
least the logical possibility of alternative modes of 
explanation. 125 He argues for a certain understanding 
of the historians subject-matter - rational and 
purposive human actionsl26 - and urges the historian to 
describe, interpret and explain on the only premise 
which would distinguish this activity from deduction, 
induction, and prediction, indeterminism. 127 Thus, for 
Dray, when an historian claims to have understood the 
occurrence of a past event,, what is being asserted is 
that, through an examination of all the evidence 
considered relevant to the question raised, within the 
context of an historiographical debate, he or she have 
assigned meaning and significance to the action, or 
actions, from the standpoint of agency and from the 
privileged position of the historian who is able to 
assess the event in a wider context and in the light of 
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the outcome. 128 It is this sense of explanation as the 
assigning of signif icance to human actions, and the 
direction of interest it entails, which places 
historical explanation in a different "universe of 
discourse" from that employed in natural science. What 
is of particular interest to our present concerns is 
Dray's concept of the "rationale" or "intelligibility" 
of human actions. Through this it is possible to map 
Dray's position along the conceptual spectrum which he 
himself helped to identify. Such a position is 
occasioned by his rejection of the covering-law model of 
historical explanation as inadequate and wayward 
description of the kind of understanding historians' 
aspire to; it is a dismissal of the "proto-sciencell 
conception of history whereby the discipline is supposed 
to have got stuck in the adolescence of its scientific 
development and cannot pass over into adulthood because 
it lacks precision tools of analysis, consensual 
practices and canons of verification and 
discrinination. 129 However this description, while 
perhaps conforming to the Hempelian version of covering 
law and to the aspirations of some social-scientists 
minded historians,, by no means exhausts the arguments 
for the importance of laws and generalisations in 
historical explanations and Dray attempts to do justice 
to their variety. 130 
Dray's central contention, first developed in Laws 
and Explanations in Historyl3l and subsequently reworked 
in a series of articles132 (many of them taking the form 
of critical exegesis of Collingwood's thought) is cast 
under the heading of 'rational' explanation. In order to 
repel the implicit contention of covering-law theory, 
that history would remain an unstable affairs, dealing 
in half-truths plundered from other disciplines, 133 
unless it sought out empirical regularities and hence 
laws of connection between events which, in turn, could 
establish "types" of situations to be matched up with 
deduced (and indeed predicted) actions, Dray needed to 
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establish that historians sought for, and often found, a 
different kind of connection between events. Any such 
connection would have to accord with the integrity of 
the subject-matter of history: purposive human actions. 
here the influence of Collingwood is crucial. Dray's 
analysis of Collingwood's belief that historical 
explanation is carried out by re-thinking the thoughts 
of those under study, 134 involves an interesting 
dichotomy. On the one hand he presents a persuasive 
reading of a much misunderstood contention, and in so 
doing develops his own version of "rational" explanation 
which clarifies and then extends the application of 
what, in Collingwood, is confused. In this Dray is the 
careful textual commentator, concerned less with the 
content of historical explanations than with questions 
of their logical structure. But on the other hand he is 
also making a point about the nature of the historian's 
subject matter and a proper attitude toward it. 
In Laws and Exnlanations Dray attempts, and 
succeeds in a rebuttal of the central thesis of the 
covering-law theorists that, to properly account for an 
historical occurrence (Dray's favourite being the French 
Revolution)135 the historian must link together an 
initial description of what is to be explained with an 
empirically validated law, or laws, which make the 
subsequent explanation deducible and therefore, from 
these specified conditions, predictable. This is, as 
Dray points out, a statement not only of what 
constitutes a correct historical explanation, but about 
the structure of verification. 136 The covering-law 
model deals in the notion of 'implicit' law, 137 that is 
to say that historians, whether consciously or not (and 
successfully or not) appeal to laws in formulating their 
explanations. Now, whether there are specifically 
historical laws -a point on which Hempel confesses 
himself neutrall38 but which both Popper and White deny 
- is a moot point. However, the failure to recognise 
and make explicit this appeal to covering laws is said 
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to stem either from difficulties in precisely 
formulating them or to the fact that the causal 
connections covered by laws in historical explanations 
are often so well-known and established that they are 
not mentioned. 139 On the one hand then, this contention 
urges history to become more rigourously scientific in 
its procedures, and on the other it is the belief that 
the common-sense generalisations relied on by historians 
are the inarticulated offspring of physical and social 
scientific laws. 140 Thus historians are to be seen as 
dealing in laws, whether they know it or not, which is 
itself the implicit recognition of the academic 
sovereignty of the covering-law model. Dray writes, 
That judgement of particular cases, without 
knowledge of covering laws actually takes 
place in history, perhaps few exponents of the 
model would want to deny. The doctrine of 
implicit law is really an attempt to convince 
historians that such judgements ought to be 
replaced, or be replaceable under fire '14 ýy deduction from empirically validated laws. 
There are two prongs to Dray's counter to the 
covering law theorists "imperialistic" claims, a counter 
which is also intended to remedy the lack of clarity and 
precision inherent in their rejection of idealism. The 
first is a lucid examination of the 'logic' of question 
and answer found in historiography. Dray concludes, 
after an extremely fair hearing of the case for covering 
laws, that, even if it is possible to cover an event by 
a law, this may not be required in the process of 
historians, explanations. 133 Included within this 
argument is an examination of the 'logically' different 
questions 'why-necessarily' and 'how-possibly'134 Both 
may be legitimately asked and answered within an 
historical enquiry, but it is quite possible, Dray 
contends,, to argue that "how-possibly" questions arise 
from a different interest than that which provokes a 
search for necessary and sufficient conditions, and 
demand an answer to a particular type of puzzlement: 
'How could that have happened in the light of so-and- 
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r , 0? 1135 Such questions would, in other words, require 
answers which fulfilled their own terms. This, if Dray 
is persuasive (and I believe that he is) strikes an 
important blow for a (limited) form of autonomous 
historical explanation; of an understanding immanent in 
a kind of intellectual puzzlement , and not an external 
criterion of intelligibility, a suffix to an 'unstable' 
and sketchy understanding. 
Dray's second prong, concerns a particular 
conception of the historians subject matter, which 
explicitly denies that explanation and understanding are 
interchangeable terms, as the covering law theory 
argues. Dray's first counter to the covering laws 
position involves an examination of the (logical) 
structure of verif ication. Here in the second, he is 
concerned less with how historians go about explaining, 
than with what it is that they attempt to understand. 
His argument is, he writes, an attempt to 'rehabilitate' 
a doctrine of idealist philosophers of history, 
... that the objects of historical study are fundamentally different from those of, for 
example the natural sciences, because they are 
the actions of beings like ourselves... 'free' 
actions... (which) ... do not fall under law at 
all ... even if they do fall under law, discovery of the law would still not enable us 
to understand them in a 199 nse proper 
to this 
special subject matter'. 
Here, if anywhere, we may locate Dray's 'reaction'. For 
him, as for Collingwood, an historical event is composed 
of the actions of individuals (acting singularly or in 
groups), and the 'rationale' of such events calls for a 
certain kind of understanding involving its own sense of 
intelligibility. Dray's position on the question of 
freewill is dependent on this conception of history's 
subject matter, and not, as he makes clear, 137 on the 
logic of verification. That is to say, he is attempting 
a logical distinction which is not itself dependent on 
an evaluation of the content of explanation which 
accords with a "certain sort of puzzlement",, and only 
then inquire into the direction of this puzzlement or 
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the referent of this, particularly historical, interest. 
And it is for this reason that Dray's model of rational 
explanation takes the form of a (partial) reworking of 
Collingwood's Ire-thinking' of past thoughts or, in this 
case, the assessing of the "appropriateness" of actions 
in a determinate context and from a particular 
standpoint. It is precisely because the subject matter 
of history is free (in a sense to be defined) human 
action and not actions taken as instances and examples 
of the operation of universal laws, that history demands 
its own explanatory model. In other words, it is the 
direction of interest implied in the historian's concern 
with the individual, the particular, the difference 
between this event and that (The French Revolution and 
not the French revolution qua revolution)138, which 
ultimately distinguishes the nature and function of 
historians' explanations to those employed in the 
natural and social sciences. Autonomy, for Dray, is not 
a category of historical knowledge, but it is present 
and is to an extent presupposed in the direction of 
interest; an interest in the individual, which 
classifies only in order to investigate further, 
detailed differences. 
Dray's reputation of the covering law argument 
makes plain that historians do make use of the concept 
of explanation, of classification and causal analysis. 
However these concepts do not constitute and determine 
the historian's enquiry: they are tools to aid an 
understanding specified by a distinct interest and 
subject matter. Before we look further at this 
'understanding' it should be noted that Dray's focus of 
attention ('free' though determinate actions) is less an 
argument for causal priority of individuals in 
historical explanations, than an attempt to highlight, 
through an analysis of a legitimate historical interest, 
a procedure which conspicuously does not fit the 
covering law model. Thus, individual actions to counter 
the idea of 'covering' with a law, and understanding to 
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oppose the belief that only by working with this 
'scientific' structure of explanation can history, as a 
discipline, make and know itself to be making progress. 
once we move away from a discussion of the logic of 
verification, and towards an analysis of the historian's 
subject matter we are in a world of moral choices. one 
of those choices is to see this subject matter as 
composed of "free" human actions. 139 The sense of 
"free" here is of actions not-yet-understood and to be 
determined. Historical events, if not subsumed under 
laws, must take their place in an account which answers 
the query as to why tbjq and not tdICLt occurred. Such 
events, understood as a concatenation of actions, must, 
to be explained in a properly historical sense, be 
rendered somehow intelligible. The decision then, is to 
recognise the moral integrity of the historian's subject 
matter. Which involves an admission of the active, 
participatory role of the historian in assessing the 
rationale of events in the constitution of explanations. 
For Dray, as for Collingwood, the human past is to be 
understood from the standpoint of agency148 which at 
least for Dray, (since Collingwood did not recognise a 
distinction between past thoughts and the historian's 
re-thinking them) includes that of the enquirer. In 
other words the notion of free and intelligible actions 
does not exist independently of the form of historical 
interest outlined above. 
In a passage from his PhilOsORhy and Historyl4l 
Dray examines Oakeshott's description of explanatory 
events as intrinsically related. 152 He commends 
Oakeshott's insistence that 'historical understanding 
depends upon the reduction of sequences to a detailed 
series of understandable gteps,, 143 and the sense in 
which this particularising direction of explanation is 
indicative of a particular interest not satisfied by a 
search for extrinsic patterns or laws. Dray himself 
wants to contend that an historical narrative 
establishes connections between events which are 
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integral to the story being told, which are, in some 
sense, intrinsic. 144 However, he rejects Oakeshott's 
notion of 'continuity' as an adequate description of the 
historians relation of connected events as too vague and 
indefinable. What then is to provide a criterion of 
cohesion between events in historical explanations? 
Dray finds it in Collingwood's linking together of 
thought and action. With a deft rhetorical twist Dray 
replaces the 'inside/outside' metaphor with one more 
conducive to analytical moderations: the following of an 
agent's largument'. 145 For Dray then, the plausibility 
of empathetical understanding, of Nacherleben, sidesteps 
the distractions of an argument over whether such 
notions belong to ontology or epistemology, 
146 and finds 
its significance when interpreted as belonging to the 
problem of historical explanation. It is also an idea 
which rather neatly mirrors the two (moral) choices 
outlined above. The first, the recognition of the 
integrity and indeterminism of the human past, 
The only thoughts that will be 
explanatory ... are thoughts we have reason to believe the agent did think; and if 
Collingwood is right to hold that an ascribed 
thought to be explanatory, must actually be 
thought by the historian, he is right to say 
also that it must be re-thought ... he must 
consider ýh% agent's situation the way the 
agent did. 141 
The second, an assertion of the right of the historian 
to understand past actions in a particular sense, 
... our understanding of his (the agent's) 
action may arise out of our perception of a 
rational connection between an action and the 
motives and beliefs we ascribe to the 
agent... (MR may) ... (then) ordering these ingredients 
14 
In the f orm. of a practical 
conclusion. 
Dray is sensitive to the criticisms that have been 
levelled at Collingwood's account of 
explanation/understanding, in particular that it 
restricts historical study to instances where individual 
agents have rationally expressed their intentions, Dray, 
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along with a few other writers (most notably Louis 
Mink), 149 has attempted to salvage what is important in 
Collingwood from the confusion of some of his more 
paradoxical statements. 150 The 'rational' in Dray's 
explanatory schema ref ers not to an interest only in 
actions that were reasonable or self-conscious 
enactments of pre-planned intentions, as opposed to 
irrational, emotive actions vhich may have been 
influenced and (partly) defined within a social and 
physical context. Rational explanation, in his 
argument, 'tries to make clear its [the action's] point 
or rationale. 151 It is in f act an argument for close 
scrutiny of background and context; the search f or the 
rationale of an action involves understanding it as 
"free" (the action of an agent) in this restricted 
sense. Delimiting the scope and significance of an 
action by relating it to a determinate context involves 
a to-ing and fro-ing indicative of the process envisaged 
by Dilthey as the play of part and whole in 
interpretation. An historian then, Dray contends, may 
claim to have understood why an action occurred when he 
can 'see the reasonableness of an action, given the 
beliefs and purposes referred to ... his action can then 
be explained as having been an 'appropriate' one'. 
152 
Appropriate suggests a response to circumstances as 
envisaged from the standpoint of agency, the discerning 
of reasons must be from that point of view; 
153 it is & 
word employed to eschew the notion of intentionalism, 
or, that what the historian must do is to af f irm the 
'correctness' of the actions he is studying: actions, 
though "appropriate" to the perceptions and beliefs of 
agents, may be 'mistaken' in the sense of producing 
unwanted and unforeseen outcomes. 154 
This is a characterisation of historical 
explanation which attempts to describe both the process 
of interpretation and the explanatory form which such an 
interpretive account might take. The historian attempts 
to 'discover' the calculations155 of agents as expressed 
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through actions within a determinate context. He then 
sets out his findings in the form of a practical 
argument which has readers are invited to consider and 
follows. 
The emphasis in Dray's argument is upon the 
ascription of interpretive significance, or meaning, to 
a past action through the conceptual connection between 
understanding that action and discerning its rationale. 
The resulting 'rational explanation' is a formula within 
which such understanding may be expressed. Dray is not 
making a claim for a privileged form of historical 
insight, nor for a particular kind of historical 
experience. He is concerned to elucidate a structure 
for historical explanations which reflects a 
distinguishing interest in detail and difference and the 
enquiry into past events themselves composed of human 
actions. For the most part (remembering that this 
historical interest is exemplified in historiography, it 
is not to be specified a priori) historians do not 
search for sufficient conditions. 156 A condition may, 
however, be frationally necessary', 'not in the sense 
that without it the action could not have been 
performed... (but) ... in the sense that without it there 
would not have been good reason to perform it. 157 Thus 
the explanatory process is one which seeks to eliminate 
158 'reasonable alternatives'. 
Dray's concentration on the explanation of 
individual actions serves,, then, the purpose of 
accounting for a particular historical interest and 
enforces his argument for regarding actions from the 
standpoint of agency. His is the cautious claim that 
the criterion of rational appropriateness is "sometimes 
found to be applicable". Before going on to look 
further at the role of evaluation in history and his 
understanding of an idealist position which he has not 
wanted to 'rehabilitate@, I want briefly to consider 
Dray's understanding of the historical individual. 
160 
In a generally sympathetic examination of Watkins' 
rejection of social wholismI59 Dray commends what he 
takes to be an accurate anatomy of movements, 
collectives and societies; that is to say,, it is an 
accurate description and useful reminder that the 
components of these social entities are distinct, 
countable individuals. Yet Dray, having identified 
Watkins' position as primarily methodological, a 'theory 
of what constitutes good explanation in history and 
social inquiry generally'160,, wants to limit its 
application. Dray himself is not a methodological 
individualist. For him, there is at the centre of 
Watkins' thesis, an ontological argument, 'a certain 
view... of what social things really are'161, and thus 
his position supports a 'constitutive rather than 
"causal" or "productive" form of explanation'. 162 Dray 
supports the particularising direction of Watkins' 
argument, of the ascription of reasons to persons to 
render their actions more understandable, but criticises 
him for not distinguishing 'between what a thing is and 
explaining why it care to be,. 163 Watkins' is held to 
lack an understanding of the productive sense of 
explanation. What this charge amounts to, is that there 
is, in methodological individualism, an adequate 
analytic for the constitution of a state of affairs, but 
less than adequate account of how it came to be that 
way. That is to say, it cannot fully account for 
movement and change, particularly in the synoptic sense 
of what an action amounted to, or contributed towards. 
Methodological Individualism, after analysing into 
constituent parts, can make no use of a part/whole 
estimate of contextual significance. 
I have already noted how Dray includes impersonal, 
collective influences as ingredients in a rational 
argument. The important point is that they should be 
understood from the perspective of the time, in terms of 
how they were envisaged by the particular agent. We may 
recall Collingwood here, and his argument about how 
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physical events enter history by provoking responsive 
actions (lactiones'). However Dray also agrees (in this 
case with a 'self-styled social holist' like 
Mandelbaum)164 that the individual actions with which 
historians are interested are by definition social, that 
is to say, that they 'enter history insofar as they have 
societal significance'. 165 Nonetheless this does not 
contradict the particularising direction of the 
historians interest: 
... even those who insist that the unit of historical study is a social rather than human 
individual, would seldom deny that 
explanations at the level of talk about 
nations, institutions, and movements usually 
involve the historian in explaining the 
actions of particular men and women. It is a 
characteristic of historical inq[yiFy to 
explain social occurrences piecemeal. 
In Laws and Explanations Dray wanted to keep separate an 
analysis of the logical form of historical explanations 
from an understanding of the kinds of things there are 
to be explained. 167 However, it is doubtful if this 
distinction is watertight. Dray has contested all along 
that his rational explanation schema is just one, 
possible way of explaining past events, although it has 
the advantage of closely resembling the practice of 
historians and the form of a particular interest which 
does not seek to render events predictable, and nor 
content itself with mere description. It is also the 
assertion of an explanatory procedure and goal which, 
more than adequately, encompasses Dray's belief in the 
moral dimension inherent in a certain attitude towards 
the human past. Whether this belief precedes Dray's 
interest in historical explanation or not, it is 
apparent how well they go together. Indeed in a later 
article Dray acknowledges this when he writes, 
**. (the) ... rational model of 
explanation... shows a way in which explanation 
can be given in history which is logically 
compatible with indeterminism regarding human 
actions. The incompatibility of representing 
actions as both free and explicable has often 
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been asserted... (but this) ... holds true for explanation on the covering law model. 
TRiy 
I want now to look briefly at Dray's commitment to 
'understand and evaluate human life from the standpoint 
of agencyl,, 169 and here we move away from a thesis 
concerning the explanation of past events to focus on 
the active, evaluative role of the historian, and the 
composition of causal judgements. 
After examining a sample of historiography dealing 
with the causes of the American civil war Dray 
concludes, that "cause" is used in such a way that 
historians, value judgements are relevant to their 
causal conclusions, to the extent that those 
'conclusions logically depend on them'. 170 What he has 
in mind here is that, given that historians do not 
intend 'cause' to mean sufficient condition, there must 
be some reason for singling out one relevant condition 
from another, and this reason appears to 'derive from 
the standpoint of moral appraisall. 171 We have seen 
how, following the 'rationale' of actions involves the 
ascribing of reasons from the standpoint of agency, that 
is, relative to the situation as envisaged by the agent. 
This 'relativity' of causes (of affording an agent with 
the motive or intention f or acting as he or she did) 
operates on the level of history res gestM but also 
because they are the outcome of the historian's causal 
judgement, of history rerum gestarum. The causal 
connection between agency and action is relative to the 
nature of influence, fear, ambition, intention, given 
shape within a determinate context. Yet the ascription 
of importance and significance within that context, the 
determination of that context itself, will, in the end, 
be relative to the standpoint of the historian. 172 This 
is not to say that Dray's ultimate position is 
historicist or subjectivist (although it may well lend 
support to one form or other of the argument for 
relativism). His language is not a vindication of the 
passive form; agency and the ascription of reasons 
embody in belief in the active, participatory role of an 
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enquirer who accepts a fundamentally indeterminist 
world. It must also be said that a relative description 
of causal judgement does not, necessarily imply a 
subjectivist interpretation of historical truth; in fact 
it does not specify anything significant about the 
content of a particular account. The "correctness" of a 
causal assertion may be quite independent of the 'moral' 
standpoint which informs it. However for this to be so 
there must be both a principle, 173 or consensus, by 
which different and conflicting accounts can be 
resolved, and the possibility fo extruding (as 
Butterworth hoped)174 "moral" commitments from an 
inquiry, or of declaring one's position so that such 
allegiances may be taken into account. In other words 
the relationship between an historian's standpoint and 
the nature and validity of his conclusions remains to be 
worked out in more detail. To this and to an analysis 
of the operation of consensus, disagreement, validity 
and verification, I will turn in the next chapter. The 
important point is that, historical explanation, along 
Dray's lines, involves a nexus constituted by his idea 
of 'evaluation': that of the agent and that of the 
historian. In addition, historians deal with a subject 
matter which is already quasi-evaluative. Historical 
facts signify human actions, and because historians do 
not, Dray argues, use cause in its sufficient sense, the 
very selection of this fact rather than that indicates a 
criterion of importance or significance. 175 
Dray, as we will see later, is not a moral 
relativist, 176 and the structure of his rational 
explanation suggests a way for the historian, as moral 
agent,, to express his interpretive ascription of 
significance to particular conditions in a formulae 
which evades a charge a subjectivity. Two historians 
who do not share the same standpoint, who actively 
disagree over the significance of the particular 
'ingredients', may nonetheless accept the plausibility 
of each others account of the same action. The notion 
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of agreement here is similar to what Dray meant by 
following a practical argument. Donagan has expressed 
Dray's schema in the following way: 
A was resolved to achieve the end E at all costs 
A judged his situation to be C 
A judged that E could only be achieved in C if 
he did X 177 Therefore A did X. 
However this marks a return to the logic of explanation. 
The agreement involved would only amount to an 
acceptance that the argument is a coherent progression 
from premises to conclusion. Now Dray's point about the 
logic of explanation was made to clear space for a 
legitimate question and answering in history which does 
not appeal to the covering law criterion of 
intelligibility. Everything that has been said in 
connection with his model of rational explanation has 
contradicted the idea that, in history, form is somehow 
more important than content. Indeed our two agreeing 
historians would not let the matter rest there but would 
return to the assembled evidence and argue over the 
significance of this or that assertion. The search for 
the resolution of historiographical disagreements is 
rarely a matter of attending to the logical texture of a 
work. As we will have reason to notice in a section on 
narrative, the whole idea that it is possible to keep 
entirely separate descriptive form analytical or 
explanatory passages in an overall account, or "story" 
has been strongly contested. 
Finally we must return to Dray's characterisation 
of an idealist approach to the problem of explanation in 
history. We have seen how Dray wants to retain the 
notion of history as the study of human actions, 
themselves (given constraints that need to be accounted 
for) the outcome of thoughts, reasons, perceptions, 
prejudices etc. History, that is, which is the self- 
conscious attempt to assume the various 'calculations' 
of past agents. However Dray imposes an important 
qualification. The process of Ire-thinking' is neither 
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intuitive, nor a means to penetrate to the inside of an 
action which is, at once, its explanation. 178 Whereas 
Collingwood was set on using his 'what/why' paradox to 
illustrate the unity of historical knowledge (the 
inferential identity of subject - historian - with 
object - the past - through overcoming the distinction 
between describing what, and explaining why), Dray 
discards this metaphysical commitment. The I what/why I 
paradox becomes,, in Dray's account, a methodological 
proposition. He writes, 'that sensibly demanding and 
accepting an answer to a "why" question requires the 
recognition of a distinction between what is explained 
and what explains it. 179 This distinction serves to 
quash any mystical sense of the 'inside' of actions as 
somehow self-explanatory. In Dray Is schema it is the 
historian who supplies the explanatory connection 
between events. 
The qualification outlined above does not remove 
Dray's position from its proximity to Collingwood's 
principle contention, that history involves a distinct 
(although in Dray, not a Rriori) direction and approach 
based on an idea of agency and a belief in 
indeterminism. Yet, in the end, Dray does not think 
that an idealist approach can adequately account for the 
peculiarities of historical explanation. His reason for 
this conclusion is that he characterises an idealist 
approach as one which emphasises the pursuit of a myth: 
the past- f or-the-past Is sake. 180 Here the reference is 
particularly to Oakeshott, a similar criticism to that 
made by Walsh. 181 Both Dray and Walsh criticise the 
abstractness of Oakeshott's 'historical past', which, if 
not unobtainable, unnecessarily limits the scope and 
interest of historical enquiries. If for dray the idea 
of "a theoretical" enquiry into the remnants of a dead 
past contradicts his account of history as an 
investigation composed of different, evaluative 
perspectives, in this sense, at least, it plays into the 
hands of covering-law theorists: 
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"My chief complaint against the acceptance of 
the covering law doctrine in history is not 
the difficulty of operating it, in either full 
deductive or mutilated form. It is rather 
that it sets up a kind of conceptual barrier 
to a manistically orientated 
historiography. 11" 
But as I have already argued Oakeshott's historical past 
is a radically different notion than Ranke's or even 
that of Elton, and it loses much of its interest when 
taken to be in the same tradition. Oakeshott's past- 
for-the-past's sake reflects both an epistemological 
statement concerning the very presentness of all 
knowledge, and, far from reflecting a complacent belief 
in the value of historical scholarship, is intended to 
"rescue" history from the intrusion of interests from 
other, contradictory, 'worlds of ideas'. 
Dray's covering law/rational explanation 
opposition, by concentrating on a structure of 
explanation and verification employed in the natural 
sciences, and the problems of their applicability in 
history, takes its place as a new version of the 
nomothetic/idiographic conflict. It owes very little to 
the apriorism and metaphysical commitments which 
influenced earlier articulations. There is however one 
sense in which Dray's analysis of historical explanation 
is closer to one strand of idealism than he might allow. 
In focusing upon the active, participatory standpoint of 
the historian, the practice of history has become a 
construction,, albeit a construction within a definite 
framework. Attention to the constructing role of the 
historian has been taken as a common feature in the work 
of idealist philosophers of history; a construction 
within different constraints and varying dimensions. 
Their demands for the autonomy of historical knowledge 
were provoked by the pursuit of a wider philosophical 
coherence. The coherence sought f or by Dray is of a 
more limited nature: to find a description of what 
historians believe themselves to be doing when they 
explain things. 
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iii) Harrative as g2mianation 
The aim of historical knowledge is to discover 
the grammar of events, whereas in the proto- 
scienc 183 view it is the logic of events 
(Mink) 
I want to conclude this chapter on explanation with 
a brief look at the argument over the use and value of 
narrative in historiography. As with the debate over 
covering laws, I an not concerned to provide a 
commentary on the detailed exchanges which occurred in a 
series of books and articles published in the 1960s. 
The protagonists can be listed for the sake of 
reference: on the one side the so-called "narrationists" 
Danto, Gallie, and Morton White, 184 with some measure of 
theoretical support from Dray, Mink, and Walsh, 
185 and 
the concurrence of the historians Elton and Rexter; 
186 
on the other side a semi-fictional scientism which 
aspired to reduce the peculiarities of history to 
instances of inaccuracy, failings of methodological 
imprecision and terminological rigour. The latter 
position, if articulated at all, finds qualified support 
in the criticisms of Mandelbaum. 187 The background and 
context of the argument can be specified in terms of a 
renewed attempt to provide an account of historical 
understanding, distinct in terms of practice and 
irreducible to the language of scientific method. What 
is elevated for attention here is the significance of 
narrative in the writing of history. As with Dray Is 
'rational' counter to the covering law position, the 
advocates of closely examining narrative as a distinct 
f eature of history,, use the double edge of praxis, 
identifying an important element of historical practice, 
and then arguing for its special theoretical importance. 
The interest of the question of narrative in this 
argument is three-fold. First because both Collingwood 
and Oakeshott are committed (though for differing 
reasons) to a description of historiography as 
narrative; second as an argument symbolic of the new 
alignments within analytical philosophy of history; 
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third because the direction of the debate illustrates 
the. fragile division between theory and practice, 
presupposition and analysis in this "second-order". In 
addition the contours of this argument provide useful 
signposts to a position developed by Mink, Hayden White, 
Fain, Munz, and, contiguously, Michel Foucault, 188 where 
attention has shifted from the idea of narrative as 
explanation to narrative as the vehicle for the 
"construction" or "employment" of historical events 
within a story. Much of this is present, in a narrower 
context, in the work of Danto and, in particular, 
Gallie. 
I want to limit the scope of this discussion in 
order to avoid falling over into other problems which, 
for conceptual purposes, will be examined later under 
separate headings. The question with which I am 
concerned (as answered in the responses of the 
Inarrationists') is "can the ordering of events in a 
narrative structure itself be an answer to an historical 
question, without the prior, intermediate, or later 
necessity of distinct, explanatory summation? " Put in 
another way, can the following of V= happened, 
expressed in a narrative order, also be a satisfactory 
answer to the question of Vhy did such an such occur? 
And, it might be asked, with what implications for 
historical understanding? To this question both 
Collingwood and Oakeshott would have responded in the 
affirmative. 
By treating Collingwood's statement 'when an 
historian knows what happened he already knows why it 
happened', as central to an argument for inferential 
understanding by way of contextual interpretation of 
actions, he can be seen as advocating a step-by-step 
analysis of an event: context, action, result. Dray has 
characterised this procedure as following a rational 
argument. 189 The premises would contain an analysis of 
an agent's (agents') position, perceived and actual 
(given the historian's knowledge of outcomes and a wider 
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context); a judgement of the options, influences, and 
limitations, open to and circumscribing action. The 
conclusion of a rational argument would, in 
Collingwoodian terms, see the resultant action (actions) 
and change as the embodiment of the thought - the 
interpretive calculation - contained in the premises. 
What is important here is the notion of "following" an 
account so that the conclusion may well confirm that the 
action was the "right", or "appropriate" thing to have 
done in the circumstances-190 The historian must 
facilitate understanding so that his readers can follow 
his 'rethinking' of past thoughts. To the extent that 
this is a matter of proceeding from a preconceived, 
selective point of view, it has something of the flavour 
of what Popper meant in a passage on 'situational 
logicI191, but it also goes beyond an argument for the 
articulation of historical interests. Emphasis on 
narrative as the vehicle which allows a reader to follow 
the story being told by the historian, was developed by 
W. B. Gallie in highly original article published in 
1964.192 whether Gallie's understanding of narrative, 
which makes room for including background conditions, 
circumstantial restraints, and the perceptions of 
agents, would satisfy those critics, such as 
MandelbaumI93 and Ely. 194 who have argued that the 
essence of narrative, if it is to be considered as an 
explanatory medium, must be the sequential relation of 
antecedents to consequents, remains to be considered. 
For the moment let us notice that, as Rolf Gruner195 has 
pointed out, narrative in the more general sense, does 
seem to satisfy the sense and order which we expect from 
and find in certain conventions of literature. 
Oakeshott supports narrative history, but for 
rather different purposes. He is not interested in the 
participant pleasures of 'Ire-thinking" or Ilre-living". 
The very idea of seeking for vicarious historical 
experience is, in Oakeshott's view, misconceived, either 
because the terms of thought-revival are neologisms for 
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correspondence with a past reality, or because they 
operate on the level of standpoint, of perceptive, of 
focus of interest, which are themselves indicative of a 
practical attitude. For Oakeshott then, the narrative 
ordering of events is not secondary to the unfolding of 
a story in an explanatory sense, it is the apotheosis of 
the historical past. What the historian's narrative 
reveals is the actual process within which past events 
are "constituted". Such an account is both the goal and 
only referent of an historical understanding of the 
past. He writes,, "Historical events are themselves 
circumstantial convergencies of antecedent historical 
events; what they are is now they come to be voven'l. 196 
The narrative is then the texture and shape of an 
historical construction: form mirrors content. In an 
argument for the existence of a special kind of synoptic 
judgement in history, whereby the historian tries to 
understand a complex process by "holding" or "seeing" 
together disparate events and their interrelationships, 
Mink contends: 
Significant conclusions are ingredient in the 
argument itself... in the sense that they are 
represented by the narrative order 
itself ... Articulated as separate statements in 
a grand finale, they are not conclusions but 
reminders ... of the topography of event 1P which the entire narrative has given order. 
This is an argument for a distinction between the 
direction of meaning and understanding exemplified in 
history from that found in the sciences. Concerning 
narrative as a possible model for historical 
explanation, Mink believes that, 'we may understand an 
event by locating it correctly in a narrative 
sequence... from a narrative answer to the question "what 
happened then? " Although this may form a 'sequential 
explanation' it in not necessarily a 'satisfactory 
answer to the different question "why did it 
happen" 1.198 This is an interesting point. Oakeshott 
would not admit that this is a legitimate distinction. 
Mink wants to emphasise that there are different 
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explanations possible of a fact or set of facts and thus 
allow for a genuine narrative answer to a specific 
historical interest, Oakeshott's divisions are modal and 
rigid. The historian does not describe past events from 
various different perspectives: past events are 
ontological nonentities. He must infer their existence 
by responding to historical interest in the constituents 
of the present: 'survivals' from the past. Similarly 
these inferences or constructions out of "evidence" have 
no referent other than themselves, they exist as answers 
to specific historical questions. Therefore the whole 
notion of explaining historically is false because it 
implies that there is something to be explained, 
something to which an explanatory model may be compared 
or imposed on, something fixed and known in advance, a 
patter to be discerned or a datum to be categorised. 
The sense in which a narrative builds up and composes an 
historical account is, for Oakeshott, a complete account 
of understanding and responding to 'why' questions. 
Without pursuing further the essential tension 
underlying his position we must notice that his version 
of narrative 'understanding' (since Oakeshott would not 
allow the word 'explanation') is a rigid form of the 
continuous series model. It is only through the 
contiguous relation of one inferred antecedent event to 
another, with no preconceived sense of what the 
narrative will amount to, that we may follow the 
unfolding of a story. 
If Gallie, Danto and White were primarily concerned 
to analyse narrative as a prevalent feature of 
historical discourse, then Oakeshott's interest is to 
specify the logic of historical understanding, 199 and 
thus narrative becomes the only appropriate response to 
his presentist conclusions. In an article on the 
narrative debate Richard Ely comments on White's 
position, which he characterises as a belief in events 
'forming a linear sequential series: A leads to B, B to 
C, C to D, and so on ... causal effectiveness within such 
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unitary strands of history is solely the property of 
antecedents. 200 In On HistM Oakeshott puts forward 
much the same argument with two important 
differences. 201 Causal efficacy is replaced by a Inon- 
exclusive relationship with some subsequent event in 
terms of which the character of that subsequent may be 
understood'. And secondly a logical difference, which 
is also an important epistemological point, the position 
D cannot be spelt out in advance, its character is 
indistinguishable from the 'circumstantial' relations 
established within the narrative. What the significance 
of D or X is, is how we come to understand it, as 
unfolded in an historical enquiry. Whereas White's 
position is essentially analytica, 202 Oakeshott is 
interested in unfolding a coherent metaphysic. There is 
here evidence of a realignment within philosophy of 
history. 
J. H. Hexter, in his article "The Rhetoric of 
History" makes the following statements, 
the writing of history... its 
rhetoric ... affects not merely the outward 
appearance of history, its delight and 
seemliness, but its inward character, its 
essential function-its capacity to convey 
knowledge of the past as it actually was ... And this implies that in the rhetoric of history 
itself there are embedded assumptions about 
the nature oF, knowing, understanding, meaning 
and truth ... 
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What these embedded assumptions are Hexter does not 
spell out in detail. However the thrust of his article 
is quite plain, the use of narrative (the syntax and 
vehicle of expression) is a special distinguishing 
feature of history, and the existence within 
historiography of rhetorical strategies highlights a 
difference in direction to the ostensibly value-neutral 
language of science. The choice of words,, of fitting 
descriptions, the omission of cumbersome lists, the 
footnoting of important detail so as not to diminish the 
force and impact of what is said, are all witness, 
according to Hexter, to history's intention of imparting 
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the reality of the past through vivid images and 
imaginative and creative phrases,, all of which might 
sacrifice $generality, precision, exactness to evocative 
force and scopse. 204 In Hexter's argument rhetoric 
indicates the strategies of an historian,, narrative a 
means of conveying these strategies. Narrative is not 
considered a special feature in itself but only in terms 
of how it is composed. What can be inferred here is a 
notion of narrative as a central organising feature, a 
function which has been compared to the employment of 
theory in the sciences. To do justice to this idea we 
must turn to an understanding of narrative which equates 
it with a "story". Although Hexter provides some 
interesting methodological pointers for the aspirant 
historian, his position has little to do with the debate 
over narrative as explanation. It is a sophisticated 
reworking of the old argument as to whether history is 
literature (art) or science. Hexter is not suggesting 
that history is fiction, but that the best history is 
Just so because it is conveyed through creative and 
intelligent use of language; that is to say, it is 
literary. Perhaps Collingwood meant much the same thing 
in expounding on the nature of an historical 
205 imagination, and similarly Walsh in his surprising 
homage to Igenius'. 206 It is a venerable tradition but 
for the purposes of this thesis it serves only to 
stimulate a further question. Given that the medium of 
expression which historians 'characteristically employ 
seems to have more in common with the language of 
literature than the precision and impersonal terminology 
of science, what can we infer about the nature of 
understanding which history seeks to impart? 
What are the presuppositions involved in the idea 
that, what is central to history, and to an examination 
of narrative, is an understanding of "story"? Here are 
three statements of intent by the "narrationists": 
Narrative is the f orm which expresses what is 
basic to and characteristic of historical 
understanding. Granted that every genuine 
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work of history is also a work of reason, of 
judgement, 
- of 
hypothesis, of explanation 
(Gallie)"' 
... narrative is... the typical form )281 discourse employed by the historian (White 
... all history 'presupposes' narrative ... it is the orVor4sing scheme f or the historian 
(Danto). 
These statements appear to be moderate assertions, the 
results of comprehensive analyses of historiography. 
Yet on a second reading they could equally be taken as 
specifying something of importance about the nature of 
historical knowledge. They are in fact a mixture of the 
two, indicative of a dichotomy between description and 
prescription prevalent in analytical philosophy of 
history. If they are premises for an argument concerned 
exclusively with narrative as the vehicle for historical 
explanation then they are plainly inadequate and 
Mandelbaux's criticisms are well made. A narrative 
model which represents causal efficacy as being solely 
the property of singular, factual statements does no 
justice to the answering of what and Nhy questions about 
the past. in particular, though explaining what 
happened may well involve the tracing of linear chain of 
sequences or events, it also may include an analysis of 
a complex interrelationship between both change and 
stasis. Mandelbaum writes, 
The task of the historian is not one of 
tracing a series of links in a temporal chain, 
rather it is to analyse a complex pattern of 
change into the factors which serve to make it 
precisely what it was. The relationship which 
I therefore take to be fundamental in history 
is a relationship of part to whole, rft a 
relationship of antecedent to consequent. 10 
Similarly Gruner has noted that there are histories 
which do not have as their primary organising aim the 
tracing of the fortunes of a subject through time. 211 
And Dray has stated that there are other kinds of 
importance in history than just what is 
212 'consequential'. 
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None of the above removes the obvious presence of 
narrative passages in most historical writings. It does 
however lead us to conclude that narrative, understood 
in its restricted explanatory sense (the causal efficacy 
of sufficient antecedents), is not a complete account of 
historical explanation, nor a very vivid insight into 
historical practice. It is narrative understood in a 
broader sense, a sense found in the positions of Gallia 
and Danto (if not White) which has far more 
significance: the conveying of understanding in the form 
of a story. 
Danto's concept of narrative, a "presupposition" of 
history, embodies his conclusions on the nature of 
historical knowledge. In his book of 1965 he sets out 
to establish certain distinguishing features of history. 
He argues that our knowledge of the past is predicated 
to our acquisition and use of language, with its past- 
213 referring words and tenses. Further he contends that 
the direction of historical understanding is 
hermaneutical, historians make use of a concept of 
"meaning" and "significance"; that the meaning and 
significance of an event, in the historical sense, can 
only be assessed in the context of a story; that 
determining the correct context can only be done 
retrospectively, and that this process may be compared 
to the meaning of episodes in a novel which, to be fully 
understood, must be referred to the entire work, in 
other words a designated context or whole. Narrative as 
explanation takes its place within this story-telling 
schema. Significantly Danto conflates the teleological 
dimension of discerning stories with the actual 
construction of a narrative. he writes, 'If an earlier 
event is not significant with regard to a later event in 
a story, it does not belong in that story'. 214 His 
sense of the significance of events to a story is not 
then, merely a function of their being antecedents or 
consequents in a linear chain. The determination of 
which events are to 'participate' in a beginning-middle- 
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end narrative might be said to derive from the 'demands' 
of coherence, or of literary aspirations, and yet the 
final arbiter of their inclusion is the historian. To 
this extent Danto's story-telling may be usefully 
compared with Walsh's search for appropriate colligatory 
concepts. 
In the end Danto Ia is an argument for the 
importance of narrative to history in a broad sense. in 
an attack on Croce's separation of living history from 
chronicle, 215 he argues that we mean much more by 
narrative than simply a list of disconnected facts set 
out in chronological order. Historical facts are given 
form by being constituted in a story. 216 To this extent 
Hexter is right in demanding attention be paid to the 
actual ordering, arrangement, and juxtaposition of 
facts, for such activities are never merely 
embellishments upon an historical enquiry. In 
Oakeshott's terms, they are that enquiry. Goldstein 
makes a similar point217 by distinguishing between what 
he called history's 'infrastructure', the processes of 
historical "knowinglf,, and its 'superstructure', the 
final literary product, and arguing that the problems 
presented by treating history in the second sense, as 
something complete, detached and stable, distracts us 
from the really interesting and philosophically 
demanding aspect of historical knowledge: the way it 
comes to be known or "constructed". To this we will 
return in the next chapter. What I wish to emphasise is 
that the idea of narrative as explanation, the focus of 
attention on an aspect of historical practice, should 
not obscure the fact that this in really a debate about 
the nature of historical understanding. 
Narrative, in its broadest sense, is 
organisational, the vehicle for the "emplotment" of 
facts. Taken in this sense there are two, important 
conclusions for this enquiry. Firstly it emphasises the 
story-telling role of the historian, the active 
engagement of presenting arguments in a certain order 
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and context. Secondly it provides a useful metaphor for 
the futility of attempting, in any final sense to 
divided of f the explanatory from the descriptive in an 
attempt to convey knowledge of the past. The form of 
the narrative - the designation of a subject,, the 
configuration of context,, the order of ovonts -will 
determine the way in which the content - the unfolding 
of events - is taken and understood. 
218 Narrative 
arrangement is based on evidence, it is in fact the 
ordering of evidence to further an argument. The 
explanatory force of a narrative will thus depend upon 
the ordering of facts, and this even if facts are 
understood to be value-neutral, the mere instances of an 
already formulated conclusion. If it is still contested 
that explanation is something which ultimately falls 
outside of a narrative description of what happened, it 
will be a matter of judgement as to what stage,, what 
position, and in what capacity to enter an explanatory 
aside or summary. 
We may have to conclude that the whole argument 
over narrative as explanation is, in the and, reducible 
to semantic differences. This in not to say that it is 
a debate conducted at cross-purposes. The acceptance, 
for example by White, of the need to produce an 
explanatory model countering the precision and 
structural uniformity of a scientific model, constructed 
on the basis of necessary and sufficient conditions (in 
White's terms, antecedents and consequents), which at 
the same time recognises that there exists some peculiar 
logic within history, some difference in interest and 
goal, reflects the ambiguous conclusion that science is 
the final criterion of rationality, that historians do 
make (implicit) appeal to general laws, but that there 
is in the narrative form an adequate vehicle for a 
methodologically aware history. Mandelbaum and White219 
share a similar approach to the presence of laws in 
historical explanations, and yet Mandelbaum strongly 
contests the idea that narrative is a sufficient way of 
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answering 'why' questions. The very fact that they 
disagree indicates that their definition of terms are 
similar. Here narrative is understood in its restricted 
sense , as explanatory model. But there are , as I have 
argued other ways of defining narrative. In Hexter Is 
rhetorical sense narrative is a function of literary 
ability. We could also mention Elton's concept of 
220 'thickened narrative', which is in part an argument 
for the possibility of expressing 'the results of 
analysise in narrative form, but which is also a 
"political" point, the reaffirmation of the centrality 
of an aspect of the historian's craft in the face of 
what he takes to be unwelcome approaches from the social 
sciences. However the definition of narrative in its 
broadest sense is appropriate to the intentions of 
Gallie and Danto, and it is with this definition in mind 
that we can see the inapplicability of Mandelbaum's 
criticisms. 
Mandelbaum was arguing against the causal efficacy 
of narrative explanation, that is, narrative in its 
limited sense. Dray has pointed out that Mandelbaum's 
main reason for 'disposing of narrative as non- 
fundamental is that the demands of ... other tasks 
necessarily interrupt the elaboration of the story line: 
the narrative, as it were, bogs down. 221 If we are to 
salvage the significance of the argument over narrative 
as explanation we must get rid of the notion of a 
strict, unbreakable, continuous-series explanatory 
model, in which there is no room for a 'cross-sectional 
breather', and replace it with the ideas of story- 
telling and organisation. only by doing this, by 
replacing an ostensibly logical argument with one 
reflecting epistemological premises, can we recognise 
that the conflicting positions are disagreements about 
the nature of historical understanding. It is 
significant that,, in rejecting the narrative position, 
Mandelbaum emphasised the importance of part/whole 
analysis, an idea often employed to differentiate 
179 
historical understanding. If the argument for the 
importance of narrative is taken, in Gallie's sense, as 
renewed emphasis on the story constituting role of the 
historian, and on a certain "logic" of organising 
information, then there is room both for the part to 
whole understanding of detail and context, and for the 
"following" of descriptive analysis. Callio turns 
Mandelbaum's criticisms on their head by allowing that 
explanations in historiography can 'have the effect of 
enabling one to follow when one has got stuck'. He goes 
on to say that: 
... in narratives explanations are inserted 
simply in order to enable the writer to get on 
with his primary and essential business - the 
unfolding of a followable, though never 
predictable whole., 222 
Thus, for Gallie,, it is narrative which determines the 
role of explanation in history, and not the other way 
round. Taken together, they are a clear indication of a 
difference of interest between those subjects concerned 
to "increase the range and accuracy of our 
generalisations and studies in which our predominant 
interest is how things actually went, actually 
223 developed'. 
There is a final point of interest in Mandelbaum's 
criticisms of the "narrationists" by way of a signpost 
to the following chapter on historical truth. At one 
stage in his article Mandelbaum draws a distinction 
between the historian's finding out what happened, 
through enquiry and research, and presenting the results 
in a manner 'clear and intelligible' to the reader. 224 
The second part of the historian's task, the literary 
"recounting" is seen as a possible distortion of results 
achieved in quite a different order. The dif f iculties 
involved in this embellishment on top of results would, 
however, also apply to the process of explaining 
causally. More than this Mandelbaum's comment reveals 
an emphatic belief in the separation of form and 
content, object and thought, history's expressive 
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frailty and the 'reality' of the past, which is so 
unpalatable to Hexter, Gallia, Goldstein and Oakeshott 
alike. History rerum gestarum lacks a way of presenting 
its results without in some way altering the 
concreteness of its subject matter. This position, 
which presumably seeks its contrast in the idea of a 
neutral, value-free medium of expression, will be 
examined in the section on objectivity and relativism, 
particularly in relation to T. S. Kuhn's conclusions as 
to the nature of scientific understanding. Mink, argues 
for an opposite conclusion to Mandelbaumls: 
... in history conclusions are seldom detachable; not merely their validity but 
their meaning refers backward to the ordering 
of evidence in the total argument. 
'Significant' conclusions are ingredients in 
the argument itself lit represented by the 
narrative order itself *00 
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Chapter 5- Historical Truth: 
i) Introduction 
... the realisation that the past is literally 
nowhere comes from some people - including 
myself... - like a bolt of lightning which 
illuminates the entire landscape. And in the 
darkness following the lightning, and until it 
strikes again we try to reconstruct bit by bit 
the complex picture which was illuminated 
briefly but powerfully. 'My God' we say, 'Its 
really true, the past isn't there at all. 
There Is no there f or it to be. 'Whatever the 
history signifies, it's not anything that we can 
conceive being placed side-by-side with the 
history 'to observe the degree of resemblance'. 
Meanwhile the historian gets on with his worl, 
humming Ranke under his breath. (Louis 0 Mink)' 
In the last chapter I looked at three responses to 
the problem of explanation in history. Each response 
embodied certain propositions and assumptions concerning 
the nature of the problem under study. Does 
historiography attempt to identify the sufficient or 
necessary conditions of an event having taken place? is 
causation a category of the physical world, and if so, to 
what extent can it be applied to the rational or 
irrational actions of human agents? Does history provide 
its own vehicle for organising its subject matter and 
describing change, and if so, can narrative itself be a 
satisfactory explanatory answer to an historical question? 
Each position in the arguments we have examined 
explicates, and assumes, something of the nature of what 
is to be explained. From the deductivist perspective it 
is something solid and monolithic, for the non-deductivist 
it is something much more transcient and dependent upon 
the interest of an enquirer. The centrality of 
explanation to analytical philosophy of history can be 
regarded as reflecting two important assumptions. The 
first is that, with explanation, historiography can, for 
the moment, be treated as a datum, as something ready-made 
and available for analysis. Attention is focused upon 
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what Goldstein has called the 'superstructure' of 
history. 2 Secondly, if it be granted that historians do 
attempt to explain (in one way or another) then an 
examination of their efforts can itself be compared and 
contrasted with the explanatory models,, procedures, and 
successes of the natural sciences. This comparative 
tendency - to see how history fares in the light of... - 
provides evidence of the prevailing importance of 1proto- 
science' paradigms. More importantly it raises the 
question of the role of scientific knowledge as that 
against which history must be contrasted. In such 
comparisons science very often becomes the "significant 
other", an other whose paradigmatic achievement of secure 
and objective knowledge is taken for granted, or (more 
likely in recent analytical philosophy of history) whose 
distinct aims and methods are emphasised. One intention 
of this chapter will be to notice the differing ideas of 
scientific knowledge which emerge out of reflections on 
the nature of truth in history. Interest in explanation 
is very appropriate to the "programme" of a post- 
speculative, analytical philosophy of history. As a 
specified ingredient of historical practice, an inquiry 
into the nature of historians' explanations may be 
regarded as a "second-orderl, 3 study, and, since the 
inquiry often involves the elucidation of a logical 
structure it falls within the purview of professional 
philosophy, thus doubly insuring it against again charges 
of meddling. When we turn to the problem of historical 
truth such detachment is less secure. Why this should be 
so, with what consequences, and the continuing importance 
of arguments over the definition and possibility of truth 
in history, will occupy us in this chapter. 
Several of the more comprehensive introductions to 
the analytical philosophy of history have employed similar 
organisational schemes. 4 They have divided their subject 
into component parts which usually include sections on, 
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why a philosophy of history?, problems of objectivity, 
subjectivity and relativism, fact and interpretation, 
explanation and causal analysis. This 
compartmentalisation is, quite obviously, an ordering 
device used in the pursuit of convenience and clarity; the 
exemplification of the analytical approach. However, neat 
divisions should not mislead us as to the true complexity 
and interrelationship of the problems relating to the 
study of the past. Even if, as has been argued by 
5 Collingwood and Oakeshott and others, historiography is 
the result of a distinctive mode of understanding, the 
outcome of a particular kind of knowledge, it nonetheless 
exists only in the attempted unity of a finished piece of 
work. It may well be that no amount of analytical 
dismembering will accurately recapture the interplay of 
context, research, values and commitments, expressive and 
persuasive abilities, that are embodied in the end 
product. 
The starting point for an enquiry into the nature of 
historical knowledge marks one of the more significant 
differences between an idealist and analytical approach. 
For, whereas Croce, Collingwood, and Oakeshott are, in 
their theoretical writings, concerned with historia rerum 
gestarum and thus, along Walsh's schema are not 
speculative philosophers of history, theirs is an 
epistemological interest which involves a varying degree 
of metaphysical apriorism. Post-war analytical 
philosophers of history have,, on the whole presupposed 
little more than that history is a rich and interesting 
field of inquiry which attempts to contribute towards an 
organised body of knowledge about the human past. Their 
divisions may then be an attempt to see just how organised 
history is. However it must be said that the division 
into tidy compartments is not entirely a neutral and 
pragmatic affairs. They of course indicate something 
about the interest of the particular philosopher, but 
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beyond this may signify more general presumptions. If, as 
for example is the case in R. F. Atkinson's Knowledge and 
E2CRlanation in Historv, 6 the sections dealing with the 
logic of historical explanations and causal analysis 
occupy a large amount of space towards the end of the 
book, coming after the author has dealt (to his 
satisfaction) with the problems of knowledge and 
objectivity, then a certain "realist" or common-sensical 
approach to the possibility of making 'true', or 
meaningful statements about past events might be inferred. 
The problems related to our knowledge of the past, and of 
the truth conditions and reference of historians' 
accounts, are not, after consideration, thought to be a 
hindrance to the further discussion of explanation. 7 In 
other words, Atkinson's organisational scheme entails the 
conclusion that, in historical enquiries, there is an 
object, accessible and settled enough to be analysed into 
its causal components and examined in terms of different 
explanatory models. This indeed is the presumption of 
most analytical philosophy of history: first clear away 
epistemological difficulties so that one can then turn to 
the logical status and explanatory force of historians' 
assertions. Explanation becomes the central issue of the 
philosophy of history. 
This organisational strategy is a perfectly adequate 
response to the need artificially to divide the 
seamlessness of historical practice and to account for the 
finished literary product. It need not be the case that 
sections on causation and explanation supersede the 
discussion of other problems, and Dray's PhilOsORhy of 
History illustrates a more pragmatic, section by section 
approach. What I want to stress is that organisational 
schemes can be conceptual prefigurations which are never 
merely neutral vehicles of analysis and expression. 
Indeed there will be occasion to notice at the end of the 
chapter how the equation of philosophy of history with the 
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analytical approach is a way of attempting to preserve the 
distinction between 'critical' and 'speculative' interest. 
For both Collingwood and Oakeshott, an examination of 
the problem of explanation in history is not to be taken 
as a conciliatory gesture in the direction of a wider 
academic community, nor a weighing up of the 'scientific' 
component or potential inherent in historical practice. 
The intelligibility of historians' assertions is properly 
understood, so it has been argued, in response to a 
particular and distinct interest, and so the category of 
explanation, if it is to have significance for the 
philosopherls enquiry, should find its place as one 
element in the argument for autonomy. 
Their conclusions are quite consistent with those of 
several analytical philosophers of history, most notably 
Dray, Gallie and Mink. Each has taken seriously the 
arguments for a more scientifically precise delineation of 
what would constitute good explanations in history. Each 
has argued against them both on their own terms and from 
the position of the historian. For these philosophers it 
has been of great importance to meet the challenge of the 
positivist, covering-law approach, so that the possibility 
of an understanding, coherent and consistent on its own 
terms, may be entertained. There is no a priori dismissal 
of the 'proto-sciencel position here. Rather, through 
analysis of the logic of explanation and verification, the 
inclusion of values and meaning, and an appeal to the aims 
and intentions of practice, space is created for an 
examination into history gmi history. 
I have attempted to reflect these conclusions in the 
structure of this thesis. For this reason I have placed 
the chapter concerned with responses to the problem of 
explanation before turning to different descriptions of 
'truth' in history. In doing so I want to contend that it 
is one of the important implications of an idealistp that 
the questions relating to historical truth are treated as 
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not having been answered in an analysis of explanation. 
This is not to argue that they are completely independent 
of such analysis: explaining "why" entails some notion of 
"what" it is there is to explain. Atkinson accepts this 
is attempting to clear away unnecessary epistemological 
debris before turning his attention to causal and 
explanatory judgements. 8 In contrast however, what 
interests us here are the assertions that these judgements 
are not detachable from the narratives which carry them, 9 
explanations are not tagged on at the end of an historical 
enquiry, but are constitutive of that enquiry, and that 
they are as interesting for what they presuppose about the 
nature of what is to be explained as they are f or the 
scope and credibility of their causal connections. 10 
"Historical truth" is a composite term which includes 
the problems of objectivity and subjectivity, fact and 
value, event and interpretation. It is the lack of a 
really plausible "internal" criterion of truth which 
remains one of the most serious barrier to a fully 
coherent idealist, or constructionist account. And the 
search for an adequate definition of historical truth (a 
possible criterion for deciding between different 
historical 'constructions') reintroduces what both 
Collincjwood and Oakeshott failed to finally dismiss from 
philosophical discussion, a "real" and recoverable past 
reality. The 'real' past in this case is not the 
assumption of correspondence between an historical account 
and its object, not a stable and monolithic referent 
external to the enquiry into the existence of survivals 
from the past, or to the interpretive exercise of empathy, 
but merely someway of breaking in to the defined 
insularity of the historian's 'experience' and 're- 
enactment'. The central difficulty of Collingwood's and 
Oakeshott's position is that it seems to have bought an 
epistemologically secure unity of subject and object at 
the price of incommensurability. If, as Collingwood 
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argued, it is possible f or two or more historians to re- 
think and re-live the exact thoughts and experiences of 
past agents - provided they have both reasoned 'correctly, 
from evidence - and yet still come up with conflicting 
accounts of the rationale of a particular event, how are 
they to be compared and contrasted, how is one to be 
decided better or more accurate than the other? And if, 
as Oakeshott contends, history be defined as a particular 
reading of present objects with the intention of inferring 
a past which is dead and gone , we must demand greater 
clarity as to the 'proper' constitution of past events 
than is provided in the formula, "what the evidence 
obliges us to believe". 
Both Collingwood and Oakeshott, in attempting to 
establish the intellectual coherence of our knowledge of 
the past from the perspective of historical autonomy, 
bequeath us a lucid description of the peculiarities and 
limitations of this knowledge but one which lacks a means 
by which (in any collective sense) we could know that it 
had been achieved. The alternative to an adequate set of 
criteria or description of the process by which the 
historical past might be assessed, compared, rejected or 
approved (in part or in whole) is as I have hinted at, a 
'loss of faith' in a shared, communicable experience. The 
delineation of this 'experience' into presuppositions, 
modes, or structures (variously defined) which operate 
both behind and above the cognitive subject may be seen as 
symptomatic of such a loss. 
I want, in this chapter, to examine some of the 
responses to the problem of historical truth which are 
sensible to the 'logic' of historical knowledge, that is 
to say, somehow immanent to historical practice, and which 
also allow for the possibility of verification, 
comparison, and communication. Insofar as several 
philosophers of history have addressed themselves to the 
possibility of historical knowledge sui generis, " these 
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problems arise out of a similar context to that of our 
idealists, although in most cases they are seen as 
problems to overcome rather than testimony to the 
epistemological autonomy of such knowledge. It is 
essentially the same conceptual spectrum which informed 
much of the debate over explanation. In this case the 
polarity between 'Positivist, (empirically testable 
knowledge of an objective and stable subject matter), and 
idealist (the denial of any practical meaning to the 
division of the past res costae from historia rerum 
Sestarum) is once again affirmed, in particular by the 
idealist position being closely identified with the 
'constructionist' approach of J. W. Meiland and L. J. 
Goldstein. 12 Whether this identification is correct will 
occupy us in section three. 13 
If it is accurate to describe the argument over 
explanation as, essentially, a contest for the middle- 
ground then, in this chapter, we begin at an intermediate 
point and move towards the supposedly idealist end of the 
spectrum. We begin by looking at the idea of objective 
knowledge in history, move towards a possible relativist 
answer (attending in particular to the implications of 
T. S. Kuhn's idea of academic 'community'); towards a full 
blown version of history as construction. The final 
section, which is in one sense, an epilogue, dwells on 
that moment of a loss of faith in a certain kind of 
historical knowledge, its emergence in the guise of a 
philosophy of history (Hayden White, Peter Munz, and Louis 
Mink) or its possible outcome in "anti-history" (Michel 
Foucault). 
ii) Historical Truth: An Idealist Perspective 
'The most important and most baffling point in the 
critical philosophy of history'. 14 So wrote W. H. Walsh in 
1951 of the problem of historical objectivity. What I 
want to do in this section is to review the problem of 
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'objective' knowledge in history rom an idealist 
perspective, and ask what difficulties remain once the 
traditional referent of historical statements, res gestae 
or a given past reality, has been dispensed with. This is 
an initial statement in an attempt to locate the referent 
and truth of historical descriptions. It is a search 
which will invoke, in various forms and guises, a spectrum 
of opinion, ranging from belief in the hard and fast, 
objective condition of historical knowledge, accessible to 
the historian through 'correct' reasoning or careful 
application of critical techniques, to the belief that 
historical knowledge is the product of thought or 
judgement, the casting of disparate events in the form of 
a story and so, actively 'constructing' meaning and 
intelligibility. Such a spectrum of opinion cannot, 
without remainder, be substituted with the distinction 
between positivism and scepticism, nor between 
"scientific" and "historical" objectivity. It will not 
prove possible to hold one end constant in order to 
isolate and examine the presuppositions of the opposite. 
Their relationship is symbiotic and dialectical. 
There is an importance in the emphasis given to the 
epistemological question, "in what sense can historical 
statements be said to be true or false, accurate, 
inaccurate, representative or unrepresentative in 
reference to their ostensible object, the past? ". 
Dismissal of this problem as a non-questionl5 may involve, 
the translation from epistemology, "given the particular 
cognitive situation of the historian, what is the nature 
and status of truth in history? ", to ontology, "does the 
past exist? 11.16 Such translation is illicit and the 
ontological question is an irrelevance. To reason that, 
since we cannot be directly acquainted with the past, we 
cannot know it existed, is to misunderstand both the 
discursive nature of historical thought and the kind of 
knowledge that is to be had in history: it is the 
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uncritical adoption of a particular paradigm of knowledge 
which has long since proved inadequate as a description of 
the process of enquiry in the natural sciences. But this 
is not the argument of this chapter, it was not 
Oakeshott's, and it is not what I mean by a "crisis of 
faith". 
Neither Collingwood nor Oakeshott believed that 
objectivity was a separate, detachable problem for the 
philosophy of history. In the epilogemma to his The Idea 
of Histo Collingwood discusses the theoretical niceties 
associated with reenacting past experience but he does not 
allocate space to the difficulty of eliminating 
'subjective' influences. We must go back to his earlier 
work Sr)eculum Mentis to understand his position. 
Similarly with Oakeshott the rejection of subjectivity, is 
embedded in an idealist philosophy. Their understanding 
of historical truth, thought they are conveyed through 
very different descriptions of the process of enquiry, 
rest upon two shared principles. 
Firstly, there is the residual belief in the unity of 
experience, the inter-connection of all facts and 
assertions. It is a belief which invokes the more baroque 
metaphysic of the 19th century idealists: the 
"Absolutell. 17 And yet it is precisely this belief in the 
union of part and whole and the significance of the 
concrete universal which is threatened by the modal 
division of experience into separate, self-sufficient 
monads (Oakeshott), and by the presuppositional 
delineation of the structure of the mind into historical 
periods (Collingwood). Here then is the implicit tension 
within an idealism which attempts to reckon fully with 
history and with the idea of 'historiam'. 18 The 
disruption to the historical continuum by emphasising the 
transformational aspects of historical construction is 
close to a 'crisis of faith'. 19 I want, however, at this 
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point to turn away from these broader implications to what 
20 Peter Kunz has called 'idealism writ small'. 
By falling back upon an idealist metaphysic 
Collingwood and Oakeshott in effect protect themselves 
against having to address the problem of objective 
knowledge of the past. Under a metaphysic of experiential 
unity there is no such thing as knowledge which is 
objective if this means outside of, or external to, 
experience. What then begins as a penetrating analysis of 
our acquisition of knowledge of the past, risks 
degenerating into a tautology. The tautology is in the 
form of the following: when an historian has inferred 
correctly as to what the "evidence obliges us to believe" 
(Oakeshott), or has reenacted the thoughts of a past agent 
(Collingwood), the following historical account will be 
'objective' in the only sense in which this has any 
meaning, that is it will be true. 
All knowledge, it is argued, is the identity of the 
enquirer with his object, and history, to meet this 
requirement, must be a unity between historian and the 
past. Since this unity cannot be represented as a direct 
acquaintance with res gestas it follows that historical 
knowledge can only emerge out of the process of critical 
examination of remnants of the past. History becomes 
historical thought, the reflection on objects understood 
as evidence. For Collingwood this process is best 
envisaged as an effort to transform evidence into an 
intelligible unit of meaning: to treat it as the 
expression of an agent's thought. For Oakeshott, history 
exemplifies a particular approach, a particular kind of 
interest which is curious enough in the "survivals" of the 
past to construct or inf er an account by which one may 
explain their present existence. All this is by way of 
recapitulation. What is important, is that this attempt 
to see history as the thought of the historian is, in 
part, an attempt to rescue it from a particular 
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understanding of objectivity. Historical knowledge is 
not, nor can it be, objective if objective means 
correspondent with an external reality. The historical 
past is not something to be surveyed and classified; it 
owes its very existence to a process of thought which 
vivifies it (Collingwood) or to an inferential 
construction which gives it a particular shape 
(Oakeshott). 
History, res gestael is the end product of the 
historian's configuration; it is not his starting point - 
a body of fixed, factual knowledge - in any significant 
way. In addition the process of historical enquiry can be 
seen as exemplifying the interconnectedness of experience. 
It is impossible to write a definitive historical account 
since any events connections with antecedent events and 
division into subevents is infinite. But in order to 
avoid charges of abstracting an event from its real 
context, from its flux and duration, it is contended by 
the idealist,, that, "the separate bits of our knowledge, 
in fact, form part of a system and however little we 
realise it, the whole system is implicit in any part of 
itte. 21 This provides a sense of unity and purpose for the 
most esoteric monograph and, more importantly, it denies 
that, in history, there is a pressing need to relate 
causally temporally separate events. Events are linked in 
the continuum of thought; they are held together in the 
mind of the historian. 
The notion of objectively true in relation to an 
independent and stable object of enquiry in entirely 
absent. 22 History must then be saved from objectivity. 
This is an inversion of a particular conception of 
scientific knowledge. The autonomy of history as the 
pursuit of the particular and individual is hold to be 
diametrically opposed to the tendency of the natural 
sciences towards classification and general laws. When we 
turn to the problem of relativism and the position of T. S. 
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Kuhn we shall have occasion to notice just how 
unsatisfactory such a distinction is, and how artificial 
is this idea of science. Indeed 'objective', in 
Collingwood's and Oakeshott's definition, is a 
characteristic of scientific knowledge and thus cannot be 
applicable to history as it represents an entirely 
different set of presuppositions. 
This dismissal of objective, understood as 
correspondent to an external reality, entails the attempt 
to get rid of the idea of subject understanding. In 
chapters two and three I have argued how important it is 
for both Collingwood and Oakeshott to deny that the 
empathetic reenactment of past experience, or the present 
construction of an historical account, might be the 
personal property of a particular historian. This effort 
is animated by the constant referral to a "significant 
other", the supposed paradigms of natural science and the 
hostile tendencies of a positivist mentality. 23 This is 
almost always to the differentiae of understanding. When 
it comes to eliciting the logic, of historical 
understanding the tendency in to hold scientific knowledge 
as a constant while noting the lack of identity with the 
aims of the historian. And yet, on an epistemological 
level, it was recognised, in particular by Oakeshott, that 
science, just as history,, knows its object (the natural 
world) mediated through the methods of its enquiry. It is 
the interest, the particular way of looking at and 
organising its subject matter which distinguishes the two. 
If this is so, objectivity may not be an absolute 
criterion and standards of objectivity may vary. Yet both 
Collingwood and Oakeshott write as if the very conception 
of objectivity is hostile to the autonomy of historical 
knowledge. In fact it is only hostile if one accepts that 
a positivist criterion of objectivity (itself a rhetorical 
fiction) is identical with, and an exhaustive definition 
of, truth. It is, for example, quite apparent, in the age 
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of quantum physics that objective knowledge cannot mean 
knowledge by direct acquaintance with an external object. 
one no more "knows" a sub-atomic particle than a past 
event. 24 The question of objectivity, if it is to have 
any meaning, must be a concern with the inedia of an 
enquiry in different disciplines. A concentration on the 
way in which the 'data' of experience are transformed into 
historical knowledge is in fact the main contribution of 
Oakeshott to the philosophy of history. 
If the first principle (the belief in the unity of 
experience) involves the rejection of a certain 
understanding of objectivity, the second allows for its 
reintroduction in a different form. The rejection of a 
correspondence notion of objectivity and the paradigm of 
knowledge by direct inspection, is a way of exposing the 
inadequacy of a common assumption. This assumption -a 
belief in the "real" past - is one which I want to examine 
more closely in a section dealing with the 
"constructionist" description of history. 25 It is an 
assumption that what the historian is aiming at is truth- 
likeness to the past as it actually was, and that the 
ultimate guarantor of the legitimacy of history is when an 
historical account accurately depicts past reality. it 
functions on many levels,, is undoubtedly common-sensical 
and pragmatic,, and yet, the question remains, can it be 
made operative in an historical enquiry. 26 The 
questioning of the nature of our knowledge of the past 
need not be a negative turn as has been pointed out 
persuasively by Peter Munz. 27 For the moment we must note 
that the second principle is rooted in the space left 
vacant by the dismissal of the traditional referent of 
historical enquiry. It is that the truth of any assertion 
is a function of its coherence with other assertions. 
If the truth of an historical account is described in 
terms of the coherence of its assertions with the evidence 
it instances, plus such other conditions as the "present 
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state" of historical knowledge, then the distinction 
between res gestae and historia rerum. gesta disappears. 
History becomes what historians write and historical truth 
will be intimately bound up with the procedures of 
overcoming or resolving historiographical debates. 
Objectivity, in this formulation of truth, becomes 
something dependent not on a relation with an external 
reality, but rather capable, in principle, of being 
resolved by any rational person. This definition might 
help to clear up many problems in the search for a 
description of truth in history, but it can hardly be said 
to be the line taken by Collingwood or Oakeshott. Why 
not? In the cape of Collingwood the answer seems to be 
related to a confused terminology and a preoccupation with 
the way in which historical understanding is arrived at as 
an individual and isolated exercise of interest in the 
past. Par from examining the implications of a coherence 
theory of truth, it would seem that Collingwood was trying 
to bridge the gulf opened up by the denial that historical 
knowledge relies upon perception or acquaintance. I have 
argued, in chapter two, that Collingwood's equating 
historical enquiry with the thoughts of past individuals 
reflects an anxiety over the validity and truth conditions 
of historical statements. In order to defend history as a 
secure form of knowledge Collingwood defines the process 
of rethinking thoughts to reveal the rationale of past 
actions as exact. The reenactment of past experience 
expressed through an historical narrative, would seem to 
have the curious advantage of being impervious to error. 
If one disagrees with an historian's reenactment one must 
try and follow his process of historical thinking to see 
how he arrived at the conclusions he did. If one reasons 
correctly (provided we have asked the same question and 
address the same evidence) it should be possible to 
understand exactly how the first historian reasoned to his 
conclusions. History proceeds, according to this scheme 
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as a series of separate reenactments In one sense each 
successive reenactment (of the same actions) supersedes 
the other, but in another sense each is addressing itself 
to a different problem. Each reenactment contribute to 
the historical experience of the 'community' of historians 
and so helps shape new questions and interests. In short 
the supposed referent of historical statements, the 
thoughts of past individuals, do not have the solidity 
that Collingwood ascribes to them, and the "truth" of 
historical thinking will vary endlessly depending on the 
position of the particular historian. And even if the 
thoughts of past individuals were, somehow, not dependent 
on how they are rethought? how could two historians who 
had both reenacted the "inside" of the same action and yet 
produced conflicting accounts as to its rationale, 
overcome their disagreement? Here then is the crux of the 
matter and though Collingwood explores, with great 
clarity, the peculiarities of historical understanding, he 
did not examine the consequences of a coherence theory of 
truth for the resolution of conflicting interpretations. 
In the end he preferred to rely on a notion of the "ideal" 
judgement, the correlation of objective fact with 
judgement as such rather than with any actual 
judgements, 28 but this, in effect, links objective 
knowledge in history with a criterion of truth arbitrarily 
cordoned off from rational discussion. 
In a statement from On Hist2ry Oakeshott writes, 
'subjectivity is not a category of existence... not a 
quality of objects ... there are perspectives, and ways of 
looking which are quite distinct but not outside of 
29 communication'. This sounds more optimistic; distinct 
ways of understanding which may, nonetheless, be discussed 
and contrasted. However it is to the word 'distinct' 
which we must pay most attention. For the distinctness of 
a perspective or way of looking is a function of modality, 
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and the modes of experience are self-contained and 
irreducible to any other. Therefore the communication or 
discourse into which a particular understanding of an 
object may enter is the limited intelligibility of a mode 
of experience. its possible truth conditions must be 
related to the presuppositions of its modality. In this 
way, though an historical construction may be saved from 
being merely the personal understanding of the present), 
its very modality prevents it from being any more than a 
partial organisation of experience. Truth in history then 
is of a very restricted kind, it is truth in as far as it 
goes# and we have already noticed how stringent 
Oakeshott's definition of historical is, how very hard to 
attain. 30 The only possible meaning of objective 
knowledge that would be available to an Oakeshottian 
position, would be coherence with the presuppositions of 
the historical mode. That is to say, if an account is 
consistent with the enquiry into the historical past that 
is all we may hope for. 
If we substitute Oakeshott's division of experience 
into modes with the notion of different organising 
schemes, a less rigid conception of the particular 
perspective and interests characteristic of different 
approaches emerges. It is a notion which has affiliations 
to Gallie's idea of the story-narrative3l and Mink's 
32 'synoptic judgement'. As Danto writes, 
the difference between history and science is 
not that history does and science does not 
employ organising schemes which go beyond what 
is given. The differences has to do with the 
kind of organising syýemes employed by each. 
History tells stories. 
As we had occasion to notice in the last chapter, whatever 
explanatory force is mobilised by a succession of singular 
statements, there is another sense which the historian's 
narrative may be said to carry intelligibility. The 
casting of separate events together in a narrative serves 
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both as a description of the active engagement of the 
historian and of a particular kind of understanding, what 
Gallie has referred to as following a story. Now the 
question remains, if it is not a linear chain of 
antecedent events, if the narrative is not to be seen as a 
transcription of a temporal sequence, then how exactly 
should we envisage the connections between events and the 
composition of a narrative? It is to this which I want to 
return at the and of the chapter, to the arguments of 
Munz, Hayden White and Louis Mink. It is possible that 
Oakeshott's historical past employs a similar notion of 
intelligibility to that of the "story-narrative"? 
Oakeshott argues that evidence is itself the product 
of inference,, a particular present object looked at from 
the perspective of an interest in its 'survival' from the 
past, and that evidence is therefore dependent upon, and 
composed by an historical past. But he then proceeds to 
say that evidence 'obliges' us to reach certain 
conclusions. Now the technical aspects of editing sources 
(Elton's historical 'craft') are sometimes instanced in 
the defence of the intellectual credibility of what 
historians do. Such a defence is addressed to arguments 
over methodological precision and presumably accepts that 
a sophisticated, perhaps "scientific" discipline is marked 
off by an array of technical skills. However Oakeshott 
does not want to contend that the historical past is 
different from all other understandings of the past solely 
because it has developed techniques which give it 
privileged access to its object of enquiry. His 
presuppositions are logical and primary and guide the 
formulation and use of particular methods and approaches. 
The 'logic' of historical understanding is the logic of 
modality and apperception, not the consistency of the 
historian's techniques with the peculiarities of his 
subject matter. When evidence becomes something that 
'obliges, we must question whether he, like Collingwood, 
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is not searching for an object referent which historical 
descriptions rest upon: res gestae of the present. 
Oakeshott's historical past suffers from the same 
isolation and incommensurability as Collingwood's 
reenactments. Indeed Oakeshott can make little use of the 
only sense in which correspondence might be operative in 
history, the comparing and contrasting of different 
explanations and interpretations, narrative with 
narrative, portrait with portrait. In his version, the 
current state of historical scholarship and opinion is an 
ingredient in the individual historian's experience, and 
it does not appear to be something to which he can appeal 
or know himself to be contributing towards. The 
historical past, he argues, may not be specified in 
advance. In order completely to destroy any possible idea 
that there may be a "real" past existing outside of 
thought or behind the historian's argument, which might 
serve as a source of parallels to present experience, or 
guidance in political dilemmas, Oakeshott's historical 
past is thoroughly contingent. 34 The historical past is 
an inference, a construct of critical thought, and it has 
not substantive shape or form which might be classified 
into taxonomies or analysed into its causal components. 
But Oakeshott is driven too far in trying to establish the 
dependence of res gestas upon a particular kind of 
interest, so that an historical account appears as an 
almost circumstantial by-product. He seems to conflate 
the idea that the historical past is a present engagement, 
with the actual moment of enquiring, as though history 
only exists in the twinkling of an eye. once constructed, 
once woven together, Oakeshott is so concerned that it 
should not be thought of as part of an established body of 
knowledge of the past (should not be confused with the 
contents of the storehouse of objects which constitute the 
practical present past), but merely as possible evidence 
in another enquiry, that the historical past reminds one 
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of a negative photographic image which has not been 
properly fixed and so dissolves and fades away. It exists 
as an answer to a particular interest or question, and not 
as part of a corporate attempt to investigate the past. 
Its truth is a truth on its own terms; a limited and 
dangerously solipsistic coherence. The presuppositions of 
the historical past - the parameters of the historical 
mode - bear the entire weight of truth and objectivity. 
Without then as the guarantor of communicable and shared 
experience the historical past would indeed (as Munz has 
argued it must)35 resolve itself into an infinite regress 
of subjectivities. 
Oakeshott leaves us with a similar problem to 
Collingwood. What ways are there of distinguishing 
between the merits of different, possibly conflicting 
constructions? Can the supposed presuppositions of 
historical understanding provide a criterion, or set of 
criteria, to be used in settling conflicts of 
interpretation? If not what kind of knowledge are we left 
with? History, from an idealist perspective cannot be a 
compilation of accredited facts, nor a body of established 
generalisations or hypotheses, and in an important sense 
there is no court of appeal. 
iii) Relativism and the standpoint of the Enauire 
An idealist understanding contends that history - 
what historians do - is a particular kind of understanding 
composed of objects seen in a certain way and perhaps 
guided by the idea of a story. History, it has been 
argued, is not, because it cannot be, the description of a 
temporal sequence. It is the construction out of records 
of linkages between events, and to this extent history is 
critical thought, the construction of a plausible 
narrative, and the study of thoughts recognised to be 
embodied in evidence. In this chapter questions have been 
raised over the truth conditions of historical statements. 
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We have, in other words, sought for an adequate 
description of the relationship between enquirer and his 
ostensible object of enquiry, the past. I want now to 
remove the cloak of neutrality from the enquirer. 
Despite his central position in an idealist 
understanding, the historian has remained largely 
anonymous. in this section I will deal with a range of 
arguments which draw attention in which the historian with 
his own values (individual and collective), commitments 
and prejudices, may be siid to impinge on the notion of 
historical truth. From an idealist perspective the 
perception and thought of the cognitive subject is a 
'necessary precondition for the configuration of 
36 existence', and this is a premise of knowledge in 
general. What concerns us here is with the way in which 
value schemes are thought to be particularly significant, 
or particularly limiting, in the study of the past. We 
turn then, the problem of relativism. 
Relativism in history is, on one level, the radical 
contextual isation of the object of study. In this sense 
it is synonymous with the development of a 'mature' 
historiography which has, as one of its guiding principles 
the recognition of an all pervasive historicity. 
"Historism" - the relation of thoughts and actions to 
their complex matrix - understands change to be a peculiar 
combination of identity and difference: there must be an 
identifiable object which remains constant enough to be 
said to have changed. Now the historicity of the 
historian's subject matter raises two important questions. 
In what sense can distinct (often very distant) past 
milieu be intelligible to an enquirer, who is a part of 
this pervasive "historism"? If relativism is a condition 
of cognition then the historian's own sense of 
significance, importance, and perhaps even intelligibility 
will necessarily shape his understanding of past events. 
But if this is so, then is the "truth" of any historical 
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account ultimately reducible to the values of an 
historian, to his time and place? 
In their most simplif ied form, these questions are 
not of particular interest. 37 It can be conceded, f or 
example, that relativist position, in the form which 
Mandelbaum has called @subjective relativiszl38 is a 
tedious example of irrationalism. If all statements are 
relative to, and only intelligible for an enquirer there 
would be no possibility of discussing or evaluating 
anything let alone the problem of relativism. 39 The very 
statement that AU understanding is relative to subjective 
values, or to the linguistic, social, economic, or 
ideological condition of the individual entails, if it is 
true and is to be acknowledged as such, that not all 
statements are bound to the solipsism of a subjective 
relativism. Furthermore the two questions above assume 
that the problem of relativism is only a problem for (or 
at least is particularly acute in) history. When we turn 
to T. S. Kuhn we will see that this is an idea which has 
40 been seriously called into doubt. Above all the 
questions assume a certain criterion, knowledge of an 
objective past reality. Recognition of how elusive this 
concept is, introduces an air of anxiety and fatalism. 
But this criterion is, as we have seen, itself open to 
question. 
The idea of relativism has not always provoked 
anxiety in historical thought. Croce, in both his 
theoretical and historical writings, celebrated the idea 
of 'living history', of history being 'contemporary' and 
problem-solving. 41 The fact that the historian's interest 
in the past would always be animated by present concerns 
was precisely why history, at its most vital and 
instructive, assumed an ethical dimension. Yet though he 
accepted that historical understanding was, in this way, 
relative, Croce was concerned not to debase a more 
absolute notion of historical truth or to limit it to 
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subjective values. To this end he relied upon an idealist 
epistemology, and the notion of identity between the 
concrete or individual, and universal judgement. We have 
had occasion to notice the tension that results from this 
attempt to retain the universality of truth in the 
judgement of the individual historian. Croce substituted 
the metaphysical and amorphous 'spirit' with 'liberty' as 
the guiding concept under which history should be 
42 written. The writing of history under a fascist regime 
had a job of work to do: to provide moral guidance and an 
historically instanced alternative. This is rather the 
opposite experience of the American historian Carl 
Becker43 it should be at the service of 'Mr Everyman'. 45 
Mr Everyman's understanding of the past concerned itself 
little with the niceties of historical accuracy or 
overmuch with any distinction between truth and falsity. 
What is important is what is remembered and what, from 
this remembered past, might be useful. In this way 
'Living history ... enlarges and enriches the collective 
specious present of Mr Everyman'. 46 Historians ought then 
to be correcting and rationalising 'for common use Mr 
Everyman's mythological adaption of what actually 
happened'. 47 However by 1941, chastened by the thought of 
a Nazi Mr Everyman', 48 and the idea that relativism not 
only destroyed truth but made morality the hand maiden of 
whoever could establish it, Backer had changed his tune. 49 
History, he wrote, 'cannot be practically applied, and is 
worthless to those who have made it... 1.50 
Charles Beard, writing at the same time an Becker,, 
called for historians to make a 'great act of faith' and 
assess the past as a movement towards 'collectivist 
democracy'. 51 But his position represents an intense 
anxiety about the nature and status of the historian's 
knowledge of the past, an anxiety which led Beard to 
conclude (as Dray mentions in an incisive article)52 that 
53 facts are 'very much at the disposal of the historian'. 
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What is of particular interest in Board's anxieties is the 
way in which historical knowledge, the truth of 
historians' conclusions are assumed to compare so 
unfavourably with those in the natural sciences. For 
example, as Dray points out, much of Beard's concern about 
the problem of how we can come to know the 'past as it 
actually was'54 is contred around the ideas of partiality 
and selection. That is to say, that not only must the 
historian '"see" the actuality of the past through the 
medium of documentation' but that, even at this mediate 
point, there must be a 'partial selection ... of the partial 
record of ... the actuality'. 
55 There is, as Dray and Danto 
have noted,, an important assumption at work here. In 
supposed contrast to scientific knowledge,, Beard assumes 
the poverty of historian's knowledge by observation or 
direct acquaintance. 56 The historian's knowledge is 
judged defective when implicitly referred to its 
"significant other". Here the "significant other" is the 
idea of the 'coolly dispassionatet57 scientist, unburdened 
by values or commitments, observing and reobserving a 
physical world without any interference from mediate and 
partial data. Given this idea of objective knowledge, no 
wonder Beard is anxious over the status of his knowledge 
of the past. But of course his idea of scientific 
objectivity dissolves under close scrutiny. All 
disciplines are necessarily selective, they select what is 
of interest and importance to them. And the notion of 
observability also turns out to be a fiction since, as 
Danto notes, scientists make use of theories, hypotheses 
and techniques precisely because 'what they often deal 
with is unobservable'. He continues: 
the fact that the most highly developed sciences 
are concerned specifically with unobservables 
shows... that the unobservability of e0ject 
matter is not an overwhelming disadvantage. '* 
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There are other disciplines, geology among them, which 
cannot 'observe' the past events to which they refer. 
Beard does however raise some interesting doubts about the 
various criteria of selection employed, and the role of 
value judgements in the actual construction of historical 
accounts, to which we must return. We can, though, 
dismiss his anxieties which are centred on a comparison 
with the direct enquirer-to-object relation assumed to be 
operative in the natural sciences: it labours a vacuous 
contrast. 
There is another distinction which has been made 
often and in various forms. The distinction is premised 
upon a general acceptance of the argument for relativism. 
It is a distinction between fact, establishing when and 
what happened in the past, and interpretation, providing 
plausible reasons for why it did so. On the side of fact, 
history is delrined in terms of its technical expertise, 
its 'Professional standards of respect for the truth 
testing of evidential materiall. 59 For some, including 
Elton, this technical side is what best characterises the 
independence of the historical "craft", and the editing of 
charters should be seen as a basic apprenticeship. Others 
have forced the distinction for different purposes. Aaron 
talks in an optimistic way of the established facts of 
history which allow the historian, prompted by his own 
interests and values, to seek different and revealing 
60 interpretations of past events. Relativism, though a 
basic condition of historical understanding, is mitigated 
by a reliance on the recognised bed-rock of information, 
and dif ferent and conflicting interpretations will be of 
historiographical interest for what they reveal about the 
historian and his time. Goldstein, who writes that there 
is 'substantial agreement among historians on the nature 
of the techniques of historical researches and on the 
character of large segments of the historical past', 61 has 
a different reason for affirming the distinction. In 
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order to provide a secure foundation for history 
understood as a construction he appeals to the "controls" 
of the discipline. 
The idealist cannot allow this distinction to stand. 
It is based on a false separation between "independent" 
historical facts and their employment, joined together in 
a narrative. The idealist argues that the facts of 
history emerge at the and of an enquiry. In other words, 
they are constituents in an argument or elements of what 
Mink calls a synoptic judgementP62 a kind of "seeing 
together". This represents a different conception of 
history which understands it to be thought and 
construction as opposed to compilation and 
classification. 63 Mink writes, 
the researches of historians, however arduous 
and technical, only increase the amount and 
precision of knowledge of facts which remain 
contingent and discontinuous. It in by being 
assigned to stories that they become 
intelligible. 64 
This does not imply historical scepticism, it does 
not deny that the "facts" of the past may be so f irmly 
established as to be (for any practical purpose) beyond 
dispute. What it indicates is a different sense of 
intelligibility, not that of the handbook or 'storehouse' 
of valid and accredited historical knowledge, of discrete 
fats and detachable conclusions,, but the intelligibility 
of the story and the framework of organisation it 
provides. Beyond this there is reason to doubt the idea 
of the concrete atomic fact, since, as Dray has argued, 
historical facts re a structured network of relations, 
covering event $the most "brutish" fact1.65 Since these 
structures are known as such,, rather than discovered in 
the nature of past occurrences, they must be imposed upon 
the facts. It is this discursive ordering and juxtaposing 
of historical 'facts' which is an essential characteristic 
of historia rerum gestaru . And the complication and 
207 
classification of facts from evidence cannot be opposed to 
the intrusion of the subject, in the construction of a 
narrative account, as the paradigm of impartial analysis 
and scholarship; the editing of charters presupposes 
organisational 'strategies' not to be found in the 
sources. More importantly, as Peter Munz has so clearly 
illustrated, the historian, in sticking to the neutrality 
of editing and detective work, is not secure in the 
knowledge of the unadulterated data of the past, the raw 
material of history. Evidence, or as he prefers, 
"record", is already artifact, 66 someone's record of an 
event, someone's thought. It is not nor does it 
constitute, a transcript of a temporal sequence. It comes 
to us already in the f orm of a construct of I'mini- 
narrative". 
At the centre of historiographical disputes are often 
different interpretations of the significance of this or 
that pivotal fact, of its importance or non-importance in 
a sequence of events, 67 even to what will count as a fact. 
Such disputes perhaps point to the slippery nature of 
facts and to the difficulty in appealing "the facts" as 
the ultimate sanction and appeal. As Danto has noted, 
'historian's differences arise over historical statements 
which are equally as acceptable'. 68 The established-body- 
of-facts argument may in the end, far from allowing for a 
consensual understanding of the human past, give rise to a 
healthy plurality of different accounts. It will not 
support the thesis that, at the level of fact, the 
standpoint of the enquirer in absent, while at that of 
interpretation necessarily intrusive. What is more, as 
wee shall see in the next section, too close 
identification of historical facts with the reality of the 
past as it actually was, is fraught with problems. if 
historical facts are not themselves recognised to be fully 
within a narrative, dependent for their significance and 
intelligibility on their place in an argument, but rather 
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are seen as the remnants of past reality and the means of 
transportation back to that reality, then the past becomes 
entirely dependent on our present f actual knowledge in a 
way that the realist would never allow and which Elton 
would deride as arrogance. Facts are overturned, demoted 
and promoted; historical knowledge changes and enriches. 
Does this mean that the past is constantly altering? The 
more sensible conclusion is that it is our knowledge of 
the past which shifts and that f acts are a product of 
historical inference. In this way we may account for 
their slipperiness without impuning their truth status for 
that knowledge, and without swapping an epistemological 
insight f or an abortive attempt to ground historia rerum 
gestarum on a bed-rock of f actual certainty and in this 
way bridge the ontological divide to the past. 
Since an absolute distinction between fact and 
interpretation cannot be made operative, we must look f or 
another way in which the implications of relativism in 
history might be mitigated. Following Mandelbaum's three- 
fold division, we turn from the anxieties of Charles Beard 
and the lack of significant contrast between his notion of 
historical and scientific truth, to the position described 
as #objective relativism', or to give it another name, 
RersRectivism. 
'Objective relativism', Mandelbaum argues, states 
that 'the truth of what is asserted cannot be judged 
independently of the context in which the assertion is 
made'. 69 This coincides with the description of historism 
given above. But if this idea applies equally to history 
res gestae, and to historia rerum gesta , then, unless 
we can understand the context in which an historical 
enquiry is conducted, we have little chance of finding it 
, mjl7o intelligible. To this end the idea of "perspectivir 
arises. The truth of an historical account, since it is 
tied to a context which must include the particular values 
and interests of the enquirer, becomes truth relative to a 
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certain perspective. in order to avoid unnecessary 
misunderstandings it is important to specify as exactly as 
possible this particular approach. This is the argument 
of Karl Popper which he describes as 'situational 
logicl. 71 He starts from the conclusion that, 
'undoubtedly there can be no history without a point of 
view; like the natural sciences, history must be selective 
unless it be choked by a flood of poor and unrelated 
materiall. 72 The historian then, should 'consciously 
introduce a preconceived point of viewj73 which reflects 
his particular interests. This is not to be taken as a 
license to 'twist the facts until they fit the framework 
of preconceived ideas,, or that we may neglect the facts 
that do not fitl. 74 Rather, 'all available evidence which 
has a bearing on our point of view should be considered 
carefully and objectively'. 75 The idea her*, is that 
specifying a point of view in advance allows us to follow 
the historian's argument and judge it in terms of its 
coherence from its point of view. Disagreements may then 
arise over whether all the facts or evidence relevant to 
that particular perspective have been included in the 
history. However,, though we may not share the point of 
view, we may, nonetheless,, find the account completely 
comprehensible and intelligible. 
From the argument point of view of this 'situational 
logics. 71 He starts from the conclusion that, 
'undoubtedly there can be no history without a point of 
view; like the natural sciences, history must be selective 
unless it be choked by a flood of poor and unrelated 
materiall. 72 The historian then, should 'consciously 
introduce a preconceived point of view, 73 which reflects 
his particular interests. This is not to be taken as a 
license to 'twist the facts until they fit the framework 
of preconceived ideas, or that we may neglect the facts 
that do not fit. v74 Rather, 'all available evidence which 
has a bearing on our point of view should be considered 
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carefully and objectively. #75 The idea here, is that 
specifying a point of view in advance allows us to follow 
the historian's argument and judge it in terms of its 
coherence from its point of view. Disagreements may then 
arise over whether all the facts or evidence relevant to 
that particular perspective have been included in the 
history. However,, though we may not share the point of 
view, we may,, nonetheless, find the account completely 
comprehensible and intelligible. 
From the argument point of view of this 'situational 
logic' raises two important questions: is it possible to 
specify the particular values and interests of the 
enquirer (those values and interests which, entangled and 
enmeshed within a history, may cut us off from the context 
in which they arose) by stating them in advance and so 
making historical understanding a matter of following an 
argument from a given set of propositions? Secondly, can 
a series of specific points of view contribute to a 
cumulative understanding of the past? 
The first question falls foul of Mandelbaum's razor. 
If the answer is yes, and if points of view can be 
specified so exactly as to make them entirely 
comprehensible to others, then objective relativism is not 
all pervasive, and some statements - in this case the 
principle of situational logic - are to be interpreted in 
a non-relativistic sense, that is to say true no matter 
who asserts it and in what context. Further more Popper's 
points of view appear to be conscious, rational and 
reserved; a framework of enunciated commitments. 
Situational logic aspires to be the ideal of intellectual 
arbitration. In fact Popper has recognised the essential 
problem of criteria of selection, but his solution is 
unrealistic. As Walsh points out, 'given a set of 
presuppositions historical work can be done more or less 
well', but 'what is a fact on one interpretation will not 
be one on anotherl. 76 Popper's ideal is too detachable, 
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too uninvolved with the process of selection and 
ascription of significance. R. F. Atkinson doubts whether 
questions can be so exactly specified as to have 
completely determinate answers'. 77 The second question 
will have to be answered in the negative precisely because 
we have no means of deciding between different accounts. 
It is possible that divergent accounts will complement 
each other but if they do conflict in argument and 
interpretation of evidence it cannot be resolved: each 
will be 'appropriate' from its own point of view. The 
question remains, where is the criterion for deciding 
between different points of view? 
The idea of perspectivism, however,, is not without 
its importance, though we may have to take it in a softer 
form than that outlined above. It is important to accept 
that the clear distinction between interest and values, 
and the intelligibility of a history cannot be maintained. 
As Morton White has written, 
'Value judgements - the extra historical element 
in... (history) ... is dominated by the idea of 
memorability or worthiness to be recorded in 
chronicle, and I know of no way of eliminating 
this factor in the construction and assessment 
of a histg ... moral judgements may not be detachable. 'Ey 
Furthermore, we must concede to Mandelbaum that no 
significant progress has been made in replacing the 
solipsism of "subjective relativism" with the determinate, 
but incommensurable, points of view of "objective 
relativism". 
Dray has outlined a softer version of perspectivism 
in which he states that, 'telling the "whole truth", in 
context, means telling those which one has the right to 
expect in that context'. 79 He goes on, 'selection makes 
historical accounts relative to the value schemes which in 
brought to them by the historian'801 but this is 'not to 
say that selection per se necessarily falsifies. Why 
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shouldn't the historian's account of the past be true as 
far as it goes? l82 The important difference between this 
position and 'situational logic' is that Drays must be 
seen as a response to the question, 'can a less-than- 
complete account of any historical object of study claim 
to be the truth about it? l83 The notion of truth in 
context is, for him, a consequent of what is 'a condition 
of human knowledge generally'840, that is to say the 
intrusion of value and selection. Par from being (as it 
appears in Popper's argument) a prescription for 
historical practice, perspectivism is merely a correct 
account of one important aspect Of historical 
understanding. To complete a "correct" description, Dray, 
along with Danto, Walsh, Morton White,, Mink and others, 
would argue that the @entire mode of organising the past 
is causally involved with our own local interests'85; that 
'every history is written from a certain point of view and 
makes sense only from that point of view'86, and that 
written history is "a quasi-evaluative notion: the 
significant past". 87 If we are to accept these 
statements, if as Hagel put it, 'Value judgement is 
logically ingredient in the very idea of historical 
inquiry" then, 'it would make no sense for historians to 
aspire to be objectivel. 88 
Before despairing of finding any place for "truth" in 
history we must turn to the notion that the proper sense 
of contextualisation, or relativism, must be understood in 
reference to the intelligibility of assertions &rising out 
of historical practice. This is the notion that the 
resolution of conflicting interpretations calls for a 
'theory of presuppositions'. 
The idea that historical understanding involves 
certain presuppositions and that a full account of 
historical truth or intelligibility must involve an 
examination of what is presupposed in the actual 
construction of the historian is a common theme in 
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idealist approaches. Applied to other disciplines, or to 
cognition in general, the analysis of presuppositions has 
been a major theoretical enterprise of the twentieth 
century. The common theme is that there are, embedded in 
the matrix of linguistic systemse intellectual 
communities, cultural milieux, and "scientific" 
disciplines, complicated and often hidden codes of 
signification and meaning, which both guide, and to an 
extent, compose the study of objects and their 
representation. If these presuppositions are located 
within the (possible) experience of an enquirer we have 
not departed from a neo-Kantian idealism. If, on the 
other hand, they are placed between the enquirer and the 
object of his enquiry (in a deterministic and over-arching 
sense) then we have a form of structuralism or sociology 
of knowledge. This distinction is important for doctrinal 
reasons, although less so in implication. Though the 
calling into question of standards of objective 
rationality can be traced back to Kant, Hegel and Marx, 
the collapse of pragmatism into existentialism and the 
fragmented systems of knowledge, expressed most vividly in 
the language games of the later Wittgenstein, and, 
concurrently, the intense specialisation of academic 
disciplines (taken perhaps to guarantee the scientific 
credentials of a field of enquiry) from which history has 
not escaped, is largely a phenomenon of this century. in 
the last section of this chapter I want to return to 
certain ideas about the way in which presuppositions 
govern or even control the construction of the historical 
past. Our interest at this point is with the possibility 
that, by attending to the presuppositions of historical 
understanding - put less forcibly as the assumptions and 
approaches which may bond together historians into an 
intellectual "community" - we may find a way to mitigate 
the more corrosive implications of relativism, and resolve 
the problem of conflicting interpretations. In other 
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words,, can relativism be understood as a relationship 
between a particular, but shared, approach and its object 
of enquiry, the historical past, and should historical 
'truth' be defined, in some sense, as the mechanics of 
this relationship? 
This third attempt to find a correct description of 
relativism in history corresponds quite closely to the 
third of Mandelbaum's definitions, that of 'conceptual 
relativism'. For the conceptual relativist, he writes, it 
is, 
I not the individual purposes or interests, nor 
the particular relationship in which he stands 
to the object with which his judgements are 
concerned; rather, what is relevant is taken to 
be the intellectual or conceptual background 
which the individual brings to his proble" from 
the cultural milieu to which he belongs. 159 
Mandelbaum, is intent on exposing the logical contradiction 
in this position, which he takes to be a form of 
ideological determinism, dealing in the idea of false 
consciousness. he accuses the conceptual relativist of 
indulging in a 'self-excepting fallacy', 'that is, the 
fallacy of stating a generalisation that purports to hold 
of all persons but which, inconsistently, is not then 
applied to oneself'. 90 Although this may accurately 
describe certain theories of cultural hegemony and the 
closed-systems of structuralists (in particular the random 
lepistemic, divisions of Foucault), it is not a 
particularly useful way of addressing T. S. Kuhn's theory 
of paradigms. 
Kuhn wanted to 'historicisel an understanding of 
scientific development, and to drive out the "'Whig" 
interpretation of history'91 from the philosophy of 
science. It is not his intention to so relativise 
scientific knowledge that all claims to "objective" truth 
by scientific disciplines must be dismissed, though it 
certainly is his purpose to deny that there is an 
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absolutely objective scale against which all truth-claims 
may be measured. Kuhn asks a series of questions about 
the mechanisms, by which shared theories become established 
as paradigms, which in turn influence the kind of research 
undertaken, and how one paradigm in replaced by another. 
The interest of Kuhn's thesis is substantial,, not least 
because of its concentration on the media through which 
scientific discoveries are arrived at and substantiated. 
Par from being a progressively more complete transcript of 
the physical world, scientific knowledge is represented as 
'a dialogue between traditions and contingent 
experience'. 92 The criteria of scientific intelligibility 
are not, we learn, absolute or eternal, but have their own 
history. it is important not to over-emphasize the 
parallels between Kuhn's idea of scientific knowledge and 
history. one would, at the very least, need to question 
whether history is governed by shared (though not 
necessarily articulated) paradigms, and whether, as a 
discipline, it constitutes a "scientific community". 93 I 
want to address a question raised by D. A. Hollinger, 'can 
Kuhn's sense of validity help ... historians to clarify what 
they mean by lobjectivel? 94 Does his idea of truth as a 
function of agreement among a "community" reveal the true 
implications of relativism for history, and provide a 
correct description of the way in which conflicting 
historical interpretations are resolved? 
Can the practice of history provide its own criteria 
of rationality and its own sense of validating claims 
about the past? F. H. Bradley argued that there are means 
for the historian to assess the likelihood of a reported 
past occurrence; 95 it must be analogous to something that 
has, or could have, happened in our present experience. 
This however, is not a license for subjective empathy, 
because our present experience is guaranteed as well- 
grounded by appeal to scientific rationality. It is the 
laws of science and their common-sense derivatives that 
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enable the historian to conf irm or deny the accuracy of 
recorded events. As Danto has point out, Bradley is 
seeking a criterion of empirical impossibility. 96 
However,, this leaves him a selection among an array of 
possible interpretations. Not only are his 
presuppositions very general, but what is possible is not 
necessarily true. Bradley focuses attention on the 
presentist dimension of historical study and on the active 
role of the enquirer in constructing and determining an 
intelligible account of past events; but ultimately 
history is dependent, for its coherence, on scientific 
laws. The task of history is represented as establishing 
the accuracy of statements contained in evidence. It is 
reduced to 'detective' work, to a calculus of 
probabilities, to what Munz calls 'documentary 
positivism'. Collingwood, of course, rejected this 
reliance on scientific laws. He declared that it was the 
historian's experience 2ga historian by which alone he 
determined the cogency of a reenactment, and rendered his 
enquiry autonomous. Even leaving aside the vagueness of 
the criteria provided by his historical "experience", and 
the impressionistic flavour of his 'historical 
imagination', Collingwood's re-enactments can, I have 
argued, be seen as incommensurable. His historical 
presuppositions are premised on a wider philosophical 
coherence, and the validity of particular thought-revivals 
are tied up with a metaphysical programme which, if not 
transcending, certainly precedes any analysis of 
historical practice. 
W. H. Walsh, in the f irst edition of An Introduction 
to the PhilOsORhy of History held out some hope that we 
might eventually arrive at a 'science of human naturev97, 
by reference to which, all hermeneutical problems might be 
resolved. By the third edition we find a footnote 
declaring that his earlier position had been 'seriously 
confused'. 98 In fact his overall approach is far more 
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sceptical: 'historians do not know any absolutely certain 
acts about the past ... all historical statements are 
relativel. 99 At another point he writes that 
understanding 'involves the judgement of evidence by 
principles whose truth is independently assumed'. 100 Are 
these principles the same as Bradley's presuppositions? 
In discussing perspectivism, Walsh talks of the 
'presuppositions'101 of points of view, but here he means 
ideological commitments which are consciously held, 
articulated, and open to discussion and evaluation. Such 
ideological commitments resemble, in their plurality, 
Kuhn's description of the 'competing-schools' which are 
indicative of the lack of consensus over definitions and 
the correct way of resolving problems in the pre- 
paradigmatic period of a science. On an absolute level 
the evaluative notion of conflicting presuppositions lacks 
an external arbiter. on the more local level discussion 
of the plausibility of different presuppositions goes 
hand-in-hand with the evaluation of historiography; the 
continuing arguments over the contribution of a Marxist 
perspective being only the most obvious example. There is 
a further, anti-deterministic point to be made. Danto 
writes, 
the fact that there should be causes for a 
belief is utterly independent of the question as 
to whether that belief is well grounded, and 
that question we can decide in utter ignorance 
of the causefoyhich may have operated on the man 
who held it. 
But Danto goes on to say that, 'differences of a more 
ultimate sort ... the very criteria in accordance with 
which... (we) ... could adjudicate between theories',, which 
includes even 'general philosophical theories'. or 
'disagreements of principle', are not 'made in accordance 
with any criteria, for they determine, finally, what are 
103 to be the criteria we shall accept'. Walsh arrives at 
a similar conclusion, 'we cannot settle the dispute by 
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reference to a body of unassailable fact - what is fact on 
one interpretation is not necessarily fact on another'. 104 
And Mink has drawn our attention to the way in which a 
particular 'methodology' will determine what will count as 
a fact. 105 
R. F. Atkinson has denied that there exists an 
'articulated body of presuppositions in historyl, 106 and 
contrasted this unfavourably with science where, 'the 
criteria of selection are more fully determined'. Mink, 
on the other hand, argues that such comparisons are 
misleading and accept a 'proto-science'107 
characterisation of historical understanding. He points 
out the the 'division of labour in research', in the 
sciences, requires that concepts have a uniformity of 
meaning, and the methodological problem of definition 
therefore becomes centrall. 108 Perhaps then, the very 
idea of an absolute and rigid set of presuppositions 
imports into the flux of historical disputes an alien and 
unworkable idea. in a related discussion of the ubiquity 
of value-judgements in historian's narratives, Dray 
argues, that to 'exclude explicit value judgements from 
the historian's language would not extrude them from his 
enquiry'109, and this because the subject-matter of 
history is itself tvalue-constituted'. 110 That is to say 
that the historian must actually bring with him to his 
enquiry "certain metaphysical presuppositions" in order to 
see it as having a certain character (political or 
religious for example); 'simply to characterise human 
actions and experiences as belonging to such fields may 
require a value-judgement... (to) ... recognise actions as 
falling into classes of activities'. 111 This for Dray, is 
merely a way of stating that the past is a 'quasi- 
evaluative notion: the significant past'. 112 It is an 
ingredient of historical enquiry and not something that 
can be eliminated, nor, if we remember Dray's commitment 
to a humanist historiography, would he wish these 
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interests and values to be excluded. 'The past "as it 
actually was" will coincide with the past as it must 
appear from the standpoint of a certain scheme of 
values. lll3 If Dray is correct, and the historian past is 
in fact constituted by values, interest, and a sense of 
significance, then the search for uniform presuppositions, 
or a set of criteria by reference to which interpretive 
differences may be resolved, will prove to be a 
misconception of a fundamental aspect of historical 
understanding. This is the point that I want to pursue 
and there will be occasion to notice some implications in 
the next section. 
The problem of arriving at a set of criteria with 
which to validate accounts of past events is also a 
misunderstanding of the concept of historical truth. it 
reintroduces the notion of truth as correspondence, in 
this case correspondence with a set of rules or principles 
by which one can know oneself,, SM historian, to have 
reasoned correctly about past events. But it has been the 
contention of an idealist approach to history that the 
truth of statements is their coherence with other 
statements, the 'sole criterion of truth available to us, 
in history as in other branches of factual knowledge is 
114 the internal coherence of beliefs we bass on evidence'. 
Peter Munz makes this point most effectively by citing an 
observation of Henri Poincarels, 
... there is no time over and above the various 
clocks we have. We can compare one clock to 
another clock; but we cannot compare any clock 
to time and it makes no sme to ask which of 
the many clocks is correct. 
What we must do then is to get rid of the notion of static 
and f ixed points of reference and attend to the way in 
which the 'truth' of an historical account, far from 
appealing to an external criterion of validity, resides in 
how favourably it compares with other accounts. this 
returns us to a semi-autonomous position on resolution of 
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historical disputes (semi-autonomous because the arbiters 
of merit are drawn from a wider circle than history's 
"professional" practitioners) and truth becomes relative 
to a whole array of cultural and intellectual standards; 
the current state of historical scholarship and opinion, 
prevailing research interests, and the particular 
interests of historians. The important point is that 
historical truth is n2t a progressively more accurate 
picture, or series of photographs of res gestal, and the 
corporate enterprise of understanding the past does not 
evolve towards a more accurate and complete approximation 
to past events. It can have no such goal: 
The facts of history... are the conclusions to 
which the best informed historical opinion is 
prepared to commit itself at any one 
time... Truth, fact, and knowledge will lose 
their total independence and become relative in 
part at least, to thlelg2ondit ions of particular 
cognitive situations. 
In this case Kuhn's idea of the 'scientific 
communityl as the arbiter of standards, practice, and 
validity, might be applicable to history. However there 
are some striking differences. The paradigm which, at any 
one time is said to guide the practice of 'normal 
science1117 involves a shared "commitment to the same 
rules and standards for scientific practice". 118 Within 
this paradigm-governed community the "scientist is working 
only for an audience of colleagues that share his own 
values and beliefs". 119 This degree of consensus and 
stability is quite obviously absent among the 'competing 
schools'120 of historians,, which make up a plurality of 
different perspectives: ideological,, methodological, and 
idiosyncratic. And yet, in spite of this range of 
perspectives 'each of which constantly questions the very 
foundations of the others'121, the difference of consensus 
in the two tcommunities' is only a matter of degree. In 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn illustrates 
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(with copious examples from the development of different 
sciences), that a 'scientific revolution - the 
recognition of anomaly and the failure of current theories 
in solving outstanding problems and their replacement by a 
new paradigm - 'changes the standards by which the 
profession determined what should count as an admissible 
problem or legitimate solution. 122 In Kuhn's version the 
absolute standards of scientific rationality are replaced 
by historically grounded organising principles. Hollinger 
comments: 
Kuhn's notion of 'paradigm' embodies the sense 
that activities are defined and controlled by 
tradition, and that tradition consists of a set 
of devices, or principlesi that have proven 
their ability to ord M the experience of a given 
social constituency. 
What is common to the developed sciences is a degree of 
consensus and commitment to shared principles, which 
allows 'normal science', at any one time, to proceed 
unburdened by any epistemological uncertainties. 
In Kuhn's schema success in solving problems involves 
a 'Recognition of a uniquely competent professional group 
and the acceptance of its role as the exclusive arbiter of 
professional achievement', who are 'the sole possessors of 
124 the rules of the game', the 'unequivocal judges'. it 
is this sense of socially-grounded objectivity125 of 
truth as agreement among enquirers, which is so helpful. 
Danto has point out that scientists have interests and 
predictions, but that this is not incompatible with their 
'finding truth'126; why then not history? It is also 
important because it helps to destroy a false comparison 
between history, as distant, indirect knowledge of its 
object, and science as direct transcript of the natural 
and physical world. 
In reviewing the importance of Kuhn's idea of 
validity in science, Hollinger writes: 
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To the extent that that what historians do has a 
claim to knowledge this claim is based on the 
existence of a community, however amorphous, 
that evaluates the various 'perspectives' of its 
members, as well as the relation between a given 
perspective and what is allegedly 'discovered' 
with it. The community distinguishes among 
points of view that are comprehensive, 
parochial, and incoherent ... Community sanction is thus W ential to knowledge, even when 
imperfect. 1 
This description is altogether preferable to Popper's 
situational logic because the context is extended beyond 
the articulated interests of the individual enquirer. it 
is not an exact nor ultimate arbitration but at least it 
extends the coherence of a historical construction onto a 
more corporate dimension. It also refers the philosophy 
of history back to historiography and to the history of 
historiography, for as Munz has illustrated128, agreement 
or disagreement emerge out of a comparison of different 
histories: references to a past reality external to the 
writings and evidence of historia rerum gestarum are 
conspicuously absent. 
Historical thought is a fluid notion, a series of 
exchanges: conversations with the past addressed to a 
third party. The theoretical search for external criteria 
of validity will cause a breach in what is an intelligible 
conversation. However, the tendency to replace the 
regress of different accounts with the idea that 
historians deal only with the established facts embodied 
in evidence is misconceived. As soon as history is 
recognised to be less a recitation of 'semi-autonomous 
name-and-date facts, 129 (an inventory of Oakeshott's 
storehouse of the practical past), than the linking 
together of sub-events into events, and events into a 
narrative; as soon as evidence is understood to be 
somebody's record and therefore somebody's thought, and 
that evidence does not stand to event as a transcript or 
mirror, then the essentially discursive and literary 
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character of history is revealed. The past-for-the-past's 
sake attitude,, if it embodies the professional standards 
of textual criticism, scholarship, and sensitivity to 
anachronism, will presumably find favour in the 
evaluations that go on within the discipline. These are 
the "controls" and standards widely shared and respected 
by the historical "community". If what is meant by this 
attitude, is the desire to eliminate the standpoint of the 
enquirer and let the past speak for itself, it 
nevertheless ignores the importance of how significance 
and "truth" are constructed within written history. The 
problem of relativism in history is best understood as 
relative to a particular narrative organisation, rather 
than a particular relationship between an enquirer and the 
past. 130 
iv) Construction. Scepticism. and the Truth of a Portrait 
our incapacity, which is granted, to observe the 
past, is not a defect in history itself but a 
deficiency which it is the precise purpose of 
history to overcome.... history owes its 
existence to the fact that wp, fo not have direct 
access to the past. (Danto)"I 
The idealist argues, that, for there to be knowledge 
there must be a possible unity between an enquirer and his 
object of study,, and that such unity is characterised by 
thought or judgement. In this chapter we have looked at 
various ways in which this relationship might be relative 
to the standpoint of the historian. The only meaningful 
sense in which a particular account may be accurate, 
representative, or correspondent is as a result of its 
coherence with other accounts (including 'primary' 
records), and that validation may be a matter of 
"community" sanction. However unfamiliar these ideas are, 
they are nonetheless consistent with a position that 
denies there is an ultimate reality (res gestae) behind a 
multitude of appearances (historia rerum gestarux). They 
are also consistent with history understood as a 
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construction. Reference to the historian's construction 
of an account of past events has been made in order to 
emphasise the presentist dimension of historical thought, 
and to examine the creative role of the onquirer in 
arriving at a narrative of past events. The idea of 
constructing sits more comfortably with a coherence sense 
of truth. it has contributed to an argument that history 
should not be understood as the recovery or transcription 
of temporal sequences. What I want to do now is add the 
ism to construction-132 What is the status of 
construct ioni sin in the philosophy of history? Is it a 
description of the way historians arrive at knowledge of 
the 'historical' past, and therefore primarily an argument 
Within philosophy of history over what historians should 
be regarded as doing, and thus methodologically neutral. 
Or should it be viewed as the outcome of a (misplaced) 
scepticism in regard to the particular cognitive 
circumstances of the historian? Is the instability of a 
constructed 'historical' past, where it seems at times 
that the historian is charged with actually creating past 
events. hostile to the status and achievements of 
historical practice? Have we, in other words, with 
constructionism, arrived at that point in which philosophy 
of history loses its second-order discreteness and becomes 
prescriptive: what historians should understand themselves 
to be doing if only they were not so weighed down by 
realist paraphernalia. 
In this section I want to argue that there are 
different kinds of constructionist approaches. Meiland's 
constructionism is indeed an attempt to establish 
scepticism in regards to historical knowledge, in order to 
reveal that the historian cannot be doing what he is 
traditionally hold to be doing, contributing to our 
knowledge of the past. 133 Goldstein's 
'constitutionism$134 (a term borrowed from Husserl) 
resembles Oakeshott's historical past in many aspects; 
225 
however, its plausibility is diminished by clinging onto a 
model of truth as direct inspection, and its narrow 
interpretation of idealism. Finally there is the notion 
of historical truth which emerges from Kunz's argument 
that history is the configuration of subevents into 
events, and events into stories. 135 It is one of the 
contentions of this chapter that Kunz's position is the 
only consistent application of the 'philosophy' of 
constructionism to history. 
Before turning to the different varieties of 
constructionism it is important to establish some common 
ground. It may be that this position - as in the musings 
of Charles Beard - is the outcome of what Dray has called 
a 'certain metaphysical anxiety about the task of coming 
to know what literally does not exist, 136, but it is also 
quite consistent with an enquiry into the "logic" of 
confirmation in history. History, it is contested, is an 
enquiry into the existence of certain objects in the 
present. In order to account for the presence of these 
objects (documents, institutions, coins etc... ) the 
historian constructs a theory or hypothesis which infers 
the existence of past events. 137 As Murphy puts it, 'an 
explanation of the state of the present object requires 
138 the postulation of events in the past'. Historical 
knowledge becomes a theoretical construction directed at 
understanding objects seen as evidence. This, as we have 
seen, is Oakeshott's position. Though it calls for 
semantic changes, so that the historian should be 
understood as 'inferring' the existence of past events, as 
opposed to finding or discovering them; as constructing an 
hypothesis to explain parts of the present rather than the 
past, it has, as Atkinson points out, 'no implications for 
139 the practice of history'* But this is only the 
beginning of the matter. For constructionism not only 
emphasises that history in present knowledge of past 
events, but that the conclusions of historical hypotheses 
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or accounts, cannot refer to anything outside their 
present context. in other words, in history past events 
not only 'rest' upon the present, but, in an important 
sense, M present. This idea is radically antagonistic 
to the cosmon-sense assumptions which make history the 
study of the past in the belief that historians, 
conclusions, when veil grounded in evidence, are true in 
the sense that they tell us about past reality. It is a 
conclusion which causes embarrassment to certain 
philosophers (Atkinson among them)140 and appears arrogant 
to historians like Elton-141 History becomes what 
historians write and the past will change endlessly 
according to how we think of it. 
It in important to limit and clarify the extent of 
what the constructionist is arguing before examining some 
criticisms. Common to the different versions of 
constructionism is the desire to expose the illusory 
nature of the "real" past. 142 In some accounts this 
appears to be the only aim and therefore the thesis seems 
driven by a destructive urge to tear down castles in the 
air. This only encourages the conflation of 
constructionism with scepticism. The inappropriateness of 
scepticism applied to historical knowledge is a results of 
its focusing on the indirectness and inaccessibility of 
the historian's object of enquiry, while ignoring the 
possibility that mediation is a condition of all knowledge 
claims. In this way scepticism raises an old distinction 
between historical and scientific truth, and at the same 
time establishes a universal scepticism stretching far 
beyond the particularities of history-143 This is true of 
Meiland's Historical Scel2ticis but not, I shall argue, 
the intention of Goldstein's Historical Knowing. 
Scepticism, just as much as naive realism, treats 
knowledge claims along a scale of the directness of 
subject to object. 144 For the sceptic145, knowledge is 
judged defective if it cannot be grounded in the co- 
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existence of fact and assertion. This however,, would 
dismiss as unfounded the historical aspects of the natural 
sciences; geology, biology, and the repetition of 
experiments. It in an argument which is bland and 
unsustainable. It completely misses the point that it is 
not the question of proximity between enquirer and 
objectl46 of study which differentiates history from the 
natural sciences, but different interests and different 
organisational schemes. An Goldstein has argued, such 
mediation is a fundamental fact of knowing, not an apology 
for scepticism. 147 
The realist assumption, which may indeed animate 
historical studies, is certainly unfounded, but the 
sceptic is not addressing himself to the really inter- 
question of what could replace it. Instead he exposes the 
illusion of the real past and then condemns history 
because it fails to have knowledge by direct 
acquaintance. 148 For this reason we should not equate 
scepticism with the constructionist position. Time and 
again - whether in relation to explanatory models or the 
presence of value judgements - the tendency to contrast 
history with an absolute standard of veracity (scientific 
truth, the disinterested observer, or the past as it 
really was) is itself dependent on an illusory "other". 
Whether the description of historical enquiry as a 
construction has any 'practical' implications (and Munz 
puts forward a strong case that it has) it is certainly a 
problem for the philosophy of history. Atkinson has 
denied that questions over the referent of historical 
descriptions are of any importance, either to philosophy 
or to historyl49,, this after having asserted that the 
whole of analytical philosophy of history lies outside the 
"Professional" concerns of historians. 150 Both Atkinson 
and McCullaghl5l seem to conflate a constructionist 
approach with a full-blown scepticism towards historical 
knowledge, and feel the need to make a common-sense 
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rebuttal: 'Against (scepticism) ... the sovereign remedy is 
firmly to remind oneself that we all constantly and 
confidently, accept and reject particular statements about 
the past152; $Scepticism is warranted from an intellectual 
point of view, but is not practice'. 153 However this 
intrusion of pragmatism completely misses the point. No 
philosopher of history (with the possible exception of 
Meiland) denies that, in history, there is an effort to 
Icharacterise an independent reality'154, or that 
historians' narratives contain a 'high degree of 
particular actuality'1551 that is to say, that the events 
they compose did actually occur. 156 But we are concerned 
with history as thought or judgement, and so the question 
how it "characterises" and "refers" is vital. Goldstein 
has shown that, though fact and assertion are conceptually 
distinct, there is no way of making this distinction 
operative in history: epistemologically there is no such 
distinction. 157 Though Elton authoratively demands on a 
measure of humility from the historian in the face of the 
integrity of complete actionsl5e, 'events of the past 
happened quite independently of the existence of he who 
now looks at them, 159, it would be quite wrong to insist 
that knowledge of these events is completely independent 
'of he who now looks at them'. And since Elton would not 
want the historian's 'craft' reducible to compilations, 
classifications, and inventories of the contents of a 
storehouse of authenticated objects from the past, he 
would have to concede that critical thought is ingredient 
in "looking" at past events. A fear of amateurishness, 
anachronism, and imprecision is close to the centre of his 
argument for the independent, dead reality of the past. 
However the past-for-the-past's sake approach no more 
eliminates Imen... in the search for truth'160 than history 
understood as a construction condones bias and 
"subjectivity". Nowell-Smith has added a philosopher's 
support to this strident realism: if a statement is true 
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at all, it is true no matter who makes it or when it is 
made, and its truth is independent of anyone Ia knowing it 
to be true and of how anyone comes to know it. 161 But if 
this is correct then this concept of truth cannot be 
applied to history. Historical conclusions change 
constantly; interests and methods rise and fall; evidence 
may be enriched in scope and clarity. But it need not be 
concluded from the instability of historical knowledge 
that the past to which it refers must also be changing 
constantly. This in sceptical nonsense. 162 The dead 
reality of what once happened can be allowed, but we must, 
as Walsh has pointed out, 'choose between a past which is 
independent and one which can be known'. 163 That decision 
is made in historia rerum gestarum. 
How past events are understood and linked together 
most certainly does depend on the thought of an observer. 
The idea that the highest achievement in history is sought 
in a mimetic relationship between narrative and past 
events must be severely qualified. Further (as we saw in 
the last section) an appeal to the "established facts of 
history" will not take us out of the "present state of 
knowledge". 
The array of arguments used to demonstrate that we 
have an inbuilt, linguistic awareness of the past164 0 to 
demonstrate that Russell's 'five minute' paradox165 only 
multiplies difficulties and contradicts our entire mental 
apparatusl66, are directed against a self-defeating 
historical scepticism. History, for the idealist, 
recognises, in its very essence, the force of the sceptics 
argument that it cannot have direct knowledge of the past, 
and that it cannot verify its conclusions by comparison or 
correspondence. This is why history is better described 
as an inferential and critical activity of thought, 
indeed, why it is philosophically interesting at all. By 
understanding history is this way one exposes the 
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impotence of the question "how can we know that the past 
existed? ". 167 
Goldstein has argued that an unmediated "real" past 
is not a constituent in the kind of knowledge historians 
claim to arrive at. it in curious then that philosophers 
of history should eschew a concern with the nature of 
these knowledge claims, and show embarrassment in pointing 
out that they do not involve transcribing a sequence of 
events. The problem of historical knowledge in indeed a 
problem for the philosophy of history. When it is not, as 
it is not for Atkinson, one should look carefully at the 
conception of history held by the philosopher, and the 
presumption that talk about the referent of historical 
descriptions is automatically sceptical and hostile in 
tendency. Not only is a concern with historical knowledge 
= necessarily sceptical, it is integral to a consistent 
account of the flogic' of historical understanding. The 
distinction between analytical (licit) and speculative 
(illicit) philosophy of history in not a distinction 
between those philosophers who abstain, and those who do 
not, from asking questions about historical truth. 
Goldstein contends that history is 'a way of 
knowing, 169 which emerges from a particular lepistemic 
background'. 170 His account of the 'methods which define 
the discipline of history'171 and of the constitution of 
'the human pastI172 is extremely challenging and is, in 
many ways, resonant of Oakeshott's description of an 
historical past. Ultimately, however, it lacks the 
philosophical coherence of Oakeshott's position, and is 
undermined by what Walsh has identified as an attempt 'to 
combine an idealist theory of history with a realist 
theory of perception'. 
Goldstein argues that, in history, there is first a 
'way of knowing'173 and that the historical past is 
174 constituted in 'historical research'. That in to say, 
it is to the mediation of historical experience and the 
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'framework of investigation' 175 that we should attend if 
we want to understand the way in which historians arrive 
at knowledge of their object of study,, and validate their 
truth claims. Goldstein is concerned to define the 
historical past with the complete absence of any role for 
the 'real' past. The latter is an assumption which he 
calls a 'habit of mind'. 176 rirst and foremost then, he 
attempts to show that in the history which historians 
constitute there is no 'logical distinction between a 
description and its referent', that this is an 
epistemological point which entails that 'the real 
past ... does not seem to enter the work of historical 
investigation at any point'. 177 The importance of this 
claim (as we have seen on several occasions) is that it 
denies any implications to a correspondence theory of 
truth and focuses attention on the kind of truth and 
intelligibility to be had within historia rerun cestarum. 
So far so good. However, Goldstein fails to do anything 
with this assertion,, and instead, as one of his critics 
has pointed out,, seems to be satisfied with a 'correct 
account of historical methodology'. 178 Instead of 
attempting to come to terms with the implications of a 
'cultural' relativism implicit in his notion of the 
historical past, in which 'truth,, fact, and knowledge will 
lose their total independence and become relative, in part 
at least, to the conditions of particular cognitive 
situations'179 Goldstein attempts to replace the 
concreteness of an acquaintance with res gestAM with the 
stability of the historical disciplinel so much so, that 
its 'growing body of established truth'180 seems to be 
thought of as detached from a ceaseless process of 
question and answer, to become a bed-rock of truth, and a 
'reality# to correspond with. What we witness here is a 
similar anxiety to that which drove Oakeshott into the 
tangled linguistic circles of On History. The traditional 
referent of historical descriptions, roe gestae, in 
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exposed as illusory. The next step is to argue that the 
historian constructs not only 'the statements which refer' 
but also the objects to which they refer'. 181 Next comes 
the conclusion that history, understood as critical 
thought, will be synonymous with what historians write. 
Now in order to preserve history from degenerating into a 
mire of subjectivities, the discipline of history, it is 
argued, exhibits a particular kind of interest or 
approach; is characterised by a distinct way of knowing. 
This way, or mode, of knowing is actually implicit in the 
cognitive situation of the historian; it is a function of 
the media through which he knows, or experiences the past. 
Since this way of knowing is common to the pursuit of the 
historical past rather than the particular approach of an 
individual historian, we have arrived at a description of 
a stable relationship between enquirer and object. 
However Goldstein's position is less consistent than 
Oakeshott's. Oakeshott made his historical past a 
component in a broader "logic" of understanding. History, 
for him, is merely one way of making sense of present 
experience. On the other hand, Goldstein wants to make 
historical knowledge different in kind. The historical 
past, he argues, is distinct from perceptual knowledge of 
the present; our understanding of the past must be 
intellectual since we cannot observe past events: it is 
because they are not available for observation that past 
events raise problems that present occurrences do not. not 
because of anything that has to do with the nature of the 
past as such. 182 
In an article critical of Goldstein's constructionist 
approach, Nowell-Smith points out that we really 'cannot 
draw a sharp distinction between what is known by 
perceptual awareness and what is historically known. 183 
The reason why this is ao is that our knowledge of the 
present by no means always conforms to the paradigm of 
direct observation. It is by contrast with this paradigm 
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that Goldstein has concluded history employs a different 
kind of understanding. However what he fails to realise 
is that any difference in the kinds of understanding does 
not follow from our not being able to perceive past 
events. He has argued (in a way similar to a sceptic like 
Meiland)184 that history in necessarily mediated 
knowledge, but he then seems to accept that it is 
disadvantaged because it cannot perceive past events. 
Nowell-Smith writes, 'an historical construction, 
Goldstein sometimes seems to suggest is a kind of second- 
best, because direct observation of what happened is 
185 unfortunately not available'. 
Goldstein berates other philosophers for paying too 
much attention to the idea of narrative in history. He 
argues that such preoccupation focuses too much attention 
upon the Isuperstructure'186 of history - the finished 
literary product - while ignoring the all important 
'infrastructure' - how historians actually arrive at their 
conclusions. But this only indicates that he has 
identified the problem of narrative with its explanatory 
potential, and not in its broader 'story-line' form. 
Hence he pays little attention to the discursive nature of 
the historical past, to the way in which events might be 
linked together, or to the form in which historical 
"knowing" could be expressed. As Walsh, in a more 
favourable articlel8s, has pointed out, Goldstein over- 
concentrates on the establishment of facts; that is, on 
the corporate and consensual areas of agreed-upon-results. 
It is in the establishment of "what happened" in the past, 
by historians, that Goldstein invests so much faith. This 
achievement, he contends, demonstrates that the historical 
past is not to be understood as a range of different, 
incommensurable interpretations. Yet if we are to accept 
this argument seriously, we reach a point in which strings 
of accredited facts,, existing quite independently of the 
historian's construction, become themselves a "real" 
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referable past. Secure traces of the past replace past 
events as 'the only fitting objects worthy of historical 
attention'. 189 This, we will see when we turn to Munz's 
thesis, is a misunderstanding of the very nature of 
historian's subject matter. 
As Nowell-Smith has quite rightly pointed out, the 
'less extreme realist' need not be committed to a 
knowledge by direct observation paradigm, or believe only 
what is observable is reall. 190 Goldstein's use of this 
paradigm in its most extreme and inapplicable form, in 
order to establish that historical knowledge must be 
something different, something intellectual, is similar in 
intent to an idealist inversion of so-called scientific 
objectivity. Essentially it is a rhetorical fiction. But 
even then, Goldstein finds it difficult to shake off its 
supposed priority. It has been pointed out by Walsh and 
othersl9l that it is not the unobservability of past 
events that make them a special case. Could the 
historian, in any sense, observe a long-term development, 
or a complex large scale event, even had he been a witness 
to them? The notion of the time machine seems to haunt 
his historical past. The problem in further compounded by 
a false comparison of our knowledge of present objects 
with our knowledge of past events193: to what extent are 
all present events observable? 
One of the ways in which Goldstein might have avoided 
these difficulties is by contrasting the "real" with the 
"historical" past in terms of the kind of intelligibility 
sought for. This in basically the argument of Oakeshott 
of Mink, and of Munz. In Oakeshott's schema, an 
historical interest in objects understood as 'survivals, 
from the past is one way of understanding, of giving shape 
and form to the past. There is also a more pervasive, and 
compelling practical interest. In this sense, and bearing 
in mind Mink1s 'synoptic judgement'194 and Munz's 'shapes 
of time', we should conclude that the mediation which 
235 
Goldstein refers to as a condition of knowing, is not the 
distance between onquirer and his object - between 
historian and the 'real' past - but is better described in 
terms of the kind of interest in, and shape given to the 
object of enquiry. This, I believe is where Goldstein 
misses a more coherent 'constructionist' philosophy. 
There are too many occasions in his argument where one is 
led to believe that it is a peculiarity of the historian's 
position that he,, alone among enquirers, has somehow to 
piece together, to constitute the object of his enquiry. 
He does, at one point in an article, say that, had he the 
space, he would hope to show how all knowledge claims are 
'tied irrevocably to a way of knowing and the adequacy of 
our accounts are determined within a framework of 
knowing', and this even with respect to 'Presently 
195 presented objects'. Against though, we must emphasise 
that this 'framework of knowing' is not something that 
stands between us and our seeing things as they really 
are, but rather is something which allows us to see 
certain objects as evidence for past events, as opposed to 
a pile of stones (Danto's historically illiterate Sicilian 
peasant)196, or as a 'delphinium in my garden' (Nowell- 
Smith)197 or a brightly coloured wood. Goldstein, then, 
labours a false distinction between an unmediated, 
perceptual understanding and historical knowledge, when 
the truth of the matter is, not as Murphy argues, that 
what distinguishes history is 'that its statements refer 
to events and objects in the past'198, but that history 
signifies a particular (though not necessarily exclusive) 
interest, approach and organisation. To place the 
differentia of history back into the past is to contradict 
the whole purpose of suggesting that history should be 
understood as a present construction. 
Since Goldstein in so convinced of the utter 
disparity between historians' conclusions and the 
realist's acquaintance with present objects, he appears to 
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suggest that historians, in constituting the objects to 
which their statements refer,. are actually creating past 
events199; in this way the past is dragged into the 
present in an unseemly manner. In fact, as Walsh has 
pointed out, historians construct accounts of past 
events. 200 Once again, Goldstein's language seems to have 
been seduced by the imagery of a realism which he wants to 
reject. In this case it is an image of a historian 
constructing a three-dimensional object. The force of the 
constructionist argument is that the kind of object to 
which historical statements refer are other statements or 
narratives: object here is an object of knowledge. 
Nowell-Smith201 has illustrated the danger of suggesting 
that the historian actually creates past events, by 
arguing that the difficulties of resolving conflicting 
constructions will be multiplied considerably if what are 
being contrasted are not differing accounts but different 
events: how can an event be false? The problem of 
incommensurability reappears when Goldstein conflates the 
ontological non-existence of past events with the role of 
the historian in constituting historical knowledge. Such 
confusion is manifested in the following statement: 
'history isn't interested in the past as suc but in the 
constitution of past human events'. 202 Given the rest of 
his thesis, what possible form could an interest in the 
past as such - in an unnediated past reality - take203 
It is in the attempt to replace the permanence of the 
"real, @ past with the stability of an historical 
construction resting on "established facts" that 
Goldstein's argument is so unsatisfactory. An a 
description (with detailed historiographical examples204 ) 
of the actual process of construction it is most 
illuminating, and is not, I suggest, challenged by 
McCullagh's %7ustifying Historical DescriRtions2O5 which 
forges a distinction between the 'truth conditions' of 
historical statements (past realities), and their 
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'Justification conditions' (reasons for thinking them to 
be true). 206 Such a distinction, though conceptually 
desirable, is not loperative, 207 within historical enquiry 
(as Goldstein has clearly illustrated),, and nor is it a 
useful way of describing any process of validation. 
Goldstein should also be defended from aspects of Nowell- 
Smith's article which rely on a rather bland realist 
approach: 'what happened happened whether or not anyone 
found out that it happened'. 208 And we certainly need not 
agree with his conclusion that two 'incompatible accounts, 
of the origins of the 2nd World War 'cannot both be 
correctl209, unless we are to understand by 'correct' a 
standard more absolute and definitive than we have 
considered applicable to the idea of truth in history. 
Ultimately, though, Goldstein's position suffers from many 
of the same structural weaknesses to be found in the 
idealist approaches of Collingwood and Oakeshott. 
Moreover he lacks a broader constructionist philosophy. 
His faith in the discipline of history rebuts charges of 
scepticism, but in the and, it cannot bear the weight of 
his argument. 
With MunzIs arguments in (The Shapes of Tiat)210 we 
return to an explicitly idealist understanding of history. 
But his idealism is of a "secular" kind, that is to say, 
it has confronted the relative nature of historical truth 
and seeks a coherent approach by attending to 'portraits 
211 of the past$. Historical knowledge in the tracing of 
the 'appearances' of the past as they are recorded in 
documents and historical narratives, and there in no 'dark 
corej212 of truth beyond this phenomenology. There is no 
need to pronounce history an arbitrary arrest of 
experience because there is no Absolute lying behind 
appearances. For Munz it is the connections between 
events which characterise historical understanding. The 
way that events which characterise historical 
understanding. The way that events are seen or held 
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together is the outcome of thought. But this thought is 
not sanctioned by categories of "knowing", and knowledge 
is not the outcome of modal divisions within perception of 
judgement. Historical knowledge is beat described as 
configurational, that is, dependent upon the shape we give 
to appearances. 213 The appearances of the past (as they 
appear in records or narratives (are, in history 
configured in the form of a story. It is to the media of 
this transformation, to the way in which time is shaped in 
history, that we ought to look in harder to understand the 
peculiarities of historia rerum gestarum. 
There is much of interest in Munz's position - the 
return of an idealist philosophy of history to Hege, 214; 
the existence of abstract and concrete universals in 
thought215; the use of "covering laws" in the construction 
of a narrative216; the collapse of distinction between 
(speculative) philosophy of history and the narratives of 
historians. 217 However,, I want to confine our attention 
to two important ideas. The first involves the extension 
of 'constructionism' to the so-called raw materials or 
"sources" of history. And the second, the notion of truth 
which follows from a broader understanding of historical 
construction. 
All events, Munz argues, are constructions. This is 
an idea we have met several times before. However, Munz 
means something more radical than an emphasis on the 
presentist, inferential argument from evidence. What he 
means is that all events are dependent on the thought of 
an observer. The thought in question he calls a 'mini- 
narrativel. 218 By mini-narrative Munz means the way in 
which different occurrences, - the sub-events -, are 
joined together by the thought of an observer (or an 
agent) into an event or sequence of events; the resulting 
record will contain an account of how things appeared to 
the observer. This, it is argued, is a basic condition of 
historians' Isources, 219, and it is also why history in 
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properly described as the history of thought. Thus 
history understood as a construction ref era not only to 
the activity of an historian but to the way in which 'time 
is transformed into history by consciousness'. 220 That is 
to say, that the direction of historical understanding is 
not in the ef fort to pierce thought he thought contained 
in evidence to the actual action or event itself (as it is 
for Collingwood) , rather it is to see the event recorded 
in evidence as alreadv a construction the outcome of 
thought which has linked two or more happenings together. 
The task of historical understanding is therefore the 
attempt to follow the way an agent or observer produced a 
mini-narrative. In all cases we are dealing with 
somebody's record, hence somebody's thought or 
construction; 'without an observer, there would be no 
conf iguration known as Alexander the Great, let alone a 
story of his campaigns and their relationship to the rise 
221 of Hellenic Civilisation's 
Applied to Goldstein's position this thought might 
suggest that his idea of historical constitution is 
inadequate because it limits itself to the construction of 
the historian without coming to terms with the nature of 
his subject matter. in doing so he raises all sorts of 
anxieties about the absence of a "real" past, the 
unobservability of past events, and the mediation of 
evidence. Munzes argument is altogether more incisive. 
History he argues, is 'not what happened but what people 
think happened, 222; it is therefore the study of 'somebody 
else's historia rerum gestarum'. 223 Though Goldstein is 
quite right to argue that, in the process of enquiry, the 
historian can make no use of a notion of how things really 
were, according to Munz this is not specifically a feature 
of the historical past. It is a condition of 
configuration in general. In other words Goldstein has 
only gone half way towards banishing the idea of the real 
past from history. The second half is provided by Munz in 
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exposing the illusion of there being any stage in an 
historical enquiry when one is dealing with a 
transcription of a temporal sequence. The "real" past, as 
something from which the historian is distanced by time, 
by the dust and corrosion of documents, by the partiality 
of his record, is not only inoperative but vast rhetorical 
fiction. A past of events existing independently of 
historical interest, or an observer's thoughts has no 
implications for the study of history because it never had 
any implications. How things really were is a notion 
subsumed by how they appeared in the thought of an 
observer, an actor, a chronicler, or an historian. It is 
'not just our knowledge of the event that depends on 
record, the existence of the event itself depends on 
somebody's record of itj224, and such record will be only 
one of the 'infinitely possible appearances of M 
gestae;. 225 
Each event (Munzls favourite being Caesar's crossing 
the Rubicon) may be broken down into an infinite number of 
smaller events, or sub-events which might be reassembled 
to form a different record. 226 This merely illustrates 
that history 'is not the totality of events, but what 
people thought happenedl227, and that it is these thoughts 
which constitute events contained in record. It is not 
'time or nature' which makes events hang together in 
history, but the consciousness of an observer and then the 
narrative organisations of historians. 228 There is no 
history without configuration because res gestae exist as 
a multitude of different possible appearances, of 
different historia rerum gestarum. A past event is 
already the outcome of thought. 229 
If Munz is correct, and I believe he is, the 
constructionist must abandon not only the notion of a 
real, correspondent past, but also the idea of a uniform 
sequence of events authenticated in the historical past. 
Munz, making a similar point to Oakeshott,, argues that 
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there is nothing solid or permanent about the past of 
historia rerum gesta I nothing which exists 
'independently so that one can study and probel. 230 All 
historical narratives, no matter how densely packed with 
events, how authoritative or backed by consensus are, in 
the end, a narrative of the appearances of res aestae, and 
therefore time given a particular shape. Goldstein's 
mistake is to make an absolute distinction between an 
'observed' past and the historical past of historians, to 
grade a correspondence with a hard and fast sequence of 
events in terms of distance from their occasion. What 
Munz has so clearly pointed out is that, once having 
embarked on a constructionist critique of historical 
knowledge, we cannot stop short of recognising that in all 
cases we are dealing with appearances or 
Isubjectivities, 231 which are, as we shall see, 
interchangeable. Any attempt to ground history upon a 
bed-rock of established certainties whether these be 
"facts" or controls of the discipline fails to be fully 
consistent, since there is 'no truth over and above the 
truths of how people appear to themselves and others and 
this is where the matter must rest'. 232 This should not, 
however, be confused with a form of historical scepticism. 
It is events which are the constructs of thought and the 
shapes in which they are configures. No doubts are being 
cast on the actual occurrence of the constituent actions 
or sub-events, on the veracity of records or on the 
reality of appearances. It is Munz's central contention 
that in history we are dealing with thoughts, because 
without thoughts there is nothing that we could recognise 
as an event. A past of events existing independently of 
thought and record has not, nor ever had, any substantive 
form. 
At this point it is possible to rephrase an objection 
to Elton's idea of a dead and gone "objective" past. not 
only does our knowledge of past events depend on present 
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interests, standards of rationality and value judgements, 
the events themselves exist as the result of their being 
constructed in record or narratives. We can also address 
a point made by Danto, that 'to count as evidence is 
already to be making a statement about something else, 
namely that for which it is taken as evidence'. 233 
Following Munz, we can see that the something also is the 
I mini -narrative I of the record, the linking together of 
events, and thus the thought of an observer or agent. But 
Danto means something rather different: 'we could not see 
what we see as history-as-record without implicit 
reference to history-as-actualityl. However 'history-as- 
actualityo234 is, according to Munz, the appearances of 
res gestae in record and thus already historia reru 
. Ustarum. Danto goes on 
to say that if we want to f ind 
out whether a certain account of the past is correct we 
must make 'an historical observation' and 'check the 
records'. 235 Yet since these records are not to be seen 
as a transcript of res gestae but somebody's narrative 
understanding of them, the reference here is that of a 
portrait to a portrait,, not of a portrait to external 
reality. This is precisely the sense of accuracy that 
Munz has in mind: the 'coherence between sources and 
narratives and between narratives and narrativest. 236 The 
historical narrative can, he argues, be 'tested and 
checked by reference to other narrativeso237, though this 
will, of necessity lead to an 'infinite regress'. 238 This 
idea of the coherence of portraits, and of a regress of 
narrative comparisons which cannot be short-circuited by 
the imposition of a 'way of knowing' or a 'mode of 
experiencel, is a fascinating extension of the idealist 
position of Oakeshott and the historical constitution of 
Goldstein. 
I want, in conclusion, to look at the notion of truth 
which fits MunzIs phenomenology of the past. When he 
talks of the historian selecting from record, from 
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'somebody else's historia rerum ciestaru l239 he in making 
an epistemological point; #it is conf iguration not 
existence which depends on perception'. 240 He is also 
arguing for the importance of a history of historiography. 
It is by attending to portraits of events as they are "in- 
figured" in historical narratives that we fully realise 
the character of a study which shapes and organises rather 
than mimics or transcribes. The distinction between 
detection of "facts" and composition of a narrative cannot 
be sustained. 241 Only by clinging onto a belief that the 
"sources" provide us with a mirror-image of past events 
can history be described as detection; only by forgetting 
that the so called raw-materials are themselves artifacts, 
mini-narratives, and constructionsi can classification and 
editing of evidence (the data) be made the goal of 
historical research. This tendency Munz describes as 
'documentary positivismi. 242 The documentary positivist 
overlooks 'the precariousness of the distinction between 
243 primary and secondary sources'. Conscious of 
maintaining standards of professionalism and objectivity, 
he infers that the historian's subjective understanding 
intrudes on, and obscures, the pristine truth of records 
once they become Idigested'. 244 Editing becomes as and in 
itself. Munz deplores this conception: it is not the 
"sources'$ which form the primary unit of historical 
intelligibility - the data of history. The 'real raw 
material of history is thought... the thought that goes in 
245 the composition of the mini-narratives'. Since, as 
Collingwood argued, evidence may be understood an 
embodying these thoughts, we have ample reason to respect 
the labour which goes into its preservation and 
clarification, but not because these efforts keep the dust 
from collecting on the source of our knowledge of an 
independent past of events. Emphasis on the stability and 
concreteness of historical evidence is perhaps indicative 
of specialisation, but it may also reveal a mistaken 
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attempt to ground historical truth on taxonomies and the 
tangible actuality of record; what Collingwood referred to 
as a scissors-and-paste mentality, and what Munz 
castigates as a Ph. D. criterion of what makes a good 
historian. The elevation of the idea that the successful 
'Ph. D. candidate is... a qualified historian' is, 
according to Munz, symptomatic of "narrow and stultifying 
methods" and an ignorance of the media of historical 
enquiry through which the historical past is constructed. 
The Ph. D. candidate is 'nothing but a detective inspector 
and should seek employment at the local police 
station'. 246 
Evidence contains not a record of what happened but 
what people think happened, and therefore the problem of 
truth in history is 'not the problem of whether a 
particular event occurred or not, but whether somebody 
thought that it occurred'. 247 Historical debates, then, 
are concerned with the appearances of past events as they 
are recorded in thought,, with the phenomenology of rjk& 
gestae. if this is so, and if history is the following of 
the way in which events are joined together by thought, 
and their use as constituents in historian's narrative or 
story, then 'discussions of historical truth are 
discussions about different ways of writing history'. 248 
Munz distinguishes between the explanation and 
interpretation of thoughts in terms of the 'general 
laws, 249 employed. For our purposes we may substitute 
"process of reasoning" for general laws since Munz intends 
by the latter, the way in which single events (or 
subevents) are linked together by a (general) thought. In 
addition his general laws are not to be equated with the 
exact, statistical and explanatory laws that the covering- 
law theorist has in mind; for Munz they refer to a host of 
"acceptable" generalisations borrowed at will from a 
variety of contexts. The important point is that they 
should be general in the sense that they are capable of 
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providing a link between at least two separate 
occurrences. In attempting to understand a past action - 
Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon25O _ if the historian can 
follow, and f ind intelligible,, the reasoning used by the 
people he is studying (Caesar 'wanted to qain power in 
Romel)251 then he is giving an 'explanation propere. 252 
On the other hand, if he makes use of reasons which, for 
him, are well grounded, but could not possibly have been 
available to those he is talking about, (Caesar wanted to 
assure the ascendancy of his clasS253) then he is offering 
an I interpretation'. 254 An explanation proper should be 
the initial aim of the historian, 'to explain the past as 
it explained itself to itselfl. 255 Yet the explanatory 
force of these reasons or generalisations depends, in the 
end, on whether or not they are considered to be true, and 
'since standards of what is believed to be true vary, 
substitutions are necessary and inevitable'. 256 By 
substitutions Munz means the replacing of 'explanations 
proper' with interpretations. These substitutions can be 
arbitrary,, such as the replacement of 'an explanation in 
terms of a passion for religious dogma' with an 
'interpretation in terms of the class struggle'. 257 On 
the other hand they may be 'typologically related' to 
explanations proper, in which case they are 
258 'translational. A translation may occur when we 
replace the explicit assertion of an intention or a 
rationale with a generalisation available at that time or 
potentially intelligible to the thought of that time; 
Caesar, in crossing the Rubicon 'wanted to protect himself 
from his enemies in Rome'. 259 This interpretation would 
have been intelligible to Caesar or to an observer whether 
it was part of the explanation proper - in this case the 
assertions in Caesar's memoirs. A substitution, or pure 
interpretation might be, Caesar crossed the Rubicon 
because, unconsciously 'he wanted to ravish his 
Mother'. 260 The important point is, however uncomfortable 
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this idea may be, that if we did not constantly substitute 
interpretations for explanations, we would deprive 
ourselves of the opportunity of fered by our better common 
knowledge to expose many ancient explanations as 
illusions. 261 Munz goes on to illustrate this point with 
a range of examples from historiography and it is 
difficult, even conscious of Elton's demand for humility, 
to deny that he accurately captures the way in which 
historical conclusions are overturned and replaced. 
Standards of rationality change,, and the idea that the 
past should be respected in and for itself, or that 
utterances must be understood in context, are themselves 
recent linterpretations'. 262 
The next step in Munz's argument is to link 
explanations proper with the idea of objectivity and 
interpretations with subjectivity. This, he recognises, 
differs from a more traditional use of the two terms. 
However, since both an explanation proper and an 
interpretation may be objective in the sense of free from 
bias or distortion, Munz's intention is to secure a 
distinction between explanation and interpretation that 
rests on the interests of an enquirer and not on "truth" 
and "falsehood". The "objective explanation" belongs to 
what actually happened in the sense that the reasoning of 
the actor or observer, as recorded in a 'mini-narrative, 
are a constituent of the event. 263 The "subjective 
interpretation" belongs to the knowledge the historian 
brings to the enquiry. 264 But, we must remind ourselves, 
in all cases we are dealing with appearances and with 
thoughts, and so the explanations of Caesar, though a part 
of what actually happened, are no more a mirror to rIM 
gestae - what really happened independent of what anyone 
thought - than are the historian enjoying the full 
benefits of hindsight. In the end we must recognise that 
there is #no final truth in any of them'. 265 
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If we conf ine ourselves to explanations proper 
and to extrapolations from explanations proper 
we would be at the mercy of what people thought 
of themselves. It is therefore necessary that 
we should allow interpretations of this 
kind... (i. e. subjective)... are objective 
interpretations because we have confidence in 
the validity of the knowledge on which they are 
based. We must therefore accept the possibility 
that some interpretations, though subjective, 
are really more objective than objective 
explanations. If we did not accept this 
possibility, we s4ould make nonsense of the 
notion of delusion. 1,6S- 
In Collingwood's version, the rethinking of past thoughts 
seems to mean that we are stuck with the rational isat ions 
of a past agent, with the way they explained themselves to 
t hemselves and to others. But this,, according to Munz, 
gets us no further than the positivist who would have to 
end his investigations with the "explanations" of the 
people he is studying, and thus with the 'discovery of 
267 what went on I. This restricts us to I less knowledge 
than we might havel. 268 It is knowledge of what 'actually 
happened', to, for example, how 'people understood 
themselves in the 12th century'. 269 If we limit ourselves 
to this kind of understanding, even with the added 
dimensions of 'typologically related interpretations$ we 
are, Munz asserts,, indulging in a 'foolish act of self- 
mutilation'. 270 Rankes demand that historians must go out 
and find out what @actually happened and all other forms 
of positivism become self defeating'. 271 If the historian 
wants to find out what really happened: we cannot 
necessarily be satisfied with the explanations that Caesar 
would have offered, because we have every right to presume 
that he was ignorant or capable of delusions or dishonest. 
If we want to find out what really happened, we might have 
to brush his own explanations aside and substitute an 
interpretation ... Such interpretations tell us what really 
happened as contrasted to what Caesar thought or wanted to 
think happened. But by no stretch of the imagination can 
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we claim that any of these interpretations are part of 
what actually happened. They are part of what is 
happening today in the minds of modern historians. 272 
What really happened will, in the end, be reducible to the 
kind of intelligibility we can find,, along the lines of 
our criteria of rationality. 
Returning to Skinner's exigetical mythologies, it is 
possible to see that the anachronistic tendencies which he 
exposes are an illicit imposition of what the historian of 
ideas believes to have really been the case onto what 
actually was. The charge, essentially, is that a 
commentator who does this is lacking in self- 
consciousness. To describe John Locke as an apologist for 
the American Revolution makes perfect sense to the modern 
student of political theory. The historian, Munz argues, 
along with Walsh, Dray and Danto, is able to construct a 
coherent narrative containing such an assertion because he 
knows, as Locke did not,, of a sequence of events called 
the American Revolution future to the event in question - 
Locke's political theory. What the historian in doing 
here, according to Munz, is substituting an interpretation 
for an explanation proper. It is an interpretation 
because it contains reasons which could not possibly have 
been available to Locke in understanding the impact of his 
political ideas. In this sense it is an idea in the mind 
of the historian, that is, not part of what actually 
happened. If the historian forgets where this idea comes 
from, and speaks as if Locke has overlooked something of 
importance in apprehending the significance of his 
contribution, or failed to clarify aspects of the division 
of governmental power, and so made the constitutional 
deliberations of the Founding Fathers more tortuous, he is 
committing an indefensible anachronism. 273 
Skinner himself, in his programme of 
contextualisation, engages in "explanations proper" by 
attempting to understand the author an the author 
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understood himself. He also goes in for "translations": 
investigating the kind of rhetorical strategies and 
linguistic opportunities available within the particular 
context in which an author was writing. However he 
considers interpretations (in Kunz's sense) eicternal to an 
understanding of an author's thoughts, as it involves the 
attribution of significance with hindsight. Skinner's 
argument is admirably lucid in its efforts to make clear 
who is saying what, when,, and to whom; the latter-day 
critic is getting it all upside down when he first decides 
what his theorist really I ineant I to say and the 
significance of his message for later times, and then 
tries to indite him for his inconsistencies and lack of 
foresight. However as soon as it is admitted that in 
order to find the author's thoughts, expressed in a text, 
intelligible, we may have to "translate" and suggest 
alternative strategies or meanings to those articulated in 
the "explanation proper" (the text), we are in a realm of 
substitutions, of appearances, and of subjectivities. 
Indeed, though we may share Skinner's concern for a self- 
consciousness of anachronistic tendencies, it is 
nonetheless apparent that there is not an Absolute 
difference in kind between the thoughts of an author and 
our thoughts in understanding them, in the sense that the 
former exist in a timeless and self-explanatory state 
while the latter must always alter# and perhaps disfigure, 
that pristine condition. "We can" Kunz concedes, 'always 
find out what actually happened by simply contenting 
ourselves with explanations and by accepting the events in 
such concatenations and constellations, and sequences as 
they appeared to people who acted in them, or who first 
274 reflected on them,, or who first observed themt. 
However to find out what really happened we may have to 
introduce other reasons acceptable to 2= sense of 
intelligibility. 
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Kunz's argument is about the direction of historical 
understanding and the status of historia rerun gestarum. 
It is not an apology for dismissing the reasoning of past 
agents as instances of a false consciousness. Far f rom 
it. It is, however, critical of any attempt to found and 
Justify historia rerum gesta it its respect for the 
'authentic' voice of the past which it can detect in its 
"sources". 
The real reason for ... respect is that the 
sources are not really primary but enshrine 
thought. And since we have no absolute standard 
as to what would be 'correct$ thought about any 
event, the thought that was thought by the 
person iyfjved is second beat to an absolute 
standard. 
Munz's distinction between what actually and what 
really happened is a master stroke. It accurately 
characterises the shifting conclusions of historiography 
without making the actuality of past actions depend for 
their existence on the narrative creations of historians. 
What really happened becomes relative to cognitive 
conditions. But,, in order to avoid affronting realist 
sentiments, Munz emphasises that it is historical thought 
which is constructed and which is relative. Nonetheless, 
what actually happened corresponds to the way things 
appeared to an observer and so we cannot contrast the 
interpretations of historians unfavourably with a 'dark 
and permanent core'. 277 In all cases we are dealing with 
appearances and therefore we should 'seek equivalences and 
interchangeabilities'. 278 The distinction between 
objectivity and subjectivity is made so that we are aware 
of the different status of explanations and 
interpretations, but it is not a distinction between truth 
and falsity. At the same time Munz's thesis does not 
condone the study of the past for all sorts of altruistic 
Purposes, least of all for the "lessons" it might teach. 
It goes to great lengths in define its "dumbness", and if 
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one wanted to glean advice f rom its multiple appearances 
one would,, at the very least, have to be a considerable 
polyglot. Furthermore though 'substitutions' may be 
inevitable this is not because modern interpretations are 
grounded in a more objectively "true" reality. The 
material criterion of the Marxist is not more objective 
than a mental criterion (i. e. the testimony of those under 
study) , in fact it is the I substitution of one kind of 
thought', the thought that income is relevant as a 
criterion of classification, 'for another kind of 
thought'. 279 The different narratives of what reallv 
happened should not be thought of as evolving towards a 
completely accurate portrait. There in no such final 
point even though the weight of consensus at any one time 
might suggest that what really happened in identical to 
what actually occurred. 
The history of historiography will provide us with an 
interesting index of changing criteria of intelligibility 
and standards of truth. 280 It provides a phenomenology of 
the past; the way in which events are constructed, joined 
together, and configured by thought. 
Difficulties remain with aspects of Munz's thesis. 
In particular it could be asked how sustainable is his 
faith in the extraction of 'general laws' and Imini- 
narrativest from evidence. To argue that the real problem 
of hermeneutics is 'which substitutions are licit, 
desirable, and helpful and which are not' seems to assume 
that there is no problem in determining the meaning, 
significance, or configurative thought contained in 
"sources". We must first infer the way things appeared in 
record before we can begin substituting interpretations. 
The significance of Munz's contribution to an idealist 
understanding of history is his extension of the idea of 
construction to an historical event. In this way he 
overcomes Collingwood's demand for identification of the 
historian's thought with that of the past agent in re- 
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enactment; breaks out of the closed homeostatic system of 
Oakeshott's historical past; and exposes as illusory the 
anxieties occasioned by the absence of an observable 
object or direct transcription. 
V) Philosophy and History 
"What a philosopher says about the philosophy of 
history is ... shaped by what he believes to be the nature oS, lphilosophy and philosophizing" (Haskell Fain) 
The concern of this thesis has been with the analysis 
of history offered by certain philosophers and 
theoretically-minded historians. As such it has been an 
exercise in mapping out border land, and we have seen that 
territorial boundaries are difficult to draw and often 
contested. Where, for example, does an "agnostic" 
interest (taken by Skagestaad as illustrative of the 
analytical approach)282 in elucidating the form of 
historical explanations becomes a "critical" concern with 
the status of historians' explanations as valid knowledge? 
Does a deductivist definition of explanation proper imply 
prescriptions to historical practice, while the non- 
deductivist provides a rationale for the explanatory 
"sketches" he finds in historiography? Does the latter 
imply $the assumption ... that historians are doing their 
job the way it should be donel? 283 It is also border land 
for quite another reason. The distinction between 
analytical and speculative philosophy of history, between 
a philosophical interest in the "course" of history r&j 
gestae and a "properly" historical interest, and between 
philosophy and history - in general between an 
"appropriate,, and an "inappropriate" interest in the past 
- is itself under threat. In this final section I want to 
look at the possibility of a break-down of these 
distinctions. As we move f rom logical interest in the 
form of historical explanations to questions about the 
nature of historical knowledge we are not merely tracing 
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different priorities: the ideal of what is under study is 
also changing. The attempt to isolate an analytical 
philosophy of history from the working practices of 
historians is rather disingenuous. We may of course allow 
for the existence of different interests,, so that the 
analytical philosopher can intrigue himself with logical 
intricacies over which the historian loses no sleep. 
Nonetheless, as Fain has pointed out, it in hard to see 
how anyone could wish to contribute (as Danto aspires to) 
'in a significant way to the analysis of historical 
thought and language' without hoping to make 'history as 
it happened more intelligible 1.284 Since 'history as it 
happened' is closely related to the activity of 
historians', an intention to contribute to the 
clarification of concepts employed in historiography seems 
difficult to deny. indeed philosophers who have sought to 
establish, whether for theoretical or diplomatic reasons, 
that analytical philosophy of history is unrelated to 
historia rerum crestarum, are going a stage further than 
was intended by Walsh in forging his critical/speculative 
distinction. The distinction of 1951 may be seen as an 
effort to delineate a range of 'respectable' philosophical 
questions provoked by the study of history. 285 Far from 
intending a clear distinction between the two, Walsh, 
following Collingwood, maintained that it was an important 
task of philosophy to reckon with the "critical" study of 
history. The implicit concern was to separate off a 
"proper" philosophical interest in the practice of 
historians from the speculative system-mongering of 
individual philosopher-historians, which, it was thought, 
tarnished theoretical approaches. Yet, however 
unsatisfactory any absolute division between a speculative 
and critical division may be 2861 it is not Walsh's 
argument that the philosopher should retire to a safe 
distance. In fact,, as Mink has noted,, 'Walsh 
intentionally or inadvertently forged an exclusive 
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alliance between the critical philosopher of history and 
the "working historiante. 287 The legitimacy of the 
philosophy of history was to be recoqnised in this 
alliance. The terms of the alliance does not prevent the 
philosopher from examining the nature of the historian's 
activity nor his relationship with his object of study. 
Dray may be instanced. as an example of an approach to 
history which concludes that, beyond the logical and 
semantic analyses of explanations, there must be a 
recognition that history is concerned with human actions, 
and therefore has a moral dimension. This moral 
dimension, characterised by the attribution of meaning and 
significance to past actions, may be explored and 
clarified, it should not be ignored. Dray's rebuttal of a 
deductivist covering-law approach not merely contributes 
to a debate over appropriate explanatory models; it is an 
assertion of the ingredient role of values in historia 
rerum gestarum. Past events are, from a humanistic 
perspective, to be seen as testimony to human willing, 
whether or not it is frustrated. It is perhaps a little 
ironic that the emphasis in the philosophy of history over 
the last four decades has been on explanatory analysis (in 
which Dray's contribution has been so central). This 
preoccupation has inhibited much analytical philosophy of 
history from examining more closely its relationship with 
its object of study and the implications of its own 
judgements. 
There is in any particular philosophical approach, a 
sense of what constitutes historical experience, that is 
to say, as to what is the basic unit of historical 
intelligibility, and as to the contents of the historians' 
"archive". If the constituents are thought of an the 
bricks -and-mortar of established facts, then the problem 
of establishing causal connections becomes central, and 
the imposition of explanatory models upon a fixed body of 
knowledge is unproblematic. This is the vision of the 
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deductivist. An intermediate position is arrived at by 
those philosophers who have seen that the 'world' of 
historical experience is not something given, but 
something won, and have attempted to understand it from 
the standpoint of the historian. For the most part they 
emphasise that historical experience is constituted by 
human actions,, and that it is therefore the real= of 
judgements, decisions, and values, and that any account of 
the efficiency of historians' explanations should not 
overlook the direction of an interest which seeks the 
significance and meaning of particular actions. A third 
and final position concentrates on the 'historical work' 
and envisages it as 'what it most manifestly is.... a 
verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose 
discourse that purports to be a model or icon, of past 
structures and processes. 00 10 
288 Its leading idea is the 
idea of the narrative and story-line; a sense that what 
distinguishes history is its discursive form. In order to 
differentiate this view from a traditional analytical 
approach we might refer to it as "narrative philosophy of 
history". 289 A concern with the kinds of problems 
associated with the construction of narratives. History, 
in this third sense, is understood not as compilation, 
classification, or establishment of facts, but as a way of 
organising (employing organisational concepts such as the 
Enlightenment, the Age of Reform, or the Progressive era) 
and giving prominence to the idea of selection, of 
representation, and of the story. 
The idea of a narrative philosophy of history helps 
us to clarify a particular philosophical approach to 
history. History, from a narrative perspective, in 
understood as a kind of treatment and not a particular 
quality of substance, and questions asked concern its mods 
of representation. This interest in history as 
"discourse" does not inevitably arise out of a 
constructionist approach. Goldstein settle& for a view of 
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history which sees it discovering what happened in the 
past (the steady growth of established matters-of-fact), 
albeit that this is achieved within the confines of an 
historical past. His interest in the media of enquiry is 
with the mechanism by which a description of evidence 
comes to take its place as an accredited aspect of our 
historical knowledge. There is some truth in Faints 
description of a 'foolish theory' that 'proposes to 
substitute the traces of past events for the events 
themselves as the only fitting objected worthy of 
historical attention, 290 when we apply it to a 
constructionism which is wadded to a paradigm of knowledge 
by direct- inspection, and so attempts to compensate for 
the second-hand, indirect condition of historical 
knowledge. However, as we saw in the last section, there 
is another version of constructionism which examines the 
idea that the past comes to us in a manner already 
constituted, and that, therefore, an historian's narrative 
organisation is merely an extension of his "sources". The 
narrative organisation of materials - the 'narrative units 
of references291 are viewed not as appendages to an 
enquiry but testimony to the discursive and ifictive@292 
nature of historical thought. 
Narrative philosophy of history departs from the 
concerns of Gallie, Danto, Morton White, and others, with 
a narrative understanding or the explanatory potential of 
singular statements. The most significant difference is 
that, whereas the Inarrationists' see narrative as a 
leading ingredient in historiography, the narrative 
philosopher of history argues that history is an instance 
of narrative organisation. It is not merely that the 
employment of narrative sequences is one of the rhetorical 
strategies open to the historian in expressing his 
findings, the idea of narrative construction captures the 
entire direction of historical understanding, from the 
treatment of record as somebody's thought, to the 
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lemplotting' of a 'story by including some events and 
excluding others, by stressing some and subordinating 
others... It 293 to our interest in the way history 
represents. in other vords, a narrative philosophy of 
history is defined, not merely by an array of questions, 
nor even by a preoccupation with the media of organisation 
and expression, but by a comprehensive vision of 
historical experience. It in this vision which challenges 
the jdjA of history that allows for a rigid division 
between an analytical and speculative approach. 
The analytic/speculative distinction has been 
attacked in three different, but related arguments. The 
first is put forward by Haskell Fainj who has attempted to 
redefine a $speculative' interest in order to limit its 
association with a damaging 'futurology', while also point 
out that an interest in the "significance"294 of the past 
cannot be used to Icharacterise the difference between 
philosopher and historian'. 295 The Second is Peter Munz's 
contention that the difference between 'ordinary' history 
and speculative philosophy of history is a difference of 
'degrees of scale'. 296 Thirdly, Hayden White has argued 
that all history involves a 'fiction-making oporation"297 
because it seeks the intelligibility of stories, and 
stories are as much invented as found. 
In his Between PhilOSORhy and HistorV298 (with its 
significant subtitle, The Resurrection Of SROculative 
Philosonhy of History within the Analytic Traditio ) rain 
expresses his intention to 'shatter' a 'stereo-type' which 
holds that there is a 'sharp distinction between 
analytical (reputable) philosophy of history and 
speculative (disreputable) philosophy of history'. 299 He 
fttteMPts to do this by redefining the interests of 
speculative philosophers Of histo3ry. In his now 
definition a ispeculative@300 interest is precisely what I 
have referred to as narrative philosophy of history, that 
is to say, an interest in the 'problems associated with 
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the task of constructing historical narratives'. 301 By 
this appropriation of 'speculative' Fain in not condoning 
the kind of futurist speculation that accompanies Marx's 
dialectical materialism or Spengler's cycle of 
civilizations, and he recoqnises the fore* of Danto's 
criticisms of those historian-philosophers who judge 
events apocalyptically by reading 'into history the 
message of events which lie in the future, events they are 
unjustifiably convinced must inevitably occur, 302t though 
he also argues that not all speculative philosophers are 
Ifuturistic, 303, Hegel amongst them. Fain's principal 
objection is of the use made of the analytical/speculative 
distinction by certain philosophers in order to avoid 
confronting the idea that history is a narrative 
construction, and to defend their analysis of 'ordinary 
historians concerned with the details of the past'. 304 
The distinction, he argues, far from being rigid, is 
l305 secured only be resort to 'metaphor Walsh's 
characterisation of an illicit philosophical concern with 
the course of history as a whole, 'i. e. with the 
significance of the whole historical processl306, rests on 
its interest in 'the significance of history'. 307 But 
this cannot, Fain argues, be made to sustain the 
distinction because the 'problem of significance, is faced 
whenever a historian constructs any history, 308; Walsh has 
admitted as much in his analysis of objectivity and in the 
formulation of his idea of colligation. A colligatory 
concept seems to approximate very closely to what Fain has 
in mind when he talks of an author's 'particular narrative 
units of reference'. 309 These units, or 'key conceptse310 
have a narrative function, 'they serve an principal 
elements in the organisation of a historian's story- 
line'. 311 
What Fain is arguing for is a recognition of the 
ubiquity of 'narrative organisations'. 312 "Ordinary" 
historians and "speculative" philosophers alike employ 
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organisational concepts, and the difference between the 
two should not be sought for in whether their concepts 
are, or are not, located in the "actual course of events". 
Given this conclusion we should seek to eliminate both an 
analytical complacency in historians' knowledge of 
'details of the past', and a speculative projection into 
the future by acknowledging the legitimacy of 
'philosophical history'. 313 By philosophical history Fain 
means 'self-conscious history'; that in to may, history 
which is conscious of the invention of its 'narrative 
units of reference',, and 'its narrative organisation of 
historical materials', and is 'at pains to justifyt314 
them. 
I want to turn to Munz for further clarification and 
for a way of 1moving beyond Fain's semantic reversals. The 
thrust of MunzIs argument is that once we have become 
'more sceptical about ordinary history, 315, recognising it 
to be not a transcript of a sequence of events, then the 
difference between it and speculative philosophy of 
history (or as Munz refers to it, simply 'philosophy of 
historyj316) resolves itself into a matter of degree. 
Armed with MunzIs analysis of historical construction, we 
can see that any attempt to isolate an illicit approach to 
the past, res gestae, either in terms of scale, or because 
it is said to falsify the reality of events, will not bear 
scrutiny. all events,, he argues, from the smallest 
'Napoleon brushed his teeth at a certain moment in time' 
to the largest - @the Roman Empire declined from the 3rd 
century A. D. onwards, 317 - are composed of sub-events with 
the help of thoughts. There is no actual course of *vents 
which a philosopher of history might be said to have 
misrepresented or distorted. MunzIs radical argument in 
that single 'the "events" themselves are constructs and 
*0 -the philosophy of history, in selecting, merely 
continues a process of selection already implicit in our 
very knowledge of the events'. 318 
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There are, however, provisos to be made. Firstly, he 
argues, a philosophy of history does not discover laws of 
historical development. The idea that there are such laws 
is as much a fallacy as the idea of being able to predict 
the future. Both are 'part and parcel of a belief that 
what we know as history is something that has been copied 
by the historian from reality'. 319 Secondly, although a 
philosophy of history will consist almost entirely of 
linterpretations, 320, this does not give free reign to 
anachronism. Kunz condemns an analysis of pro-industrial 
societies into economic classes as excessively 
interpretive', since there is no typological link between 
the notion of class and any of the notions employed in 
321 those societies I. Interestingly Marx is disqualified 
as a philosopher of history. The reason for this is that 
he 'propounded his philosophy of history and all the 
lesser narratives it contains as the result of an 
empirical study of res gestao. 322 Marx, Munz states, 
argued that he had I discovered the real nature 0f X21 
aestae and had not written another historia rerum 
gestarum'. 323 Marx denied that our 'knowledge of the 
historical past depends on thought and that history is the 
history of thought, 324 in the belief that he 'could form 
an absolute and final picture of res cestaot. 
325 But, as 
Munz has pointed out, we cannot, in this sense, know what 
res gestae look like. Unless we understand Marx's 
materialism as one amongst many possible interpretations - 
something he strongly denied - instead of an ultimate 
explanation we do not, according to Munz, have a 
philosophy of history. A philosophy of history is 
conscious (as Hegel was) of the 'a priori assumptions that 
have to go into the construction of narrativeso326; it is 
not mimetic of a course of events on a grand scale. For 
Munz, as for Fain, a philosopher of history is 
characterised by this high degree of self-consciousness. 
Thus philosophy of history may be instructive because, in 
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its pervasive use of interpretations,, it is illustrative 
of the kind of understanding which history seeks,, and 
because it displays the artifice and invention of 
narrative construction. Munz writes, 
'No historical narrative can be written vithout 
selecting events from the totality of everything 
that has happened. The ordinary historian is 
more cautious and modest. He selects what the 
sources suggests to him and he considers himself 
bound in an important sense by the general laws 
contained in or implied by the sources. The 
philosophy of history goes beyond the sources in 
the sense that it deals freely with 
interpretations and does not allow the sources 
to dictate. The difference is again a 
difference in degree. The more fact that a 
philosophy of history is highly selective does 
not distWpish it from an ordinary 
narrative. ' 
The f act that the human past cannot be endowed with a 
single permanent shape or character does not give f roe 
license to the application of random interpretive 
schemata. If, as Christopher Hill contends, 17th century 
England is characterised by a 'change from traditional 
Christianity to Lockean Liberalism@328 challenges can be 
raised against this description. But the question "is 
this an accurate description of everything that happened 
in 17th Century England? " is misconceived. Rather we 
should ask 'who first saw it in that shape. Is this shape 
an explanation or an interpretation? What contemporary 
narratives does it correspond to? 329 In other words we 
may question the criteria of selection, but not the fact 
of selection per se. In all cases it is important to be 
aware of what, in an historiographical dispute, is being 
argued over. 
Finally it must be emphasised that Munz actively 
supports the activity of the philosopher of history. 
Philosophy of history exposes the hollowness of the 
analytical philosopher's Jdjj of history; it challenges 
the positivistic mentality of the monograph; it 
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recognises, in its essence, the implications of a 
cognitive relativism in its employment of substitutions, 
330 translations, and interpretations. It takes the wider 
view, attempts to relate single events to a wider series 
of events331, and so returns history to the story, and an 
analysis of historia rerum gestarum to the importance of 
narratives and their construction. 
Hayden White's thesis brings into close focus the 
assumption that the literary dimension of historiography 
is merely the gloss and finish on established findings. 
On the contrary, White considers the "plotting" of events 
in a story the most salient feature of historical 
understanding. He argues that 'no given set of causally 
recorded historical events in themselves constitute a 
story, the most they offer to the historian are 'story 
elements, 332. Mink, in support of what he has called the 
'synoptic Judgement'. or 'configurational model, in which 
a complex of events are seen together in history, has made 
a similar point: @the researches of historians, however 
arduous and technical, only increase the amount of 
precision of knowledge of facts which remain contingent 
and discontinuous. It is by being assigned to stories 
that they become intelligible'. 333 
On of White's strategies is to consider the 'fictive 
capabilities, 334 of historians which bear witness to the 
way in which historical conclusions are conveyed through a 
literary medium. He mentions, for example, the 'non- 
negatablel aspects of 'historical classics'. 335 As 
compared to the conclusions of scientific research, a 
history cannot be so easily disconfirmed and disregarded, 
it may have value as evidence f or a future enquiry, or be 
preserved for its literary qualities. This non-negatable 
aspect testifies to the literary dimension of history. 
White also notes the way in which, 
'explanations of historical structures and 
process are ... determined more by what we leave 
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out of our representations than by what we put 
in. For it is in this brutal capacity to 
exclude certain facts in the interest of 
constituting others as components of 
comprehensive stories that the historian 
displays his 
337 
tact as well as his 
understanding'. 
But his central idea is that there are a number of 
different ways in which the historian can employ 
'historical sequences, 338, and each will provide a 
different interpretation and endow the events with a 
particular meaning. Michelet construed the French 
Revolution as a romantic drama; Tocqeville as an ironic 
tragedy. Can we ask which was a more accurate account? 
White answers in the negative. 'Neither can be said to 
have had more knowledge of the 'facts' contained in 
record; they simply had different notions of the kind of 
study that best fitted the facts they know ... They sought 
out different kinds of facts because they had different 
stories to telle. 339 White's aim is to reveal the part 
that invention plays in the historian's operations: 'The 
death of a king may be the beginning, or ending, or simply 
a transitional event in three different stories. l340 
Thus, in an important sense, a historical narrative is a 
'symbolic structural, it 'tells us in what direction to 
think about the events'. 341 There is then, in history, a 
'translation of "fact" into "fiction"1.342 
White emphasises the importance of selection, 
narrative organisation, and representation in history. 
His thesis is not a denial of historical narratives as a 
kind of knowledge, but an assertion that it in to be 
sought for as much in the intelligibility of the way it 
represents and organises as in the factual quality of its 
contents. In this case understanding follows from 
perceiving the kind or jtypej343 of story to which what we 
are reading belongs. 
White's writings form a brilliant critique of history 
as #a kind of archetype of the realistic pole of 
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representation'. 344 He urges us not to look on the 
activity of historians as model-making; the attempt to 
'reproduce' original 'structures and processes'. 
345 In 
addition he contends that what animates an historical 
enquiry may not be, perhaps should not be a desire to 
assimilate and render familiar but through an intrigue 
with the 'very strangeness, 346 of the past as it appears 
in record. 
His description of history as an occasion for the 
'invention of ingenious malodies, 
347 marks the extreme 
point of a narrative philosophy of history, and sits in 
total immersion in the media of representation. His 
position may also be seen as that moment of a loss of 
faith. To conclude section and chapter I want to look at 
the nature of this loss of faith in the knowing subject 
and ask how it is related to an idealist understanding of 
history. 
A loss of faith refers to the nadir of the 
"transcendent" subject. Specifically it refers to an 
anxiety over the quality of the subject's - the 
historian's - knowledge of past events. As we have moved 
along our conceptual spectrum we have noticed the idea of 
what constitutes historical experience shifting. This 
change is most apparent in the philosopher's search for 
the 'object' of historical enquiry and the way in which 
historians' descriptions may be said to refer. And yet, 
dispute the distance between a positivist and 
constructionist position, in terms of the kind of 
knowledge and understanding to be had within historia 
rerum gestarum, there exists a prevailing faith in the 
rationality of the subject - object relationship, however 
it might be conceived. This rationality may simply amount 
to a belief in the methodological continuity of the 'human 
sciences', or in the opaqueness of 'common languages. 
Above all it describes a faith in a communicable 
experience in which,, for example,, one may recognise and 
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evaluate different approaches or relate the employment of 
key concepts to the context in which they occur. However, 
this faith is not boundless and we have noted several 
attempts to delineate its scope. indeed the understanding 
of history as narrative construction and the emphasis on 
historian as "maker" of meaning and intelligibility may 
occasion doubts as to the status of his conclusions. 
Ironically it is the attempt to ground the historical past 
in modality that is indicative of a loss of faith, far 
more than any exploration of the "subjectivities" of 
different interpretations. It is the attempt to 
reintroduce an absolute criterion of truth and 
intelligibility, so inappropriate to historical practice, 
which destroys a common (if not always articulated) 
rationality. Knowledge of the past isj, in this way, 
wrenched away from the standpoint of the enquirer and 
located in the operation of mental categories. 
In a general sense the transfer effectively removes 
the important distinction between an idealist enquiry into 
the mental operations of an observer and the structuralist 
search for hidden, unconscious determinations of thought. 
Hayden White, who has strong sympathies with aspects of 
the structuralist programme, allows for the breakdown of 
this distinction. His categories are the limited number 
of 'plot-structures, 348 available to the historian in 
telling his "story". Though the historian has a certain 
amount of choice about the way he wants us to think about 
the events in question, it is a choice that in governed by 
'the generic -plot-structures conventionally used in our 
culture, 349, whether they be 'tragic, comic, romantic, or 
ironic'. 350 White's thesis may be understood as 
transitional between a constructionist description of 
history and a structuralist critique of the determining 
medium of language. His oscillations between the 
historian's chosen narrative, and 'the story type or 
, 351 mythos is illustrative of his intermediate 
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perspective. The subject still plays a recognisable part 
in the construction of historical understanding, but, 
though self-consciousness may help define that role, it is 
not seen as a free-ranging choice among multiple different 
rhetorical strategies or interpretations, as it is for 
Munz. The significant difference in White's position is 
that the plot-structures are not merely relative to the 
conventions of culture but somehow determinative of 
consciousness, of the historical imagination. But this, 
we have seen, is also the implication of Oakeshott's modal 
division of experience. Here too, ways of seeing are more 
than just directed by particular interests, they are 
determinative of how objects are understood; they are 
352 apperceptual so that seeing is always seeing as. In a 
less extreme form this is also the contention of Kuhn's 
analysis of paradigms, though the Kuhnian categories are 
placed firmly within the history of science and are 
determinative in the more limited sense of directing and 
justifying the conduct of "normal science". Importantly, 
in Kuhn's schema, there is an adequate account of the 
breakdown of one paradigm and its replacement by 
another. 353 In the divisions within consciousness - the 
epistemes - of Michel Foucault, there is no such mechanism 
of change, and no possibility of comprehending the primary 
nature of their operation (how then Foucaultls? 354). 
There is no account of change because he is essentially 
uninterested in history, and no allowance for self- 
conscious deliberation because he despises the notion of a 
primary, transparent consciousness; pledging to cleanse 
history of all 'transcendental narcissism'. 355 It is 
Foucault's intention to destroy the idea of history; its 
attempt to represent "the order of things" in the right 
356 order of words. He claims to be interested only in 
'ruptures' and Idiscontinuitieso357 against history's 
interest in continuity and the seriality of *vents. 358 
History, in its effort to give a uniform shape to past, 
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displays its subservience to the false ideal of language 
as representation, and to knowledge as the handmaiden of 
power. 
I have no intention of entering into disputation as 
to the originality of Foucault's thought, nor of 
attempting to minimise the extent of his historical and 
epistemological nihilism. For our purposes we may take 
the epistemic divisions of his anti-history as 
illustrative of the extreme consequences of a loss of 
faith in the knowing subject and in a communicable 
historical experience. In the case of Foucault the 
structures of knowing are primary and absolute, they 
determine all efforts to comprehend and represent, and 
expose the human sciences an captives of language and of a 
'mode of discourse', which 'at once provides its access to 
"reality" and delimits the horizon of what can possibly 
359 appear as "real". His efforts are directed against the 
idea that historical knowledge is knowledge of the past. 
In Oakeshott's schema thee categories of knowing are 
intended to preserve the possibility of historical 
knowledge in the present, and to secure the unity of 
subject and object. However, despite an enormous distance 
between their philosophical and political commitments, 
there is nonetheless a conceptual relation between the two 
positions. Foucault dismisses out of hand the 'founding, 
grounding subject, 360 and makes it the creature of a 
knowledge-power struggle. Oakeshott defends the unity of 
our experience but has to resort to the stringent 
limitations of an historical mode in order to do so. In 
both cases the result is to make knowledge the outcome of 
a "discourse" which interposes between subject and object 
and which, more than this, entails the kind of knowledge 
to be had. If Foucault's structures are arbitrarily 
imposed, deterministic and omnipotent, while Oakeshott 
allows for the possibility of self-conscious selection 
among them, this is a difference in degree, not in kind. 
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Finally we might notice the employment by Oakeshott in Qn 
History of the phrase - 'universe of discourse' instead of 
the 'world of ideas' which figure in EXRoritnce and its 
Modes. This terminological shift is so evocative of the 
ideas outlined above. The parameters of his modal 
understandings have grown from the comprehensive 'world' 
to the exclusive 'universall while 'ideas'. with their 
connotations of the personal and contestable, have 
crystalised into 'discourse' with its (structuralist) 
overtones of closed systems. 
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Conclusion 
It is apparent that the idealist's conception of 
history is used in the service of a wider Philosophical 
position. In Collingwood's later work historical thought 
subsumes philosophy. It is the unity of the individual 
and general in critical thinking, and the route to self- 
knowledge in re-enactment. scientific history provides 
the basis, the rationale and the method for all organised 
thought. oakeshott defends history for different reasons: 
against reduction to laws and lessons, and as the clearest 
indication that human understanding is an engagement in 
and for itself, without 'practical' consequences and 
irreducible to programmes or systems. I take both of 
these broader philosophical positions to include a moral 
viewpoint. They are extensions - perhaps implicit 
extensions - of an idealist analysis of history, but we 
are not obliged to accept them in the form of moral 
imperatives. An idealist analysis of history per so is 
largely convincing: Collingwood's account of the rise of 
'scientific' history; Oakeshott's critique of the role of 
the past-as-it-really-was; Munz's attack on the equation 
of historical events with a time series. The application 
to history of the ideas of coherence, unity and context 
result in an illuminating description of historical 
knowledge - particularly of what it cannot be. it remains 
to ask, what idea of history survives an idealist 
critique. 
It is clear, epistemologically, What history is not 
and cannot pretend to be. It cannot be defended as the 
discipline which, uniquely, studies the past. What makes 
history different from other disciplines is not the 
particularity of its content. History does not inhabit a 
particular field or area of the map of knowledge and it 
cannot claim an array of objects as its own rightful 
property with history, as with all other enquiries, a 
particular direction of interest proceeds the organisation 
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of its materials. Oakeshott's argument seems to me 
persuasive: an historical past is the organisation of 
present objects looked at in a certain way, with a certain 
kind of puzzlement. Historical interest transforms 
present objects into evidence f rom. which past events may 
be inferred. What is important is that the same objects, 
seen in terms of different interests, are put to work for 
quite different ends. The same manuscript which interests 
an historian f or what it reveals of systems of land - 
tenure in the Middle Ages, interest an art collector for 
the beauty of its calligraphy or the price it might fetch 
at auction, or an American attempting to trace his 
genealogy. unlike Oakeshott I cannot see these interests 
as logically exclusive (though they may well be mutually 
exclusive for professional reasons), but they do form a 
vital element in an analysis of how we acquire knowledge. 
Since, in idealist terms, knowledge entails a relationship 
between subject and object, only different, organised 
directions of interest can account for the proliferation 
of systematic enquiries. 
History, then, is a relationship between historian 
and his object (objects recognised as deposits from the 
past) under the guidance of a particular kind of interest. 
But this relationship cannot be analysed into two separate 
halves for without one the other would not exist. Just as 
history is not a particular kind of content so it is not 
an array of techniques or tools of analysis, which can be 
learnt, passed-on and represented as the advantage of 
"doing" history at university. Any functional analysis of 
history ignores the way in which the relationship between 
historian and "evidence" is reciprocal. Change the 
historian and one changes the evidence. What is an 
important document for one might be left out of a 
narrative by another. Indeed the idea of evidence as a 
fragmentary record or representation of past events, and 
its conception as so many lists and archives fails to see 
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that evidence is itself the result of prior organisation 
dependent on questions. The idea that one can go and 
check whether a particular interpretation is true or not 
by simply consulting the records is jejune, and is not 
supported by the discursive nature of historiography. 
Facts, as an idealist approach has made plain, are never 
merely detachable from a narrative. They are dependent 
for their significance on the order, texture and direction 
of a narrative: facts are conclusions not empirical 
building blocks for permanent structures. 
The idea that different conceptual techniques can be 
tested out on history needs to be qualified. At the very 
least the process of sharpening analytical tools is never 
neutral in its implications for the study of the past. 
Statistical analysis of crop yields or demographic changes 
provide a useful organisation of potential sources, but 
any amount of numerical lists, no matter how uniform, will 
never add up to a history: they are organisations of 
evidence, an early stage in the transformation of present 
objects into a narrative, and must then find their way 
into interpretations. The important point is that 
statistical analysis should not be seen as the empirical 
dimension of history, pushing it ever closer to the social 
sciences. Any such analysis is dependent on prior 
questions and selections. Furthermore, detailed 
enumerations and empirical generalisations are, in Munzes 
words, a particular shape placed upon the past, one, among 
many, ways of making sense of past events. There should 
be no confusion that they were ever a part of how things 
really were. Computers may take massive chunks out of the 
time spent compiling and analysing the "data" of evidence, 
but, once again, their role in historical construction 
should be spelt out. They are sophisticated organising 
devices dependent upon a prior question which determines 
the kind, and order, of information which is put onto a 
disc, and, it might be added, the order it is read off, 
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suggesting, perhaps, that computer data-bases are not 
value-neutral in the teaching of history. 
Our idealists have argued consistently that history, 
which is not a social science, is not susceptible to 
causal analysis, does not generate laws and, in no sense, 
is deducible from hypotheses. They have defended this 
contention on epistemological grounds (the 
particularizing, individualizing interest of history 
enquiries into detailed differences); on logical grounds 
(the presuppositions of history entail that prior 
identification of cause and effect is a contradiction of 
the nature of the historical base which lacks shape and 
form until it is constructed in the narrative of 
historians). To identify an event as the cause of all 
that followed is, in Oakeshott's words, to pre-empt what 
it is the entire purpose of an historical enquiry to 
establish. Finally there is a moral argument. History is 
not a nascent science, but is rather autonomous and 
provided us with a special kind of understanding. Of 
these arguments I take the first to be essentially 
convincing, the second to be in need of further 
clarification and the third to have only a contingent 
relationship with the first two. 
An idealist approach to history urges the historian 
to be self-aware: to be self-conscious of how he or she 
writes history; to realise that this is always a matter of 
selections and interpretations for which the historian is 
intellectually responsible; to see clearly that history is 
not mimetic precisely because there is nothing from which 
to copy and describe from different angles; and to 
recognise that history teaches no lessons and has no voice 
unless first put there. This implies a sharp critique of 
comparative histories, of attempts to establish criteria 
of relevance in terms of the antiquity or modernity of the 
"history" being studied, and finally of holding up a 
revisionist monograph as the academic highpoint and 
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justification for studying history. It is quite clear 
that definitions of legitimate research topics and 
accurate scholarship cannot rest upon the size and density 
of stretches of the past. Even a history of the tiniest, 
most back-water mediaeval manor, is the result of 
selection, organisation and narrative interpretation: its 
historian is no more dealing with a hard chunk of past 
reality than one who, in writing a history of the concept 
of democracy in the 19th century, is imposing his own 
conceptual framework on that reality. 
I have, however, some reservations over the argument 
that history can make no use of hypotheses or of causal 
interpretations on the group that logicallY, they are 
excluded from the historical mode of understanding. An I 
have attempted to show; there is a suspicion that, 
Oakeshott is continually unhappy with the direction of his 
argument. If history, the study of the past, is finally 
only what historians write (a phenomenology of the past) 
then why should not historians decide amongst themselves 
whether certain hypotheses and causal analyses are valid? 
Oakeshott takes away this possibility of consensus, not 
merely because historians may be philosophically naive 
(which indeed many are) and thus unaware of what their 
agreements confirm. Oakeshott rejects this, distances 
himself from any charges of meddling, and seals off his 
arguments by talking of logical exclusions. it is 
precisely the use of logical postulates to confirm both 
the autonomy and the insularity of history which seems 
vulnerable. Since what historians operate on is evidence 
of past occurrences (albeit themselves the result of 
inference) why should organisational and empirical 
hypotheses relating to particular interpretations of 
evidence not be a valid way of conducting 
historiographical arguments? Oakeshott's anxiety over the 
misuse of history leads to a picture of what historians do 
as something shifting and intangible. This seems apposite 
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to the way in which questions provoke research which in 
turn produce new interpretations and new questions. it 
also highlights the fact that it is just not the case that 
history proceeds by discovering and establishing past 
events beyond doubt. 
But why should we conclude that historical accounts 
are necessarily incommensurable to the extent of being 
completely isolated activities? Undoubtedly interests and 
values are constitutive elements of the historical past, 
yet, historians can acknowledge and even discuss their 
differences, without having to conclude that their 
accounts are logically distinct and so refer to two 
entirely different things. A phenomenological description 
of historical knowledge shows quite clearly that 
historiographical disagreements are disagreements about 
how history should be written, how evidence should be 
selected, interpreted and incorporated, and certainly no 
amount of consensus amongst historians will alter the fact 
that it is constructions of the past which stand or fall. 
All of this has been conceded to Oakeshott. Why, then, 
the anxiety which seems to allow the thing-in-itself - the 
noumenon of past reality - to convict the historian's work 
of being tentative and partial? If this is all we have 
then presumably it may be true insofar as it goes, and the 
arbiter of truth become comparisons of different accounts, 
discussions of interpretations, and judgements on the 
relative appropriateness of evidence. 
History, as an intellectual engagement, exists 
precisely because past events have to be inferred and 
established discursively. For the most part 
historiographical disputes reflect the fact that history 
is all about selections and interpretations. To this 
extent the idealist's point is confirmed in practice. It 
seems, however, that history will always be subject to 
invitations (even intimidation) from other disciplines to 
establish common-fronts, enter into joint projects, or 
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demands to provide an new def ence of its use and value. 
This seems to be inevitable. It would - as I hope I have 
shown - be both intellectually dishonest and self- 
defeating to claim that its association with the past, and 
its methods for pursuing this relationship, confirm 
history's legitimacy. Philosophical analysis has made 
this apparent and by revealing what history is ngj, 
supports, I believe, a traditional, humanistic defence of 
its rationale. History is critical, literary and 
discursive. But this definition does not entail the 
conclusion that history studies only individuals or 
purposive actions. These are judgements an historian 
brings with him to this enquiry and they form an important 
element in the selection of materials. Although value- 
Judgements are constituitive of the resulting narrative we 
do not have to think of them as determinant, undetectable 
and beyond discussion. What it does suggest is that 
histories are always and necessarily individual: indeed 
this is a feature of the shifting interests and consensus 
of historiography. Large tracts of the past are, for 
mainly practical reasons, always treated as fixed or 
understood in any narrative (which obviously needs to 
begin somewhere and so assume a certain given context), 
but this is not because they have been established beyond 
all possible doubt. In the sciences, certain important 
generalisations permit the activity of scientific research 
to proceed unhindered by doubts about first principles or 
the need to establish, as a first step, the underlying 
laws of physics. So perhaps, in history, certain 
important "facts" or "events" are treated as, for all 
practical purposes, beyond dispute# while research goes on 
around, between or beyond them. In both cases there is an 
element of operating under an established rule or 
consensus until one, or a number of findings to the 
contrary force a re-think. And, in both cases, these 
established matter-of-facts tend to illustrate the 
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interests and priorities of research within the discipline 
at a particular time, suggesting that its practitioners 
are less than entirely free to pick and choose what they 
will investigate next. 
Is this notion of consensus and restraint what 
Collingwood and Oakeshott meant by the presuppositions of 
historical thought - those common, organising features 
which underlie and bind together historians' interest in 
the past? I think not. As outlined above, these common 
areas of agreed-upon "results" are too rational and 
debatable; only metaphorically do they owe anything to the 
idea of mental categories through which the mind 
encounters the world. Collingwood's absolute 
presuppositions, though historical in the sense of 
changing over time, are absolute because they are beyond 
discussion: they entail what and how we think and cannot 
themselves be the object of any of our questions. 
Oakeshott's modes of experience exclude absolutely any 
mixture of different interests being represented as a 
genuine enquiry. When the argument of this thesis talked 
of the practical nature of holding certain historical 
conclusions constant, it was hopping between universes of 
discourse in a way entirely forbidden by Oakeshott for 
only ignoratio elenchi could follow. But, as I have 
mentioned, Oakeshott's own position involves just such 
modal mixing. The division of experience into distinct 
organisational interests may well be the result of 
epistemological analysis, but the contention that genuine 
history -a rare and tentative thing - will only be found 
by keeping wholly within a modal understanding that 
determines what kind of past will emerge involves a moral, 
even a political, position. The idea, developed by Croce 
and Collingwood, that history offers a living, autonomous 
form of understanding similarly involves a moral position. 
It was used to counter a positivistic conception of 
knowledge, to challenge the demand that history become 
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more scientific, and to prepare the way for the assumption 
of philosophy by history in the one true judgement both 
particular (the historical individual) and universal (the 
interpretative concept). Perhaps, most importantly, a 
definition of history as autonomous in terms of its 
approach and understanding, and the absolute right of the 
historian "to be master in his own house", appears to be 
an attempt to establish historical truth on more certain 
grounds than any analysis of its practice will confirm. 
The claim that history is an autonomous form of 
knowledge protected by logical postulates is one that can 
be rejected without destroying the important critique 
offered by an idealist analysis of history. What remains 
is an idea of history which has its own interests, 
organisations and ways of conducting (if not definitely 
concluding) arguments over the truth of different 
interpretations. History is, however, certainly eclectic 
in its choice of materials, relative to the selections and 
values of historians, and provisional in its conclusion. 
And since history rests on selections and choices, and on 
their limits and restraints, philosophy must remain an 
essential and permanent critical element in any self- 
analysis and definition: to detect similarities, common 
approaches, and critical differences in the way words and 
concepts are used, and to ask how and whether these 
choices affect what the historian writes. Meanwhile the 
historian might feel enholdened to ask the philosopher 
exactly what it is he means by history. 
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23. See Hughes, op. cit., account of Croce's 
philosophical development p86ff. See also E 
Jacobitti Revolutionarv Humanism and Historicism in 
Modern ItalV (1981) p62ff- 
24. Croce History of Europe in the 19th Century Transl. 
Henry Furst (London 1934) p353. 
25. White op. cit. p114. See H. L. p83. 
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An Introduction to Historical Thought (London 1980), 
Autobiography pp95-101. 
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Mind 
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"History and Freedom" I. H. pp315-20, it was 
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10. Quoted by Knox op. cit. pIV. 
11. Ibid. pVI. 
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der Dussen op. cit. p6l and 64. See also Knox "Notes 
on Collingwood's Philosophical Work: With a 
Bibliography". Proceedings of the British Academy 
(1943) pp469-475. 
13. Knox op. cit. pVII. 
14. W Debbins ed. RG Collingwood: Essays in the 
PhilOBORhy of History (Austin 1965). 
15. The archive is located in the Bodleian Library 
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College Library. 
16. A Donagan The Later Philosophy of RG Collingwood 
(Oxford 1962) 
17. L0 Mink 
--History and 
Dialetic. The Phil0s0Rhy 
of RG CollingKood (Indiana 1969). 
18. L Rubinoff CollingWood and the Reform of Meta 
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physics: A study in the Philosophy of Mind (Toronto 1970). 
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19. WH Dray Laws and Explanation (Oxford 1957). For a list of Dray's other writing& on Collingwood see the 
bibliography of this thesis. 
20. Donagan op. cit. p5,, 6,, 9ff. Donagan recognises a 
conversation to 'historicism' occurring 'perhaps, in 
1935 or 36 (pp, 10,11) possibly as a result of an 
'absorption in history' during this time (p14) but he 
calls for a less radical view of this change than the 
"fall" outlined by Knox. He believes I-JJL,, IN, Th& 
PrinciRles of Art, and The new Leviatha from a 
'largely consistent whole' (pl8) which 'should not be 
divided into historicist and non-historicist groups$. 
21. Debbins op. cit. ppXXXI, XXXII. EE Harris 
"Collingwood's Theory of History" The PhilOSORhical 
Quarterly No. 7 (1957) p35. 
22. Mink op. cit. 
23. The New Leviathan Oxford 1942. 
24. Mink makes this particularly clear in an essay 
"Collingwood's Historicism: A dialectic of Progressel 
in M Krausz ed. Critical Essays in the Philosophy of 
RG CollingHood (Oxford 1972). Mink lists three 
'recessive' doctrines in I. H. pl57ff. 
25. Op. cit. pllff. Dussen, unlike Knox, Donagan or 
Mink, believes that Collingwood's development in 
consistent with the account he gave himself in his 
AutobiograRhy. See pl57ff. 
26. AutobiograRhy p4l. See Collingwood's own account his 
break from British idealism in his Autobiogra2hy 
pP18,19,41. In Speculum Mentis (Oxford 1924) 
Collingwood writes: 'in abolishing the notion of an 
external world other than the mind we do not assert 
any of the silly nonsense usually described by 
unintelligent critics as idealism... I p3ll. 
27. This is infact the thrust of Van der Dussen's 
argument with respect to the essays and manuscripts 
of 1926-28: a conversion to an anti-realist approach 
to our knowledge of the past, op. cit. p32ff. 
28. Van der Dussen op. cit. makes extensive use of the 
correspondence between Collingwood and Do Ruggiero. 
See, for example, p14. 
29. See chapters four and five of this thesis. 
30.1 owe much of the following discussion to a reading 
of Van der Dussen, op. cit. Whereas,, however, he 
argues for the existence of a shift in Collingwood's 
historical thought from realism to anti-realism, I am 
more specifically concerned to retain the label 
idealist as the leading characteristic of his Ifta of history. 
31. Rubinoff op. cit. p27. 
32. Mink Mind. History and Dialectic p20. 
33. Op. cit. p249, along with the other forms of 
experience: art, religion and science. 
34. Ibid. p220. 
35. Ibid. 
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36. Cf Autobiography p22. Collingwood quotes Moore 
talking of the "'transparency" of the act of 
knowing'. See also SRecujum Mentis (S. M. ) p283. 
37. S. M. p4l. Each of the forms of experience is 
believed by those engaged in them 'to afford truth 
and indeed absolute truth concerning the nature of 
reality'. In this they are 'competitors for one 
prize, the prize of truth'. Passages like this are 
remarkably similar intone to Oakeshottle account of 
the 'abstraction' inherent in the 'arrests' or 
'modes' of experience in ExRerience and its ModeR. 
See chapter 3. 
38. See S. M. p3ll. 
39. Ibid. p231. 
40. Ibid. p234. 
41. Ibid. p238. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid. pp245-6. See also p295. 
44. Ibid. p256. 
45. Ibid. p309. He writes: 'The various countries on our 
initial map... turn out to be variously distorted 
versions of one and the same country... 
46. Ibid. p252 and 295. 
47. Although history, as a dialectic, is capable of 
'dialectical development' (p253) and philosophy takes 
up 'much belonging to the historical frame of mind', 
what is destroyed is history's pretension to know a 
concrete reality of fact: this turns out to be 'an 
illusion ... perfectly unknowable' (p238). 48. Autobiography p22. 
49. Written in 1917. See Collingwood's own account in 
the Autobiography p33. 
50. Ibid. p29. 
51. S. M. p208. 
52. Ibid. p210 
53. Ibid. p216. This realistic view of history was first 
articulated in Religion and Philosophy (oxford 1916): 
'History is that which actually exists, fact as 
something independent of my own or your knowledge of 
it' p49. 
54. See, for example, the 1927 document, "The Idea of a 
Philosophy of something, and in particular, a 
Philosophy of History" (attached to 1926 lecture 
notes). On pXXV he writes that, philosophy of 
history is 'the exposition of the transcendental 
conception of history, the study of history as a 
universal and necessary form of mental activity#. or 
again, 'the empirical concept [of history] in nothing 
but the prina facie application of the transcendental 
concept'. 
Rubinoff, op. cit. pll3,, has made the point that, 
throughout Collingwood's work, it is 'left to the 
reader to decide on which occasions he in referring 
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to history as a general habit of mind and on which 
occasions he is referring to it as a special 
discipline'. 
55. "The Idea of a Philosophy of something... " pXXv. see 
also "The Philosophy of History" in Dobbins op. cit. 
ppl2l-39. 
Van der Dussen links this in the theory of 
philosophical concepts discussed in E. P. M. 
56. "The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History" 
first published in The Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society XXV (1924-5), reprinted in 
Debbins op. cit. ppl5l-74. 
57. See for example "Science and History" The Vasculum 9 
(1923) pp52-9. 'History and science both deal with 
reality - the only reality in existence - concrete fact'. In "Croce's Philosophy of History" Hibbert 
Journal XIX (1921), in Debbins op. cit. pp3-22. 
Collingwood actually attacks the distinction between 
science (abstract classification) and history 
(concrete individual thought) arguing that both 
historians and scientists generalise and both 
reconstruct particular events. See Dobbins pla. And 
in "Are History and Science different kinds of 
knowledge? " Mind XXXI (1922). in Dobbins pp23-33, 
Collingwood argues against the distinction between 
history as knowledge of the particular and science as 
knowledge of the universal, arguing that there in 
only knowledge of the individual (Debbins p29). This 
false distinction is based on an 'inside view of 
science' and 'an outside view of history', Dobbins 
p33. 
59. "The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History" p49. 
60. Ibid 
61. Ibid: p39. "Such mutilations and misrepresentations 
... are... explained by the limits of the historian's intelligence". 
62. For much the same reason as instanced in S. M. History 
'assumes that there is a world of fact independent of 
the knowing kind, a world which is only revealed and in no sense constituted by the historian's thought'. 
(p46). Thus the historian is 'always a spectator of 
a life in which he does not participate... I (p47). 
62. Van Der Dussen charts this contradiction in the first 
chapters of his book. 
63. S. M. p46. 
64. S. M. p44: 'a world in which truth and error are at 
any given moment inextricably confused together'. 
65. Bosanquet The Principle of Individuality and Value (London 1912) p79. 
66. Autobiography p59. 
67. I. H. pl4lff. 
68. "Croce's Philosophy of History" op. cit. 
69. Ibid., Debbins p4. Collingwood is not entirely 
sympathetic towards Croce - the "amateur" philosopher 
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- and in particular (p8ff) he criticises the tension 
implicit in Croce's thought generated by the presence 
of an unresolved materialist-idealist dualism. 
70. Ibid 
71. Ibid: p7. 
72. As he did in both S. M. and "The Nature and Aims of a 
Philosophy of History". 
73. Collingwood enthuses over the relative nature of 
historical understanding: 'History, to be, must be 
seen, and must be seen by somebody, from somebody's 
point of view'. 
74. He makes this point again in "The Nature and Aims... " 
p54: 'The various "perspectives" of historians are 
arranged in a "space of perspectives", each historian 
is a monad which mirrors the universe from a point of 
view which is irrevocably not another's point of 
view,. 
75. Ibid. p55. 'The historian can never get outside his 
own point of view and see it as a monad among 
monads ... he is a victim of the "egocentric 
predicament" which holds good for all people'. 
76. Ibid. p56. Just why the historian in unable to 
transcend his own particular perspective is unclear. 
Collingwood seems to be suggesting that it is in the 
nature of his subject-matter, its partiality and 
abstraction. The idea of a philospher-historian who 
writes history in the self-consciousness of its 
intimate relation to the 'Knowing mind' is ruled out 
because Collingwood believes the subject-matter of 
history is a world of related facts which cannot be 
organic to a present enquiry: they belong to a dead 
"reality". Philosophical judgement upon the activity 
of historians alone seems feasible. 
77. Ibid. pl4ff. This is particularly interesting since 
Collingwood argues that history involves 're- 
thinking' or Ire-living', passing judgement again, 
and, in this sense, 'a past agent is not dead, not 
beyond judgement' in the way Croce believed. The 
proximity of past to present is a function of the 
partial and relative understanding of historians. 
Collingwood calls for full awareness of this. He 
does not, at this time, however, believe that 
historical re-thinking offers a way towards a 
reaRprochement between philosophy and history. it 
illustrates the inevitable distortion involved in any 
attempt to describe past reality. 
78. "The Idea of a Philosophy of something... " op. cit. 
ppXII-XIII. 
79. Ibid. See also the letter written to Croce on 5 January 1928: 11 have learnt from you to regard 
philosophy as primarily the methodology of history'. 
Quoted from Donagan The Later PhilosoRhy p315. 
80. Van Der Dussen op. cit. p35ff. 
81. Ibid. 
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82. IH p126. See also the 1930 essay "The Philosophy of 
History" in Debbins op. cit. ppl2l-139. 
83. "Outlines of a Philosophy of History" written in 
April 1928 at Die in France, ppl2-13. It is in this 
document that Collingwood argues: 'All history, then, 
is the history of thought, where thought is used in 
the widest sense and includes all the conscious 
activities of the human spirit'. 
84. See Bibliography. 
85. Op. cit. 
86. Ibid. p43. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Ibid. p55. This clearly illustrates the dualism 
present in Collingwood's thought: 'The more the 
historian knows, the more accurately he becomes aware 
that he will never know anything'. 
89. Ibid. p43. 
90. Ibid. 
91. Ibid. 
92. Ibid. p44. 
93. See Chapter 5. 
94. An idea which Collingwood pursue to the limit in ; LH. 
See, for example, "The Historical Imagination" p232. 
95. "Lectures on the Philosophy of History" (75 pages) 
written between 9 and 13 January 1926 and delivered 
from January to March of that year, p2l. 
96. Ibid. p42. 
97. Ibid. pp53-4. 
98. Ibid. 
99. IH p155. 
100. "Lectures on the Philosophy of History" op. cit. p5i. 
101. Van Der Dussen op. cit., has noted that this 
manuscript is a complete revision of the 1926 
lectures, p143. 
102. "Outlines... It p4. 
103. See ibid. p6. 
104. Ibid. 
105. Ibid. 
106. Op. cit. p143. 
107. Ibid. 
108. "Outlines... Of p14. At this point Collingwood makes a 
distinction between past 'thoughts' and feelings or 
emotions which 'cannot be re-enacted by the 
historian'. 
109.1-H P141ff. 
110. In the Die manuscript Collingwood made it clear that 
the 'identity of a past thought with the one re- thought by the historian must be seen as conceptual'. 
p14. 
111. See the AutobioqraRhv p57 and JH p269. 
112. Mink "Collingwood's Historicism: A Dialectic of 
Progress" in Krausz ed. p155. Mink also makes the important distinction between the 'empirical' and 
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'philosophical' concept of history (p158,160) and 
refers the reader to M p35. 
113. Mink op. cit. p165. 
114. Mink op. cit. 
115. Ibid. pl55ff. 
116. See Bibliography for a list of Dray's articles. 
117. See Bibliography for relevant works. 
118. See Bibliography. A sample of criticisms is provided 
by Van Der Dussen op. cit. p8lff. 
119. For a useful discussion of this idea see Van Der 
Dussen op. cit. p259ff. 
120. See ZE pp282-302 and Index under Ire-enactment, 
conception of' p338. 
121. See pp 36,125-6,143,257-66,269-70,274-81,319. 
122. Ibid. pp302-315. 
123. The analysis of the "idea" of history in the central 
theme of the first four parts of JR. 
124. Ibid. index p338. 
125. See in particular the intricate discussion of 
'numerical difference and specific identity' p285ff. 
126. See Autobiography p54. 
127. Gardiner, P. The 
-Nature of 
Historical EXplanation 
p47. 
128. Ibid. 
129. Ibid. p39. 
130. Renier G. J. History: Its Purpose and Methods (London 
1950) p48. 
131. ZZ p214. 
132. Ibid. p294. 
133. Autobiography p77. 
134. Gardiner op. cit. p36: ... the suggestion of some 
sort of telepathic communication with past thoughts 
is too insistent to be entirely disregarded. What is 
at least fairly clear is that in much of 
Collingwood's work the desire to assimilate the past 
to the present so that the requirement of an 
acquaintance theory of knowledge may be satisfied is 
in evidence'. 
135. See for example Renier's demand: 'What warranties are 
there for this limitation of the idea of history' op. 
cit. p45. 
136. Collingwood charts the course of his disillusionment 
in the Autobiography pp34ff. 
137. Donagan The Later Philos_o=... op. cit. p227. See 
also Collingwood's discussion JH p301. 
138. Gardiner I'The Objects of Historical Knowledge" 
Philosophy 27 (1952) pp2ll-220. p216. Here Gardiner 
rehearses the theory that Collingwood was aiming at 
some kind of acquaintance theory of knowledge. See 
Dray's ccmment on Gardiner's views and their links 
with Gilbert Ryle's I'dispositional" view of mind in 
IIRGC and the Acquaintance Theory of Knowledge" Review 
Internationale de PhilOBORhie 11 (1957) pp420-32. 
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139. Gardiner ibid. p213. Collingwood makes this plain in 
. 
111 p115: I ... history is not history unless it 
presents us with a series of acts ... only knowable... as the outward expression of thoughts'. 
140. IH p226. See also Autobiograj2hv p76. 
141. Dray W. H. PersRectives on History (London 1980) p14. 
142. See "Historical Evidence" J. H pp249-282 and p246: 
'What we mean by asking whether an historical 
statement is true is whether it can be justified by 
an appeal to the evidence... 
143. JH p133. 
144. Ibid. p202. 
145. See Collingwood's account of his experience on 
Archaeological excavations in his Autobiogra2h 
pp83ff and Van Der Dussen's helpful chapter on 
"Collingwood as Archaelogist and Historian" pp202-241 
op. cit. 
146. This is a word used by Dray to express the idea of 
historians seeking a rational explanation of a past 
occurrence: 'What Collingwood is claiming when he 
says the thoughts must be 'Ire-thought", is that they 
are only explanatory if the historian in able to 
certify for himself their sufficiency as reasons for 
doing what the agent did. ' RGC and the Acquaintance 
Theory of Truth p432. 
147. Ibid. I ... a criterion of intelligibility'. 148. Van Der Dussen op. cit. p312. 
149. IH see pp2-3,, 20-1# 28,64-6,134-41,151-9,188 
etc... 
150. Donagan The Later Philosopfty op. cit. p222. 
151. This reaches a particularly vitriolic pitch in his 
condemnation of 'the "realist" dogma' that 'moral 
philosophy' studies a 'subject matter which it leaves 
wholly unaffected by that investigation' (pl1l), a 
'detachment from practical affairs' which the older 
Collingwood sees directly related to a 'coming 
fascism' (plll). 
152. Mink "Collingwood's Historicism... " op. cit. p157. 
153. ZZ p213. 
154. Ibid. p283. 
155. Ibid. pp266-8 
156. Van Der Dussen insists that the re-enactment doctrine 
is not involved in the question of subjectivity and 
objectivity, they must be looked at in terms of an 
interrelation between the historian's 'questioning 
activity and historical evidence' op. cit. p352. 
In the Die manuscript Collingwood wrote: 'The only 
knowledge that the historian claims is knowledge of 
the answer which the evidence in his possession gives 
to the question he is asking ... The certainty in history, then, is the certainty that -the evidence 
in 
our possession points to gne particular answer to one 
particular crugstion we ask of-Ill. p36. 
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157. 
-TH pp266-8. 158. IH p238. Dray argues that Collingwood's theory of 
mind provides us with this possibility. "Historical 
Understanding as Re-thinking". University of Toronto 
Quarterly 27 (1958) pp200-215f pp204-5. 
159. See Donagan The Later Philosophy op. cit. p204: 
11 ... pure physical force, e. g. a push,, can produce 
only a pure physical effect, e. g. a fall, but not an 
action, e. g. a walk or a run... 
160. IH p231. 
161. See Collingwood's examples ZZ p317. See also the 
AutobiograRhy p86,, fn, where Collingwood 
distinguishes between actiones and Rassiones, the 
latter being 'instances of being acted upon', e. g. 
the eruption of Vesuvius in AD 79, which only 
'becomes an "historical event" in so far as people 
were not merely affected by it, but reacted to this 
affection by actions of various kinds'. 
The criticism that Collingwood ignored the importance 
of physical changes in the environment has been 
levelled by JA Roberts, among others: I ... natural changes cannot possibly be ex plained in terms of human motives or intentions'. History and Christian 
Apologetic (London 1960) p13. But WH Walsh, 
11R G Collingwood's Philosophy of History" PhilosoRhy 
22 (1947) p155, Donagan The Later PhilosoDhy op. cit. 
P204, and Mink Mind. History and Dialectic op. cit. 
p171-2, have all supported Collingwood. Mink writes: 
that natural facts 'are relevant to history 2nly to 
the extent that they enter the consciousness of men'. 162. The important point, clarified in "History and Freedom" IH p3l5ff, is that the rationality of an 
agent's position consists in his ability to think 
about his situation 'rightly or not' (p317). 'When 
an historian says that a man is in a certain 
situation this is the same as saying that he thinks 
he is in this situation', but he is not free at all 
with regard to the situation in which he stands which is his 'master, his oracle, or his god' (p316). The 
'hard facts of the situation' will always be the way 
an agent conceives his position (p317). 
163. In JH, p231, Collingwood does indeed dismiss 
'irrational elements' - the IsubJect-matter of 
psychology' - from history. These 'blind forces# form the 'proximate environment in which our reason lives', and this is their importance. 
164. In an essay of 1938, "Kind Arthur's Round Table: 
Interim Report in the Excavations of 1937". LN 
(1938) ppl-31, Collingwood writes: ... history can only demonstrate its own right to exist by demonstrating the rationality of its subject-matter 
... by showing that a tangle of facts, patiently 
unravelled, makes sense. 
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165. 
. 
1H p213. 
166. Rex Martin provides a good account of this 'practical 
deliberation' on the part of an historian. See 
Historical Explanation: Re-enactment and Practical 
Inference (Ithaca 1977) pp50-52. See also p149: 
'When we explain by re-enactment we simply exhibit 
certain specified connections as holding between 
particular thought factors and between these and the 
particular deed we are explaining'. 
See also P Skagestad Making Sense of History: The 
Philosophies Of POPRer and CollingKoo (Oslo 1975) 
and his example of Columbus' crossing of the 
Atlantic, pl8ff. He argues that both Collingwood and 
Popper believe that an historical problem must be 
understood as the attempt to solve a problem. For a 
penetrating account of the shortfalls of Skagestad's 
argument see Nielsen, MH and Shearmus, JCG "Making 
Sense of History: Skagestad on Popper and 
Collingwood" Ingiaiza 22 pp459-89. see Dray 
Perspectives op. cit. p23. 
168. See Martin op. cit. p52. 
169. Dray Perspectives op. cit. p1l. 
170. The argument between a 'methodological' and 'non- 
methodological' interpretation of Collingwood's re- 
enactment theory is well charted by Van Der Dussen 
plooff. Dussen lists Donagan, Dray, Schoemarker 
("Inference and Intuition in Collingwood's Philosophy 
of History" The Monijkt 53 (1969) PP100-15), Martin 
and Mink as proponents of the non-methodological 
interpretation. Against them we might range 
Goldstein, Gardiner and Skagestad. 
171. Martin op. cit. p52ff. 
172. Ibid. p53. 
173. In this sense re-enactment of past thought is, in 
Donagan's words, 'not a precondition of historical 
knowledge, but an integral element in it', Donagan 
"The Verification of Historical Theses" Tilt 
Philosophical Ouarterl 6 (1956) ppl93-208. 
Schoemarker puts it in the following way: 1R*- 
enactment is not an explanation of how the historian 
arrives at knowledge of past thoughts, but rather, it 
explains how or on what conditions knowledge of the 
past is possible'. 
174. JH 263,284-5,287-8,298,299. 
175. Iff p287,300. 
176. Ibid. p28O. 
177. Dray 11R G Collingwood and the Acquaintance Theory of 
Knowledge" op. cit. p431. 
178. Ibid. Dray argues that Collingwood's theory attempts 
to 'elicit the criteria of intelligibility in 
employed in historical studies', p432. 
179. Dray Perspectives p23. 
180. P56. 
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181. See Donagan The Later PhilosoDhY, Goldstein 
"Collingwood's Theory of History" History and Thegl: y 
9 (1970) pp3-36, Mink "Collingwood's Historicism... " 
op. cit. see p154, Van Der Dussen op. cit. see 
Chapter 5 "Collingwood as an Archaeologist and 
Historian" p202ff. 
182. Op. cit. See in particular Van Der Dussen's account 
of Collingwood's theory of 'Romanization' p24ff and 
p260,271. He argues that the idea of Romanization, 
expressed both in Roman Britain (Oxford 1923,, 1932) 
and Roman Britain and the English Settlements (1936) 
exemplifies the theory of a 'scale of forms' which 
'are dialectically related to each other, in which 
their generic essence is realised in varying 
degrees'; and idea Collingwood developed in =. 
183. This is the view held by Dray, but not by Donagan who 
argues that Collingwood was a methodological 
individualist in the 'strongest sense of that 
disputable term' The Later Philosoph p206. In 
defence of the opposite view see Collingwood himself 
. 
JH p219, "A Philosophy of Progress" The Realist 1 
(1929), in Debbins ed. pp104-20, and my discussion of 
Goldstein's interpretation of Collingwood on the 
following pages. 
184. The clearest exarAple of Collingwood's belief in the 
importance of "unconscious action" in history is his 
account of the survival of Celtic art during the 
period of Roman occupation of Britain, see Roman 
Britain op. cit. p247, and Goldstein's comments in 
"Collingwood on the Constitution of the Historical 
Past" in Krausz ed. pp241-67. See also the 
AutobiograDhy p92ff. This idea is given 
philosophical underpinings in The New Leviathan 
(Oxford 1942) KL see section 38. 
185. AutobioqraRhY p25. 
186. See for example A Toynbee A Study of HistgXy Vol. 9 
pp717-37 where he speaks of Collingwood's 'rule', 
'instruction' and 'prescription'. 
187. See JH "Historical Evidence" pp249-81. 
188. see Autobiography pp56-7: 'The historian has to 
decide exactly what he wants to know'. 
189. IH 237,252-6,269-74,280-1,311-12. 
190. See Dray's excellent account in Perspectives op. cit. 
pp9-26. 
191. Ibid. p2l. 
192. Goldstein "Collingwood on the Constitution of the Historical Past" op. cit. p244. 
193. Ibid. p262 
194. Dray "Collingwood's Historical Individualism" op. 
cit. p3. 
Dray mentions the long chapter Collingwood 
contributed to Frank's Economic Survey of Ancient 
Rome (Baltimore 1937) as scarcely citing an 
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individual agent. Instead there are examples of the 
survival of a Celtic style of art, changes in 
patterns of town and country life. See also the 
example of a strike at a factory JH p310 and RL p283 
and the argument that Icivilisation is something that 
can only happen to people collectively, not 
individually'. Mink's elaboration of Collingwood's 
theory of presuppositions in the understanding of 
institutions is also illumination, Mind. Histola and 
Dialectic pl76ff. 
195. ZH p65. 
196. Op. cit. p20. The important point made by Dray is 
that since 'even my knowledge of my own mind is 
achieved by interpreting my activities as expressions 
of thoughts', and not a case of 'privileged access' 
then la group mind, if it existed would be 
"accessible" to historians in precisely the same way 
as any mind is accessible to them'. 
197. Goldstein "Collingwood on the Constitution... " op. 
cit. p248. See also Van Der Dussen f or the same 
point, p324. 
198. Op. cit. pp262-3. 
199. Op. cit. p266. 
200. Ibid. p262. 
201. Dray PersRectives P19 - See JH p215: cause... (is] 
... the inside of the event itself'. 202. Autobiography p73. 
203. IH p262,249, p231ff. 
204. Ibid. p248. 
205. Collingwood argues that although I ... evidence changes 
with historical method, principles of criticisms 
change... questions change' this is 'not an argument 
for historical scepticism'. 
206. Ibid. p251. See also p133. 
207. Donagan The Later PhilosoRhy op. cit. p210ff. 
208. "The Limits of Historical Knowledge" Journal of 
Philosophical Studies_2 (1928) in Debbins ed. pp90- 
103, pp97ff. 
209. M p280. See also p246. Collingwood. considers this 
himself. 
210. See IH p244. This suggests that Collingwood's 
'historical imagination' the 'innate' JdIL& of an 
historical landscape is really something rather 
pragmatic: It is important to see his division 
between 'scientific' and 'scissors and pastel history 
in terms of both range of enquiry and critical status 
of enquires. 
211. Ibid. p275. 
212. Ibid see p256ff. 
213. Ibid. p274. 
214. Autobiography p34. 
215. LH- p274. See also Autobiography p22ff. 
216. IH p274. 
217. Ibid. p236. 
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218. Ibid. p9, by which, of course, he rAeans thought 
expressed in events', p214. 
219. Autobiography p37,63,99. 
220. Ibid. p22. 
221. Ibid. plll. 
222. Ibid. p73. 
223. See the manuscript "Notes on Historiography" written 
on Collingwood's voyage to the East Indies 1938-9, 
pll. 
224. Op. cit. p34. 
225. IH p300. 
226. Ibid. 
227. Autobiography p48. 
228. See Bibliography for a list of Collingwood's 
historical publications between 1932 and 39. see 
also Van Der Dussen op. cit. Chapter 5. 
229. AutobiograDhy p73. 
230. JR p234. 
231. See ZZ p10: 'History is "for" human self-knowledge'. 
232. Ibid. 
233. Ibid. pp76-81. 
234. Ibid. p175. 
235. Autobiography pp78-9. 
236. Ibid. p102. This is how Collingwood describes Manz. 
237. Skagestad op. cit. p7l: 'An intellectual tradition is 
made up of such a chain of questions and answers, 
each answer serving aa presupposition of logical 
ground for the next question'. See EX p23: 'Every 
statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer 
to a question'. 
238. Skagestad op. cit. p9l, a theory which he believes is 
outlined in the Autobiography and EM. Skagestad 
argues that the theory of absolute presuppositions is 
a later addition to defend metaphysics against 'the 
attacks from logical positivists'. In a review 
discussion of Skagestad's argument Nielsen, op. cit., 
argues that this connect of Collincjwood's two 
concepts - re-enactment and the theory of 
presuppositions - far from being new, may be said to 
be 'the received' interpretation, p485. 
239. Nielsen op. cit. p485. 
240. Autobiography p48. 
241. EM p62. 
242. ii-kagestad, op. cit. puts this well: '... every 
rational, and hence intelligent action performed by 
an historical agent has an intelligent content. The 
Agent was faced with a problem, and his action was his attempt to solve that problem. The problem can be expressed as a question, and the action embodies a 
particular answer'. In the Die manuscript 
Collingwood uses the example of a game of chess - an horizon which places limits on actions and a determination which is not causal but creates now 
situations within which 'a free and intelligent 
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agent' acts and 'exercises his freedom and 
intelligence' p4l. See also JZ p316. 
243. ZM p62. 
244. Crucially this assumes,, as Skagestad points out, a 
'common rationality' (op. cit. p73) which can be 
'invaded given sufficient imagination and good will. 
245. AutobiocraRhy p67. 
246. "Reality and History" written December 1935: 'An 
experimental essay designed to test how far the 
thesis can be maintained that all reality in history 
and all knowledge historical knowledge' (Bodleian 
Library) p20. 
247. UM p32 with regard to absolute presuppositions 'the 
idea of verification is an idea which does not 
apply... 1 
248. AutobioaraRhy p48. 
249. An introductory conment by S Toulin in his essay 
"Conceptual Change and the Problem of Relativity' in 
Krausz ed. Critical Essays op. cit. p20lff. 
250. N Rotenstreich "Metaphysics and Historicism" in 
Krausz ed. op. cit. p179ff. Toulin op. cit. 
M Kransz op. cit. "The Logic of Absolute 
Presuppositions" p222ff. 
251. Donagan The Later Philosg= Ch. IV. S2. 
Skagestad, op. cit. p84ff. Donagan,, Skagestad and 
Toulin point out that Collingwood's attempt to 
account for the change of one absolute presupposition 
into another, which is not a matter of conscious 
choice but of 'strains' (see ZX p48fn) in not 
satisfactory. Toulin comments that the problem of 
'conceptual dynamics' is unanswered, pp209. 
Rotenstreich op. cit. P198, points out the 
inconsistent application of the relative nature of 
absolute presuppositions in The Idea of Nature pp29- 
30. 
52. Dray "Collingwood's Historical Individualism" op. 
cit. p15. 
253. Mink Mind. History and Dialectic p149. 
254. Ibid. p146, 'a prior conceptual systems' which are 'a 
yardstick by which experience is judged'. See ZX 
pp193-4 and Mink "Collingwood's Historicism" p172. 
255. Mind. History and Dialectic pl4l. It is, Mink argues 
'possible to speak of the absolute presuppositions of 
a society'. 
256. Ibid. 
257. Ibid. p156. 
258. Ibid. 
259. Ibid. 
260. Dry "Collingwood's Historical Individualism" p14 
261. Ibid. 
262. Op. cit. p73. 
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263. This is, of course, the scheme of the 
historiographical sections of JH, the tracing of 
different ideas of history. 
264. EM p4. 
265. Op. cit. p217. 
266. See EM p96. 
267. Krausz op. cit. p226. 
268. In particular the placing of absolute presuppositions 
in the realm of unconscious causes. 
269. See Toulin op. cit. and his argument for a 
distinction between 'consideration of theory and of 
disciplinary aim' p2l4ff. 
270. Mink Mind. History and Dialectic p146ff. 
271. See Ch. 5 section 3. 
272. Toulin op. cit. accuses Collingwood of choosing bad 
examples from the history of science, p207. 
273. See ZZ pp63-71. 
274. Not in the sense that they were actually argued over 
and chosen by historians or scientists at the tinal 
but that they are susceptible to analysis by us now 
even though we operate under different absolute 
presuppositions. 
275. Toulin op. cit. p2l4ff. 
276. Rotenstreich op. cit. P199. 
277. Ibid. See also the AutobiograRhy p48ff. 
278. See Ch. 4 section 3. 
279. Autobiography p34. 
280. A point made by Donagan The Later Philoso2hy p241. 
281. See JH p202. 
282. Autobiography p48. The metaphysician-historian 
inquires into beliefs, 'presuppositions of question,: 
'the distinction between what is true and what is 
false does not apply'. He had previously argued (JH 
p300) that it was a mistake of 'philological history' 
to inquire into 'what Plato thought, without 
inquiring "whether it is true"'. 
283. This is where truth or falsity applies since the 
statements metaphysicians make or refute are 
'certainly true or false; for they are answers to 
questions about the history of these 
presuppositions'. 
284. JH pXI. 
285. Toulin op. cit. p208. 
286. ZZ p248 '... in history no achievement is final'. 
Chapter 3 Michael Oakeshott: History Conversation or 
Discourse 
1. See ZZ p158 where Collingwood presents this "third" 
alternative as a way out of Oakeshott's "dilemma". 
2. See ExDerience and its Modeit, EM (Cambridge 1933) 
pplog-10. 
3. On History and other essays (QH) (Oxford 1983) p58. 
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4. See, for example, RF Atkinson Knowledge and 
ExRlanation in History (New York 1978) . Atkinsones 
reaction to Oakeshott is, on the whole, one of 
bafflement and bemusement. See pages 10-11,23j 24, 
25,32,37,40,, 96,, 111,124,158,222. See also 
WH Walsh -a more sympathetic commentator - &a 
Introduction to the Philosophy of History (London 
1951) p193. 
5. See for example "Moral Judgement in History" in Thl 
PhilOsORhy of History in our Time ed. M Meyherhoff 
(1959). GR Elton The Practice of History (1967). 
6. See WH Dray "Michael Oakeshott's Theory of History" 
p32, in P King and BC Parekh ed. Politics and 
ExRerience: Essays Rresented to Michael Oakeshott 
(Cambridge 1968) pp19-42. 
7. See EN p106: 'History is the past for the sake of the 
past'. 
S. The attitude which understands the past an 
lunassimilated to ourselves is, in "The Activity of 
Being an Historian" in Rationalism in Politics 
(London 1962) pp called "Scientific". Oakeshott goes 
on to say, p165, I ... it is precisely the task of "the historian" to loosen the tie between the past and the 
practical present'. 
9. See P Gardiner The Nature of Historical EXRlanation 
(Oxford 1952) p58, Atkinson, op. cit. p23, WH Dray 
PhilosoDhv of Histo (New Jersey 1964), p7l 
D Bebbington Patterns in History (1979) p150, 
M Cowling Reliaion and Public Doctrine V01.1 
(Cambridge 1981) p256. See also the identification 
of Oakeshott with the idealist position of Dilthey, 
Croce or Collingwood in GV Renier Historv: __Ir& PurRose and Methods (London 1956) and M White 
Foundations of Historical Knowledge (Now York 1965) 
p3, Fischer, DH Historical Fallacies: Toward a Logic 
of Historical Thought (New York 1970) and P Winch TIlt 
Philosophy (London 1958). 
10. See Gardiner and Atkinson op. cit. 
11. Dray Philosophy of History p8ff- 
12. Collingwood JH p155. 
13. Walsh "The Practical and the Historical Past" in King 
and Parekh op. cit. pp5-16. 
14. The three essays are "Present,, ruture and Past" pi- 
48, "Historical Events" pp45-96, "Historical Change" 
p97-118. 
15. Oakeshott wrote this in a letter answering a general 
enquiry of mine, December 6 1986. 
16. Oakeshott has written this of Hobbes in his editor's 
introduction to Leviathan (Cambridge 1946) pXIII: 
I ... style and matter, method and doctrine are inseparable' 
17. Cowling op. 
ýit. 
p281. Cowling gives the example of 
the 'a-moralism which he associates with philosophy'. 
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18. OH p62. 
19. Ibid. p26. 
20. EM p7: I ... what seems to be required is not so much 
an apology for idealism as a restatement of its first 
principles'. Oakeshott,, in his only concession by 
way of bibliography, cites the influence on his 
thoughts of Bradley's ARPearance and Reality and 
Hegel Phenomenologie des Geister. 
21. Ibid. p82. 
22. The division of EM is along these lines. 
23. T Fuller editor's introduction to The Voice of 
Liberal Learning. Michael Oakeshott on Education 
(Yale 1989) p8. 
24. Fd. M- P355. As early as page I Oakeshott writes: 
I ... philosophy is without any direct bearing upon the 
practical conduct of life... 1 
25. Ibid. p356. (please change the quotation to 'empty 
kisses of abstraction). 
26. Ibid. p355. 
27. Fuller op. cit. pa. 
28. Oakeshott writes, EN p118: 'The ultimate reference of 
historical judgement... is reality' and the 'criterion 
of reality' in history, as it is in 'all forms of 
experience is the criterion of self -completeness or 
individuality'. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Fuller op. cit p8fn. 
31. See EM pp355-6. 
32. EM p2. 
33. Ibid. pp87,88. 
34. Ibid. p145. 
35. Ibid. p5. Defined by Oakeshott as 'the most fatal of 
all errors', fit occurs whenever argument or 
inference passes from one world of experience to 
another'. The impression, Cowling has noted, in that 
ignoratio elenchi 'was rotting the fabric of 
intellectual activity', op. cit. p258. 
36. Cowling op. cit. p258 and 257. 
37. "A Place of Learning" in The Voice of Liberal 
Learning p23, see also the footnote on page 19 of QH. 
38. Fuller op. cit. pil. 
39. Cowling op. cit. p258. 
40. EM p148. 
41. Dray "Michael Oakeshott's Theory of History" op. cit. 
p20. 
42. Fuller op. cit. pa. Fuller thinks not. 
43. Ibid. p9. 
44. Ibid. plo. 
45. IH p159. 
46. This metaphor is resonant of Wittgenstain's 
exploration of "language games". In the feschrift 
presented to Oakeshott - Politics and ExRerience op. 
cit. -WH Greenleaf, in an essay entitled "Idealism, 
Modern Philosophy and Politics", argues (p43) that 
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there is a 'certain affinity between philosophical 
idealism and modern linguistic philosophy'. 
47. Fuller op. cit. plO. 
48. See in particular the political essays in Rationalism 
in Politics and other Essay-q op. cit. on Human 
Conduct (Oxford 1975) and the essays in The Voice of 
Liberal Learning op. cit. 
49. Op. cit. p268. 
50. EM p86ff. 
51. See "The Activity of being an Historian" p142, and QU 
P5. 
52. EM p86. 
53. Ibid. p87. 
54. Ibid. plll. 
55. Ibid. plOl. The other postulates are 'the ideas 
... of fact, of truth, and reality and of 
explanation'. 
56. EM pS. See also the Introduction to Leviathan pIX. 
57. EM p9ff. In this way, Collingwood argued (JU pl5l). 
Oakeshott had overcome 'Bradley's dilemma'. 
58. EM p93. 
59. Ibid 
60. Ibid: p95. Oakeshott aruges that, it ... may be 
convenient for the historian to think of his work as 
the discovery and interpretation of a past course of 
events, to think of historical truth as the 
correspondence of his ideas with a past fact, but it 
is the first business of anyone who undertakes to 
consider the character of history as a form of 
experience to criticise these notional. 
61. Ibid p9o. 
62A Ibid p9l. 
62B Ibid. 
63. Ibid. p94. 
64. Ibid. p93. 
65. This "reading",, as becomes increasingly clear in 
Oakeshott's reflections on history, is subject to 
what the 'historian as such is obliged to think'. 
ploo 
66. Ibid: p93. 
67.1 ... a fixed and finished past, a past distorted from 
and uninfluence by the present, is a past divorced 
from evidence (for evidence is always present) and is 
consequently nothing and unknowable'. p107. 
68. Ibid. p98. 
69. Ibid. Although this particular argument relates to a 
coherence theory of truth, it also has certain 
affinities with Collingwood's idea of the 'historical 
imagination' in the sense that, 'no historian begins 
with a blank consciousness' IM p97. 
70. Ibid. p99. 
71. An echo of Dilthey's idea of shuttling to and fro 
between past and whole. See Chapter one. 
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72. Early on Oakeshott makes it quite clear that even 
evidence - the tangible remains or I survivals If rom 
the past -I can never take us outside our own world 
of experience' p117- 
73. Ibid 
74. Ibid: p95. 
75. Walsh Introduction to the Philosgphy of History 
(1967) p88. 
76. Gardiner The Nature of 1jistorical Ex2lanation p36ff. 
It is, he argues, a 'dissatisfaction with the past 
for not being present'. In fact Gardiner's 
caricature of Oakeshott's position is very similar to 
Oakeshott's own description of the 'past as it really 
was I (plO6) , the assumption of aI... complete and 
virgin world of past events, which history would 
discover if it could, but which it cannot discover on 
account of some radical defect in human knowledge'. 
77. See Meiland's chapter on Oakeshott in Historical 
Skepticism op. cit. 
78. Atkinson op. cit. p1O- 
79. See EM plO8. 
80. Ibid. p107. 
81. Dray "Michael Oakeshott's Theory of History" op. cit. 
p2l. 
82. EM plOl. 
83. Ibid. pl26ff. See Dray's discussion of this in Tbj 
Philosophv of Histo p8ff and "Michael Oakeshott's 
Theory of History" P21ff. 
84. EM p140ff. 
85. "Michael Oakeshott's Theory of History" p27ff. 
86. M P108. 
87. Ibid. p118. 
88. Ibid. p125. 
89. Ibid. p99. 
90. "The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind" 
written in 1959 and reprinted in Ratignalism in 
Politics op. cit. p215. 
91. EM P129. 
92. Ibid. p144. 
93. Ibid. p122. 
94. Ibid. 
95. Ibid 
96. Ibid: p129. 
97. Ibid. p142. 
98. Ibid. p140. 
99. Ibid. p133ff. 
100. Ibid. p135. 
101. Ibid. p136. 
102. Ibid. p138. 
103. Ibid. p140. Both of these two sentences, despite 
Oakeshott's protests, are causal judgements. The 
actual order of words entails some form of cause and 
effect relationship. 
306 
104. Ibid. p143- This passage is resonant of Butterfield 
(Oakeshott's contemporary at Cambridge) in The Whig 
Interpretation of Historv (Cambridge 1931): 'In the 
last resort the historian's explanation of what 
happened is not a piece of general reasoning at all. 
He explains the French Revolution by describing 
exactly what it was that occurred; and if at any 
point we need further elucidation all that he can do 
is to take us into greater detail, and make us see in 
still more definite concreteness what really did take 
place' p72. 
105. Dray Philosophy of History pp9,10. 
106. Dray Ibid. p33. See also "Michael Oakeshott's Theory 
of History" p3lff. 
107. Philosophy of History p37- 
108. EM P161. 
109. Ibid. p137. 
110. Ibid. p97. 
111. Ibid. plll. 
112. Ibid. p146. 
113. Ibid. p110. 
114. Collingwood LH p155. 
115. Walsh Introduction to the PhilOsORhy of History op. 
cit. P88. 
116. EM p146. 
117. Cowling op. cit. p268- 
118. Op. cit. p198. On p200 philosophy is described as a 
'parasitic activity'. 
119. "The Activity" p137. See also "The Voice of Poetry" 
p197. 
120. "The Activity" p137. 
121. Ibid. p139. 
122. Ibid 
123. Ibid: p142 
124. Ibid. p140. 
125. Ibid. p142. 
126. Ibid. p147. 
127. Ibid. p143. 
128. Ibid. 
129. Ibid. 
130. Ibid. 
131. Ibid. p144. 
132. Ibid. 
133. Ibid 
134. Ibid: p145. 
135. Ibid. p146. 
136. Ibid. 
137. Ibid 
138. Ibid: p147. 
139. Ibid 
140. Ibid: p148. 
141. Ibid. p149. 
142. Oakeshott instances Tolstoy's Napoleon. Ibid. p149. 
143. Ibid. 
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144. Ibid 
145. Ibid: P150. 
146. Ibid. 
147. Ibid. 
148. Ibid. p165- 
149. Ibid. pl5l. 
150. Ibid. 
151. Ibid 
152. Ibid: p152. 
153. Ibid. 
154. Ibid. ppl52-3. 
155. Ibid. p153- 
156. Ibid. p154- 
157. Ibid. p160- 
158. Ibid. 
159. Ibid 
160. Ibid: p164. 
161. Ibid. p144- 
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158. "The Historical Explanation of Actions" p7l. 
159. See, in particular, Mind. History and Dialectic op. 
cit. 
160. See Chapter 2. 
161. Dray PhilosoRhy of History p12. See also 
Perspectives p58: lWhat makes the citation of an 
individuals beliefs, aims, attitudes, etc... so 
intellectually satisfying is their enabling us to see 
his responses as somehow "appropriate". 
162. "The Historical Explanation of Actions" p69. 
163. Ibid. p70.. 
164. Ibid. p72. 
165 Ibid. p7l. 
166. Laws and EKplanations p138. 
167. PhilOsORhy o History p44. This in a reference to 
Collingwood. 
168. "The Historical Explanation of Actions" p86. 
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169. Perspectives pp47-66. 
170. Ibid. p48- 
171. Ibid. p53. 
172. Ibid. 
173. Ibid. p66. 
174. Ibid. p65. 
175. Mandelbaum The Proble of Historical Knowledge (Now 
York 1938). 
176. "The Historical Explanation of Actions... " p66. 
177. Laws and Explanations p164. 
178. "The Historical Explanation of Actions" p87. 
179. Ibid. p89. 
180. Perspectives p55. 
181. Ibid. 
182. See "Colligatory Concepts" op. cit. 
183. See Walsh's hesitant belief in the possibility of a 
'science of human nature' Introduction 1951 pG8. 
184. See, for example, H Butterfield "Moral Judgement in 
History" in Meyerhoff ed. The Philosophy of Histoj: y 
in Our Time (New York 1959). 
185. Philosophy of History p471 55. 
186. See Dray on Beard in Perspectives op. cit. 
187. Donagan "Historical Explanation... " op. cit. p24. 
188. Perspectives ppl6-19. 
189. Ibid. p18. 
190. See his essay on Oakeshott "Michael Oakeshott's 
Theory of History" op. cit. 
191. See Walsh "The Practical and Historical Past" op. 
cit. 
192. "The Historical Explanation of Actions" p89. 
iii) Narrative as EXplanation 
193. Mink "The Autonomy of Historical Understanding" p182. 
194. Danto Analytical Philosophy of HistM op. cit., 
Gallie Philosophv and Historical Understanding 
(1964),, "The Historical Understanding" History and 
Theory 111 (1964), M White Foundations of Historical 
1(nowledge (New York 1965), "Historical Explanation" 
in Gardiner ed. Theories of History, "The Logic of 
Historical Narration" in Sidney Hook ad. PhilosojW 
and Histoz: y (New York 1963). See also AR Louch 
"History as Narrative" History and Theory (XIV 1985). 
195. Dray "Mandelbaum on Historical Narrative: A 
discussion" History and Theory VIII (1969), "On the 
Nature and Role of Narrative in Historiography" 
History and Theory X (1971), Mink "The Autonomy of 
Historical Understanding 10 , "History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension" Now LiterazX Histo I 
(1976), Walsh see section II of this chapter. 
196. Elton The Practice of History op. cit, JH Hexler 
"The Rhetoric of History" History and Th22jy VI 
(1967). 
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197. M Mandelbaum "A Note on History as Narrative" Histo 
and Thgoa VI (1967),, see also "Causal Analysis in 
History" Journal of the History of Ideas 111 (1942) 
and The Autonomy of Historical Knowledge (Now York 
1977). 
198. Mink "History and Fiction" op. cit.,, Hayden White 
Metahistory - The H storical Imagination in 19th 
Century Europe (1973), "The Historical Text as 
Literary Artifact" in RH Canary and H Kozicki ed. 
The Writing of Histolar: Literary Form and Historigal 
Understanding (1978), see Bibliography for Foucault. 
199. See section III of this chapter. 
200. Dray Philosophy of Histo p44. See also Lawil and 
Explanations p113: I ... to give and def end a causal 
explanation in history is scarcely ever to bring what 
is explained under a law, and almost always involves 
a descriptive account,, a narrative,, of the actual 
course of events, in order to justify the judgement 
that the condition indicated was indeed a cause,. 
201. Popper The Poverty of Historicism ppl49-152. 
202. op. cit. 
203. Op. cit. 
204. R Ely "Mandelbaum on Historical Narrative: A 
Discussion" History and Theory VIII (1969). 
205. R Gruner "Mandelbaum on Historical Narrative: A 
Discussion" History and Theory VIII (1969). 
206. On History p67. 
207. "The Autonomy of Historical Understanding" pl8l. 
208. Ibid. ppl72-3. 
209. See Chapter III> 
210. Ely op. cit. p276. 
211. On History p86. 
212. It should be remembered that White himself was an 
advocate of a limited version of the convering law 
theory. A concern with the peculiarities of 
narrative entails no particular ideological/ 
epistemological commitments. 
213. Hexter op. cit. pli. 
214. Ibid. 
215. Mink means much the same thing when he argues that in 
interpretative hypotheses can serve as guides to 
understanding "The Autonomy... " ppl75-6. 
216. IH pp231-49, Walsh Introduction p67- 
217. "The Historical Understanding" P168. 
218. Foundations of Historical Knowledge p4. See also p3. 
219. Danto op. cit. p142. See p137. 
220. "A Note on History as Narrative" pp417-18. 
221. Gruner op. cit. p284. 
222. Dray "On the Nature and Role of Narrative... " p293, 
questions which I ... are clearly story generating'. 223. Danto op. cit. pp63-87. 
224. Ibid. p134. 
225. Ibid. ppll6-142. This criticism also encompasses 
Walsh's approval of Croce's distinction between 
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'plain' and a 'significant' narrative of the past. 
The only 'only relates what happened' while the other 
'also tries to show why it happened'. "The 
Intelligibility of History" op. cit. p128. 
226. Ibid. p99. 
227. Historical Knowing op. cit. p149: ... it cannot be 
reasonable that the essential nature of the 
discipline is defined by the literary form in which 
results are conveyed rather than by the kind of 
enquiry it is... focus on narrative ignores the 
infrastructure of history, pays no attention to the 
epistemic peculiarities'. 
228. A colleague pointed out to me that the historiography 
of Nazi Germany conforms particularly well to this 
sense of ordering. Not merely the assessment of 
important antecedent events, but also of direction, 
purpose and responsibility enter into shaping of this 
particular past. See I Kershaw The Nazi DictatorshiR 
Problems and PersRectives of Interpretation (Edward 
Arnold 2nd ed. 1989). See Chapter 1 with its 
assessment of the shifting conclusions of Nazi 
historiography. One of Kershaw's "medieval" articles 
- "The Great Famine and Agrarian Crisis in England 
1315-132211 in Past and Present (May 1973) - also 
illustrates how the historical past alters under 
different perspectives - in this case the elevation 
of an event - the agrarian crisis of 1315-22 - to importance for our understanding of the catastrophic 
impact of the Plague. The contours of 14th century 
British history alter considerably, and the tragedy 
of the plague becomes one of sophoclean anticipation 
rather than unheralded disaster. 
229. See "Historical Explanation" op. cit. 
230. The Practice of History p138. 
231. "Mandelbaum on Historical Narrative" p291. 
232. "The Historical Understanding" p196. 
233. Ibid. p186. 
234. See Dray "Mandelbaum on Historical Narrative" pp292- 
4, and Mandelbaum "A Note on History as Narrative" 
p414. 
235. "The Autonomy... " pplao-i 'Articulated an separate 
statements in a grand finals, they are not 
conclusions, but reminders ... of the topography of the 
events to which the entire narrative has given 
order'. 
Chapter 5 Historical Truth 
1. "Is Speculative Philosophy of History Possible? " in 
Dray and Porapa ad. Substance and Form in History 
p111-2. 
2. Historical Knowing p149. 
3. Gardiner ad. The Philosophy of History p3. 
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4. See, Dray Philosophy of History, Walsh Introduction, 
Atkinson op. cit. 
5. The others include, Mink, Goldstein, Kunz and to a 
certain extent Hayden White. See section III of this 
chapter. 
6. Op. cit. 
7. Atkinson writes, pp52-3, that it is, in effect,, a 
non-problem. 
a. Ibid. 
9. See Mink "The Autonomy of Historical Understandinq" 
p179ff. 
10. Any historiographical division between the relative 
importance of low and high politics; economy, society 
or influential individuals; structuralist/ 
functionalist analysis; the long-view of the 
microscopic local-history, supports this contention. 
11. Walsh, Dray, Mink, Fain, Munz, Goldstein amongst 
them. 
12. See section III in this chapter. 
13. Ibid. 
i) Historical Truth: An Idealist PersRective 
14. Introduction p94- 
15. Atkinson op. cit. pp52-3. See also Elton The 
Practice of History pVII: I ... a philosophic concern 
with such problems as the reality of historical 
knowledge or the nature of historical thought hinders 
the practice of history'. 
16. This translation lies at the heart of Meiland's book, 
op. cit. 
17. The 'absolute' finds its classic expression in 
British philosophy in FH Bradley's ARDearance and 
Reality (Oxford 1930). 
18. At this point I feel forced to use the word historism 
to refer to the 'sociological dependence of our 
opinions' (Popper The Open Society Vol. 2 (Now York 
1963) p208, and also to the idea of radical 
contextualisation. Popper has aggrandised the term 
'historicism' for his own purposes in The Poverty of 
Historicis .P Skagestaad (Making Sense of History Oslo 1975, p36) has pointed out that the word 
historism was earlier employed by Mandelbaux an an 
English equivalent for historismus. one further 
reason for a distinction is given by Croce's use of 
historicism to refer to the 'science of history'. 
See also Mandelbaum History. Man and Reason: A Study 
in Nineteenth Century Thought (Baltimore 1971) pp4l- 
138,369-70. He defines historicism as *the 
widespread belief that a thing can be properly 
understood only if one views it in terms of the place 
that it occupies in some larger process of 
development'. 
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19. It should be emphasised that by faith I do not mean a 
belief in the possibility of knowledge of a rJAJ 
past. It is a faith in the kind of relative, 
discursive and unstable intelligibility of an 
historical construction. For Oakeshott this 
knowledge is best represented as a 'conversation' 
amongst practitioners, for Collingwood something 
altogether more ethically important. 
20. Munz The Shape of Time (Middletown 1977): 'The 
narrower theory [of idealism] concerns one particular 
aspect OT the problem of time. As time passes, 
myriads of things happen and change. Not even the 
most confirmed realist would claim that it is 
possible for the human mind to encompass more than a 
minute fraction of these events. Therefore, if the 
notion of history has any meaning at all, it must be 
a meaning dependent on the mind's capacity to select 
and link the selections' p20. 
21. Introduction p77: Walsh adds this caveat: 'The 
coherence theory can be substantially correct even if 
it cannot be used to support a monistic metaphysical 
(p78f). 
22. See Walsh ibid. p77: "A f act ... is n2t something 
which exists whether or not anybody takes any notice 
of it, it is rather the conclusion of a process of 
thinkingi (my italics). 
23. A hostility which Mink notices in "The Autonomy of 
Historical Knowledge". Referring to May Brodbeck's 
"Explanation, Prediction and 'Imperfect Knowledge'" 
op. cit. he writes: I ... the underlying issue remains the antagonistic confrontation of the scientific cult 
and the humanistic cult' p164. 
24. M Murphey uses a comparison with quantum physics in a 
rather different way: 'George Washington enjoys at 
present the epistemological status of an electron - 
each is ... entirely postulated for the purpose of 
giving coherence to our present experience, and each 
is unobservable by us# Our Knowledge of the 
Historical Past (New York 1973) p16. 
25. See section III of this chapter. 
26. Goldstein makes this point effectively in Historical 
KnowiM, see pXIX, and also in "History and the 
Primacy af Knowing" Histoz3r and Theory XVI (1977). 
27. The Shape of Time op. cit. 
28. Walsh suggests in a curious conclusion to an article 
discussing Goldstein's Historical Knowin , that we might have to reserve 'objective knowledge' of the 
past for the 'ideal judgement' so that 'historianis 
produce no more than a series of more or less well- 
supported beliefs' ("Truth and Fact in History 
Reconsidered" History and Theory XVI p68). 'The past 
as constituted in historical thought' will, he 
continues. be only a 'presumption'. Given the 
incisiveness of his preceding comments on Goldstein's 
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constructionist approach it is difficult to know what 
to make of this 'ideal judgement'. How exactly is it 
attained? How can be know ourselves to have attained 
it? Munz puts forward an altogether more persuasive 
distinction of the past as it actually happened and 
the past as it really occurs in historical thought. 
See section III. 
29. On History pll. 
30. The idea that the historical mode of experience is a 
partial and unsatisfactory attempt to see or 
comprehend the totality of experience is explored in 
F, 
-M-; philosophy - 
experience without presupposition - 
judges the historical mode to be an arrest in 
experience. By On Histo the Absolute of 
Oakeshott's idealism (the monistic metaphysical 
commitment to the oneness of all experience) now 
receded and we are in a world of competing and 
contradictory discourses. Discourse intervenes 
between subject and object in knowledge, and the 
insularity of an historical past becomes dependent 
upon a particular logic of comprehension. 
31. See Chapter 4 section III. 
32. "The Autonomy" p184f. 
33. Danto op. cit. pil. 
34. Munz, op. cit. p296,, points out that an absence of 
contingency is due to the kind of intelligible 
connections which constitute an historical narrative 
The very fact that a narrative is a 'configuration; 
of events implies that it seeks to eliminate 
contingencies from its organisation: ... in a 
properly intelligible narrative there is next to no 
contingency. This is not the same as saying that 
there is not contingency in res gestAt'. It is one 
of Oakeshott's difficulties that he overlooks this 
distinction. He is concerned to deny that the past 
has any given shape or form from which the historical 
past might copy, but in denying any substantive 
existence to past events he does not need to deny 
that an historical past may have its own logic and 
necessity, it's own way of giving shape and form. A 
residual belief that our present search to eliminate 
contingencies actually falsifies and distorts the 
reality of what happened in the past lies behind the 
past-for-the-past's sake approach. Yet Oakeshott 
exposed the idea of an objective reality (lot alone a 
past reality) independent of thought and judgement. 
He is caught on the horns of an intractable dilemma: 
a dead, gone and irretrievable past on one hand, and 
on the other an historical approach which must, 
though part of our present experience and our 
attempts to make sense of our world, be severed from 
all the interests, values, and criteria of 
intelligibility of the practical present. 
35. See Section III. 
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II Relativism and the StandROint of the Enquirer 
36. Munz op. cit. p184. 
37. See, e. g. Charles Beard's "That Noble Dream" American 
HIstorical Review 41, (1935) reprinted in Fritz 
Stern's The Varieties of History (London 1956) pp314- 
28 and "Written history as an Act of Faith" American 
Historical Review 39, (1934) reprinted in Meyerhoff 
ed. op. cit. pp140-51. 
38. All references to Mandelbaum in this section (unless 
otherwise stated) are to his essay 'Subjective, 
objective, and Conceptual Relativism', The Monist 62, 
pp403-28. 'Subjective relativism... (an) assertion is 
true (or false) for him or her' p403. 
39. Ibid. p405. 
40. See below. 
41. See Section II chapter I. 
42. History as the Story of Liberty (London 1941). 
43. Carl Becker "Everyman his own Historian" America 
Historical Revie 1933. This was Becker's 
presidential address to the American Historical 
Association in the previous year. 
44. Ibid. pp252-3. 
45. Ibid. pp242-6. 
46. Ibid. p253. 
47. Ibid. 
48.1 owe this point to a discussion of Becker's changed 
position by Hexter in his On Historians (London 1979) 
pl3ff. 
49. His new position is expresed in the essay "some 
Generalities that still Glitter" in New Liberties for 
Old (1941). 
50. Ibid. p4l. 
51. Beard "Written History as an Act of Faith" pl5l. 
EH Carr makes a similar demand of historians in his 
call to see 'progress' in history. See the f inal 
chapter of What is History? (Macmillan 1961). 
52. Dray "Charles Beard and the Season for the Past as it 
Actually Was" Persr)ectives pp27-46. 
53. Ibid. p40. 
54. Ibid. p29. 
55. Ibid. pp27-8. 
56. Ibid. p29. This assumption has been criticised by 
Danto op. cit. p94ff. Atkinson op. cit. makes a 
similar point against scepticism p42ff. 
57. Danto op. cit. p96. 
58. Ibid. p95. 
59. Atkinson op. cit. p82. 
60. R Aaron "Relativism in History" in Meyerhof f ed. TJ1q 
Philosphy of History in our Time op. cit. p153. 61. See the second chapter of Historical Knowing. 
62. op. cit. 
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63. See also Beard's attempted distinction between 
history as 'knowledge' and history as 'thought' (see 
Dray Pers'pectives p30). History as knowledge is our 
grasp of particular facts, something concrete. 
History as thought refers to the 'larger syntheses' 
of historians. 
64. Mink "History and Fiction... " op. cit. pp545-6. 
65. Perspectives p4l. Dray's example is 'the price of 
cotton in Alabama in the 1850s'. His point is to 
expose the inadequacy of Beard's faith in the 
, objectivity, of the historian's knowledge of 
particular facts as opposed to subjective 
interpretations. The price of cotton means 
absolutely nothing devoid of the context or network 
in which we know it. What is important is how it is 
taken, used or lemplotted' in a narrative: its 
alotted place in a history of slavery or the civil 
war. Is it to be taken as indicative of economic 
problems, of the monopoly power of southern growers; 
or is it to be seen in terms of the psychological 
impact it made upon national and international 
politics; or again is it to be taken as illustrative 
of the cost-efficiency of slave labour? Historical 
facts are not detachable and historical understanding 
is not directed at compiling lists of figures. 
66. See the next section of this chapter. 
67. See Munz's discussion of the "Fischer controversy" in 
an understanding of the causes of the First World War 
p282ff and Dray's discussion of the AJP Taylor 
Trevor Roper argument over the origins of the Second 
World War, Perspectives pp69-96. 
68. Danto op. cit. P108. Atkinson argues that: 
'Alternative interpretations will often be compatible 
with the same data' op. cit. PSO. 
69. Op. cit. p404. 
70. Atkinson calls perspectivism 'objectivity' relative 
to a point of view op. cit. p8l. 
71. The Poverty of Historicis ppl47-52. Popper had 
given earlier expression to this idea in The ORen 
Society chpt. 25. 
72. The Poverty of Historicis p150. 
73. Ibid. 
74. Ibid. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Introduction p114. 
77. Atkinson op. cit. p84. 
78. M White Foundations of Historical Knowledge p10. 
79. Perspectives p34. 
80. Ibid. p37. 
81. Ibid. 
82. Ibid. p33. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Op. cit. 
85. Danto op. cit. p33. 
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86. Walsh Introduction p98 0 87. Dray PhilosohDv f. History p28. See also 
Perspectives p46: I ... values are constitutive of the facts the historian is concerned to report. That is, 
the latter are such that "in their very nature" they 
involve "ethical and aesthetic considerations"'. 
88. E Nagel "The Logic of Historical Analysis" in 
Meyerhof f ed. The PhilosoRhv of History in our Time 
p213. Quoted by Dray PhilOsORhv of History p22. 
89. Op. cit. p404. Mandelbaum has in mind the 'later 
Wittgenstein, Whorf, and TS Kuhn. In the case of 
the latter Mandelbaum seems to overstate his case. 
Kuhn's paradigms do not, as Focault's evistemes do, 
exist in complete isolation from each other. The 
mechanics of a revolution (the displacement of one 
scientific paradigm by another) are clearly grounded 
in time and place. Despite his lucid analysis of 
Kuhn's gestalt psychology, Mandelbaum wants to 
convict Kuhn's theory of anti-rationalism, which I 
cannot how it is unless the attempt to clarify how 
knowledge is arrived at within a determinate context 
is judged sceptical. 
90. Ibid. p405. 
91. D Hollinger 'IT S Kuhn's Theory of Science and its 
Implications for History" American Historical Revie 
1973 p20. 
92. Ibid. p8. 
93. See, for example,, Kuhn The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions op. cit. p162. 
94. Op. cit. p1l. 
95. "The Presuppositions of Critical History" (1874). 
96. Danto op. cit. p106. 
97. op. cit. P109: an 'objective historical 
consciousness... [the] possibility of developing a 
point of view which would win universal acceptance'. 
See also p117. 
98. Introduction (1967) p68 footnote. 
99. Introduction (1951) p90. 
100. Ibid. p106. 
101. Ibid. p1l3ff. 
102. Danto op. cit. p97. He goes on to say, p100, that: 
'a) a theory may be correct or incorrect 
independently of what caused somebody to entertain 
it, b) as a general rule we determine whether a 
theory is correct by making observations, c) nothing 
is an observation apart from a theory of somesort'. 
103. Ibid. pp109-16. 
104. Introduction p117. 
105. "The Autonomy... 11 p168. 
106. Atkinson op. cit. p8o. He also makes the interesting 
point that the 'criteria of selection are firmly 
determined by the nature of the particular study 
among the sciences... in history they have to be 
imported for outside' p79. We might compare this 
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with Dray's contention to the contrary, that is, that 
the historian's subject-matter is, by its very 
nature, 'quasi-evaluative' Perspectives Chpt. 2. 
107. "The Autonomy" p168. 
108. Ibid. plSO. 
109. Philosophy of History p2S. 
110. Ibid. p26. This is a position which Mandelbaum in Ille 
Problem of Historical Knowledge (New York 1938) 
called 'the fountain-head of relativism', p20. 
111. Dray Perspectives pp44-5: The classification of an 
action as political or military, e. g. 'are the 
killings planned and executed by the PLO or IRA 
political acts or are they just organised murder? 
Are they simply acts of terrorism or acts of war... 
values are constitutive of the facts the historian is 
concerned to report'. 
112. PhilOsORhv of History p2S. 
113. Perspectives p46. 
114. Introduction p93. 
115. Munz op. cit. p221. 
116. Walsh "Truth and Fact in History Reconsidered" op. 
cit. p70. 
117. Kuhn op. cit. plO 
118. Ibid. pil. 
119. Ibid. p164. 
120. Ibid. p162,163. 
121. Ibid. p163. 
122. Ibid. p6. 
123. Hollinger op. cit. p4. 
124. Kuhn op. cit. p168. 
125. Hollinger op. cit. p23. In a passage which 
effectively challenges Mandelbaum's criticism of 
Kuhn's 'conceptual relativism', Hollinger writes 
that, the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
'clearly assumes that our ability to make judgements 
can survive the knowledge of how entangled those 
judgements are in our psychological matrix and that 
neither our reason nor our values are inappropriately 
threatened by a thoroughly historical perspective, 
p23. 
126. Danto op. cit. p97. 
127. Hollinger op. cit. p19. 
128. Munz op. cit. Munz discusses the debate surrounding 
F Fischer's Deutschlands Griff Nach der Weltmach 
(1962) p221ff, and also the Hill-Hexter argument, 
pp282-3. 
129. Hollinger op. cit. In full the passage reads: 'In so 
far as historians have produced a body of knowledge 
that "works" to the satisfaction of everyone who 
cares, it consists largely of the semiautonomous 
name-and-date "facts" that take up the pages of 
standard biographies, and that are only incidental to 
the questions historians try the hardest to answer'. 
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130. In the next section attention will be paid to certain 
descriptions of the break-down of the distinction 
between history res crestae and historia reru-m 
gestarum. Munz will be the centre of attention: 
Historians alone among all scientists still 
believe that the only reason why truth 
eludes them is that they show too much 
bias, or that their sources do, or that 
there are missing 'facts'. But this is all 
wrong. The real reason why it must forever 
elude us is that it is not there. There is 
nothing the case over and above what people 
have thought (i. e. the sources) and think 
(i. e. the narratives) , so that we can have 
no statement of which we can say that it is 
true if and only if what it asserts is the 
case. (p221). 
III Constructionism. Scepticism and the Truth of a 
Portrait 
131. Danto op. cit. pp94-5. See also Lewis Namier 
"History" reprinted in Stern ed. The Varieties gf 
History: 'The function of the historian is akin to 
that of the painter and not of the photographic 
camera... I p379. 
132. Meiland op. cit. equates 'the Construction Theory of 
History' (p3) with certain idealists, particularly 
Croce and Oakeshott (p7). 
133. His questionable thesis is that historical scepticism 
can be made to support the "theory" of 
constructionism. 
134. Historical Knowin op. cit. 
135. The Shapes of Time op. cit. 
136. Perspectives p28. 
137. See PH Nowell-Smith "The Constructionist Theory of 
Philsophy" History and Theory XVI (Beiheft 16), p3. 
Interestingly Nowell-Smith lumps Collingwood together 
with Goldstein as the two protagonist of this 
position. Meiland, op. cit. p7, argues the opposite 
- that Collingwood should be seen as an opponent of 
scepticism. See also Elazar Weinryb "Construction vs 
Discovery" Philosophy and --Phenomenological 
Research 
39, pp227-39. 
138. M Murphey Our Knowledge- of the Historical Past op. 
cit. p14. 
139. Atkinson-op. cit. p53. 
140. Ibid. Atkinson believes that its only originality is 
a semantic one and even then it is not an 
'improvement on the way we talk', p53. 
141. The Practice of History pVII. 
142. What Nowell-Smith characterises as the 'philosophical 
thesis' entwined with the constructionist 'account of 
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historical methodology' (p4). The philosophical 
thesis, so unacceptable to Nowell-Smith, is none 
other than idealism. Goldstein, stung into response 
by Nowell-Smith's criticisms, counters by writing: 
'Realism is a philosophy of the loss of nerve'. 
"History and the Primacy of Knowing" op. cit. p3l. 
143. See J Passmore "The Objectivity of History" reprinted 
in Gardiner ed. The Philosophy of History ppl45-60. 
144. See Meiland op. cit. ppll3-120: I ... historical knowledge is, by definition, knowledge about the past 
that is based on evidence, but nothing can serve as 
evidence about the past, since the required 
correlations cannot be established ... nothing can 
serve as evidence about the past'. p113. 
145. My sceptic here is Meiland. 
146. See Meiland ppl55-72. 
147. Goldstein "History and the Primacy of Knowing" p47. 
148. See Meiland ppl42-54 and "The Verification Argument" 
pp152-4. 
149. Atkinson op. cit. pp40-41. 
150. Ibid. p6. 
151. C Behan McCullagh Justifying Historical Descriptions 
(Cambridge 1984). 
152. Atkinson op. cit. p52. Atkinson feels strong that 
questioning historical knowledge challenges our 
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